Sunday, June 27, 2004

Breme'rs 'fatwas' for Iraq

The US has bound the interim government of
Iraq in a series of mandatory restrictions in an
attempt to keep it as a puppet in American hands after
this week's transfer of sovereignty. Effectively,
these restrictions are nothing but legalised
colonialisation, critics say.
Nearly 150 Americans are installed in key positions in
various ministries and departments on five-year
contracts that could not be nullified by the interim
government. These officials have virtual veto power
over any decision taken by the concerned ministries
and departments. Their contracts could be anulled only
by a two-third majority of a to-be installed national
assembly of 100 Iraqis who would be named at a
national conference to be held in July.
In addition, Paul Bremer, the American overseer who
would leave office on Wednesday, has also named more
than 20 Iraqis to jobs that he describes as aimed at
checking corruption and ensuring transparency of
governance. In essence, these Iraqis are seen as
American stooges whose job is to impose and promote
the American concept of governance that hardly match
the realities on the ground in Iraq and the
peculiarities of a Middle Eastern Arab Muslim society.
Bremer has signed nearly 100 decrees — which his
critics have nicknameded "fatwas" (edicts) —  that are
obviously aimed at restricting the interim government
from taking or implementing any decision that runs
contrary to the American-designed shape of Iraq. These
"edicts" could be overturned only by a majority of
members of the interim cabinet as well as the
president and two vice-presidents. Given that most
members of the interim government are US-picked and
are bound to Washington one way or another, this is an
insurance that the "edicts" remain in place even if
some in the interim government might not approve them.

Among the most controversial of the "edicts" are:
-- a suspension of the death penalty.
-- an election law that a seven-member panel that
wields a veto power against any political party and
candidate in elections.
-- one of every three candidates of any recognised
political party must be a woman.
-- formation of committees that have sweeping powers
over communications, the media, and the stock market.
-- a commission which will have the authority to send
government officials, including members of the interim
cabinet, for trial on corruption charges.
-- a ban on former members of the Iraqi army from
holding public office for 18 months after their
retirement or resignation.
-- punishments of up to 30 years in jail for those
convicted of selling weapons.
-- a ban on former militiamen from being absorbed to
the Iraqi military and from campaigning for election
candidates.
Some of Bremer's edits are "administrative" in nature.
These include:
-- an anti-money laundering law that mandatorily
subjects to scrutiny any transaction involving $3,500.
-- an industrial-design law to protect microchip
designs.
-- a ceiling of 15 per cent on any tax.
-- a ban on violation of intellectual property laws.
-- a ban on employment of anyone under the age of 15.
A scrutiny of Bremer's "edicts" will show that few of
them are compatible with the way of life in Iraq.
For instance, the suspension of the death penalty is
imposed on a country where tribal feuds are settled
through the barrel of a gun on the "an-eye-for-an-eye"
principle of the desert. Therefore, if the judiciary
does not have the authority to order the execution of
a convicted murderer, then the tribes would seek to
settle the score by killing the murderer or even a key
member of his or her clan as revenge even before the
issue goes to court.
The proposed ban on political parties has already
drawn protests, with Iraqis saying that why should an
American-imposed body have the right to veto parties
and candicates in elections in Iraq.
While the Saddam Hussein regime was liberal in
approach to women and given women broad rights,
Iraqis, as other Arab Muslims of conservative
societies, will resent the imposition of a
one-in-three quota for women candidates in elections.
The 30-year mandatory punishment for weapon sellers
will immediately be rejected since almost every
household in Iraq has more than a firearm. Often, such
weapons are sold by families as last-resort means.
Therefore a ban on selling a weapon and such a high
penalty could never be accepted by Iraqis.
The ban on militiamen from joining the armed forces
runs contrary to the plans of the interim government,
which has already launched a process where all
militias — except those of the Kurds in the north
— will be disbanded and absorbed into the security
forces.
The ban on children under 15 from taking up employment
will be rejected outright. In a country where there is
little employment and where many families have lost
male adults earning a livelihood, children are the
sole wage-earners. Those families will go hungry if
the children are banned from working.
The interim government is unlikely to obey Bremer's
edicts, and such an approach will pit the interim
ministers against the "agents" Bremer has put in
place. The result: A perennial state of friction that
would not bode well for the interim government to
carry out its assigned task of shaping Iraq's future.

Thursday, June 24, 2004

$3,415 per American family

The invasion and occupation of Iraq would
have cost the average US household at least $3,415 by
the end of this year, says a expert study.
The Washington-based think tank, the Institute for
Policy Studies (IPS), also says that not only have US
taxpayers paid a "very high price for the war," they
have also become "less secure at home and in the
world."
In a report entitled "Paying the Price: The Mounting
Costs of the Iraq War," IPS states that the US would
have spent $151.1 billion on the invasion and
occupation of Iraq by the end of the year. This
translates into $3,415 per American household.
The report points out that $151.1 billion could have
paid for comprehensive health care for 82 million
Americanchildren or the salaries of nearly three
million elementary school teachers.
The same amount, it says, if spent on international
programmes, could have cut world hunger in half and
covered HIV/AIDS medicine, childhood immunisation, and
clean water and sanitation needs of all developing
countries for more than two years.
Apart from the financial costs, the report says, the
US also absorbed "costs in blood" that are "by no
means insignificant."
More than 850 US troops have been killed since the
start of the war on March 20, 2003, just over 700 of
them since President George Bush declared the end of
major hostilities on May 1, 2003. In addition, more
than 5,134 troops were wounded until mid-June 4,600
of them since the official end of combat. Nearly
two-thirds of the wounded received injuries serious
enough to prevent them from returning to duty.
The toll among Iraqis is much higher.
According to the IPS report, t between 9,436 and
11,317 Iraqi civilians have been killed as a direct
result of the US. invasion and ensuing occupation,
while an estimated 40,000 Iraqis have been injured. In
addition, during "major combat" operations both during
the invasion and after May 1, 2003, the report
estimates that between 4,895 and 6,370 Iraqi soldiers
and insurgents were killed as of mid-June.
The IPS report also refers to the long-run health
impacts of the estimated 1,100 to 2,200 tons of
ordnance made from depleted uranium (DU), which caused
illnesses among US soldiers in the first Gulf War and
led to a seven-fold increase in child birth defects in
southern Iraq since 1991, that were expended during
the March 2003 bombing campaign.
The report also highlights the psychological impact of
the warm, post-war resistance and crimes, including
murders, rapes, and kidnapping. It points out that
deaths from violence rose from an average of 14 per
month in 2002 to 357 per month in 2003.
Other points that the report highlights include:
— Iraqi women do not enjoy safety and security outside
their homes.
– Many Iraqi children cannot attend school.
— Water and electricity networks are far short of
meeting the demands as a result of sabotage by
guerrillas and corruption by companies like
Halliburton.
— Iraq's hospitals and health systems have been
overwhelmed by a combination of lack of supplies and
unprecedented demand created by the ongoing violence.
The IPS report also highlights that the US has
suffered a seriouos blow to its own standing and
credibility in the international scene among both
Muslims countries as well as America's traditonal
allies in Europe. The US actions also led weakening
the UN and international law by the wars against
Afghanistan and Iraq and the inhumane treatment of
detainees in both wars.
In conclusion, the report states that the US have to
pay the price for its invasion of Iraq for a long
time. It refers to to an assessment by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
that the Iraq war has led to a swelling of the ranks
of anti-US groups, particularly Al Qaeda.
Accordingn to the IIS, Al Qaeda's membership at
18,000 with 1,000 active in Iraq.

Saturday, June 19, 2004

The lamb and the tiger


by PV Vivekanand

A folk tale speaks about a tiger that seeks to savour
the flesh of a lamb drinking water downstream. It
accuses the lamb of polluting the water. The lamb
replies it is innocent since he is downstream and the
tiger upstream. "Oh, then it is your grandfather who
polluted the water some years ago," replies the tiger
and pounces on the lamb.
We are reminded of this tale every time we hear the
American allegation that Saddam Hussein had links with
Osama Bin Laden despite an independent commission's
findings to the contrary. Washington's
behind-the-scene efforts to make the charge stick are
at best pathetic.
The only difference is that Saddam Hussein was no
lamb.
Russia has joined the American bandwagon with an
assertion by Vladimir Putin that Russian security
agencies repeatedly had warned the White House after
Sept.11, 2001, that Saddam was planning "terrorist
attacks" against targets both outside and inside the
United States.
"This information was passed through channels to
American colleagues," according to Putin. "George Bush
had a chance to personally thank a chief of one of the
Russian secret services for the information that he
considered very important."
Indeed, the assertion, which lacks in details, could
help the US effort to justify the invasion of Iraq as
well as US President George W Bush's standing among
American voters since the Democrats have accused Bush
of launching the war with little justification.
"It appears Mr. Putin is trying to help Mr. Bush win
his second election, that Moscow is becoming a player
in the American political scene," Lilia Shevtsova, a
political scientist at the Moscow Carnegie Center, was
quoted as saying by the Baltimore Sun. The inference
is that Putin might feel more comfortable dealing with
Bush as president of the US than his Democratic rival
John Kerry and is hence pitching his lot into run-up
to the US presidential elections in November.
Without going into details, Bush himself has insisted
that Saddam's Iraq was linked to Bin Laden's Qaeda.
But neither Bush nor anyone else has come up with hard
evidence.
Middle Eastern circles endorse the finding by the
American independent commission investigating the
Sept.11 attacks that no proof exists of co-operation
between Al Qaeda and Saddam.

Linkage not possible

Allegations of a tie-up between Bin Laden and Saddam
were seen with scepticism in the Middle East whenever
such charges were made in the US.
Most analysts and observers in the Middle East think
such a linkage is not possible because the two,
despite their fierce anti-US postures, followed
different, dramatically divergent paths. Bin Laden
never considered Saddam as a Muslim faithful and
steadfastly rejected the Iraqi strongman's overtures
to set up an alliance.
Bin Laden blamed Saddam for the Mideast's troubles as
much as he blamed the US and Israel. He saw Saddam as
having set the ground for the US to set up a permanent
military presence in the Gulf region by invading
Kuwait in 1990.
Bin Laden was a bitter critic of Saddam for using
Islamic tenets whenever it suited and ignoring them
otherwise. A classic example cited by Bin Laden was
Saddam's imposition of parts of the Shariah (Islamic
law) in Iraq, like bans on alcohol and nightclubs and
enforcement of the Islamic dress code at times when it
suited him. The ban was imposed and implicitly lifted
at regular intervals during the Saddam reign in Iraq.
As far as Bin Laden was concerned Saddam was not a
true Muslim and this, in his eyes, ruled him out as an
ally. If anything, according to sources who knew Bin
Laden in the early 90s, the Yemeni-born Saudi militant
considered Saddam as a traitor of the Islamic and Arab
cause since he felt that the Iraqi strongman would
respond positively to any American overture to settle
Washington-Baghdad differences and rejoin the American
camp if the US administration invited him to do so.
"Saddam Hussein is in fact an infidel who is trying to
use Islam to serve his politics and secure support
among the faithful in Iraq," Bin Laden was known to
have commented to some of his "Arab Afghan" supporters
— Arabs, who like Bin Laden himself, volunteered to
fight against the Soviet army in Afghanistan during
the 1980s. He also maintained that the people of Iraq
should be seen separate from the regime since "they
were Saddam's innocent victims" just as "the
Palestinians were the victims of Israel."

Secret report

A secret British intelligence report, which was
suppressed by the government in late 2002, said it was
not possible that Bin Laden and Saddam could have
forged an alliance if only because their "ideological"
differences were too wide. The same report also said
that there was no evidence of an Al Qaeda-Baghdad
link.
After the August 1998 Al Qaeda bombings of the
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the
retaliatory American attacks against a Bin Laden camp
in Afghanistan, Saddam reportedly extended an
invitation to Bin Laden to go to Iraq and take shelter
there against any further American military action.
Saddam promised him "absolute" safety and protection.
The Al Qaeda leader not only turned down the
"invitation" but also berated Saddam for thinking that
a "true believer" such as Bin Laden himself would
accept such an invitation from a "non-believer" like
Saddam.
Indeed, according to the sources, Al Qaeda activists
from Egypt, Sudan and other countries might have
visited Iraq while Saddam was in power, but this never
constituted any basis for an alliance as alleged by
the US.
Against this backdrop, persistent claims made by
senior American officials that Saddam and Bin Laden
had strong links sounded hollow and without substance.
US Secretary of State Colin Powell raised a big hue
and cry in mid-2002 that Ansar Al Islam, an Al Qaeda
affiliate, was housed in northern Iraq and was
developing chemical weapons there.
In less than 24 hours after Powell made the
allegation, the horde of Arab, regional and
international media based in the region rushed to the
area only to find a couple of ruined buildings there.
The only chemicals worth mentioning that were found in
the area was a packet of detergent that someone had
forgotten in a makeshift washing room.
So much for American intelligence findings.
However, the catch in the situation was always that
while administration allegations against Iraq were
played up, results of on-the-ground inspections were
played down, and not many got to read or hear the
actual findings. They were left with the first
impressions of the charge itself.
Contrary to what many Mideastern pundits argue, the US
investigating commission asserts that Bin Laden had
made overtures to Saddam but the Iraqi strongman never
responded.
It could indeed be true that someone, somewhere in the
Bin Laden camp might have made such requests, but it
is highly unlikely it came from Bin Laden to Saddam,
say Arab intelligence agencies.

False claims

The American investigating commission's failure to
find any evidence that Al Qaeda and Iraq had links
pulls the rug from under the feet of steadfast claims
made by President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and
other administration officials.
Even last week, Cheney claimed Saddam "had
long-established ties with Al Qaeda," but what he had
to cite as evidence was an already discredited report
that Mohammed Atta, leader of the 19 Sept. 11
hijackers, met in Prague, Czech Republic, with a
senior Iraqi intelligence official before the attacks.
The investigating panel concluded no such meeting had
occurred.
Putin's assertion that Saddam plotted terror attacks
against the US after Sept.11 brings forth several
elements into consideration.
It was assumed as early as November 2001, one month
after the US launched the war against Afghanistan,
that Iraq was the Bush administration's next target.
Bush said his interpretation was that his war against
terror include those countries which "terrified" their
neighbours with their weapons of mass destruction.
That was the clearest signal that he intended to wage
war on Iraq no matter.
Surely, if even the man on the street could sense that
Bush was on an irreversible course towards war against
Iraq, then Saddam and his advisers and strategists
should have also known of the inevitability of war.
From that point onwards, Saddam tried desperately to
avoid war. Despite his public anti-US rhetoric, it was
clear since July 2002 that he would have complied with
every American and UN demands in connection with
charges that he had a massive stockpile of weapons of
mass destruction. The truth, as it had emerged, was
that he did not have any. He did not risk anything by
allowing UN inspections and accepting other UN demands
aimed at ensuring that he did not resume his weapons
programmes.
However, Bush, nudged by his neo-conservative
pro-Israeli advisers, had made up his mind and
Saddam's offers of compliance were steadfastly turned
down. There was nothing in the world Saddam could have
done to change the course towards war.
The pattern of American behaviour since late 2001
clearly showed that the objective was indeed invasion
of Iraq, topple Saddam and occupy Iraq until the
country is reshaped as the most "American-friendly" in
the Middle East after Israel.
By late 2002, it became very clear that war would be
launched anytime. All the American manoeuvrings
through the UN under European pressure had only one
objective: Give no room for Saddam to get off the hook
even if he were to go on his knees.
It was during this period, according to Putin, Saddam
allegedly had plotted terror attacks against the US.
Logic does not agree with that assertion.
Notwithstanding all his shortcomings, Saddam would not
have been as naive as not to realise that any such
action against the US would have brought an immediate
military action upon Iraq and would have made
meaningless any effort to avert the war.
Many in the Middle East see as credible recent
revelations that Saddam had, through a Lebanese
intermediary, made a last-ditch offer to open all his
military facilities to the US without reservation and
meet any American demand as long as he remained in
power. That fits in with the overall picture that
Saddam knew that war was inevitable and was trying to
hang onto to the slimmest straw.
Against that reality, it seems inconceivable that
Saddam might have been plotting terror attacks against
the US at a time when he was desperately attempting to
ward off war that would inevitably topple him.
But then, that is what the lamb tried and failed.



Thursday, June 17, 2004

No Saddam-Bin Laden ties

by pv vivekanand

THE FINDING by an American independent commission
investigating the Sept.11 attacks that no proof exists
between Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein
should not be surprising. It was always known in
Mideastern circles that a tie-up between Bin Laden and
Saddam was never possible because the two, despite
their fierce anti-US postures, followed different,
dramatically divergent paths, religiously
ideologically, politically and otherwise.
Bin Laden, a truly committed Muslim with strong
convictions and beliefs, never considered Saddam as a
Muslim faithful and steadfastly rejected the Iraqi
strongman's overtures to set up an alliance.
Bin Laden blamed Saddam for the Mideast's troubles as
much as he blamed the US and Israel. He saw Saddam as
having set the ground for the US to set up a permanent
military presence in the Gulf region by invading
Kuwait in 1990.
Bin Laden was a bitter critic of Saddam for using
Islamic tenets whenever it suited and ignoring them
otherwise. A classic example cited by Bin Laden was
Saddam's imposition of parts of the Shariah (Islamic
law) in Iraq, like bans on alcohol and nightclubs and
enforcement of the Islamic dress code at times when it
suited him. The bans were imposed and implicitly
lifted at regular intervals during the Saddam reign in
Iraq.
As far as Bin Laden was concerned Saddam was not a
true Muslim and this, in his eyes, ruled him out as an
ally. If anything, Bin Laden considered Saddam as a
traitor of the Islamic and Arab cause since he felt
that the Iraqi strongman would respond positively to
any American overture to settle Washington-Baghdad
differences and rejoin the American camp if the Bush
Senior administration, the Clinton administration or
the Bush Junior administration were inclined to do so.
"Saddam Hussein is in fact an infidel who is trying to
use Islam to serve his politics and secure support
among the faithful in Iraq," Bin Laden was known to
have commented to some of his "Arab Afghan" supporters
-- Arabs, who like Bin Laden himself, volunteered to
fight against the Soviet army in Afghanistan during
the 1980s. He also maintained that the people of Iraq
should be seen separate from the regime since "they
were Saddam's innocent victims" just as "the
Palestinians were the victims of Israel."
A secret British intelligence report, which was
suppressed by the government in late 2002, said it was
not possible that Bin Laden and Saddam could have
forged an alliance if only because their "ideological"
differences were too wide. The same report also said
that there was no evidence of an Al Qaeda-Baghdad
link.
After the August 1998 Al Qaeda bombings of the
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the
retaliatory American attacks against a Bin Laden camp
in Afghanistan, Saddam extended an invitation to Bin
Laden to go to Iraq and take shelter there against any
further American military action. Saddam promised him
"absolute" safety and protection.
The Al Qaeda leader not only turned down the
"invitation" but also berated Saddam for thinking that
a "true believer" such as Bin Laden himself would
accept such an invitation from a "non-believer" like
Saddam.
Indeed, according to the sources, Al Qaeda activists
from Egypt, Sudan and other countries might have
visited Iraq while Saddam was in power, but this
never constituted any basis for an alliance as alleged
by the US.
Against this backdrop, persistent claims made by
senior American officials that Saddam and Bin Laden
had strong links had sounded hollow — to those who are
familiar with the thinking of the two — and without
substance.
On the other hand, the US investigating commission
asserts that Saddam had never responded to requests
for help from Bin Laden in 1994. The reality,
according to highly credible and informed sources in
the Middle East, was that such a request was indeed
made by an unidentified Sudanese member of Al Qaeda
but without Bin Laden's knowledge. That Sudanese,
identified as Mamdouh Kais, was killed in a 1997
accident in Afghanistan, according to the sources.
Arab intelligence agencies which have more to fear
from a Bin Laden-Saddam alliance than the West have
asserted that they could not establish a link between
Al Qaeda and Baghdad.
The investigating commission's failure to find any
evidence that Al Qaeda and Iraq had links pulls the
rug from under the feet of steadfast claims made by
President George Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and
other administration officials.
Even last week, Cheney claimed Saddam "had
long-established ties with Al Qaeda," but what he had
to cite as evidence was an already discredited report
that Mohammed Atta, leader of the 19 Sept. 11
hijackers, met in Prague, Czech Republic, with a
senior Iraqi intelligence official before the attacks.
The investigating panel concluded no such meeting
occurred.

Wednesday, June 16, 2004

Saturday, June 12, 2004

Qadhafi and plot to kill Abdullah

IT is unlikely that Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi will
face any international punishment for his alleged plot
to assassinate Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. If Qadhafi
were to be punished, then it would prove too
embarassing for the Bush administration, which had
touted his pledge in December to renounce terrorism
and abandon weapons of mass destruction as a major
victory of the US-led war against terrorism.
The US cannot cannot afford to see Qadhafi as having
committed a unredeemable sin by allegedly plotting to
kill Crown Prince Abdullah. It In the short run, there
would be a lot of talk about punishing Qadhafi but
these would fade away, with Iraq, Palestine and
American elections as well as Washington's push for
Arab reforms taking centrestage.
The key here is that the US had known since September
of the alleged Libyan plot to kill Prince Abdullah and
kept back the information from the Saudis. No doubt
the top officials of the Bush administration had known
about it throughout. Therefore last week's pledge by
President George Bush that he was concerned and the
affair would be thoroughly investigated sounds hollow
since it is based on the asusmption that he came to
know about it only now; whereas it is illogical that
he was not immediately informed by US intelligence
agencies of a plot against the de factor ruler of a
country as important as Saudi Arabia when it was
discovered.
According to reports in the American and Saudi media,
the alleged plot to kill Abdullah involved Qadhafi and
his top intelligence agents as well as Abdul Rahman
Alamoudi, an American Muslim leader jailed in
Alexandria, Virginia, on federal charges of having
illegal financial dealings with Libya; and by
Mohammeed Ismael, a Libyan intelligence officer in
Saudi custody.
Alamoudi was detained by British authorities last
August as he boarded a flight from London to Syria
with $340,000 in cash. They suspected he was carrying
the money for the Palestinian group Hamas. He denied
it and said a Libyan had simply gave him the money at
his hotel room with no explanation. Then he said the
money came from the Libya-based World Islamic Call
Society. Then he said the money came from Libyan
intelligence.
He was sent to the US where he faced charges of
violating the US sanctions agains Libya - travelling
to Libya and receiving money from Libyans.
Then, in a bid to escape from the charges, he made a
deal with the US authorities and revealed the plot
against Abdullah.
Alamoudi is the founder of several Islamic groups
including the American Muslim Council, and is an
occasional White House visitor during the Clinton and
current Bush administrations.
He said he was summoned to Libya by top intelligence
officer Abdullah Sannousi, who introduced him to
Mohamed Ismael, another intelligence agent, in a
meeting attended by Sannousi's deputy Mousa Koussa.
Alamoudi and Ismael worked together since then.
Almoudi received at least $3 million from Libya and
met Saudi dissidents in London to hire them for the
killing.
He said he had met Qadhafi twice since then and both
times the Libyan leader told him to speed up the plot
to kill Abdullah.
The plot began in May 2003, shortly after Qadhafi and
Abdullah had a fierce verbal clash at an Arab
emergency meeting in Egypt. Qadhafi accused Saudi
Arabia of agreeing to give military facilities to the
US for invading Iraq and Abdullah retorted that
Qadhafi himself was helped by the US to assume power
in Libya in a coup.
Prince Abdullah shouted at Qadhafi: "Your lies
precede you and your grave is in front of you."
Alamoudi's version was corroborated by Ismael, who was
arrested in October last year. According to Saudi
newspaper reports, he was arrested after police were
alerted by an employee of a money exchange company who
grew suspicious about a $1 million transfer that had
come in Ismael's name.
Ismael tried to explain that the money was to be spent
for expenses related to the Umra pilgrimage of several
"leading" women from Libya.
The money exchange employee alerted Saudi police and
Ismael was kept under observation. But he was not
arrested in Saudi Arabia. He was apparenlty allowed to
leave the country and was detained in Egypt and sent
back to Saudi Arabia.
Four Saudi dissidents was arrested from a hotel
outside Mecca whether they had gone to collect money
for their role in the plot.
Saudi police questioned Alamoudi and the four, and the
plot was unveiled.
By then, American authorities had also known the
details of the plot from Alamoudi and the two versions
matched.
In the meantime, American-Libyan relations grew
stronger. Qadhafi had offered in secret talks with the
US and UK to renounce terrorism and abandon his
secret weapons projects in mid=2003 and in December
he made the public pledge to drop his weapons plans
and renounced terrorism.
The US is indeed concerned that Qadhafi should be
keeping his pledge, but the explanation, if any is
available, is that the plot against Abdullah came
before his pledge and therefore he is a changed man
now.
The American approach to the affair is rather low key.
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher
acknowledged that Washington had known of reports
"that Libya was in contact with Saudi dissidents who
have threatened violence against the Saudi royal
family" before Qadhafi's pledge on Dec.19 abandoning
his weapons programmes and renouncing terrorism.
"We raised those concerns directly with the Libyan
leadership, and they assured us that they would not
support the use of violence for settling political
differences with any state," said Boucher. The
allegations were one reason the US had not removed
Libya from the State Department's list of nations that
support terrorism.
President Bush said last week: "We're going to make
sure we fully understand the veracity of the plot
line. . . . When we find out the facts, we will deal
with them accordingly. . . . I have sent a message to
(Qadhafi) that if he honours his commitments to resist
terror and to fully disclose and disarm his weapons
programmes, we will begin a process of normalisation,
which we have done."
Libyan Foreign Minister Abdul Rahman Shalqam has
denied the allegations "completely and categorically."

In the meantime, investigations are continuing, with
Americans and Saudi officials seekign to to interview
at least two of Alamoudi's US associates, who
apparently are overseas.
The US and Saudi Arabia are also pressing British
officials to intensify their investigation of Saad
Faqih, a Saudi dissident in London suspected of having
played a role in the Libyan plot. Faqih has denied
any connection to the plot. Faqih acknowledged having
known Alamoudi for years but denied being funded by
him or by Ismael.
Saudi dissidents in London are suspected of having
given Alamoudi and Ismael clues to locate men in
Saudi Arabia willing to join an assassination plot
that involved the use of small arms or
rocket-propelled grenades.
In technical terms, if the charge against Libya is
proved true, then it could lead to reinstatement of
international sanctions on Libya that were lifted by
the United Nations Security Council last September
after Tripoli government renounced terrorism, admitted
responsibility for the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing and
agreed to pay $10 million compensation to the
families.
However, to acknowledge that he had gone wrong in
dealing with Qadhafi would be embarassing for Bush,
who had highlighted Qadhafi's pledge against
developing weapons and supporting terorrism as a one
of the most tangible results of the US-led war against
terrorism. Washington would only seek to absolve
Qadhafi of any wrongdoing.

Monday, June 07, 2004

Saddam's oil vouchers

Separate investigations by the UN, the US
Congress and an auditor appointed by the now-defunct
Iraqi Interim Governing Council (IGC) have unveiled
different forms of oil export scams run by the ousted
Saddam Hussein regime.
In all, the regime is said to have sold several
billion dollars worth of smuggled oil. The money has
not been accounted for, but it is unlikely that the
cash was ever sent to Iraq. The money changed hands
through carefully concealed bank transfers and in cash
outside Iraq under instructions issued by the regime.
One channel was to inflate the invoices of goods
supplied to Iraq under the UN's oil-for-food
programme. The Saddam regime had the final say about
what was to be imported under the programme —  mainly
food, medicine and related supplies — and at what cost
while the UN collected proceeds from the sale of Iraqi
oil.
The regime made secret deals with suppliers of food,
medicine and related items to inflate the costs. The
supplier submitted the invoices to the UN and
collected the money, and remitted the inflated
difference to secret accounts of the Saddam regime
outside Iraq. The regime used the money to benefit its
top leaders and to pay bribes to friendly politicians
and groups as needed.
During the seven-year oil-for-food programme that
ended in October 2003, Iraq exported $65 billion and
more than $38 billion in food and medicine had been
delivered to the Iraqi people. It is not known how
much money was involved in the inflated invoices.
The difference in the exports and imports went to a UN
fund that paid compensation to victims of the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
The second scam run by the Saddam regime was through
smuggling oil in violation of the UN sanctions imposed
after the invasion of Kuwait.
The regime used to pump around 200,000 barrels of oil
through a pipeline that runs from Kirkuk in northern
Iraq to Syria's Banias port.
Oil companies took delivery of the oil from Banias
port upon producing coded slips issued by Iraq's
State Oil Marketing Company or SOMO.
The US knew about this, but could not do anything to
stop the smuggling through Syria because Damascus
refused to co-operate with Washington.One of the first
things the US military did after invading Iraq and
toppling Saddam last year was to close down the
pipeline.
The scam through Syria allegedly benefited about
270 foreign government officials, legislators,
political activists and journalists as well as
companies from more than 52 countries who are said
to have received money from Saddam for supporting him
in international and regional forums.
The Saddam regime issued "oil vouchers" to various
beneficiaries who could then sell them to oil dealers
or agents operating from Rashid Hotel in Baghdad. The
agents would then sell the vouchers to oil companies
which, in turn, would submit them to the State Oil
Marketing Company or SOMO and collected coded slips
that entitled them to collect the oil from Banias
port. Both the beneficiary and the agent collected
quick and handsome profits. More often than note,
beneficiaries sold the vouchers at an average of $3
per barrel for instant cash.
The beneficiaries of the scam allegedly included
Western, Arab and Asian politicians and groups (the
list includes the Indian Congress Party, which
allegedly received one million barrels, according to
Al Mada, an Iraqi newspaper, which released the list.
The Congress Party has issued a categorical denial of
the allegation).
Another alleged beneficiary was Benon V Sevan, the
former director of the UN oil-for-food programme. He
has denied the charge, but a secret memo based on an
inspection of documents recovered from the former
regime's offices claim that Senan collected the oil
vouchers and channelled the proceeds to a Panamanian
trading company.
The alleged beneficiaries of oil vouchers included
19 political parties, and numerous politicians and
journalists. Russia led the way among countries, with
46 recipients for a total of about 2.5 billion
barrels. Significant individual recipients include
British MP George Galloway, the president of
Indonesia, the prime minister of Libya, the former
prime minister of Yemen, a former French minister of
interior, Patrick Maugein who, according to French
sources, is a financial supporter of French President
Chirac, the sons of the former Egyptian leader Gamal
Abdul Nasser, the President of Lebanon Emil Lehoud,
the former Syrian minister of defence Mustafa Tlass,
several Jordanian politicians and others.,
Some of them have issued categorical denials, some
have said they were offered oil vouchers but turned
them down and others said they had accepted the
vouchers on behalf of someone else or for charity
projects.
Another channel adopted by the Saddam regime to beat
the UN sanctions was to smuggle oil through barges and
small ships through the Gulf. The vessels used to
collect the oil from Umm Qasr in southern Iraq and
followed a route hugging the Iranian shore before
entering Gulf waters where the oil was pumped to
larger ships bound for the Far East. Gulf-based Iraqi
agents collected the money.
The regime also sent truckloads of oil to Turkey
through Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. Although
they were avowed enemies of the Saddam regime, Kurdish
militia groups allowed the trucks through because they
benefited in cash — they collected a "toll" from
every vehicle.
"Oil vouchers "were also distributed to companies and
individuals from Sudan, Yemen, Cyprus, Turkey,
Vietnam, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, the UAE,
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Panama, Thailand, Chad,
China, Nigeria, Kenya, Ireland, Bahrain, and the
Philippines. Two Saudi companies were also listed.
The full disclosure of the names and details of the
alleged foreign beneficiaries of Saddam's oil bribes
could be devastating to those named.
At this point in time, Ahmed Chalabi, the head of the
Iraqi National Congress, who has fallen out of favour
with the US, is believed to be in possession of the
entire files that contain all details. He has refused
to hand them over to the US.
A US-backed Iraqi police raid of Chalabi's offices and
residence last month was seen as an effort to locate
those documents.
Washington has distanced itself from its one-time pet
Chalabi, who is now accused of spying for Iran,
misappropriating tens of millions of American money
allocated for pre-war anti-Saddam campaigns and for
intelligence operations in post-war Iraq,
profiteering from reconstruction contracts in the
country and implicitly undermining American political
efforts there.

Saturday, June 05, 2004

Bitter fights ahead

The newly installed interim authority in Iraq is the
best bet for the US to advance its designs in the
Middle East. However, developments in the last week
clearly showed that Iraqi politicians and leaders of
various ethnic groups have a mind of their and this
might not exactly be dancing to Washington's tunes.
Both sides, despite pledges of co-operation with each
other, are destined to fight it out at every juncture
of Iraq's course towards shaping its own political
future.
The US plans for Iraq has turned a key corner with the
installation of an interim government, which will
formally take charge on July 1. The next item on the
US agenda is "legitimising" its military occupation of
Iraq by sealing a special agreement with the interim
government while also securing a United Nations
Security Council resolution which is purposely kept
ambiguous about withdrawing US military forces from
the embattled country.
No matter what angle one would look at the situation,
it is loud and clear that the US will maintain its
military presence in Iraq for the foreseeable future
and exercise absolute control over the country through
direct and indirect means.
The US has already devised mechanisms that give it
absolute power over all political and administrative
decisions taken by the interim government.
Upto 150 American officials will be installed under
contracts signed by the US-led Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) — these contracts are binding on the
interim government — and these US officials will hold
direct authority over all the key institutions — state
finances, the armed forces and media and
communications.
Earlier, the US envisaged that the interim government
will have little control over its armed forces, but
the revised version of a draft resolution at the UN
Security Council gives the interim government control
over the Iraqi army and police.
However, the interim government would have no
authority to make or change laws and will be unable to
make major decisions within specific ministries
without tacit US approval.
An example is a media and telecommunications
commission appointed by US overseer Paul Bremer. The
body will have immense powers over the media,
including the power to shut down news agencies and
newspapers. Fines of millions of dollars could be
imposed on television channels for violating the "code
of conduct" laid down by the US.
A US-appointed Board of Supreme Audit will have
representatives in every Iraqi ministry, with powers
to monitor all contracts and expenditure.
The US-installed members of the board will have a
five-year term of office and cannot be removed except
by a two-thirds vote in a Iraqi parliament as and when
it is elected. American “advisors” will remain in
every ministry, reporting to a virtual parallel
government operating out of the American embassy in
Baghdad, which, with over 3,000 staff, will be the
largest in the world, and run by John Negroponte, a
man known for ruthlessness in Vietnam and Latin
America in the 60s and 70s.
It does not really matter to the Americans that the
revised draft UN Security Council resolution says that
the interim authority could ask Washington to
withdraw its forces at any time from Iraq since the
US knows there would never be any such request since
those supposed to be making the request are
American-controlled.
The unseen string is the power of American funds that
are being spent in Iraq. That is the leverage that the
US would be using to have it way in the country.
The revised draft of the sought-for UN Security
Council resolution states that the interim government
will be "fully sovereign" and reaffirms the right of
the Iraqi people to determine their political future
freely, control their natural resources and coordinate
international assistance.
That catch in the resolution is: While it notes "that
the presence of the multinational force in Iraq is at
the request of the incoming interim government," it
doesn't specifically give the new leaders the right to
ask the force to leave.
Instead, it anticipates that the incoming government
will make a formal request "to retain the presence of
the multinational force" and leaves room for the date
of that request to be included in the resolution.
That is where the interim government would be coerced
into signing a proposed "Status of Forces Agreement"
under which it would request that the US military will
stay on in Iraq until the interim government is
capable of assuming security of the country.
The new interim prime minister, Iyad Allawi, has
already said the US military will be asked to stay on
and promised that Iraq's security forces will be a
"pivotal partner" with US and other coalition troops
in the fight to restore security to Iraq.
This is not likely to happen any soon, and hence the
January 2006 deadline —  the installation of a
constitutionally elected government —  will remain
only a clause in the resolution with as much as value
as the paper it is written on.
That is the American grandiose plan. The only unseen
element in the plan is how the people of Iraq are
going to recognise and respect the interim government
in the days, weeks and months ahead.
If the signs on the ground are any indication, it will
be tough going for the interim government, and, by
extension, to the US.
The interim government will not be able to assume
control of security without American military help,
and no election worth the name could be held as long
as the American military could not pacify Iraqis. With
the mounting Iraqi resistance against occupation, the
deadline set for electing a government does not seem
realistic.
Washington knows that well, but it would not be the
one to tell the world that its plans for Iraq have
little to do with freedom and democracy for Iraqis but
aim at consolidating the American grip on the oil-rich
Gulf region.
The interim government, or at least some of its
members, have shown that they are determined to assert
their independence and aim for full sovereignty
despite the obvious American effort to retain absolute
control of the country. That was what we saw when the
now dissolved Interim Governing Council (IGC) insisted
on its own choice for president, Sheikh Ghazi Yawar,
rather than Adnan Pachachi, who was backed by the US.
It was as much a signal to the US that things might
not be going Washingtons' way no matter how carefully
the plans were laid down months ago.
It is no easy sailing for the caretaker government.
The biggest challenge it faces is securing the
endorsement and support of a majority of the country's
25 million people, of whom Shiites have a majority of
60 per cent.
It has to tread a delicate line between serving the
interests of the people of Iraq and risking being
labelled as American agents if its decisions are seen
dictated by Washington.
Notwithstanding the language in the UN draft
resolution and declarations from Washington that Iraq
would soon have "full sovereignty," the interim
government and the US would be engaged in a
long-running battle involving bottlenecks in
appropriation of the country's oil revenues,
reconstruction contracts and local administration.
On the political front, the US will veto any move to
characterise Israel as an enemy or to even censure the
Jewish state for its occupation of Arab territories.
However, the interim authority would draw Iraqi fire
if it is deemed as staying silent on Israeli actions
against the Palestinians.
Similarly, the US would be keeping a close eye on
Iraq's relations with other countries and would
intervene at any point it feels such ties have a
negative effect on American interests.
Having advanced its goals of ensuring energy security
and assuring itself of a say in the international oil
market by taking control of Iraq and having eliminated
a potential military threat to its ally Israel by
removing Saddam, Washington is unlikely to give up
its stranglehold on the country and deprive itself of
a weapon which it wants to use to achieve its third
elusive objective: Regional stability of the type that
serves American interests.

Thursday, June 03, 2004

Execution video 'doctored'

PV Vivekanand

The infamous, revolting video showing the
decapitation of American Nicholas Berg by alleged Al
Qaeda members is a complete fraud and it was shot
inside the US-controlled Abu Ghraib prison outside
Baghdad. This is a contention put forward by experts
who made a frame-by-frame analysis of the footage.
The inference in the contention that the footage is
fraud is that the US military, reeling back from
allegations of gross abuse of Iraqi detainees by US
soldiers and interrogators under contract, wanted to
hit back by showing that Al Qaeda members were inhuman
executioners. The footage, which was put on an
Islamic website, drew worldwide condemnation of Al
Qaeda, and by inference Arab Muslims.
"The hastily released and shoddy video showing five
phoney Al queda members participating in the
decapitation of Nicholas Berg twas intended,
exclusively, to defray attention from the scandalous
sexual abuses of Iraqi PoW's that took place at the
Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad," says the
California-based La Voz de Aztlan, a news service.
"Evidence in fact shows that the Berg decapitation was
filmed inside the walls of the notorious Abu Ghraib
prison, this cursed dungeon where probably Satan
himself roams its corridors."
La Voz de Aztlan says many of its subscribers saw the
footage and raised doubts about its authenticity.
US intelligence officials have claimed that al Qaeda
assciated Abu Musab Al Zarqawi was the masked person
shown decapitating Berg with a large knife, but the
officials have not explained by the masked man did not
show any sign any handicap (whereas it is believed
that that Zarqawi lost one leg in an explosion).
According to La Voz de Aztlan, the features that
expose the footage as fraud are:
1. The white plastic chair in which Berg is shown
sitting in the video is identifical to the chair in
which an American female soldier is sitting with a US
Marine in fatigues standing behind her in one of the
infamous abuse photographs that came from Abu Ghraib.
The same chair is seen in at least four other
photographs that showed American abuse of Iraqi
detainees.
2. The orange prison overall that Berg is shown
wearing is exactly the same given by the US
authorities to prisoners taken in Afghanistan and
detained at Guatanamo Bay, Cuba.
There is no explanation why the same uniform was worn
by Berg if his captors and executioners were Al Qaeda.
3. Three of the five captors and executioners are
shown wearing bullet-proof vests that are of standard
US military supply. There has never been any
indication ever that Al Qaeda fighters anywhere in
the world ever used bullet-proof vests at all. And how
did they end up with American standard supply vests
which are not available in the market?
Furthermore, the one "Al Qaeda fighters" on the
extreme right in one of the video shots is pudgy and
is wearing very clean tennis shoes. This will not be
the case with an Al Qaeda fighter.
4. In one of the shots in the video showing Berg being
executed, a head wearing an American military cap of
the same type used by Abu Ghraib wardens is seen
poking into the right hand frame for a split second.
This could be seen only in slow motion review of the
footage. There cannot be any mistaking the similarity
between the Abu Ghraib cap and the cap seen on the
video. The man could be carrying a second video camera
as seen in slow motion.
5. The colour and texture of the wall as shown in the
frames taken from the video as shown in several
photographs of the Abu Ghraib abuse.,
The video footage of the "Berg execution" was uploaded
from London, England to a now defunct website in a
server located in Malaysia on May 11. Berg's body was
found near a highway bypass outside Baghdad on May 9.
According to La Voz la Aztlan, the website at
http://www.al-asnar.biz was shut down as soon as
"conservative news outlets like CNN and Fox News were
notified. These two news services wasted no time in
coming out with headlines like 'Islamic Terrorists
Decapitate an American in Iraq.' Within minutes, local
news services from New York to Los Angeles were
screaming 'Muslim Animals Chop Off the Head of an
American' and were showing only short segments of the
fake video. Pro-Zionist radio stations in Los Angeles
have spent literally days since then talking about the
Muslim barbarians and why it is so important to
support the war in Iraq. "
Additionally, Berg's family has said that they had
learnt that Berg, a former soldier who was trying to
sell a communication technology in Iraq, was in
American military custody at the time of his death.
His body was found outside Baghdad two days before
the videotape surfaced, but it was never explained the
body was decapitated.
"The real Nick Berg may or may not be dead, but the
heavily edited video is nothing but a fake," says La
Voz de Aztlan.
"For the time being, the mainstream media is totally
ignoring the above evidence," it says. "Hopefully soon
some brave mainstream publisher will dare to bring
this important information to the American people."

For related images, see
http://www.aztlan.net/berg_abu_ghraib_video.htm

Saddam not 'brainwashed'

June 3, 2004

Saddam not 'brainwashed'
PV Vivekanand

Saddam Hussein is suffering from fatique but has not been "brainwashed" during his detention since December last year. He has retained full control of his faculties and, if anything, has sharpened his argumentary skills, and one could expect to see verbal tirades from the ousted Iraqi leader during his trial at an Iraqi court on charges of crimes against humanity.
This much was from the 30-minute session where an Iraqi court formally read out the charges against him and he refused to sign a paper acknowledging that he understood the charges and proceedings.
While he was shown on television making his argument, his voice was not broadcast and Salim Chalabi, the man in charge of prosecuting him, said later hearings may not be broadcast live for fear of acting as a rallying call to insurgents.
Judging from the way he conducted himself, it was clear that Saddam has not changed a bit in his approach.
Probably it took some time for him to collect himself after being brought to the court in chains after the first few minutes of his being produced in court, was really the Saddam of the old: arrogant, scornful while focused and intense.
Every word he used was so typical of Saddam, starting with the overpowering approach where he could have been mentally taking charge of the courtroom by asking the judge to introduce himself and questioning his credentials.
"What is this court? Who are you? Under whose jurisdiction do you fall? I am the president of the Republic Iraq,"
His insistence that "I am the president of the Republic of Iraq" could be easily seen as a reflection of his self-assurance that he was elected with more than 95 per cent of the votes in the referendum he held prior to the war.
"I am the elected leader of the Iraqi people. Please do not take that away from me. ...Please do not strip me of the title," he told the judge.
 His description of the trial as theatre and US President George W Bush as the "real criminal," his dismissal of the charge that he had ordered the gassing of Kurds — "yes, I have heard about it" — his defence that his 1990 invasion of Kuwait was "for the people of Iraq" and his reference to Kuwaitis as dogs are vivid examples of his behaviour and approach while he was in power.
His response to the court's offer to appoint a lawyer for him if he could not afford one was again so typical: "As everyone says, the Americans say, I have millions of dollars stashed away in Geneva. Why shouldn't I afford a lawyer?"
On Kuwait, he told the judge: "How can you, as an Iraqi, accuse me of an invasion of Kuwait when Kuwait is part of Iraq? How can you call it an invasion? I was doing something for the good of Iraqis. These mad dogs were trying to put down the price of Iraqi oil and turn Iraqi women into 10-dinar prostitutes."
Waving a pen for emphasis while being polite Saddam questioned the legality of prosecuting him for crimes that he argued were covered by presidential immunity. He often showed anger and exasperation at the same time.
All these expressions underlined one thing: Saddam has not been "brainwashed" and left to be a mental wreck by his American interrogators. He has retained his faculties and it is a safe bet that one could get to see another Slobodan Milosevic in action once the trial gets going in earnest, perhaps in a few months' time.
Saddam being produced in court marked an unprecedented episode in the Arab World. For the first time, a former Arab leader was being put on trial in his own country to be judged by his own people.
Indeed, there are many firsts happening in Iraq, and some of them defy logic and reason if seen on their own outside the right context. However, putting Saddam on trial is an imperative of the interim government, which wants to send the strongest message yet to the people of Iraq that it is in control of the country and that not only the brutal era of the Baathists is over in an irreversible course of events but also that the former regime's leaders would pay for their doings against Iraqis.
International legal experts differ over whether a "fair trial" is possible for Saddam. Some say that they would have preferred to see Saddam put on trial in an international framework with UN involvement while others say that it is the privilege and right of the people of Iraq and their government to try the ousted president. All said and done, Saddam and his close associates during his reign in power have been put on trial before an Iraqi court made up of Iraqi judges and the process would take its own course regardless of what anyone has to say about it, including the opinion that Saddam never applied justice in the functions of his judiciary and thus he does not deserve fairness during his trial.
Then, there are those who are insisting that he should be given the death penalty while others believe that he should be subjected to prolonged imprisonment, which they feel is more appropriate for a man who had little mercy for others, including his own sons-in-law.
On the other side of the coin is the fact that it might even have been painful for Arab nationalists, given that Saddam was once seen as the most powerful Arab leader with all that it implies and as the strongest symbol of Arab resistance against biased American polices in the Middle East. To see him brought into court in chains and treated like a criminal was shocking and saddening to many who remember the way he used to conduct himself while in power.