Lockerbie - the real story?

This was written on Feb. 1, 2002 as Libyan Abdel Baset Megrahi's appeal was being heard.
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IT SEEMS unlikely that the world would ever know the real story behind the 1988 mid-air bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over the Scottish town of Lockerbie..
Several theories have been floating around about who was behind the blast, all of them with their own merits. These included suggestions that the bombing was Iranian revenge for the downing of an Iranian passenger airline in the Gulf by an American warship at the height of the Iran-Iraq war in the mid-80s; that it was the work of fearful Central Intelligence Agents (CIA) involved in illegal activities: that the blast was masterminded by anti-American elements who penetrated a CIA-endorsed
drug running operation; and that the target of the bombing was two Eastern European politicians.
A special court of Scottish judges is hearing the appeal of an alleged agent of Libyan intelligence sentenced to 20 years last year after he as convicted of planting the bomb that exploded in mid-air, killing all the 259 people on board and 11 people on the ground.
The general expectation was that the Libyan government would unveil "shocking" revelations of the mid-air blast during the appeal.
Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi had said that Libya had in its possession evidence that pointed the figure at the "real culprit" behind the bombing, which the US says was Libya's revenge for a 1985 US bombing of Libyan cities.
He asserted that when he produced the purported evidence, it would leave the trial judges with the choice of quitting their profession or committing suicide.
Two Libyans were indicted by the special court, which functions out of a former US military base, Camp Zeist, in the Netherlands, and the court acquitted one of them, Al Amin Khalia Fhima, but convicted and sentenced Abdel Baset Megrahi on circumstantial evidence.
The evidence was based on shreds of clothing that was used to wrap the radio cassette player which was rigged with the explosives that went off and brought down the Pan Am flight on its way from London to New York.
US and British forensic experts traced the clothing to a shop in the Mediterranean island of Malta and the shop's owner testified that Megrahi "could have been" the man who bought the clothes. Apart from that, there was no direct evidence linking Megrahi to the bombing.
Megrahi's appeal is based on an argument that the shopkeeper's testimony was not enough to convict him, and that the trial judges made several errors in arriving in their judgment found him guilty as charged.
During the trial, the defense had argued that the shopkeeper could not positively identify the purchaser as Megrahi and the description he provided fitted another man, Mohammed Abu Talb, a member of a Palestinian group which was mysteriously dropped as a suspect after investigations.
The defense is also seeking to introduce as evidence the testimony of a security guard at London's Heathrow airport that a high-security cargo bay was broken in shortly before the ill-fated plane took in cargo and flew off headed for New York. The guard's evidence emerged after the trial was over in January 2001. The implication is that whoever had carried out the break-in could have planted the bomb-rigged suitcase among other pieces of baggage to be loaded onto Flight 103.
If the appeals court accepts the guard's testimony as evidence, then it rips open the prosecution contention that Megrahi had planted the bomb-laden suitcase with a New York tag in the baggage ramp at Malta's Liqua airport. From Liqua, the suitcase went to Frankfurt and onto London and aboard the Pan Am plane without security checks, the prosecution contented.
No clear explanation has been given why it was not subject to security inspections, particularly that European and American intelligence circles had gotten wind that a bomb attack was being planned against an American airliner.
The trial was held in Camp Zeist after a decade of a tug-of-war between Libya and the US that ended in a compromise worked out in 2000 under which Qadhafi agreed to allow the two Libyans to be tried in "neutral" territory by Scottish judges under Scottish law. In return, the UN lifted sanctions against Libya.
Many assertions and unanswered questions were raised in the wake of the mid-air explosion.
The US has maintained that the bombing was in retaliation for a 1985 April US air attack on the Libyan cities of Benghazi and Tripoli, which killed up to five people, including the adopted daughter of Qadhafi.
That air raid, which fitted into a pattern of US-Libyan confrontations, was ordered by the then president Ronald Reagan to punish Libya for its alleged role in the bombing of a disco in Berlin frequented by US Marines.
But the alleged Libyan connection to the Pan Am bombing is only one of the many theories that were raised at the very outset of investigations into the crash. These theories varyingly pointed the accusing fingers at Iran, Syria, Libya, the Lebanese drug underworld, and even the CIA.
Every theory appeared to be as strong as any, and a widely-held argument in the Middle East was Libya is the scapegoat in the case and the notorious Israeli secret service, Mossad, helped fabricate the case against Tripoli.
Iran was conveniently removed as a potential suspect because taking on Tehran would have been too heavy for the US at that point. Washington was also seeking to pacify the Iranians after having extended support to Iraq during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.
Syria, which supported the US in the 1991 war that ended Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, was off the hook since Washington needed Damascus to enter the Middle East peace process launched in late 1991.
All other theories about the bombing would have dented what the US saw as an opportunity to have a stranglehold on Qadhafi's Libya, one of the most vociferous critics of US policy in Africa and the Middle East.
The Pan Am trial at Camp Zeist was attended by relatives of passengers, and some of them have stated that they were not at all convinced by the evidence presented against Megrahi.
Marina de Larracoechea, whose stewardess sister died in the crash, had formally demanded to know why the plane was only two-third full although it was peak Christmas time, and why some people apparently were warned not to travel on Flight 103.
The court found the submission "incompetent" and rejected it.
The defense strategy during the trial was based on laying out a well-built case where the accusing fingers pointed in several directions. The defense sought to prove that several other parties had as good motives and opportunity (supported by circumstantial evidence) as Libya to carry out the bombing.
But none of those arguments worked in favor of Megrahi.
The key piece of evidence was a tiny piece of a timer that allegedly helped detonate explosives in the suitcase aboard Pan Am Flight 103. The timer was rigged into a Toshiba cassette player and the fragment was found in part of the wreckage of the airliner in Lockerbie.
That timer, according to the prosecutor, was manufactured and supplied to Libya by a small electronics company called MEBO based in Zurich, Switzerland.
But a company official said that similar timers were supplied to several parties, including the Stasi secret service of former East Germany.
Major Owen Lewis, a former British army explosive expert and now an independent security consultant, said he could not fathom how the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reached the conclusion that the fragment came from the MEBO timers supplied to Libya because of some fundamental differences in the construction of the devices bought by Libya and those sold by MEBO to others.
Also challenged in court was the record of misguided conclusions and lack of scientific qualifications of an FBI operative who "established" the alleged link between the timer and Libya.
Edwin Bollier, head of MEBO, said that the fragment could have come from one of two timers he had sold to Stasi. He also reported the theft of blueprints for the timer from his office and affirms that whoever had those blueprints could have manufactured a similar timer.
The Stasi connection opened up another avenue.
A Syrian-based group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), which was among the first suspects named by US authorities in the case but dropped eventually despite other circumstantial evidence, did have close links with the Stasi and could have obtained the MEBO timer from the East Germans.
Also challenged was the testimony of a former Libyan intelligence that he had seen Megrahi and Fhima at Malta airport on the day of the explosion.
The testimony was challenged on grounds that he has a vested interest in lying because he was living under a witness protection program in the US and stood to be rewarded by up to $4 million from the US government.
Air Malta has categorically rejected the possibility of an unaccompanied baggage being aboard the concerned flight to Frankfurt and affirmed that all procedures were strictly followed and the suitcase was not aboard that flight.
Air Malta also said that if anyone had substituted the suitcase for one belonging to a passenger on the flight, the airline would have had a claim for a lost bag when the passengers reached Frankfurt. But no such claim was made and every one of the 39 passengers aboard the flight were individually interviewed and they confirmed that there was nothing amiss.
In essence, even in the hypothesis that there was an unaccounted piece of baggage at Frankfurt that was could have eventually found its way to the Pan Am flight, there was no concrete evidence that the baggage came from Air Malta - another major dent in the prosecution case.
During the trial the defense highlighted suspicions that the PFLP was behind the bombing and cited the repeated instances where the Syrian-based group's name cropped up during the investigations.
Initial reports citing US intelligence sources said the PFLP-GC could have carried out the bombing on behalf of Iran, which was seeking revenge for the shooting down of an Iranian plane with 290 passengers aboard by an American warship, USS Vinceness, in the Gulf at the height of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.
PFLP-GC leader Ahmed Jibril, a Syrian colonel, was named as having personally undertaken the alleged "contract" to bomb an American passenger plane in Europe several months before the Pan Am attack.
Reports spoke of warnings emanating from Finland and several other European countries, months before the Pan Am explosion, of an impending attack of similar nature.
Figuring high in the reports was a German police raid of a Frankfurt apartment where several men said to have been PFLP-GC members were staying. The raid yielded several weapons, and, most significantly, a Toshiba radio cassette player rigged with a bomb similar to the one that blasted Flight 103 over Lockerbie.
The Palestinians detained during the raid were freed shortly thereafter.
The presence in Malta of the PFLP—GC'S Abu Talb, who is now serving term in Sweden on unrelated charges, at the time of the purchase of the clothes used to wrap the Pan Am bomb and the shopkeeper's description of the buyer was seen as another strong nail in the prosecution's case.
If there was enough ground to warrant an investigation whether PFLP-GC — and by implication Syria and Iran — were involved in the blast, why did the US move away from that direction?
Explanations a theory that the US wanted to "neutralize" Iran in the crisis triggered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and "secure Syrian support" for the US-led coalition against Iraq. It meant excluding the two countries from the investigations.
Other theories raised in connection with the bombing involved a covert CIA operation involving drug lords in Lebanon whose help the US wanted in order to secure the release of American hostages in that country. This involved allowing drugs to allowed aboard US-bound airplanes without inspection — something the CIA could do with its connections in Europe, said one theory, which was partially supported by the findings of an investigation carried by a private agency hired by Pan Am.
According to the theory, the CIA believed the suspect suitcase contained drugs and allowed its passage through Frankfurt onto the Pan Am flight. Somewhere along the line, someone switched the suitcase with one containing the bomb. It could have been the PFLP-GC or another group with links to the drug lords and this group might have been seeking to eliminate the CIA station chief in Beirut, Charles McKee, who was aboard the same flight.
Closely linked to this theory is another which says that CIA agents knew that the suitcase contained explosives and that McKee was the target but they allowed the blast to take place since the CIA station chief was headed for home with a complaint against them that could have led not only to their dismissal from service but prosecution in the US.
"The inference was obvious - Pan Am 103 was sacrificed by the intelligence community to get rid of Major McKee," according to a detailed report carried by the British Guardian newspaper after extensive investigations.
A local farmer from Lockerbie had reported finding a suitcase containing cellophane packets containing white powder among the debris in his fields, but the suitcase was taken away and no explanation was given. It was also discovered that the name the farmer saw on the suitcase did not correspond with any of the names on the passenger list of the crashed plane.
It was expected that the "evidence" that Qadhafi claimed to possess would be unveiled during the appeal process and throw out the verdict.
But, if reports in the US press are accurate that the US and Libya are involved in secret negotiations on a deal that would see Tripoli owning up "complicity" of its agents in the bombing in return for an end to the US sanctions against Libya, then no such revelations could be expected in Camp Zeist.
According to the reports, the "deal "being negotiated by American and Libyan officials will lead to the lifting of US sanctions against Libya. Although the UN lifted its sanctions, the US is maintaining its own trade curbs on Libya.
If the "deal" is made, then at least four US oil companies could return to Libya and resume their operations and Libya would also be removed from a US list of countries supporting "terrorism."
That is too strategic a prize for Qadhafi to let go.

Analytical report based on hard news on March 15, 2002.


Legal experts are skeptical over the rejection of the appeal filed by the Libyan convicted of the 1988 bombing of an American airliner when seen in light of Scottish criminal procedures and framework of prosecution and defense.
On Thursday, a panel of five Scottish judges announced that they were upholding the conviction of Libyan Abdel Baset Megrahi at a special court set up in Camp Zeist in the Netherlands.
The panel ruled that the defense failed to establish grounds to question the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial court, which was also held at Camp Zeist under a compromise reached with Libya after a 10-year stand-off.
But legal experts are skeptical.
"Scottish law says that the defense has only to show that the crime could have been committed by another party, and this appears to have been done in this trial," said Albert Hickinson, a prominent Scottish criminal lawyer.
"The defense presented reasonable grounds to believe that someone who broke into the cargo bay at Heathrow could have planted the bomb-laded suitcase among the baggage to be loaded on Flight 102. This is enough reasonable ground to indicate that someone had the opportunity and circumstances to carry out the crime."
Under Scottish law, said Hickinson, it is enough for the defense to show grounds to believe that someone other than their client could have committed the crime.
"The defense does not have to prove the case," said Hickinson. "That is a prosecution responsibility."
The lawyer hastened to add that he was not "questioning" the competency of the panel of judges at Camp Zeist, but that "some questions remain unanswered and answers provided by the prosecution to some other questions were unsatisfactory."
Megrahi, 49, was convicted of causing the explosion aboard Pan Am Flight 103 above the Scottish town of Lockerbie by planting a suitcase rigged with explosives in a cargo bay at Malta that found it way to the ill-fated aircraft.
This suitcase, according to the prosecution, bore a forged Pan Am New York tag and was sent to Frankfurt and then to Heathrow where it was loaded onto Flight 103 in the evening of Dec. 22, 1988.
"There have been many ambiguities in the case from the very beginning, and they have not been cleared by the trial or at the appeal," said James Weatherby, another British lawyer.
Weatherby cited the "many suggestions and reports indicating other groups or government(s) had the motive to carry out the attack and could have been behind those who planted the bomb" as one of the reasons for skepticism.
"The prosecution swept off all that under the carpet and zeroed in on Libya," he said.
The "key" Libyan witness, a defected intelligence agent, was discredited in court because of questions over his motivation, noted Weatherby. "The questions are too many in the case and none has been answered satisfactorily."
"The witness who identified Megrahi as the person 'who could have bought' an umbrella and clothing from his shop (in Malta) has been found to have enjoyed Scottish police hospitality," which is against the law, noted Weatherby.
Megrahi, who was convicted and sentenced to life in prison in January 2001, filed an appeal, and Thursday's ruling rejected that appeal.
The appeal was based on the argument that the rigged suitcase could have been planted by those who broke into a Heathrow cargo bay.
The defense lawyers produced two witnesses, a security guard and his supervisor who were on duty at that time, who testified in court that there was a break-in at the cargo bay some 16 hours before the flight took off, that those who broken in had access to genuine Pan Am baggage tags and could have stashed the suitcase among the baggage lined up to be placed aboard Pan Am 103. The plane exploded en route from London to New York .
Megrahi's alleged accomplice, Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, also a Libyan, was cleared of all charges by the trial court in January 2001.
However, that ruling had the "clear inference" that Libya was behind the "conception, planning and execution" of the bombing.
The Libyan government and the Arab Lawyers Association have rejected Thursday' verdict as politically motivated.
Megrahi "was convicted for political reasons and ... will be considered a political captive according to international law and codes," said the Libyan government.
The verdict will mount pressure on Libya to pay compensation for the victims of the crash. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi's son has said that his country was willing to pay compensation if only for the sake of lifting completely the UN sanctions imposed on the country and ending its isolation.
A UN resolution demands not only that Libya pay compensation but also that it own up responsibility for the bombing, renounce terrorism and disclose all it knows of the crime, a demand that Libya is unlikely to accept.
The rejection of the appeal said The five-judge court ruled unanimously that the prosecution's circumstantial case against Megrahi was convincing, and the defense had failed to produce evidence to undermine the conviction.
"None of the grounds of appeal is well founded," it said.
Shortly after the verdict was announced, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw welcomed the ruling and called on Libya to take steps to pay compensation.
In Washington, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said the decision should prompt Libya to comply with the Security Council requirements.
Speculation has been rife that Washington and Tripoli had been in secret contacts aimed at facilitating the compensation payment in return for the US lifting the ban on American oil companies dealing with Libya and ending the diplomatic isolation of Libya.
US officials have acknowledged that Washington envoys had met with Libyan representatives in London in the presence of British officials, but rejected that this indicated a "rapprochement" between the West and Libya. They said the talks aimed at sorting out the procedures of compensation.
However, Libya has rejected demands for up to $4 billion in compensation presented by lawyers for the victims of the crash.
Qadhafi, who had described Megrahi a "hostage," has said any compensation deal would be conditional on payment of damages "to all victims of the United States." That would mean, among others, victims of an April 1985 US bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in which five people, including Qadhafi's adopted daughter, was killed.
Notwithstanding the diplomatic imperatives, the intensity to ward off questions related to the Lockerbie, including suggestions that someone or country or group other than Libya, "has left a sour taste....," said Hickinson, the Scottish lawyer.
"It is as if a process intended for public consumption was played out frontstage while thick curtains sealed off real drama for no one to see," he said.

World braced for terror

PV Vivekanand

WITH the military campaign in Afghanistan all but over, thousands of people around the world are living in terror anxiously awaiting the hammer to strike on them for no reason other than simply knowing some of the prisoners of war taken by the US in Afghanistan. Indeed many others might not even know of the sword swinging towards them.
The US has so far maintained a tight lid on the findings of its investigations with the thousands of Taliban and non-Afghan fighters of Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network.
Apart from gathering evidence about the Sept.11 attacks in New York and Washington, the US is seeking information on what it describes as "sleepers" of the Al Qaeda network who, according to Washington, are lying low in at least 50 countries from the Philippines to Canada awaiting word from each other to plan new attacks.
Intelligence sources say that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is building a "data base" of names and details of the "sleepers" drawing from information gained through interrogating the detainees held in Afghanistan and those moved to the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.
True that there here might be remnants of Al Qaeda in some countries, but it seems to be out of place for the US to assert that the group had built up such a large network of operatives. They say that the US assertion is providing ammunition for many governments to launch crackdowns that would otherwise be seen as violation of human rights. But that is a different issue altogether.
Information the "sleepers" is the prime objective of the US while dealing with the thousands of prisoners of war taken in Afghanistan. More often than not, simply knowing them could be dangerous for others, however innocent they might be. Many might even recollect knowing them but that is not going to be an issue for the CIA.
It is quite simple. Anyone who was an acquaintance of an Al Qaeda member is a suspect and risks detention and questioning wherever they are. That is what is happening today in some countries (Britain, Spain, Italy and Jordan are examples).
The CIA has not shared all the information it has with the partners of the US in the war against terrorism, and experts believe it would be selective in offering information and only when it is ready to do so.
The US cannot get to the alleged layers of "sleepers" without help from the local government, and information will be provided to them on a case-by-case, need-to-know basis, experts say.
Washington might also use the leeway of a law it adopted in the late 80s that allows it to try people accused of plotting or carrying out attacks against American citizens. An extension of that law permits US security and law enforcement agencies to even kidnap suspects for trial in the US.
There have been several instances since then where US agents lured suspected hijackers and kidnappers of American citizens into situations where they were kidnapped and ferried to the US to stand trial. They included a Lebanese national who was involved in the 1987 hijack of a Royal Jordanian airliner in which an American navy diver was killed. The suspect was lured to a luxury yacht in the Mediterranean by a woman agent and arrested as he boarded the vessel. He was flown to the US and given a life sentence after being found guilty by a US court.
Innocents could face ordeals if it was found that they have had the slightest brush with Al Qaeda members even if it was before the group was formed. That is the extent to which the CIA is willing to go in its campaign.
US intelligence documents drawn up since Sept. 11 identify dozens of cities and groups around the world as: "financing and banking centre," "militant training centre," "Islamist group with links to Al Qaeda," "Al Qaeda cell," and "Al Qaeda strategic planning centre." These include Mindano in the Philippines, Pakistani cities and towns including Peshawar, Khost, Islamabad and Karachi, Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sanaa and Aden in Yemen, Amman in Jordan, Nairobi in Kenya, Dar es Salam in Tanzania, Mogadishu in Somalia, Khartoum in Sudan, Algeria, Tripoli in Libya, Nicosia in Cyprus, Sofia in Bulgaria, Sarajevo in Bosnia, Milan in Italy, Hamburg n Germany, Madrid in Spain, Paris and London.
Interestingly, the list excludes India despite New Delhi's assertions that Al Qaeda operatives are living in hiding in the country. Iraq and Iran are also excluded from the list.
Included in the list are US cities like Portland, Boston, New York, Miami, Arlington (Texas), and Vancouver, Ottawa and Montreal in Canada.
Some of the governments have already been given some information on the presence on their soil of suspects, and some arrests have been made.
But the "big wave" of crackdown, either by the host government or by US agents has yet to come. And when it comes, it would be sweeping and all-embracing.

Waiting for the hammer

WITH the military campaign in Afghanistan all but
over, thousands of people around the world are living
in terror anxiously awaiting the hammer to strike on
them for no reason other than simply knowing some of
the prisoners of war taken by the US in Afghanistan.
Indeed many others might not even know of the sword
swinging towards them.
The US has so far maintained a tight lid on the
findings of its investigations with the thousands of
Taliban and non-Afghan fighters of Osama Bin Laden's
Al Qaeda network.
Apart from gathering evidence about the Sept.11
attacks in New York and Washington, the US is seeking
information on what it describes as "sleepers" of the
Al Qaeda network who, according to Washington, are
lying low in at least 50 countries from the
Philippines to Canada awaiting word from each other to
plan new attacks.
Intelligence sources say that the US Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) is building a "data base" of
names and details of the "sleepers" drawing from
information gained through interrogating the detainees
held in Afghanistan and those moved to the US naval
base in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.
True that there here might be remnants of Al Qaeda in
some countries, but it seems to be out of place for
the US to assert that the group had built up such a
large network of operatives. They say that the US
assertion is providing ammunition for many governments
to launch crackdowns that would otherwise be seen as
violation of human rights. But that is a different
issue altogether.
Information the "sleepers" is the prime objective of
the US while dealing with the thousands of prisoners
of war taken in Afghanistan. More often than not,
simply knowing them could be dangerous for others,
however innocent they might be. Many might even
recollect knowing them but that is not going to be an
issue for the CIA.
It is quite simple. Anyone who was an acquaintance of
an Al Qaeda member is a suspect and risks detention
and questioning wherever they are. That is what is
happening today in some countries (Britain, Spain,
Italy and Jordan are examples).
The CIA has not shared all the information it has with
the partners of the US in the war against terrorism,
and experts believe it would be selective in offering
information and only when it is ready to do so.
The US cannot get to the alleged layers of "sleepers"
without help from the local government, and
information will be provided to them on a
case-by-case, need-to-know basis, experts say.
Washington might also use the leeway of a law it
adopted in the late 80s that allows it to try people
accused of plotting or carrying out attacks against
American citizens. An extension of that law permits US
security and law enforcement agencies to even kidnap
suspects for trial in the US.
There have been several instances since then where US
agents lured suspected hijackers and kidnappers of
American citizens into situations where they were
kidnapped and ferried to the US to stand trial. They
included a Lebanese national who was involved in the
1987 hijack of a Royal Jordanian airliner in which an
American navy diver was killed. The suspect was lured
to a luxury yacht in the Mediterranean by a woman
agent and arrested as he boarded the vessel. He was
flown to the US and given a life sentence after being
found guilty by a US court.
Innocents could face ordeals if it was found that they
have had the slightest brush with Al Qaeda members
even if it was before the group was formed. That is
the extent to which the CIA is willing to go in its
campaign.
US intelligence documents drawn up since Sept. 11
identify dozens of cities and groups around the world
as: "financing and banking centre," "militant training
centre," "Islamist group with links to Al Qaeda," "Al
Qaeda cell," and "Al Qaeda strategic planning centre."
These include Mindanao in the Philippines, Pakistani
cities and towns including Peshawar, Khost, Islamabad
and Karachi, Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sanaa and
Aden in Yemen, Amman in Jordan, Nairobi in Kenya, Dar
es Salam in Tanzania, Mogadishu in Somalia, Khartoum
in Sudan, Algeria, Tripoli in Libya, Nicosia in
Cyprus, Sofia in Bulgaria, Sarajevo in Bosnia, Milan
in Italy, Hamburg n Germany, Madrid in Spain, Paris
and London.
Interestingly, the list excludes India despite New
Delhi's assertions that Al Qaeda operatives are living
in hiding in the country. Iraq and Iran are also
excluded from the list.
Included in the list are US cities like Portland,
Boston, New York, Miami, Arlington (Texas), and
Vancouver, Ottawa and Montreal in Canada.
Some of the governments have already been given some
information on the presence on their soil of suspects,
and some arrests have been made.
But the "big wave" of crackdown, either by the host
government or by US agents, has yet to come. And when
it comes, it would be sweeping and all-embracing.

Blood through Baghdad streets

PV Vivekanand

AS expected, the focus has shifted to Iraq in the US-led war against terrorism. US officials are visiting friendly countries trying to figure out how far Washington could go in military terms against Iraq. What seems to be overlooked or sidelined is that the US has little evidence to prove that Baghdad is involved in international terrorism or had any links with the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington. If anything, in the view of the Arabs at large, the Iraqi leadership is more preoccupied with coping with the effects of 11 years of crippling trade sanctions on its people than indulging in the kind of activities that Washington deems as international terrorism.
Of course, Baghdad's support for the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) is irking the US since that might pose a challenge for Israel in its efforts to beat the Palestinians into submission in the peace process. By extension, the US might even deem it fit to classify Iraq's support for the Palestinian struggle as terrorism since some of the Palestinian resistance groups are branded as terrorist organisations.
The international context to military action against Iraq is equally important.
Many European countries, mindful of the vast oil and gas wealth of Iraq, maintain a steady relationship with the Saddam regime and have too much at stake to allow their best-laid, post-sanctions plans to go awry or be silent witnesses against the possibility that the country goes under the US tutelage. Prominent among them are France, Germany and Russia, whose leaders have cautioned the US against taking the war against terrorism to Iraq.
It is obvious that the US approach to Iraq is now based on the "old/new" definition given by President George W Bush to "international terrorism," when he said a few weeks ago that as far as he was concerned any country which develops unconventional weapons of mass destruction.
Allegations that Iraq had been secretly developing weapons of mass destruction since late 1999 when UN inspectors were forced to leave the country are the best arguments put up by the US, but the world has seen no solid evidence to support those assertions either.
In any event, there is little doubt that the prime objective of any American-led military action in Iraq, if and when launched, would be elimination of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Or at least that is what is understood. But by launching military action against Iraq, the US would be unleashing something it might not be able to control, and Washington knows it better than anyone.
A close look at the situation on the ground in Iraq could be as accurate as it could be deceptive. Saddam's foes argue that the people of Iraq are fed up of the suffering over the past decade caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait that brought in the sweeping sanctions and that they would be the US's natural ally in any American action undertaken through dissident Iraqi factions in exile to topple Saddam.
At the same time, let us not overlook that over the past years Iraqis have also come to see the US as their natural enemy and the cause of all their suffering. They know that it would take a Herculean effort backed by unwavering commitment and determination to dislodge the Saddam regime from power. It would not be walkover like Afghanistan for the US, and there would be heavy American losses when the going gets to the ground inside Iraq, and Iraqis aware how fast US enthusiasm could wane in the event of American lives being lost in conflict.
Iraqis have witnessed the US encouraging them to revolt against Saddam after the 1991 war but stopping short of extending support at the most crucial moment for the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south. That US posture left the rebel movements not only high and dry but also allowed the Iraqi government to launch a massive crackdown and bloodshed against the dissidents
(Perhaps it was the sense of guilt that prompted the US to declare the so-called "no-zones" in the north to "protect" the Kurds and in the south to "defend" the Shiites).
Against that backdrop, it would be naive for the US to take for granted that a military action against Iraq would have the support of Iraqis from within the country. Such support, at best, will be limited.
In the hypothesis that the US did manage to secure the support of the people of Iraq in its drive to eliminate the Iraqi regime, what happens thereafter is anyone's guess. But one thing is clear: the US would not be able to get a grip on things in Iraq.
The reasons are clear.
In the event that the Saddam regime is toppled, it means the total elimination of a multi-layered system that has no existence without Saddam. The first layer is Saddam's family, then his cousins and relatives, then people from Tikhrit (Tikhritis), Saddam's hometown, and then "co-opted" Shiite and Kurds, most of whom are not necessarily backed by their communities. The final layer is the leadership of the Baathist Party.
The entire system, which has for long acquired the hatred of Iraqis who have suffered at its hands, will collapse like a house of cards the moment Saddam goes. Blood will flow through the streets of Baghdad.

US misadventure in the making

expected, the focus has shifted to Iraq in the
US-led war against terrorism. US officials are
visiting friendly countries trying to figure out how
far Washington could go in military terms against
Iraq. What seems to be overlooked or sidelined is that
the US has little evidence to prove that Baghdad is
involved in international terrorism or had any links
with the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington.
If anything, in the view of the Arabs at large, the
Iraqi leadership is more preoccupied with coping with
the effects of 11 years of crippling trade sanctions
on its people than indulging in the kind of activities
that Washington deems as international terrorism.
Of course, Baghdad's support for the Palestinian
uprising (Intifada) is irking the US since that might
pose a challenge for Israel in its efforts to beat the
Palestinians into submission in the peace process. By
extension, the US might even deem it fit to classify
Iraq's support for the Palestinian struggle as
terrorism since some of the Palestinian resistance
groups are branded as terrorist organisations.
The international context to military action against
Iraq is equally important.
Many European countries, mindful of the vast oil and
gas wealth of Iraq, maintain a steady relationship
with the Saddam regime and have too much at stake to
allow their best-laid, post-sanctions plans to go awry
or be silent witnesses against the possibility that
the country goes under the US tutelage. Prominent
among them are France, Germany and Russia, whose
leaders have cautioned the US against taking the war
against terrorism to Iraq.
It is obvious that the US approach to Iraq is now
based on the "old/new" definition given by President
George W Bush to "international terrorism," when he
said a few weeks ago that as far as he was concerned
any country which develops unconventional weapons of
mass destruction.
Allegations that Iraq had been secretly developing
weapons of mass destruction since late 1999 when UN
inspectors were forced to leave the country are the
best arguments put up by the US, but the world has
seen no solid evidence to support those assertions
either.
In any event, there is little doubt that the prime
objective of any American-led military action in Iraq,
if and when launched, would be elimination of Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein. Or at least that is what is
understood. But by launching military action against
Iraq, the US would be unleashing something it might
not be able to control, and Washington knows it better
than anyone.
A close look at the situation on the ground in Iraq
could be as accurate as it could be deceptive.
Saddam's foes argue that the people of Iraq are fed up
of the suffering over the past decade caused by Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait that brought in the sweeping
sanctions and that they would be the US's natural ally
in any American action undertaken through dissident
Iraqi factions in exile to topple Saddam.
At the same time, let us not overlook that over the
past years Iraqis have also come to see the US as
their natural enemy and the cause of all their
suffering. They know that it would take a Herculean
effort backed by unwavering commitment and
determination to dislodge the Saddam regime from
power. It would not be walkover like Afghanistan for
the US, and there would be heavy American losses when
the going gets to the ground inside Iraq, and Iraqis
aware how fast US enthusiasm could wane in the event
of American lives being lost in conflict.
Iraqis have witnessed the US encouraging them to
revolt against Saddam after the 1991 war but stopping
short of extending support at the most crucial moment
for the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the
south. That US posture left the rebel movements not
only high and dry but also allowed the Iraqi
government to launch a massive crackdown and bloodshed
against the dissidents
(Perhaps it was the sense of guilt that prompted the
US to declare the so-called "no-zones" in the north to
"protect" the Kurds and in the south to "defend" the
Shiites).
Against that backdrop, it would be naive for the US to
take for granted that a military action against Iraq
would have the support of Iraqis from within the
country. Such support, at best, will be limited.
In the hypothesis that the US did manage to secure the
support of the people of Iraq in its drive to
eliminate the Iraqi regime, what happens thereafter is
anyone's guess. But one thing is clear: the US would
not be able to get a grip on things in Iraq.
The reasons are clear.
In the event that the Saddam regime is toppled, it
means the total elimination of a multi-layered system
that has no existence without Saddam. The first layer
is Saddam's family, then his cousins and relatives,
then people from Tikhrit (Tikhritis), Saddam's
hometown, and then "co-opted" Shiite and Kurds, most
of whom are not necessarily backed by their
communities. The final layer is the leadership of the
Baathist Party.
The entire system, which has for long acquired the
hatred of Iraqis who have suffered at its hands, will
collapse like a house of cards the moment Saddam goes.
Blood will flow through the streets of Baghdad.
As that happens in the central part of the country,
the Kurds in the north, who have for long yearned for
statehood, would be busy setting up an independent
Kurdistan to represent the nearly 20 million Kurds who
live in the region. That prospect is anathema for
Turkey (as it is for Iran and Syria which have
sizeable Kurdish communities). But once the momentum
of destablisation of Baghdad picks up speed, there
would little political or military means at the US'
disposal to contain the Kurds.
In the south, Iran, which has for long sought control
of the holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala, would slice
across Iraq, effectively cutting off the
Shiite-dominated part of Iraq from the rest of the
country as the Kurds in the north and take over the
two holy sites. Given their history of oppression and
suffering under the Sunni-dominated Saddam regime, the
Iraqi Shiites in the south would be more than glad to
welcome their co-religionists.
That leaves the central region, including Baghdad,
where Shiites and Sunnis, friends of foes of the
regime, and the dozens of Iraqi opposition groups
would be fighting for each other's blood and for
spoils of war.
In the northwest, it is anyone's guess how Syria would
react to such a course of events unfolding in Iraq,
which, for many Syrians, is a strategic prize, in
view of the centuries-old ties across the border
despite the strain in political relations under
Saddam.
The Arab leaders of the region are fully aware of the
scenario and that is the main reason for their
argument against any US-led assault against Iraq under
the present conditions. They are apprehensive of the
spill-overs of what would be nothing short of a
full-fledged civil war among Iraqis and the prospect
of the country with the second largest proven reserves
of oil being divided.
An overwhelming majority of the 22 members of the Arab
League have warned the US against any military assault
against Iraq, before, during or after Washington's
Afghanistan campaign.
It is quite clear that it would require a long-term
collective effort launched by a majority of the dozens
of Iraqi opposition groups in exile (like the Northern
Alliance in Afghanistan) to maintain the unity and
territorial integrity of Iraq to prepare the people of
Iraq, whether Shiite or Sunni, and keep the situation
"contained" and suited for a smooth transition of
power while Saddam is "eliminated."
Then again, a "smooth transition" of power is simply
impossible in Iraq, given the violent history of that
country and deep-running conflicts among the country's
communities, tribes and clans.
It is Saddam's total and complete grip on power that
is keeping the country united, and no foreign
influence is going to be a substitute for his "iron
fist" and "scorched-earth" policy to keep his people
in check.
That is where the US faces its biggest challenge.
Since 1991, Washington has been trying in vain to
bring most of the prominent Iraqi opposition groups
under one umbrella. The result? Well, in December
2001, Washington suspended all financial aid to the
London-based Iraqi National Congress (INC), which has,
since 1989, claimed to be represent all Iraqi exiles.
The reason for the suspension was misuse of tens of
millions of dollars that the US had provided to the
group.
In real terms, the break between Washington and INC
represented the failure of a decade of intense US
efforts to produce a credible Iraqi opposition group
which could lead an anti-Saddam revolt.
At this juncture in time, it seems clear that the US
is unsure how to go about subduing Iraq. Quite simply,
the stakes are too high to be lost with a bungled
operation in Iraq not only for the US but also Europe
as well as the Arab World.

Year-ender 2001

IT WILL BE an understatement to assert that the world changed during the year 2001. If anything, the winds of change that swept the globe were unprecedented and brought about a new set of rules to life on the planet.
No one was spared the effects, direct and indirect, of the attacks on Sept. 11 when suicide hijackers took over four American airliners, slammed two of them into New York's landmark twin World Trade Center towers and one into the Pentagon in Washington; the fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania when passengers resisted the hijackers and fought with them in the cockpit.
The Sept. 11 events were the most devastating terrorist attack in history; more than 3,000 people died New York alone. Equally stunning was the fact that the United States, which had been spared terrorism — spare the Oklahoma boming of 1995.
How did the assaults change the world?
It would be a gross overstatement that a clash between religions is taking place now. But it is true that the orchestrated campaign by the Western media to smear Islam has been intensified in the wake of Sept. 11. The campaign has been going on for decades. It could be easily seen that the Western media were largely successful if only because of ineffective, misguided, misrepresented or half-hearted approaches to correct the image and portray the realities of the Islamic faith.
It would take many years before the true image of Islam takes hold in the West, again because of the negativism that has been bred by the media there. It needs a broad and well-planned strategy that takes in the realities on the ground to tackle the issue. Any campaign that sidesteps the Western public mindset would fall short of the mark.
That is the challenge that the Sept. 11 events pose to the Islamic World.
For sure, Arab-Muslim relations with the US would never be the same again.
Within the US, the attacks in New York and Washington have brought in a completely new dimension to the way the United States looked at the rest of the world. They prompted the administration of President George W. Bush to declare and wage a war on global terrorism, starting with Afghanistan's hardline Taliban regime, which refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden, whose Al Qaeda network was accused of carrying out the attacks.
With the large-scale military phase of the war against the Taliban over, the US is shifting focus to other countries it accuses of sponsoring terrorism.
In political terms, Sept. 11 was a wake-up for all governments regardless of whatever definition and outlook they had for terrorism. They had no choice but to adopt measures to counter any action that could be construed as terrorism under the parameters set by the US and fight whatever means were being used to finance terrorism.
There is no ambiguity over Bush's stand: He is determined to see this through and he has the kind of people around him to accomplish it, be it Defence Secretary Ronald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell or National Security Advisor Condaleeza Rice.
The equation is simple: Any country which does not fall in line with the US-led war on terrorism will have to pay the price. Bush made it so clear when he said, "either you are with us or against us."
The impact the US approach has on international relations is one of the most important changes heralded by Sept. 11. The US-led military campaign against Afghanistan (regardless of whether Osama Bin Laden was caught dead or alive) clearly sent a strong message to the world that the US position is uncompromising. There could no longer be any wavering on any country's stand on terrorism. Indeed a highly welcome development.
But the catch remains with Israel. As long as the US refuses to accept that Israel's brutal oppression of the Palestinians is not state terrorism, US credibility in leading the war against terrorism will remain weak.
Adding insult to injury to the Arab and Muslim worlds is the US labelling of Palestinian resistance organisations as terrorist.
For the moment and indeed for the foreseeable future, it is difficult to make any dent on the US stand. It is as simple as that. Any country trying to apply any pressure on Washington over this particular issue will incur US wrath and risk being labelled along the same lines as terrorism-sponsoring states.
The US is taking aim at Iraq as well as Somalia in its drive; at this point it is not known whether it intends to re-enact a military campaign similar to the one in Afghanistan in any other country.
Brought into focus by the US drive against international terrorism are the problems in the Indian sub-continent over Kashmir and the crisis in the Philippines.
But the Kashmir and Philippines problems do not have a direct bearing on American life, and as such the US approach could not be expected to be as strong as the case was with Afghanistan.
Another major fallout of the Sept. 11 events is the shift in the US approach to immigrants, legal or illegal.
Arabs and Muslims have come under hate attacks and they continue to live in fear. Life has undergone a major change for them in the US. In due course of time, neighbourhoods might tend to forget the negative aura that the Sept. 11 events created for Arabs and Muslims in the US, but the administration and powers that be would not.
Arabs and Muslims living in the US for decades now say that they feel like aliens or being treated like aliens with little regard for their blemishless record as law-abiding citizens of that country.
Many of those detained as "suspects" since Sept. 11 are Arabs or Muslims, and they face an uphill task to convince the authorities of their innocence. The approach of the authorities contradict the age-old system of justice -- innocent until proven guilty -- since it is now based on guity by association or thought until proven innocent.
Hundreds of Arab students have opted to leave the US and try to pursue their studies elsewhere, preferably in Europe.
Hundreds of thousands of aspiring immigrants are living in the US at various stages of legalising themselves as residents of the country. The rule of the thumb, if you will, until Sept. 11 was an assumption that even if you are an illegal resident of the US, you did not risk being caught until you commit a capital crime or be deliberately pinpointed as an illegal. There are "illegals" in the US trying to rectify their status for decades while making a living there and, for all practical purposes, having "Americanised themselves."
Today, that situation has changed. They are no longer safe with the belief that if they stay away from entangling with the law in the US.
There is a well-orchestrated campaign under way in the US to identify illegal residents and take appropriate action against them. For many, the administration's offer to help them legalise themselves if they provide information on "terrorism" might be an attractive proposition, but then that opens a Pandora's box.
For the nationals of the oil-producing Arab countries, obtaining a visa for the US was relatively easy. Today, they face a screening process.
The US is no longer a preferred destination for Arabs and Muslims. Even Europe is being shunned now.

The ultimate responsiblity

PV Vivekanand

SIX young Palestinians were laid to rest on Saturday, the latest victims of the crisis in Palestine. The bullets that killed them might have been fired by Palestinian policemen, but the ultimate responsibility for the deaths of the six rests with Israel. It was Israeli pressure on the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat that was behind the clashes between PNA policemen and Hamas activists that killed the six.
Indeed, Israel is responsibile for the killings of the more than the 1,000 who died in the Palestinian Intifada in the last 14 months as well as for the hundreds of thousands of others killed since 1948 when the Jewish state was created. It was Israel's expansionist designs that sparked the crisis in the Middle East and continue to do so today. Its refusal to accept the legitimate territorial and political rights of the Palestinian people and its brutal oppression of the Palestinians living under its occupation since 1967 have bred so much of frustration and fury that Israel would not be able contain despite its military might.
But the Palestinians are also willing to take another chance at peace.
Signs emerged on Saturday of a gradual shift in mood against armed resistance against the Israelis, with Islamic Jihad members deliberately staying away from carrying weapons at the funeral of the six in the Gaza Strip one day after Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, announced the suspension of suicide attacks against Israelis in Israel.
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon would not be a happy man at all. After all, things are going wrong for him.
Arafat's call for a halt to attacks against Israel and the implicit adherence to the call by Hamas and apparently by Islamic Jihad are slowly pulling the rug from under Sharon's argument against resuming peace negotiations. The hawkish former general known for his hatred for the Palestinians now finds himself cornered. And that is a dangerous situation since Sharon has a record of breaking out of corners with sheer military brutality. That definitely implies provoking the Palestinians into actions that he could call violations of the truce called by Arafat and apply more pressure and continue to defy international calls for a calm atmosphere conducive to peace.
We would have hoped that Washington recognised the seriousness that the Palestinians showed in taking up Arafat's call. They are fed up of strife and bloodshed, but that would not mean that they are willing to surrender their rights. They yearn for life in freedom and dignity but not on Israel's terms.
Washington's demand that Arafat make sure that the Palestinian resistance groups be dismantled completely so that they would not be able to resume armed resistance is meaningless with Israeli assurances guaranteed by the US that the basis for a peace agreement would be the legitimate Palestinian rights. It is not enough for the US to say that it has not abandoned its vision of a Palestinian state. It has to spell out clearly the shape of the state that it envisions. The Palestinians are not demanding the elimination of Israel; they have accepted the reality of Israel's existence. They are seeking the rights granted to them under international law and UN resolutions. But the US is stopping short of endorsing those rights by declaring that it is up to Israel and the Palestinians to negotiate peace.
Isn't it clear that the Palestinians are the weaker party in the negotiations under the current geopolitical realities of the region? But they have international legitimacy behind them and all they are demanding is the enforcement of that legitimacy in their land where they are unable to bring about a military solution. Nor would Israel be able to impose a military solution.
Instead of ensuring that international legitimacy is the foundation for peace, the US is imposing conditions on the Palestinians that would deprive them of their option to wage armed resistance to regain the legitimate rights from an occupier who has shown every sign of seeking impose own terms for "peace."
The inter-Palestinian clashes since Wednesday were most unfortunate. They were definitely not in the interests of Palestinian unity. The bright side that emerged on Saturday was the declaration by Islamic Jihad that it would not undertake anything that would undermine Palestinian unity. It shows a clear understanding of the Israeli game to pit Palestinians against each other in the name of "security" for Israelis. Thankfully, that understanding came before more Palestinian lives were lost.
But the Palestinian sacrifices would amount to nought if Israel does not recognise the immense effort and willpower that the Palestinians have to undertake to suspend armed resistance despite Israeli provocations. The Palestinian lives that were lost would have been lost for nothing if Israel continues to insist that Arafat is not doing enough to check armed resistance and demand more from the Palestinian National Authority. The West Bank and Gaza are staying on the brink of another explosion, and Israel would be playing with fire if it persisted on its intrasigence and arrogance.
Let Sharon not forget that it is much easier for Hamas and other groups to reverse the decision to suspend suicide attacks than maintaining it against provocations. And this time around, if Sharon does not move to change his mindset, then he could expect every Palestinian to be a walking human bomb ready to explode itself against Israeli targets until Sharon and company realises the futility of relying of military power as the answer to all of Israel's problems.

Palestinian Intifada - the key

PV Vivekanand

SOMETIME in September 1987, as the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) Executive Committee held another of its routine meetings in Tunisia, and, as usual, demanded international action to help the Palestinians regain their land and rights, a veteran political observer commented: "They (the Palestinian leadership) could shout and scream at the top of their voice, but any real change in the Middle East equation could come only when the people who live under the bitter reality of Israeli occupation rise up and resist the occupier and make the occupied land impossible to be ruled."
It was as if he was claivorant. Less than three months later, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza rose up and launched the Intifada, catching by surprise even the PLO leadership. What had started as scattered stone-throwing at Israeli soldiers, and indeed at every sign of Israeli occupation, turned out to be one of the most bitter resistance struggle ever waged without weapons.
The PLO leadership struggled to get the revolt organised, but was not until several months later that Khalil Al Wazir, who headed the military wing of the PLO, was able to assert with any conviction that the organisation had gained partial control of the uprising. By then it had to reckon with the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, and other groups such as Islamic Jihad which refused to line up under the PLO umbrella and waged their own revolt with little co-ordination with the PLO groups.
The Intifada led to Jordan renouncing its pre-1967 territorial claims to the West Bank in July 1988, and this cleared the way for the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the then parliament-in-exile of the Palestinian people, to meet in Algiers and adopt the declaration of independence on Nov. 15, 1988. In a way, that declaration was also an effort by the PLO leadership to let the world know that it was in control of the Palestinians.
Quite clearly, throughout the years the Israelis saw Arafat as the "moderate" among the Palestinian leaders.
Between the declaration of independence and January 1991, Israel systematically "eliminated" several PLO leaders — including Khalil Al Wazir (Abu Jihad) and Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) — who were seen as tougher than Arafat in the Israeli eyes. Perhaps that was its way of ensuring that Arafat could be singled out and pressured into accepting an Israeli deal as and when the time was right; and that is what happened in September 1993 with the signing of the Olso agreements.
But it was the Palestinian children who kept up their "revolution of stones" who pressured Israel into considering for the first time making even the Olso deal with the Palestinians. The Intifada let the Israelis know for the first time how it was like to be confronted by an unarmed people fighting for their rights with conviction and determination.
"Break their bones" — ordered the then Israeli army chief, Yitzhak Rabin in his allout effort to quell the Intifada.
Israeli soldiers killed more than 1,300 Palestinians, broke thousands of bones, and threw thousands in prison. But the Intifada continued.
The Israelis were alarmed. And the new element of non-violence was introduced into the Intifada by Palestinian American Mubarak Al Awad, who took a leaf from the Gandhian approach and called on the Palestinians to boycott Israeli goods and not to pay taxes. That approach was more terrifying to the Israelis; the captive Palestinian market represented nearly $2 billion in annual business for Israeli manufacturers (They could not wait to get rid of Awad on technical grounds, but it took them some time to do it).
As the Intifada hit its peak, forcing the the US administration of Geoge Bush Senior to search frantically for some way to contain the situation. Then came the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, throwing disarray into the Arab ranks.
By the time a US-led coalition evicted Iraq from Kuwait in February 1991, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat's support for Iraq in the crisis had dealt a major setback to himself and, by extension, to the Palestinians although the Bush administration had promised the Arab World that the US would take the lead in trying to resolve the Palestinian problem once the problem in the Gulf was over.
The elimination of Iraq as a potential Arab military power capable of challenging Israel set all the elements right for an effort for Arab-Israeli negotiatons, where Israel was only interested in finding an end to the Palestinian Intifada by engaging the Arabs in talks and gain legitimacy in the region while giving little in return.
The right-wing regime that ruled Israel went to the Middle East peace conference and a ceremonial launch of peace talksheld in Madrid in September under pressure from Washington.
But the talks got nowhere, but the intensity of the Intifada declined, as hopes remained high among the Palestinians for peace.
It was not until the Likud was ousted from power by Rabin's Labour that some movement was made on a realistic ground. Obviously, Rabin had learnt from his army days that without offering something substantial to the Palestinians, the Intifdada would not stop. Sure enough, the Intifada was suspended in September 1993, when the PLO and Israel signed the Oslo agreements, which were negotiated in secret by senior PLO and Labour Party officials.
But Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and several component factions of the PLO remained opposed to the Oslo agreements and vowed to wreck it since they saw the accords as a sell-out of the Palestinian cause.
Undaunted, Arafat made a triumphant entry to Gaza in July 1994 and set up the interim Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and went about consolidaring his authority while continuing negotiations on the "final status" of the Palestinian territories Israel occupied in the 1967 war.
Rabin was assassinated in 1995, when it appeared to Israeli righ-wingers that he was ready to give "too much" to the Palestinians, and the peace process went into disarray.
Arafat dealt with three Israeli prime ministers after Rabin — Shimon Peres of Labour and Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud) and Ehud Barak (Labour) — before ending up with his long-time foe Ariel Sharon in the saddle of power in Israel.
By then the damage to the peace process was already done by Israel's steady refusal to implement signed interim agreements and insistence that Arafat control Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other groups which opposed the Oslo process.
The five-year interim period for negotiations and a final peace accord expired in 1998, but the Palestinians held back, hoping for a breakthrough.
But all their hopes were shattered in the summer of 2000 when it became clear that Israel had no intention to respect the Palestinian rights to Arab East Jerusalem and the "right of return" of Palestinian refugees. Adding insult to injury was the truncated shape of the land that Barak, the then prime minister, was offering to return to them.
Sharon's defiant visit to Islam's third holiest shrine, Al Aqsa Mosque in Arab East Jerusalem, and his declaration that Israel would never give up the Holy City broke the proverbial last straw for the Palestinians; and the Intifada was relaunched.
Today, we see Israel unleashing its firepower against the Palestinians at will, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad staging suicide attacks. Arafat is caught in the middle.
Throughout the five decades since Arafat entered Palestinian resistance operations (he became chairman of the PLO in 1968), he has survived by sheer wits.
Indeed, the Al Khithyar (old man), as Arafat is called by many close to him, is the symbol of the Palestinian struggle. But he finds himself between a rock and a hard place.
On the one hand is his conviction that a peace accord could be worked out with the Israelis with international backing. On the other is the rejectionist camp led by groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad as well as some of the PLO component factions.
Obviously, Israel had hoped that it could use Arafat and the PNA to crack down on Palestinians who reject the Israeli version of peace and then pressure the Palestinian leadership into accepting its terms.
Now that it is abundantly clear that Israel could not hope to use Arafat as its policeman, Sharon is considering alternatives.
Arafat had been trying to strike a balance between the two, but has alienated his own people in the bargain. While he remains the symbol of the Palestinian struggle, his ability to muster the Palestinian ranks behind him has been put to question, if only by Israeli actions that have systematically eroded the Palestinian belief that he could strike a hard but successful bargain with Israel in favour of the Palestinian territorial and political rights.
But Israel will be risking a bloodbath in Palestine if it tries to "take out" Arafat with the hope that it would be easier to strike a deal with his successor.
But Arafat is finding the situation the biggest challenge in his life.
Wednesday's suicide blast, which killed at least eight Israelis, has shot tension to its heighest-ever peak in Palestine. The Israeli options are clear: Sharon could not be expected to see the situation with logic and reason and comprehend that the first step in containing such actions is a clear-cut declaration that he is willing to accept the Palestinian rights as the basis for peace. For him, accepting that would not only be politically unpardonable but also a "humiliating" compromise in his "tough posture" and rejection of "negotiations under fire."
But it only means one thing: Sharon is politically immatured to see realities as realities and lacks the pragmatism to accept the "peace of the brave."

Saddam & Bin Laden - oil and water

PV Vivekanand

IT has been made more or less clear that there had been no links between Iraq and Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network. It would have been actually surprising if there was any link, given that Bin Laden is a fierce critic of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein but a sympathiser with the suffering of the Iraqi people following the 1991 Gulf war over Kuwait.
Indeed, Baghdad had tried to woo Bin Laden, and even offered him asylum when US threats mounted against him following the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. But, according to Arab intelligence sources, Bin Laden turned down the offer.
Those who knew Bin Laden in Afghanistan in the 90s say that the Yemeni-origin Saudi dissident was highly critical of Saddam for one thing — for inviting American military intervention in the Gulf by invading Kuwait in August 1990.
"Saddam's biggest mistake, Bin Laden used to say, was his invasion of Kuwait without realising that the Americans were waiting for a back-door military entry to the Gulf region," said a Jordanian who knew Bin Laden in the mid-90s in Afghanistan. "The Iraqi move into Kuwait gave the Americans the pretext to come in militarily; look a the situation now'," the Jordanian quoted Bin Laden as saying in reference to the strong US military presence in the Gulf and Washington's post-1991 defence treaties with the countries in the region.
Bin Laden also saw Saddam as a "bad military strategist" and as having committed "a series of military blunders" in the seven-month run-up to the US-led war to liberate Kuwait. "Saddam had many options to avert the war or to make it very costly for the Americans in the event of a war, but he offered himself as a sitting duck until the Americans decided to strike at their convenience," Bin Laden was quoted as saying by the Jordanian.
"Bin Laden also refused to believe that Saddam was becoming a true Muslim when he went on a spree of building mosques and upholding Islamic principles such as banning alcohol in Iraq," he said. "He (Bin Laden) accurately assessed that these moves were politically motivated and efforts to send a message of Saddam's 'firm belief' in Islam to his own people and the Muslim world with a view to gaining Muslim support and sympathy," he added.
At the same time, Bin Laden sympathised with the people of Iraq whom he saw as a victim of the Saddam regime as much as of the US-enforced UN economic sanctions that have sent the Iraqis to absolute poverty despite the country's known oil reserves (11 per cent of the world's proven oil deposits).
"Bin Laden did not want to have anything to do with Saddam since he saw that aligning himself with the Iraqi president was contradictory to what he believed in, and often said that 'I want no share of his sins against his people'," said the Jordanian.
Shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks in the US, Washington said it had evidence to prove that Iraq had a link to the aerial assaults. It said Mohammed Atta, the suspected leader of the hijackers of the planes that were slammed into New York and Washington targets, had met with an Iraqi diplomat in the Prague in early 2001.
That purported meeting was the only "evidence" cited by the US in its effort to link Iraq with the attacks.
Baghdad has denied that such a meeting took place. Western as well as Arab intelligence sources believe that even if it was true that Atta had a one-time meeting with an Iraqi diplomat there was nothing since then to indicate continued contacts or any other evidence to show that there was an Iraqi role in the Sept. 11 events.
Britain said there was no evidence linking Iraq to the attacks. France and Germany have warned the US against expanding the war against terrorism beyond the borders of Afghanistan.
It is against this background that US President George W. Bush said on Monday that his definition of the war against international terrorism included countries which "develop weapons of mass destruction to terrorise" others and warned Saddam that "he'll find out" the consequences if he refused to allow UN inspectors to verify his country's weapons programme.
Predictably, Baghdad has scoffed at the demand and reiterated its stand that UN inspectors were welcome only after the crippling UN sanctions were lifted totally.
Arab leaders have warned that any US military action against Iraq — whether in name of fighting international terrorism or in the name of Saddam's non-existent weapons of mass destruction — would be destablising to the region, a warning that Bush could ill afford to ignore. But, it is not likely that the US president, whose agenda is dictated by his pro-Israeli advisers and strategists, would take note of the warning.

Israel sends clear message

By PV Vivekanand

THROUGH another "targeted killing" of three Palestinians, one of them a prominent Hamas activist in the West Bank, Israel has sent the message clear that it wants little to do with the new American diplomatic effort to revive peace talks with the Palestinians and is also determined to pre-empt any chance of its success. For, if Israel was genuine in its pronunciations of commitment to peace talks with the Palestinians, then it would not have carried out the assassination of Mahmoud Abu Hanoud and two others two days before US emissaries William Burns and Anthony Zinni were due in the region to push the effort for revived talks.
Israel knew well that the killings, coupled with the death of five Palestinian boys in the blast of an Israeli booby trap near their school in Gaza, would incite Palestinian fury and foil chances for an atmosphere conducive to the Burns-Zinni mission. And sure enough, the more than 60,000 Palestinians who gathered in the West Bank and Gaza on Sunday to mourn the slain activists made a public pledge to avenge the killings.
We can now expect, notwithstanding whatever security measures in place, Palestinian retaliation in the form of suicide attacks in key Israeli areas.
Let us not forget that Abu Hanoud was the reputed mastermind behind several suicide attacks in Israeli towns and cities. Unlike amateurish activists who get intercepted on their way to suicide missions or die in prematured attacks without causing major damage, Abu Hanoud's men have a record of successful operations, and now they have an added reason to step up their activities.
It is no exaggeration that there are thousands of Palestinian youngsters ready for suicide attacks against Israelis. The suffering, indignity and humiliation they have gone through since birth under Israeli occupation and bleak prospects for future, coupled with a sense of serving the cause, have prepared them to accept martyrdom.
There are many in the world who question the futility of suicide attacks. Well, the simple answer is: it is one of the few options available to the Palestinians to press their resistance, given the military might of Israel and hi-tech equipment the Israelis use in their vain bid to quell the Intifada. What else a people armed at best with machineguns and crude homemade mortars could do when faced with an army supported by the most advanced weapons and surveillance and "security" equipment?
The Geneva Conventions define it as a right ot a people under foreign occupation to resist the occupier with whatever means available to them; the Intifada — the revolution of stones — and suicide attacks represent the means that are available to the Palestinian people living under Israeli occupation of their territory. That is precisely why Israel refuses to accept that the Geneva Conventions apply to its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
If anything, to say the least, it is a highly lopsided equation in Palestine.
Effectively, the Israeli military, which controls the land, sea and airspace around the Palestinians, is picking and choosing its targets and hitting them at will with little fear of direct military retaliation or international punitive action.
If anything, the impunity with which Israel is going around implementing its policy of "targeted killings" adds to the determination of the Palestinians to retaliate through whatever means available to them.
The international community and the UN, the very organisation which was created with the aim of preventing any country from undertaking such actions, seem powerless to act. At best, the UN could issue statements condemning Israeli actions and often even such symbolic actions are pre-empted by the powers that call the shots at the world body.
The geopolitical elements of the Middle East at this point in time rule out a military option to reverse Israel's occupation of Arab land. The only way to hit Israel is to hit it where it hurts most: posing real threats to the "security" of Israelis.
The only effective means to keep the Israelis reminded of the reality of the Palestinian struggle is to keep them always on their toes and looking over their shoulders with the hope that sooner or later they could come to accept the inevitability of respect, recognition and acceptance of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.
Definitely, it is not a method that the so-called advanced world would accept as a means of liberation. But then what has the so-called advanced world done about containing Israel's state terrorism against defenceless Palestinian civilians?
By any stretch of imagination, is there any justification to the death of the five children in Gaza on Thursday? An accident? But then, placing booby-trapped bombs in close proximity to a school could not have been an accident. It was a deliberate trap and Israelis could not care less whom it killed as long as the victim or victims were Palestinian.
Isn't that a crime that warrants retaliation in the same currency?
It is audacity at its peak for Israel to assert that Friday's killings were part of its fight against "terrorism" while affirming its "commitment" to achieving a "truce" with the Palestinian National Authority (I would not call that "truce" a ceasefire, since "ceasefire," in my reading, means an agreement between two warring parties with roughly balanced military capabilities to call off their guns. Here, Israel is the sole warring party and the Palestinians are the victims who are desparately trying to defend themselves against a militarily mightier enemy).
The Abu Hanoud killing has effectively drawn a bitter dark cloud over prospects for any truce. It has further weakened Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's ability and manoeuvrability to convince his own people to stay put while he tries the diplomatic approach as represented by the Burns-Zinni mission.
Regardless of what Israeli leaders have to say, the situation on the ground has become radicalised by their own actions and turned the elements around so drastically against prospects for the UN mission.
No doubt that is what Israel wanted since behind the Burns-Zinni effort is the reality that there is a 180-degree shift in the decades-old American stand that ruled out the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in Palestine.
What better way to foil it than fait accomplis that would do nothing other than conditioning the Palestinians for retaliation that would play to the Israeli game of holding them responsible for the volatility of the situation and accusing them of being terrorists?

Taliban and opium!!!!

THE refurbished argument that the Taliban of
Afghanistan have gone "back" into producing opium
since the Sept. 11 attacks not only lacks logic and
sense, but also reflects a surprising lack of Western
understanding of the mindset of the rulers in power in
Kabul.
If anything, the US approach to the issue is
contradictory and murky. For one thing, many US
officials accuse the Taliban of growing drugs to
finance itself while the UN agency fighting narcotics
around the world has certified that the Taliban not
only ordered a total end of poppy production in the
country in early 2000 but also enforced it to the
letter.
At the same time, the US has no reluctance to deal
with the Taliban's foes, the Northern Alliance, which
the UN agency says survives on drugs produced outside
Taliban-controlled areas.
According to the January 2000 Taliban edict, issued
by none other than its spiritual leader Mullah Omar
Mohammed, growing, dealing, and using drugs is
"un-Islamic," and hence the ban.
The US, which is the hardest hit country by the menace
posed by narcotics, grudgingly admitted a few months
after the edict was issued that the Taliban were
indeed enforcing the ban, but the Northern Alliance
was continuing the trade.
Today, when the US suddenly found the Taliban as its
immediate enemy in its war against terrorism, open
occusations are levelled that the ruling Afghan
militia has resumed opium production and is posing an
additional threat to the international community in
addition to its support for terrorism.
Quite predictably, little is said about the proven
record of the Northern Ailliance in using narcotics as
one of its mainstay means of incomes and about the
newfound partnership the US has forged with the group
or groups that make up the opposition to the Taliban
in the country.
What is missing here is an American understanding that
the Taiban, despite all what the West sees as their
vagaries and support for terrorism, see themselves as
puritan sect based on the noblest of noble principles
and are committed to what they believe in. Of course,
what they see as noble might not be seen so by others.
But that does not have any bearing on the group's
strong belief in what it is doing.
As such, Mullah Omar's ban on opium production was not
just a bolt out of the blue, but a decision taken in
view of Islamic principles, and it is highly unlikely
that he would go back on that ban simply because it
suits him to hit back on the world community and earn
money in the bargain by resuming the drug trade. An
argument to the contrary reflects nothing but the
gaping hole in American understanding of the Taliban
in general.
Indeed, it is of course quite possible that the US and
its strategists have understood the reality but do not
want to acknowledge it because it would be against US
interests to even hint that the Taliban are living by
certain principles, flawed as they might be as they
appear to the West.
That is not to say that the way of life practised by
the Taliban is perfect or impure, conservative,
militant, hardline, moderate or liberal. That is for
religious scholars to decide. But it is important here
to understand the group's has an unflinching way of
thinking and would not deviate from that as a
political strategy.
What the US and the rest of the international
community fail to realise is that the way of life the
Taliban have chosen for themselves — right or wrong,
good or bad, fanatic or moderate — is not a strategy.
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the way of
life that the Taliban have adopted is as dear to the
movement as non-violence was the way of life for
Mahatma Gandhi.
Probably, the ongoing crisis might unravel itself if
the US were to understand this crucial truth and act
accordingly. Or is it too late?

Can Bush 'get' Bin Laden

Almost two weeks into the US-led military assault
against Afghanistan, the key question many people are
asking is: Will George Bush get Osama Bin Laden? Will
Bin Laden be caught alive? Or will he manage to slip
away?
Judging from whatever little has been disclosed by the
US of its military strategy, it is abundantly clear
that without deploying a sizeable ground force
supported by massive and close air cover, the US-led
coalition would not be able to do much in real terms.
And the risk of battle-hardened Taliban fighters
engaging the invaders in the rough terrains of the
Afghan mountains is pretty high.
It is often heard these days that Afghanistan has
always made things difficult for invaders, starting
with Alexander the Great to British forces at the peak
of the colonial days to the Red Army in the 80s. The
immediate counterpoint is also heard: None of those
invaders had the hi-tech military might to back them.
Put in simple terms, the US has the firepower to
demolish mountains in their entirety if they stood in
the way. That is a luxury that none of the previous
invaders had.
Indeed, with the raid carried out by Special Forces
near Kandahar on Saturday (as Friday night depending
on which part of the world you are in), the US has
launched the riskiest part — but also potentially
decisive stage — of its military action against
Afghanistan in the war against terrorism.
Breaking away from 12 days of aerial bombings and
missile attacks, the US sent over 100 Army Rangers —
highly trained soldiers from the Special Forces — for
the operation and pulled them out safely after they
accomplished whatever they went in for. Command
centres would have heaved a big sigh when it was
confirmed that the operation was over without any
American casualties.
The actual impact of the raid apart, the operation was
also important in symbolism: US President George W
Bush was tellng his allies and foes alike that he was
not bluffing when he said he was determined to see
through the war against terrorism and ready for the
risk it carries in terms of American casualties.
Seen against Bush's firm pledges and obvious
determination, it is foregone conclusion that he has
already ordered his commanders to do what it takes to
achieve the US objective: Get Bin Laden dead or alive.

Now we also hear that the action against Afghanistan
could stretch for months, even until April of May.
Politics of the equation apart (dwindling Arab, Muslim
and international support in the event of a protracted
conflict), the US seems confident of its ability to
sustain the action. However, it still does not
necessarily mean Bush would get Bin Laden.
Bush's ultimate glory would indeed be television
footage of a hand-cuffed and rejected looking Bin
Laden escorted into a US helicopter by US soldiers for
trial in the US. But it seems like his ultimate,
unrealisable dream too. For, those who have known Bin
Laden in Afghanistan swear on their soul that the
number one enemy of the US would not be taken alive.
They say that Bin Laden, who rejects suicide in line
with his Islamist beliefs, always keeps one guard
close to him with a loaded gun and strict
instructions: Shoot and kill me if capture becomes
inevitable.

Sharon targets Arafat

By PV Vivekanand

IF WE were to take Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon seriously, then the worst development in the Israeli-Palestinian equation is not the killing of Israeli minister Rehavam Zeevi but Sharon's assertion that the era of Yasser Arafat was over.
If anything, Sharon's declaration and dispatch of several ministers to convince Washington that Arafat was no longer a viable partner for peace reeks of Israel's well-known arrogance and contemptuous treatment of the Palestinians.
Equally sinister is Sharon's "warning" of an impending war: “Arafat has seven days to impose absolute quiet in the (occupied) territories. Ifnot, we will go to war against him. As far as I am concerned, the era ofArafat is over.”
One wonders how far Israel is willing to go in Sharon's war. If the hawkish former general's record is anything to go by, then it would mean Israeli soldiers armed to the teeth and supported by heavy tanks, bombers and helicopters entering Palestinian towns and villages to "eliminate" every trace of resistance. Quite simply a re-enactment of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and of course the massacre of thousands in Sabra and Shattila.
But the Israeli premier is riding on false hopes if he believes that a change of guard at the leadership would make any difference to the Palestinians' determination to gain their legitimate rights and not to be dissuaded from adopting whatever means they have at their disposal to achieve that goal.
The worst mistake Israel ever made in the Middle East peace process was taking the Palestinian people for granted and assuming that the decades of brutal occupation have co-opted them into accepting that they were not a match to Israel's military might and, as such, they should be thankful to whatever Israel was willing to offer them.
Israel coerced Arafat into accepting the 1993 Oslo agreement by partly intimidating him with a scenario of Palestinian Islamists (like Hamas and allied groups) gaining strength and popularity in the occupied territories at the expense of the nationalists represented by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).
Arafat was more than tempted to accept Oslo. He had found himself largely isolated in the Arab World as a result of the pro-Iraq position he had adopted during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. So, the Oslo agreements represented his political salvation, another element that Israel counted for itself in the bargain.
Since then, regardless of whoever was in power, Israel expected Arafat to act as its proxy policeman in the occupied territories by keeping the Palestinian people in check and containing armed resistance.
To a large extent, it worked for some time. A majority of the Palestinians were indeed tired and frustrated over what they saw as the impossibility of the situation and were jubiliant when the Oslo agreement was signed. They were willing to give peace a chance.
Many actually expected a total Israeli withdrawal from most of the land the Jewish state occupied in the 1967 war and Arab East Jerusalem be named the capital of an independent Palestinian state under some compromise arrangement even it meant giving up part of the Arab identity of the city. For them it was largely a matter of technicalities that needed to be addressed in the process.
However, problems started cropping up when Israel started showing its real colours, and soon it became clear that the Israeli scenario under the Oslo agreement would involve heavy territorial compromises and political limitations for the Palestinians. In the meantime, Israel sought to legitimise itself in the region through Arab recognition.
The signs of the Israeli approach manifested themselves from day one.
We recall distinctly Israel's refusal to hand over a map of the Palestinian territory showing the potential shape of a Palestinian entity as promised at the sighing in Cairo in June 1994 of the first "implementation" deal as the first phase of the Oslo accord.
Arafat refused to sign the agreement, and it took a lot of persuasion and promises by the US that no matter what the inalienable rights of the Palestinians would be respected in the "final status negotiations" before he signed the deal. After all, UN Security Council resolutions were the basis for a final agreement, he was assured.
Similar situations were re-enacted at every stage since then, and everytime it was the Palestinians who had to give up something.
The Israeli strategy was clear: It began negotiations on every phase of implementing the Oslo agreement by imposing tough demands, and the Palestinians put up resistance. Obviously the deadlock had to be broken and the mediator, the US, was brought in inevitably. The end result was simple: Agreements were reached, but they involved Palestinian compromises more than Israeli "concessions." If anything, on a scale of 1-10 (10 being the full realisation of Palestinian rights), Israel "maganimously" gave up 2 and the Palestinians surrendered 8. And when it came to actual implemenation, Israel fell short of its obligation to give up 2 and the Palestinians were asked to absorb that loss.
The Palestiniain experience was repeated at every stage of the negotiations.
The shifting political powers in Israel since 1996 had had their bearing on the negotiations, but not in real terms since the bipartisan Israeli objective was clear; the Palestinians have to remain under Israel's control in whatever form and shape, with limited political and territorial freedom. Furthermore, Israel always sought to retain the West Bank and Gaza as a captive market for its products (the annual Israeli "exports" to the Palestinian territories are around $2 billon).
The dreams of an independent Palestinian state with Arab East Jerusalem as its capital suffered a serious setback in the summer of 2000 when the then Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, made it clear that Israel had no intention ever to respect the Arab and Islamic identity of the Holy City by returning it to the Palestinians.
The three main elements that foiled a peace accord being worked out at Camp David in August last year were:
— Israel's refusal to respect the Palestinian rights to Arab East Jerusalem.
— Israel's rejection of the "right of return" of upto four million Palestinian refugees.
— Israel's insistence on keeping territorial control over large chunks of West Bank land that would have deprived the Palestinians of physical continuity that is vital for an independent state.
The deadlock at Camp David led to a sudden surge of Palestinian frustration, and Sharon's infamous visit to Al Aqsa in September as a declaration of Israel's determination not to give up Arab East Jerusalem broke the proverbial last straw for the Palestinians. The Intifada — the anti-occupation revolt that was part of the reason that prompted Israel to join the peace process in 1991 — was relaunched with increased intensity.
The writing went up on the wall when Sharon was elected prime minister early this year that the Palestinian hopes were dealt another serious blow, for his record of hatred for anything Arab was well known; so was his campaign to evict all the Palestinian across the River Jordan.
We have clearly seen what happened since Sharon's election. Israel stepped up the intensity of its military bruality against the Palestinians and the cycle of violence continued.
Today, international condemnation makes little difference to Israel when its sends its hi-tech fighter planes, helicopter gunships and tanks into war-like action against the residents of the West Bank and Gaza.
Israel wasted no opportunity to discredit Yasser Arafat in front of his own people. Israeli leaders have made no secret of their conviction that Arafat was expected to carry out Israel's wishes against his own people.
Zeevi's killing was the natural result of Israel's actions. There would be more to come. Neither Arafat nor any other Palestinian leader would be able to check the manifestations of their people's fury and frustration against occupation.
Sharon's argument that Arafat is no longer a credible counterpart to discuss peace stems only from the Palestinian leader's refusal to mow down his own people. Washington should know better than to conveniently accept Sharon's argument. The consequences would be unpredictable.

Iraq next target

PV Vivekanand

AMID TALK of Iraq being the next target in the US-led war against international terrorism, Washington is trapped between the need to consolidate its alliances in the effort by revealing more of its findings against Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network and fears that its intelligence sources would be compromised in the process.
The equation is quite clear: The military offensive against Afghanistan has brought out seething Arab and Muslim anger and frustration not only over the bombings against that country but also over the US insistence that it would not reveal the evidence it has against Bin Laden and Al Qaeda at this stage.
It is a dead certainty that the US would initiate military action against Iraq with the goal of ousting Saddam Hussein — on whatever pretexts — and installing an American-friendly regime in Baghdad.
The Arab sentiments would only be inflamed if the US were to maintain its insistence on secrecy and confidentiality of evidence in the Sept.11 case but go ahead with a military offensive against Iraq. That course of an event would lead to security and instability of some Arab governments which are half-hearted members of the US-led coalition against terrorism.
Equally enraging Arabs and Muslims is the pointed silence that Washington is maintaining over their demands that Israel, which has consistently defied UN resolutions and international legitimacy and is continuing brutal military assaults against the Palestinians, be treated as terrorist state.
While the logical course is to present the operative parts of the evidence for public consumption and satisfy the Arab and Muslim streets of the strength of its case, Washington might simply be unable to do so since it would compromise the sensitive intelligence sources that provided the clinching proof.
The main evidence against Bin Laden released to the public at this point is the money trail – cash transfers, credit cards and bank accounts that link some of the alleged hijackers in the Sept. 11 kamikaze attacks and known Bin Laden associates as well as common features in the assault against the New York and Washington landmarks and earlier attacks attributed to Al Qaeda.
Other elements of the US case link the suspected hijackers to the attacks themselves.
Washington has shared part of its findings with its European allies and Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two of its key Arab allies. But other partners in the coalition are demanding that they too be privvy to the evidence.
International experts and analysts say that a feud is raging between political strategists and intelligence agencies in Washington over how much information the US could afford to offer to its allies on a confidential basis and how much could be released for public consumption.
While the strategists argue that satisying the Arabs and Muslims at large is an integral part of strengthening their governments' support for the war against terrorism, intelligence agencies counter by pointing out that it would be too damaging for their investigations at this point.
Beyond that argument is the fear that the recipient governments would run the data through their intelligence networks and this would led to compromising the sources from where the US had gained the informaton.
The issue has assumed graver proportions with the US formally notifying the United Nations on Monday that it might target other countries in the war against terrorism and senior Bush administration officials mentioning Iraq as a potential target.
Given that there is only flimsy references to an alleged Iraqi role in the Sept. 11 attacks made available to the public at large, any assault on beleaguered Iraq would only inflame Arab and Muslim anger and frustration, and this could pose serious threats to the security and stabilty of their regimes.
Baghdad has vehemently denied suggestions that it had a role in the Sept.11 attacks based on reports of an alleged meeting between Mohammed Atta, a key suspect in the attacks, and an unidentitifed Iraqi diplomat somewhere in Europe sometime ago.
It has warned that the suggestions were a smokescreen for the US to settle political scores by destablising Iraq and indirectly topple the regime of Saddam Hussein — an objective the US failed to achieve in the 1991 Gulf war.