Sharon targets Arafat

By PV Vivekanand

IF WE were to take Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon seriously, then the worst development in the Israeli-Palestinian equation is not the killing of Israeli minister Rehavam Zeevi but Sharon's assertion that the era of Yasser Arafat was over.
If anything, Sharon's declaration and dispatch of several ministers to convince Washington that Arafat was no longer a viable partner for peace reeks of Israel's well-known arrogance and contemptuous treatment of the Palestinians.
Equally sinister is Sharon's "warning" of an impending war: “Arafat has seven days to impose absolute quiet in the (occupied) territories. Ifnot, we will go to war against him. As far as I am concerned, the era ofArafat is over.”
One wonders how far Israel is willing to go in Sharon's war. If the hawkish former general's record is anything to go by, then it would mean Israeli soldiers armed to the teeth and supported by heavy tanks, bombers and helicopters entering Palestinian towns and villages to "eliminate" every trace of resistance. Quite simply a re-enactment of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and of course the massacre of thousands in Sabra and Shattila.
But the Israeli premier is riding on false hopes if he believes that a change of guard at the leadership would make any difference to the Palestinians' determination to gain their legitimate rights and not to be dissuaded from adopting whatever means they have at their disposal to achieve that goal.
The worst mistake Israel ever made in the Middle East peace process was taking the Palestinian people for granted and assuming that the decades of brutal occupation have co-opted them into accepting that they were not a match to Israel's military might and, as such, they should be thankful to whatever Israel was willing to offer them.
Israel coerced Arafat into accepting the 1993 Oslo agreement by partly intimidating him with a scenario of Palestinian Islamists (like Hamas and allied groups) gaining strength and popularity in the occupied territories at the expense of the nationalists represented by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).
Arafat was more than tempted to accept Oslo. He had found himself largely isolated in the Arab World as a result of the pro-Iraq position he had adopted during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. So, the Oslo agreements represented his political salvation, another element that Israel counted for itself in the bargain.
Since then, regardless of whoever was in power, Israel expected Arafat to act as its proxy policeman in the occupied territories by keeping the Palestinian people in check and containing armed resistance.
To a large extent, it worked for some time. A majority of the Palestinians were indeed tired and frustrated over what they saw as the impossibility of the situation and were jubiliant when the Oslo agreement was signed. They were willing to give peace a chance.
Many actually expected a total Israeli withdrawal from most of the land the Jewish state occupied in the 1967 war and Arab East Jerusalem be named the capital of an independent Palestinian state under some compromise arrangement even it meant giving up part of the Arab identity of the city. For them it was largely a matter of technicalities that needed to be addressed in the process.
However, problems started cropping up when Israel started showing its real colours, and soon it became clear that the Israeli scenario under the Oslo agreement would involve heavy territorial compromises and political limitations for the Palestinians. In the meantime, Israel sought to legitimise itself in the region through Arab recognition.
The signs of the Israeli approach manifested themselves from day one.
We recall distinctly Israel's refusal to hand over a map of the Palestinian territory showing the potential shape of a Palestinian entity as promised at the sighing in Cairo in June 1994 of the first "implementation" deal as the first phase of the Oslo accord.
Arafat refused to sign the agreement, and it took a lot of persuasion and promises by the US that no matter what the inalienable rights of the Palestinians would be respected in the "final status negotiations" before he signed the deal. After all, UN Security Council resolutions were the basis for a final agreement, he was assured.
Similar situations were re-enacted at every stage since then, and everytime it was the Palestinians who had to give up something.
The Israeli strategy was clear: It began negotiations on every phase of implementing the Oslo agreement by imposing tough demands, and the Palestinians put up resistance. Obviously the deadlock had to be broken and the mediator, the US, was brought in inevitably. The end result was simple: Agreements were reached, but they involved Palestinian compromises more than Israeli "concessions." If anything, on a scale of 1-10 (10 being the full realisation of Palestinian rights), Israel "maganimously" gave up 2 and the Palestinians surrendered 8. And when it came to actual implemenation, Israel fell short of its obligation to give up 2 and the Palestinians were asked to absorb that loss.
The Palestiniain experience was repeated at every stage of the negotiations.
The shifting political powers in Israel since 1996 had had their bearing on the negotiations, but not in real terms since the bipartisan Israeli objective was clear; the Palestinians have to remain under Israel's control in whatever form and shape, with limited political and territorial freedom. Furthermore, Israel always sought to retain the West Bank and Gaza as a captive market for its products (the annual Israeli "exports" to the Palestinian territories are around $2 billon).
The dreams of an independent Palestinian state with Arab East Jerusalem as its capital suffered a serious setback in the summer of 2000 when the then Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, made it clear that Israel had no intention ever to respect the Arab and Islamic identity of the Holy City by returning it to the Palestinians.
The three main elements that foiled a peace accord being worked out at Camp David in August last year were:
— Israel's refusal to respect the Palestinian rights to Arab East Jerusalem.
— Israel's rejection of the "right of return" of upto four million Palestinian refugees.
— Israel's insistence on keeping territorial control over large chunks of West Bank land that would have deprived the Palestinians of physical continuity that is vital for an independent state.
The deadlock at Camp David led to a sudden surge of Palestinian frustration, and Sharon's infamous visit to Al Aqsa in September as a declaration of Israel's determination not to give up Arab East Jerusalem broke the proverbial last straw for the Palestinians. The Intifada — the anti-occupation revolt that was part of the reason that prompted Israel to join the peace process in 1991 — was relaunched with increased intensity.
The writing went up on the wall when Sharon was elected prime minister early this year that the Palestinian hopes were dealt another serious blow, for his record of hatred for anything Arab was well known; so was his campaign to evict all the Palestinian across the River Jordan.
We have clearly seen what happened since Sharon's election. Israel stepped up the intensity of its military bruality against the Palestinians and the cycle of violence continued.
Today, international condemnation makes little difference to Israel when its sends its hi-tech fighter planes, helicopter gunships and tanks into war-like action against the residents of the West Bank and Gaza.
Israel wasted no opportunity to discredit Yasser Arafat in front of his own people. Israeli leaders have made no secret of their conviction that Arafat was expected to carry out Israel's wishes against his own people.
Zeevi's killing was the natural result of Israel's actions. There would be more to come. Neither Arafat nor any other Palestinian leader would be able to check the manifestations of their people's fury and frustration against occupation.
Sharon's argument that Arafat is no longer a credible counterpart to discuss peace stems only from the Palestinian leader's refusal to mow down his own people. Washington should know better than to conveniently accept Sharon's argument. The consequences would be unpredictable.