Friday, February 13, 2004

9/11 probe - Deception again

PV Vivekanand

BY NAMING a hand-picked group of peopled mostly deemed as Republican loyalists to conduct an investigations into "intelligence" failure in Iraq, the Bush administration is seen as trying to conceal the real fact of the affair -- intelligence data was tailored to suit and facilitate the administration's determination to launch war against Iraq.
The argument among American commentators today is that the so-called neoconservatives — read as pro-Israeli hardliners — in Washington were determined to wage on Iraq from the day George Bush entered the White House in 2001.
Such an argument was rife in the Middle East but it has gathered so much strength in Washington today that the administration is accused of creating the right atmosphere and conditions to launch military action against Iraq and went about it ruthlessly, picking and choosing information that suited its purposes and discarding anything that could raise questions about its intentions.
The "independent" investigation has been ordered with the predetermined objective that it would come up with a tailor-made finding exenorating Bush and the hardline neoconservatives around him of the political crime of deliberately waging an unprovoked war based on false and misleading claims that they themselves had created in the first place, argues Barry Grey, writing on the World Socialist Web Site.
That is one of the many salvos against Washington.
"Claims Iraq had nuclear weapons, death rays, vans of death, drones of death, mobile germ labs, poison gas factories, hidden weapons depots, long-ranged missiles, links to Al Qaeda — all were false," says The only thing real: Iraq's oil," says by Eric Margolis, a syndicated foreign affairs columnist and broadcaster, and author of War at the Top of the World - The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet.
The New York Times recently carried an article recalling that US Secretary of State Collin Powell appeared at the United Nations Security Council in February 2003 that the evidence added up to "facts" and "not assertions" that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and that it was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program and building a fleet of advanced missiles.
"Powell's testimony, delivered at a moment of high suspense as American forces gathered in the Gulf region, was widely seen as the most powerful and persuasive presentation of the Bush administration's case that Iraq was bristling with horrific weapons. His reputation for caution and care gave it added credibility," said the New York Times.
"A year later, some of the statements made by Powell have been confirmed, but many of his gravest findings have been upended by David A. Kay, who until Jan. 23 was Washington's chief weapons inspector...," notes the paper.
The emerging consensus among American commentators is that
Bush and his people, having failed to tconvince the world that Saddam Hussein was somehow linked to Al Qaeda and thus to the Sept.11 attacks, came up with charges that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction and posed a security threat to the US and the rest of the world.
Now, having invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam but failing to come up with any proof that he had any weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration is engaged in an effort to exonerate itself by blaming intelligence failure for the pre-war claims.
Bush this week shifted his rationale for the war saying Saddam had the capability to build weapons of mass destruction and he needed to be removed. Saddam having the capability was enough reason for war, he argued.
As a footnote, Bush also asserted that he had done a big favour for the people of Iraq by removing Saddam. Of course, Bush stayed away from recalling that prior to the war he himself had rattled off a list of specific quantities of chemical weapons like nerve gas and biological weapons and cited them as offering a legitimate reason for invading Iraq and toppling Saddam.
The very structure of the investigating panel indicates that the outcome of the inquiry would clear the administration saying that US intelligence agencies "misread" information and reached the conclusion that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction and advised senior administration officals accordingly. These officials in turn conveyed the information to people closest to Bush like Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Condaleeza Rice and Powell, who in turn advised Bush, and the president acted accordingly; and that solves the problem, according to the thinking of those who are orchestrating the exercise now.
Washington describes the investigators as independent. But there is little of any independence about the group.
Retired federal judge Laurence Silberman, who co-chairs the investigating panel, is known as a long-time Republic supporters and has a record of having cleared senior Republican administration officials of any wrongdoing in past cases, points out Grey in an article on World Socialist Web Site under the title "Bush’s Iraq commission and the 'intelligence failure' fraud."
Grey specifically efers to the infamous Iran-Contra scandal during the Reagan adminstration years. (The scandal stemmed from a revelation that Reagan had authorised a secret operation to finance and arm, in violation of US law, the contra death squads that killed tens of thousands of people in Nicaragua. Silberman played a key role in sabotaging the investigation by Iran-Contra independent counsel Lawrence Walsh).
Grey argues:
"Bush brought into his administration precisely those extreme militarists such as Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz who had for the better part of a decade been campaigning for a new war to “finish the job” left undone by the Gulf war of 1991—overthrowing the Baathist regime, occupying Iraq, and seizing control of its oil resources. Both he and Cheney had the closest ties to American oil and energy conglomerates that stood to benefit most immediately and directly from this imperialist enterprise.
"The evidence is, by now, voluminous that Bush and his top advisers came to power with the determination to invade Iraq. What they lacked was a pretext. The terrorist attacks of Sept.11, 2001, provided them with precisely the casus belli they had been seeking, and they eagerly seized on it, even though they knew Saddam Hussein had nothing to do with the hijack-bombings and had no links to Al Qaeda.
"Far from being misled, Bush and his co-conspirators proceeded to concoct a case for waging an unprovoked war, relying on the complicity of the Democratic Party and the media. A central preoccupation of the administration became the fabrication of intelligence."

Suspect timing

The timing of the expected submission of the inquiry panel's report — until after the November elections — is also suspect. No doubt, the timing is set to serve the purpose of concealing the real facts and pre-empt any political fallout from the report, argues Bush opponents.
Most telling is the mandated task of the panel — determining why there was an "intelligence failure" that led to conflicting claims and statements by Bush and his closest aides like Vice-President Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice, Powell and others on Iraq's alleged stocks of weapons of mass destruction.
The whole premise of this assertion sidesteps any investigations into determining whether these false claims were issued with the sole objective of justifying the war and those who made the claims knew that they were based on doctored intelligence reports.
The investigation should have been entrusted with a non-partisan group and ordered to focus on the behind-the-scene conduct of Bush and others around him as they plotted the war against Iraq. Such an inquiry, if conducted in transparency and objectivity, would have revealed the truth of the political conspiracy and disinformation campaign that the administration waged in order to build the case against Saddam.
That anyone in the administration who opposed that approach was booted out was evident in the dismissal of Paul O’Neill as treasury secretary last year. O'Neill has revealed that the Bush administration started discussing means to set the ground for invading and occupying Iraq as soon as Bush assumed office in January 2001. He stated that the overthrow of Saddam was a priority topic at the first National Security Council meeting of the Bush administration and that he had access to documents that clearly indicated that the administration was planning the invasion and occupation of Iraq and exploitation of its oil reserves in the first days after assuming office.
Rumseld himself is said to have advocated seizing the Sept.11 attacks as the pretext for war against Iraq and preparing for invasion and occupation of that country in less than 24 hours after the aerial assaults in New York and Washington. The war on Afghanistan was only the fore-runner of the action against Iraq.
When one speaks about "intelligence failure," the agency that would be faulted should be the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In the case of Iraq, the CIA had done its job, but its findings were twisted and used selectively and often out-of-context to serve the purpose of those who were determined to wage war on Iraq.
A honest and objective investigation would reveal that
Rumsfeld and his associates at the Defence Department had set up their own intelligence operation, called the Office of Special Plans.
This operation skirted all intelligence agencies of the US, including the CIA, and created, twisted and filtered information in a manner that a case for war against Iraq was built on dubious grounds.
Apart from discrediting and twisting CIA findings that there was no evidence that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, the Office of Special Plans adopted the view that the CIA was undermining the OSP findings.
Laurie Mylroie, who is close to Cheney and other hardliners in Washington, has accused the CIA and the State Department of "systematically" discrediting "critical intelligence about Saddam’s regime, including indisputable evidence of its possession of weapons of mass destruction.”
According to Washington insiders, these bent upon discrediting the State Department and the CIA included Cheney, Rumsfeld, Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Wolfowitz' deputy Douglas Feith and Pentagon adviser Richard Perle.
Kenneth Pollack, a former CIA analyst, has provided an insight to the workings of the Office of Special Plans. He says that the Bush ddministration gave "greatest credence to accounts that presented the most lurid picture of Iraqi activities. In many cases intelligence analysts were distrustful of those sources, or knew unequivocally that they were wrong. But when they said so, they were not heeded...."
The administration aslo drew heavily on newspaper articles that conformed to the views of administration officials, he says.
"To a great extent OSP personnel ‘cherry-picked’ the intelligence they passed on, selecting reports that supported the Administration’s pre-existing position and ignoring all the rest," says Pollack.
A particular example, he says, was the way the OSP accepted every "report" given by the anti-Saddam Iraqi National Congress (INC) headed by Ahmed Chalabi on Saddam's alleged weapons of mass destruction and rejected reports given by trained intelligence officers because the INC was saying what the OSP "wanted to hear."
In turn, the OSP passed "raw, unverified intelligence straight to the cabinet level as gospel," says Pollack.
Such formal submission of reports was made an integral part of the OSP activities since the senior administration officials who made public statements based wanted to back up themselves.
The Washington Post wrote in June 1003 that Cheney and one of his top aides had tried to pressure the CIA "into producing more categorical and blood-curdling assessments of Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capacities" and “sent signals, intended or otherwise, that a certain output was desired from here.”
The Post went on to say that Iraq analyst at the CIA were under pressure to find information or write reports in a way that would help the administration make the case that going into Iraq was urgent.
Seymour Hersh wrote in the New Yorker magazine in October 2003: “The administration eventually got its way, a former CIA official said. ‘The analysts at the CIA were beaten down defending their assertions. And, they blame George Tenet for not protecting them. I’ve never seen a government like this.’”
No doubt these reports will be reviewed as routine by the new investigators, but it is unlikely that the officials will be questioned whether they were aware that the documents were based on doctored intelligence and they were filing it away for a situation where they were asked what their sources were.
The Bush administration is hoping that ordering an "independent" investigation will put to rest questions about the duplicity of its approach to war and the issue would not cast clouds on Bush's re-election chances.
But it might not be the case. In the days, weeks and months ahead, there would be more revelations and political horse-trading in Washington — plus a potential failure of Washington's political efforts in Iraq — that could raise more serious and focused questions about why the war itself. And those questions would refuse to be shelved, given the added ammunition Bush's Democrat rivals have found in their arsenal.
Bill van Auken, leader of the Socialist Equality Party of the US, summarised what many Americans feel today.
He says that the Iraq embroglio was "not a matter of miscalculations or exaggerations by intelligence agents."
"The administration repeatedly claimed that it had irrefutable evidence that Iraq had several hundred tonnes of chemical and biological weapons and was on the verge of obtaining nuclear weapons," Van Auken points out. "Top officials insisted that they even knew the precise whereabouts of these weapons. Now, with the first anniversary of the war approaching, they are forced to admit that not a single vial of such material is to be found in all of Iraq.
"If no weapons were there, clearly there existed no verified evidence that they were there, something that United Nations inspectors attested to before the war began. The inescapable conclusion is that the government manufactured a pretext for dragging the American people into war. As a result, tens of thousands of Iraqis have been killed. At least 525 US soldiers have lost their lives and thousands more have been wounded.
"This would be the starting point for any genuinely independent investigation. The questions before such a panel would include: Who was responsible for lying to the American people and to the world in order to carry out an illegal war? Whose interests—hidden behind the false claims about WMD—were served by this war? How was the administration allowed to get away with it?"