Monday, August 20, 2007

Wishes that will remain only listed

Aug.20, 2007

Wishes that will remain only listed


IT IS conventionally welcome news that Iraq's fractious leaders have agreed on the agenda for a political summit called by Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki, who is desperately trying to rescue his crumbling "national unity" government.
Maliki, who is under intense American pressure to salvage the government, is obviously hoping that the Sunnis who have quit the government would come around and opt to attend the proposed gathering if only because there is no other game in town.
It was not exactly a wise move by the Shiite prime minister to announced the formation of an alliance grouping his Dawa party and Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council and the Kurdish groups — the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) but excluding all Sunni factions. The move underlined what many see as the inevitability of the country splintering along Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni lines. The record of the post-war crisis in Iraq is interpreted by many as having established that the three major sects are unable to co-exist with each other as long as the US maintains its presence there. The US presence is the not the solution; it is the problem.
Seasoned international experts agree with the assessment; so do many retired American and European generals.
But the world has not heard much from the people who actually deal with the situation on the ground on how to deal with the crisis and whether they feel something could be done to correct the American course in Iraq. The world did hear from them this week when the New York Times carried an article written by six US military personnel serving in Iraq — Army specialist Buddhika Jayamaha, sergeants Wesley D. Smith, Jeremy Roebuck, Omar Mora and Edward Sandmeier and staff sergeants Yance T. Gray and Jeremy A. Murphy.
The article summarised what most people already knew but denied by the US administration: That the US is not winning is unlikely to win "hearts and minds" of Iraqis has ended up alienating everyone.
The article carries pointed references to the massive number of Iraqis who have fled their country and to similar number internally displaced. The article highlights the plight of the ordinary people of Iraq — the lack of electricity, services, drinking water, and above all security.
One of the most damaging revelations in the article is that the Iraqi security forces — which the writers find penetrated at the street level by Shiite militiamen and their supporters —  have become not only totally unreliable in times of crisis but also a potential source of danger for US soldiers.
Add to that what we know already of the complexities of the Iraqi way of politics, the alliances and rivalries, the fortune-hunters and back-stabbers and opportunists, and the people at large who continue to pay the price of a foreign military misadventure and who have seen the "liberator" turning to an "occupier" and to an "oppressor."
Does the net image that emerges look like a war that could be won?
Of course, Maliki has little option but to hope and continue to try to salvage himself and his government so that the US could see at least one of its strategic objectives being pushed through: Approval of legislation that would effectively hand over control of Iraq's oil resources to foreign companies.
Indeed, there is nothing that could stop anyone drawing up a wishlist, but it is a dead certainty that the US wishes in Iraq would only remain on a list.

Sunday, August 19, 2007

US 'better off with Sadr'

Aug.19, 2007


US 'better off' with Sadr as an ally


ONE OF the most interesting theories that have come up recently is that the US would be better off working with firebrand Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr to restore the "state" in Iraq and with Iran to restore normal Washington-Tehran relations if it were to hope for a face-saving formula to get out of the Iraq crisis.
The strongest proponent of the theory is William S. Lind, director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation in Washington.
The practical implementation of Lind's theory hinges on the precondition that the US administration accepts that its maximalist objectives of the invasion and occupation are not realisable, and it could no longer hope to dictate terms but could only hope to try influence things in a manner that reduces its losses and produces a way out of Iraq.
Essentially, Washington has to accept that the US is already defeated in Iraq and should act immediately in the light of that acceptance rather than wait for events to take their course towards the inevitability of having to eat crow in Iraq.
Indeed, that is where the problem is rooted. The US continues to believe that a victory in Iraq means the chaotic country being turned into an American satellite that is friendly to Israel and will guarantee US energy interests and offer military bases from which American forces can dominate the region.
That is where the neoconservatives who planned and orchestrated the Iraq war made their biggest mistake. None of these objectives were ever attainable and would never be attained regardless of how much military power the US throws into Iraq.
Let us start from point zero. The US-led invasion destroyed the "state" in Iraq and restoring it should be Washington's first priority. However, it would be unable to do so as long as it continues on its present course. The US would never be able to turn the government of Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki to be the unifying force capable of re-knitting Iraq because any association with the US becomes an immediate disqualifying factor for any Iraqi politician, whether Shiite or Sunni. The US remains an invader and occupier in most Iraqi eyes and it is simply impossible for Washington to be the creator of a post-Saddam Hussein state in Iraq. It has no option but to work with the country's Shiites to create a new state but only with a clear and public declaration of its intentions not to continue its occupation of Iraq and of a clear timeline for military withdrawal from that country. And Sadr, by his steadfast resistance against the US, is, at this juncture in time, the most credible Shiite leader in Iraq, no matter how Washington evaluates him in view of his known links with Iran.
Sadr has played his cards right. He has even reached out to Sunni groups by ordering his Mahdi Army militiamen to call off their violent campaign against the Sunnis and entering a de facto alliance with some of the Sunni factions.
There are many who believe that Sadr has already set his eyes on the highest position of power in Iraq and hence his strong emphasis on Shiite-Sunni unity against the US. They are suggesting that the time might not be more opportune for the US to make an overture to Sadr if indeed Washington is sincere in its declaration that it does not want to continue its military occupation indefinitely.
The US should essentially realise that it is no longer a question of ensuring that Iraq would remain US-friendly when the US forces withdraw from that country. It is simply impossible, given the way the US conducted itself in post-war Iraq. The question should indeed be how to ensure minimum losses and maxium protection for US forces as they withdraw from Iraq. In order to achieve that there should be a state that would co-operate with the clear understanding that the US military is leaving Iraq for good. In fact, the leaders of that new state would be more anxious than the American themselves to create an environment that is conducive to an accelerated US withdrawal from the country.
There would indeed be Sunni rejection of any US-Sadr deal. But then, the US should know that it could not please everyone. The Sunnis of Iraq have to accept that their days of domination are over and their only hope is to negotiate and bargain for the best deal they could get from whoever emerges as the political leader in a post-US occupation Iraq.
Of course, the strongest opposition to any US move to enter a compromise of sorts with Sadr would come from other Shiite leaders, but that is where Iran comes in with its clout with the Shiite community in Iraq in general to remove challenges to Sadr.
That is precisely the reason why the US should abandon its determination to subdue Iran and seek to launch an all-embracing dialogue aimed at settling most, if not all, differences and stabilise relations with the Islamic republic.
Washington should drop its belief that ending its in-built hostility towards Iran's theocratic regime and normalising relations with Tehran implies defeat for the US. Simply put, there would never be a US victory in Iraq as long as Washington pursues a belligerent course towards Iran.
Dropping hostility and negotiating an end to the tension with Iran is not seen as an option for the US at this point because Washington is convinced that it is not possible to co-exist with Tehran. The Iranian regime is similarly convinced, and Tehran could not be expected to help Washington to stabilise Iraq as long as the US military is present there. Instead, Iran believes that its interests of getting the US out of the region and emerging as a dominating regional power could be served only through continued destabilisation of Iraq. One could also throw in Afghanistan for good measures.
Within Iraq, the US could strike a deal with Moqtada Sadr, but that would be at the expense of accepting and acknowledging that it could not realise its objectives of the invasion of that country. Beyond that, it would simply mean giving up Iraq to be controlled by forces friendly to Iran, a much worse fate than being defeated in Iraq.
It is almost certain that with Sadr as the dominant Shiite political figure (under a hypothetical deal engineered by the US), there is no telling how the cookie will crumble in Iraq.
On the other hand, stabilising relations with Tehran and working out a face-saving formula by promoting Sadr, the US would be able to work out an exit strategy out of Iraq and also be assured that groups like Al Qaeda are significantly weakened because the new state in Iraq would make sure that such destabilising forces are chased out after the US quits the country.
It would indeed be a key scoring point in the US-led war against terror.
The Lind theory is an excellent suggestion for Washington because it offers the best way out of the US with the minimum loss of face. Washington and Tehran may not be become buddies, but they would be able to work out a formula under which they would avoid a confrontation and that is good news for the region.
However, the element that deflates all prospects for such course of events is the obvious determination among the Washington hard-liners, led by Vice-President Dick Cheney, to stage military action against Iran and not to allow anything to stand in their way of eliminating that country as a potential threat to US and Israeli interests in the region.
It is the same Washington camp that plotted and orchestrated the invasion of Iraq that is behind the campaign for military strike against Iran. And it is also clear that all they need is a pretext to launch action, and the neoconservatives are admitting it in public.
nother 9/11 attack.
In an article titled "To save America, we need another 9/11," Stu Bykofsky writes in the Philadelphia Daily News that the fight between the Republicans and Democrats over Iraq shows that the US is divided and that the unity of Americans brought about by the Sept.11 attacks has disappeared.
Therefore, Bykofsky argues, the US needs another 9/11 style attack "quell the chattering of chipmunks and to restore America's righteous rage and singular purpose to prevail."
What Bykofsky falls short of suggesting is that Iran has already been lined up as the target for the "righteous rage" and "singular purpose."
Against that reality, theories and proposals such as those made by Lind have as much chance of consideration as the Iranians opting to buy Japanese caviar.

Saturday, August 18, 2007

A threat that would be a reality

Aug.18, 2007

A threat that will soon be a reality


AMONG the many silent and not-so-silent drives undertaken by Israel to consolidate its grip on Palestinian land is a campaign to evict as many Arab residents from East Jerusalem in order to dilute the non-Jewish presence in the Holy City and strengthen the number of Jews there. It is indeed an integral part of Israel's quest to "legitimise" its occupation of Arab East Jerusalem and its claim that the eastern half of the city is an "indivisible" part of the "eternal capital" of the Jewish state.
According to the Israeli human rights group B'Tselem, the number of Palestinian residents of Arab East Jerusalem who had their permanent residency status revoked in 2006 increased dramatically — more than six fold. While the number stood at 272 in 2003 and was 222 in 2005, last year 1,363 residents of Arab East Jerusalem had their residency status revoked, according to the group, which quoted the figures from statistics available with the Israeli occupation authorities.
Israel applies a special formula while dealing with the Palestinian residents of Arab East Jerusalem, which it occupied in the 1967 war. Immediately after seizing the eastern part of the city from Jordan, Israel said it was granting the area's Arab residents full Israeli citizenship provided that they swear allegiance to the Jewish state and renounce any other citizenships they may have. It effectively meant that the city's Arab residents had to give up their Palestinian identity once and for all. Not many accepted the offer, and then came an offer of permanent residency status, which meant the Arab residents cannot vote in parliamentary elections, but they can vote in municipal elections and can work in Israel.
In 1996, as it became clear that Israel would have to negotiate peace with the Palestinians sooner or later, the Jewish state launched a quite drive to revoke the residency status in Arab East Jerusalem, starting with Arab residents who had moved outside of the city's municipal boundaries. It also applied an across-the-board policy of refusing Arabs to build new homes or expand existing buidlings. Parallel to that, it also encouraged Jews to buy Palestinian-owned property in Arab East Jerusalem.
Israel has always taken note of the fact that the growth of Arab population is far higher than that of Jews and it became Israel's need to keep the number of Arabs living in East Jerusalem as low as possible and hence the mass revocation of permanent residency status in what B'Tselem describes as a a policy of "quiet transfer."
The complex laws and regulations applied by Israel make it impossible for anyone to fight the revocation of permanent residency status in Arab East Jerusalem. In fact, the same situation applies to any fight against any aspect of Israel's occupation of Palestinian land.
In the case of Arab East Jerusalem in particular, any delay in working out an Israeli-Palestinian agreement works in Israel's favour. The disarray in Palestinian ranks makes it all the more easy for Israel to carry out its plans.
No doubt, the Palestinian leaders, whether Fatah, Hamas, centre, left or right, are aware of the danger, but they are too busy fighting among themselves that they could not focus their efforts to deal with the real enemy, Israel. And the losers in the bid to regain Arab East Jersualem, which houses the third holiest shrine in Islam, would not be the Palestinians alone but the entire Muslim World.

Friday, August 10, 2007

The only way to stability

Aug.10, 2007
The only way for stability




THE meeting of tribal leaders from Afghanistan and Pakistan under way in Kabul is perhaps the best chance to stabilise Afghanistan in the face of a resurgent Taliban who are operating from near the border between the two countries. No doubt, the Taliban, who have become a source of perennial headache for the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as the US-led Western coalition present in Afghanistan, have support from the tribes on both sides of the border and hence the significance of the jirga.
It is a tradition for centuries that the region has relied on jirgas among tribes to settle problems, but the Kabul forum marks the first time that neighbouring tribal elders have come together for talks on the growing militant violence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
However, any effort to stabilise Afghanistan has to have as its central pillar the acceptance of the fact that the Taliban are as Afghan as anyone else. There is no prospect of any success for any effort in Afghanistan while the Taliban are kept out.
The Taliban might have unwittingly posed themselves as models for other militant groups elsewhere, but the Afghan group's agenda had always been and remains Afghanistan specific. Taliban-linked militant actions in Pakistan were and are directly linked to the crisis in Afghanistan and not the result of the Taliban trying to export their brand of militancy abroad.
The growth of pro-Taliban sympathies in the tribal areas along the Afghan-Pakistan border has to do with mainly the history of neglect, denial, ignorance and lack of development of the region and the group's emergence as a symbol of rebellion in the 1990s.
There has alwasy been a sense of social injustice felt by the residents of the region over the centuries. The rulers in power centres in the area could not be bothered to look into the way of life of people in the area. Even with the creation of Afghanistan and Pakistan last century as they exist today, there was little effort to uplift the lot of the tribes in the border area.. Whatever effort that was exerted was thwarted by the tribal leaders who tried dictate their terms.
In the process, resentment and bitterness grew among the tribes towards whoever was in power and they became rebellious by nature.
Involving the tribes in the exercise of stabilising Afghanistan has hopefully started with the jirga in Kabul.
Political imperatives might be involved in the absence of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf at the conference, but it need not be seen as a major blow to the effort because no overnight breakthroughs are expected, particularly that some of the important tribal leaders are also absent.
A good start has been given, but it would be counterproductive for anyone to pin all hopes on mobilising the tribes against the Taliban and succeeding in the effort. The exercise should not be aimed at intensifying the military fight against the Taliban but to deal with the group with a view to bringing them into mainstream politics. It is no easy mission, and compromises would have to made by all sides, but that is the only way for stability in Afghanistan and the border region.

Thursday, August 09, 2007

Social injustice is the root

Aug.9, 2007

Social injustice is the root

THE meeting of tribal leaders from Afghanistan and Pakistan under way in Kabul is perhaps the best chance to stabilise Afghanistan in the face of a resurgent Taliban who are operating from near the border between the two countries. No doubt, the Taliban, who have become a source of perennial headache for the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as the US-led Western coalition present in Afghanistan, have support from the tribes on both sides of the border and hence the significance of the jirga.
It is indeed a tradition for centuries that the region has relied on jirgas among tribes to settle problems, but the Kabul forum marks the first time that neighbouring tribal elders have come together for talks on the growing militant violence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
However, any effort to stabilise Afghanistan has to have its central pillar the acceptance of the fact that the Taliban are as Afghan as anyone else and they have to be part of any power-sharing agreement in Kabul. There is no prospect of any success for any effort in Afghanistan while the Taliban are kept out.
The Taliban might have unwittingly posed themselves as models for other militant groups elsewhere, but the Afghan group's agenda has always been and remains Afghanistan specific. Taliban-linked militant actions in Pakistan were and are directly linked to the crisis in Afghanistan and not the result of the Taliban trying to export their brand of militancy abroad. The growth of pro-Taliban sympathies in the tribal areas along the Afghan-Pakistan border has to do with mainly the history of neglect, denial, ignorance and lack of development of the region and the group's emergence as a symbol of rebellion in the 1990s.
There has alwasy been a sense of social injustice felt by the residents of the region over the centuries. The rulers in power centres in the area could not be bothered to look into the way of life of people in the area. Even with the creation of Afghanistan and Pakistan last century as they exist today, there was little effort to uplift the lot of the tribes in the border area.. Whatever effort that was indeed exerted was thwarted by the tribal leaders who tried dictate their terms.
In the process, resentment and bitterness grew among the tribes towards whoever was in power and they became rebellious by nature.
Involving the tribes in the exercise of stabilising Afghanistan has hopefully started with the jirga in Kabul.
Political imperatives might be involved in the absence of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf at the conference, but it need not be seen as a major blow to the effort because no overnight breakthroughs are expected, particularly that some of the important tribal leaders are also absent.
A good start has been given, but it would be counterproductive for anyone to pin all hopes on mobilising the tribes against the Taliban and succeeding in the effort. The exercise should not be aimed at intensifying the military fight against the Taliban but to deal with the group with a view to bringing them into mainstream politics. It is no easy mission, and compromises would have to made by all sides, but that is the only way for stability in Afghanistan and the border region.

Wednesday, August 08, 2007

Vision and courage for justice

Aug.8, 2007

Vision and courage for fairness, justice


IT IS WELCOME news that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is gathering support for a Middle East conference proposed by US President George W Bush in an intiative that could be prove to be a watershed for efforts to Arab-Israeli peace.
No doubt all key players will agree to attend the conference because the Saudi-intitiated Arab proposal is there as the only comprehensive approach to peace in Palestine and between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon.
Indeed, that is assuming that the Arab peace proposal would be the central theme at the proposed conference rather than the piecemeal approach favoured and demanded by Israel. If anyone has any other ideas, then the whole exercise would be wasted.
Therefore, it should be clear that Israel should not be using the conference to establish contacts and relations with the Arab World while it corners the Palestinians and tries to impose its version of a peace agreement on them.
The Arab peace plan envisions every things that is linked to Arab-Israeli co-existence in the region. The Arabs are offering the Jewish state the legitimacy it seeks as a member of the regional order in return for its return of the Arab territories it occupied in the 1967 war, co-operation in finding a just solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees and creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with Arab East Jerusalem as its capital.
Indeed, the key questions are the future of Jerusalem, the borders of a Palestinian state and the right of return for refugees.
When Israeli leaders balk at making a commitment that the negotiations would include these issues, then it is time that the Arabs and those wishing a fair and just settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict took note.
We have used to Israel's deception-based strategies and tactics too long to accept anything at face value while dealing with the Jewish state.
There has to be a definite and irrevocable commitment on the Israeli side that these key issues would be placed on the table with the Palestinians with a view to working out an equitable solution that would not be at the expense of the Palestinians, who are the agrieved party.
Of course, some compromises would have to be made but nothing should infringe upon the core of the conflict — the inalienable and legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
It requires willpower, courage and determination not only to propose peace on honourable terms but also to accept the challenge and do what it takes to settle a problem as complicated as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Arabs have done their part. Can or will the Israelis do their part?

Saturday, August 04, 2007

The shame of the 'silent majority'

Aug.4, 2007

The shame of the 'silent' majority

by pv vivekanand

The alarming report that more than half of Iraq's population live in poverty and hunger and disease are growing in the country brings up the key question: Why is the US doing this to the people of Iraq?
Did the people of Iraq invade the US?
Did the people of Iraq threaten the US?
Did the people of Iraq challenge US interests anywhere in the world? Did the people of Iraq occupy homes in the US?
Did the people of Iraq rape American girls?
Let us for a moment consider the theory that the regime of Saddam Hussein was rogue and did not serve US interests in the region and that was the reason the US invaded Iraq.
Doesn't it follow that, having invaded the country and toppled the "rogue" regime, it becomes the responsibility and obligation of the invader and occupier to ensure that those who were oppressed during the ousted regime should enjoy the fruits of being "liberated" from a tyrant?
The US is behaving in a manner that it is nobody's business to question what it is doing in Iraq and how it is treating the people of Iraq. Washington seems to believe that the world should continue to celebrate that the poor suffering Iraqis were "liberated" and should be thankful to the sole superpower for having done so.
The US should not have shirked its responsibilities towards the people of Iraq. But Washington is not showing any sign of accepting that it did evade its responsibility. It is continuing to subject the people of Iraq not only to murder, abuse and gross oppressionand expose them to starvation and disease by denying them basic essentials to survive.
In post-war Iraq, prices of food have shot up so high that one third of Iraqis could not afford even a decent daily meal. Compare that with the pre-war situation, where the government offered them most staples at subsidised prices.
In post-war Iraq, nearly 70 per cent of people do not have access to drinking water. Compare that with the pre-war situation, where there was no shortage of drinking water.
In post-war Iraq, people have an average of four to five hours of power supply and that too intermittently. Compare that with the pre-war situation, where there was no shortage power and even industries thrived.
In post-war Iraq, people did not have to cower inside their homes fearing they could get killed in bombings or they could be shot to death in their homes by storming troopers. Compare that with the pre-war situation, where the fear of death is ever-present, whether at home or outside. One might be fortunate to escape a car-bombing in the street, then there is no escape from the fear that sectarian militias or occupation soldiers could simply knock at your door and shoot you down.
In post-war Iraq, children could go to schools and entertain dreams of good education and a fair career whether in the country or outside. Compare that with the pre-war situation, where the country's education system is in shambles, with teachers and students living in perennial terror of being targeted by insurgents or of being caught in the cross-fire between the "good" and "bad" men (regardless how you define "good" and "bad").
Who bears the responsibility for this state of affairs in Iraq?
It is easy to hold the governments of the US and its allied countries responsible. But then, don't the people who elected those governments have any responsibility? If the people plead helplessness to influence their elected government against gross violations of the human rights, then they don't have the right to call themselves democracies.
There is something seriously wrong when only a small percentage of the world's six billion people have the willingness or inclination to publicly express their rejection of what their governments are doing to the people of Iraq. Doesn't that imply that the "silent" majority approve of whatever is happening in Iraq but that they still belong to the so-called civilised world.
It is hypocrasy of the tallest order, and the "silent" majority should be ashamed of themselves. Everyone of them is responsible for every Iraqi who gets killed or maimed, for every Iraqi who dies in the daily bombings or in the US-led military sweep, for every Iraqi who goes to sleep hungry, for every Iraqi who is detained and tortured, for every Iraqi who lives in perpetual terror, every Iraqi who dies because the country's health system functions no more, every Iraqi who had to flee his or her home, and for every Iraqi who has no school to go to.
The "silent" majority is also responsible for shoving Iraqis into the arms of groups like Al Qaeda, which has turned Iraq into killing grounds and a platform to wage a war of attrition against the US.
Al Qaeda never had a presence in Iraq prior to the US invasion and it is the US military presence there that is drawing "international jihadists" like a magnet.
It was the governments elected by the majority of the "civilised" world which pushed the people of Iraq and tipped them over into the bottomless abyss of denial, despair, frustration, anger, agony and suffering. And the majority of the "civilised" world have to answer for it.