Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Political tsunami in Lebanon






February 21 2005
Hariri assassination a political tsunami

pv vivekanand

There could be a dozen varying political scenarios in the Lebanese-Syrian equation, but no matter how Damascus plays its hand, the American-led pressure being applied against Syria to withdraw its 13-15,000-strong military force in Lebanon will not be eased. The Bush administration has clearly signalled it and it has French support. There is very little the Syrian government of President Bashar Al Assad could do to withstand the pressure and play the brinkmanship of his late father Hafez Al Assad.
Damascus retains enough clout in the Lebanese parliament to resist a change in government through the legislative process, but it might not be enough. The Hariri assassination has brought together many non-political Lebanese with political parties and communities such as the Sunni camp led by the slain prime minister, the Maronite Christian community and the Druze from Shouf mountains in an alliance that would not have been thought possible.
Despite the mounting accusations that Syria had ordered the killing of Hariri since he had fallen out with Damascus and posed a challenge to Syrian interests in Lebanon, the prevailing belief in the region is that the Syrians are not that naive to believe that they could get away with it. Many are convinced that an external force, most likely Israel, was behind the assassination since the Jewish state stood to benefit most from the resulting crisis.
French President Jacques Chirac, a close friend of Hariri, has bluntly accused Syria and its allies in Lebanon of orchestrating his assassination and demanded an immediate international investigation. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said his country had reasons for strong suspicion that Syria was behind the killing.
Israel's drive
The effort to terminate the Syrian influence in Lebanese affairs could be interpreted as part of Israel's drive -- successful so far indeed -- to separate the "Arab confrontation states or parties" -- Egypt, the Palestinians, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria -- from each other and pre-empt a united Arab negotiating position in the Middle East conflict.
That was established in 1978 when Israel managed to negotiate with Egypt on its own and sign the Camp David agreements. Egypt's Anwar Sadat might have initiated the move, but he was nudged into that corner by the US.
The Camp David agreements removed Egypt as a "confrontation state" with Israel, which followed up with invading Lebanon in 1982 and tried in vain to install an Israeli-friendly regime in Beirut. Israel had no choice but to withdraw from Lebanon after a disastrous 17-year occupation of southern Lebanon in 1999.

One down, four to go.

Israel dismantled a joint Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating position launched at the international conference in Madrid in late 1991 by engaging the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in secret talks that led to the signing of the Israel-PLO Oslo agreements in September 1993 under American auspices.
As soon as reports of the secret talks came out, Jordan said it was dismantling the joint negotiating team, leaving the PLO to pursue its own track with Israel with no reflections on the Jordanian track.
Subsequently, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in October 1994 while the Jewish state kept the PLO engaged in "interim arrangements" pending "final status" negotiations in 1998.
Two down, two to go.
Now it is Lebanon's turn to be pried away. The first concrete step in this direction came when the UN Security Council adopted a US-backed resolution in September 2004. Resolution 1559 called on Syria to stop interfering in Lebanese affairs and withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Equally importantly, it said the Israeli-occupied Sheba Farms was seized from Syria in 1967 and not from Lebanon. It meant that no Lebanese territory was under Israeli occupation and therefore the Lebanese had no bilateral dispute with the Jewish state.
In order to fully assert for itself three down and one more to go, Israel needs to cut the Syrian-Lebanese artery as reflected in the strong Syrian influence in Lebanese politics, and this would be achieved when Damascus would find itself so much under international pressure that it would have no choice but to withdraw its forces from Lebanon and dismantle its intelligence network there. This was emphasised by US President George W Bush during his tour of Europe this week.
In a joint statement, Chirac and Bush said: "The United States and France join with the European Union and the international community in condemning the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, and in their support for a free, independent, and democratic Lebanon."
It added: "We urge full and immediate implementation of UN resolution 1559 in all its aspects."
Washington has recalled its ambassador to Syria following the assassination and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has stressed the distinction between holding Syria morally responsible for developments in Lebanon and directly accusing Damascus of Hariri's murder.
However, Chirac, whose country has close links with the Lebanese Christian community, made no such distinction and railed against Syria's intelligence services in Lebanon.
"It is not only the military occupation that is being questioned," Chirac told a news conference on Tuesday night in Brussels. "The special service operatives controlling Lebanon are in fact more questionable than the military occupation."
No doubt, the pressure against Syria would be intensified in the days ahead. That was noted by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who sent his intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, to Damascus with a message to Assad on Wednesday.
"Something has to happen because the situation is difficult now and (Syria) won't be able to stand against the pressures of the international community," said Mubarak. "But we must find solutions."
Mubarak, a veteran Arab leader, knows that the US and Israel have smelt blood and would tighten the screws against Assad to unbearable levels and would not let go until their goals are achieved even if it means destabilising Syria and Lebanon.
It would be an intelligent guess that Mubarak's message advises Assad not to engage in brinkmanship and accept the inevitability of having to relinquish his country's dominant role in Lebanon, particularly given the growing Lebanese opposition campaign against the Syrian presence in their midst.
Syria has already said that it remains committed to start withdrawing some troops from Lebanon soon in line with the Taif accord that ended Lebanon's 1975-90 civil war. Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq Sharaa said this month that he expected the troops to stay on in Lebanon for another two years.
The Taif agreement required the then 35,000-strong Syrian forces to withdraw to the eastern Bekaa region, close to the Syrian border, within two years. Syria periodically redeployed its troops, which now number 13-15,000. Syria did withdraw 3,000 troops from Beirut last year.
The Lebanese opposition has also called for implementation of the Taif agreement, but insists on a total Syrian pullout.
UN investigation
For purposes of legitimacy for the US-Israeli drive against Syria, a UN-appointed commission will investigate the Hariri killing and determine who was behind it.
The investigators, headed by Peter Fitzgerald, is due in Beirut on Friday and Lebanese Justice Minister Adnan Addoum has affirmed that the government is "ready to fully co-operate with the UN team, as long as Lebanese sovereignty is preserved."
However, few attach any hopes to the commission's effort since it seems to be a foregone conclusion that no investigation would ever reveal the real hands behind the Feb.14 explosion. Many see the UN investigation as a different version of the UN search in Iraq for (non-existent) weapons-of-mass -destruction -- the justification that the US offered before invading Iraq in March last year.
Analyst and commentator Samir Khalaf wrote: "Brutal and cold-blooded assassinations are an indelible feature of Lebanese political culture. Abominable as they are, usually such acts remain unexplained. The perpetrators and criminals are never recognised or brought to justice. Barely four months ago, former economy minister Marwan Hamade miraculously survived a bomb attack. If the same malicious forces were also behind Hariri's murder, and the incriminating traces are strewn all over, they made certain that providence would not this time foil their crime."
The prima facie evidence in the Hariri killing is so overwhelming that there is no doubt whatsoever that only a powerful government intelligence agency with extensive contacts and network in Lebanon could have carried out the assassination. The first candidate who fits the description is Syria, but that is the obvious conclusion. Equally strong in its intelligence network in Lebanon is Israel, whose notorious Mossad spy agency has a record of carrying out bombings and shootings in Lebanon although its role was never explicitly proved.
Given the benefits that Israel is reaping and hopes to reap from the scenario resulting from the assassination of Hariri, it would not be off the mark at all to line up Israel as the culprit. It is known for such deceptive tactics and it would not be the first or last time it would undertake such actions.

Heavily anti-Syrian

Where do the people of Lebanon -- the most important player in the equation -- fit into the scheme of things?
Politics apart, the message that is coming out of Lebanon is that the Hariri killing is heavily anti-Syrian.
One thing is clear: Many Lebanese want Syria to leave them alone. The assertion that the Lebanese are capable of looking after themselves without Syrian help has been heard for long.
Effectively, the Hariri killing brought those voices together as well as others who did not speak out earlier.
As Gibran Tueni, an opposition leader who publishes the Beirut Daily observes, "this is the beginning of something important. It's the first time in Lebanon you have Muslims, Christians and Druze asking for the same thing."
Tens of thousands of people have marched through the streets of Beirut in the largest anti-Syrian protests since the Hariri killing.
Lebanese opposition figures have seized on public anger to demand that Syria pull out and that the Beirut government it supports resigns.
Prime Minister Omar Karami, who succeeded Hariri as prime minister in October when the latter resigned in protest against Syrian moves to retain Emile Lahoud as president for another three years, has said he is ready to resign.
Lahoud himself spoke in a tougher tone. He was quoted as saying in a newspaper interview on Wednesday that the government cannot succumb to opposition demands.
Lahoud argued that the withdrawal of the Syrian army, which went to Lebanon as part of an Arab peacekeeping force under an Arab League mandate in 1976, can only be decided in line with the Taif agreement.
Confidence vote
If it comes to a vote of confidence in the 128-member parliament, the government would be unlikely to lose since it has a majority in the assembly, which will meet on Feb. 28 to question the government on who was behind the Hariri assassination.
Orchestrating the opposition are Druze leader Walid Junblatt, Maronite Catholic Archbishop Nasrallah Sfeir, and Sunni Muslims led by Bahaa Hariri, son of the slain president, with the blessing of the Sunni Muslim mufti of Lebanon.
Fears are indeed high that the country could slide back into civil war -- a prospect no one in the region wants.
Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has already issued a warning that the popular agitation against Syria's role on the country following the Hariri killing could plunge Lebanon into civil war again.
It all depends on how Damascus and the government in Beirut opt to deal with the mounting calls for a Syrian departure from Lebanon leading to a restructuring of the geopolitical balance that would work against Syria's strategic interests.
The opposition leaders determined to force the Syrian hand. They are said to be planning a series of "spectacular" shows of strength in Beirut aimed at paralysing government activity.
Parallel to that, they will also step up external pressure by organising rallies by Lebanese living outside the country, including the US, Europe, Middle East and Far East.
If the Syrians and government forces decide to use muscles to put down the growing agitation within Lebanon, then it is inevitable that violence would follow, but then it would invariably invite foreign military intervention, including a possible American-French alliance entering the country.
Mounting French pressure
If, on the other hand, Syria succumbs to the US-French pressure and quits Lebanon -- which is a likely scenario -- then the question that comes up is: How would the country's majority Shiites respond to the newfound strength of the Maronite Christians backed by the Hariri and Junblatt camps?
Experts familiar with the Iranian-backed Hizbollah, arguably the most organised group in Lebanon, say that the organisation is pragmatic and realistic to grasp that a return to arms is not an option and that it has to adjust its positions to the new realities emerging on the ground in the country.
Abdo Saad, a Lebanese analyst, says: "The good thing about Hizbollah is that their political discourse has been very moderate and they have won the respect and admiration of the opposition,
"Hizbollah has taken the initiative, which will be translated into dialogue with the opposition in the coming days. They want to find common ground."
In the meantime, the opposition is said to be seeking to split the Shiite ranks by enlisting the support of the parliament speaker, Nabih Berri, who heads the Shiite Amal movement, against Hizbollah. It is not yet clear how far vulnerable is Berri and his supporters to such pressure in the changing scenario where it is abundantly clear that the crisis is turning out to be a make-or-break situation for the country.

Lebanese intelligence

An immediate result of Berri joining the anti-Syrian group would be a green signal for an open debate in parliament about the Hariri killing where one of the opposition demands would be for questioning the Lebanese intelligence chief General Jamil Al Sayad as well as General Rostum Ghazallah of Syrian military intelligence.
Kuwait's Al Siyassah has named the two as behind the assassination.
"Those standing behind Hariri's death are Brigadier General Assef Shawkat, who recently became Syria's military-intelligence chief, Syrian Brigadier Bahjat Suleiman and Lebanese Brigadier Jamil Sayyed, who is known for his blind loyalty to the Syrian regime," according to the paper.
Junblatt has also openly declared that the Syrian-Lebanese intelligence services were behind Hariri's assassination, which came ahead of parliamentary elections in May where the Hariri-Sfeir-Junblatt alliance was expected to do well and gain a challenging position against Syria.
Former army commander General Michel Aoun, a bitter foe of the Syrians who lives in exile in France, says he expects the government to be toppled in a vote on Monday.
According to Aoun, although parliament was still made up of the same members who agreed to the extension of President Lahoud's mandate and approved the appointment of the Karami cabinet, the killing of Hariri has opened their eyes to the need for change.
If Karami steps down as prime minister before a vote, Damascus might try to use it as a tool to defuse the tensions, but it would be a fruitless exercise since the US and France would not settle for anything less than complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.
In Aoun's view, which he gave to Beirut's Daily Star newspaper in an interview, there is a strong international political will to pressure Syria into leaving Lebanon.
"The Syrians will be out before the parliamentary elections in Lebanon take place," he told the paper. "In case that does not happen, I am sure the international community will move. The issue is not a matter of bilateral relations between Syria and Lebanon anymore."

Syrian options

Syria might not have much of options at all except to bow to the American pressure unless it wishes to risk a military confrontation that would not stop anywhere short of a regime change in Damascus.
For more than a decade, Syria has seen steady pressure which it sees as aimed at stripping itself of what it considers as its strategic assets which it intends use in possible negotiations with Israel to secure the return of its Golan Heights.
Damascus also has economic interests in Lebanon. More than a quarter o million Syrians are employed in Lebanon, and they also control many businesses based in Lebanon. There is no definite figure on what percentage of Syria's gross domestic product comes from Lebanon, but it is indeed believed to be significant to the Syrian economy.
However, economic considerations might have to play second fiddle to political survival.
The US and Israel have always used every opportunity to apply pressure on Damascus, whether in the name of its alleged support for international terrorism, the presence of hard-line Palestinian groups in Syrian territory, the alleged flow of Iranian-supplied arms for Hizbollah for use against Israel, its alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (it is widely believed that it has chemical weapons), human rights and democracy, and charges that it is sheltering wanted Nazis.
Damascus has challenged the US on every count. It has been demanding an internationally accepted definition of terrorism and distinction between freedom fighters and resistance fighters. Over the last 15 years, it has toned down the activities of Palestinian groups after getting rid of groups like those led by Abu Nidal and Carlos the Jackal, a former ally of the PLO who was once described as the world's most wanted man.
Syria has asked the US to prove that Iranian arms are flowing through its territory to Lebanon. It has pointed out that it is not a signatory to the international convention on chemical weapons and therefore it is not violating any international law even if it -- hypothetically -- did have such arms.
It has also demanded that Israel prove with substantiation that Nazis are being sheltered in Syria.
However, all these challenges and affirmations did little to alleviate the pressure on Damascus if only because of the Israeli-backed American determination to "clip the Syrian wings" that challenge the American-Israeli designs in the region.
And, from the looks of things today, a head-on clash appears to be inevitable

Wednesday, February 16, 2005

Right partners in Iraq

February 16, 2005

Seeking right partner


SHIITES, the long-oppressed majority in Iraq, have done well in the Jan.30 elections, but they may have to make compromises with other groups since they failed to win an absolute two-third majority of the seats in the 275-member National Assembly.

The 47.6 per cent vote won by the Shiite list -- the United Iraqi Alliance -- endorsed by the country's senior-most Shiite religious leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani is far short of the two-third majority that would allow the group to form a government of its own.

Therefore it has to depend on other groups in a coalition arrangement. Indeed, some Shiites in the list are saying their showing in the elections qualifies them to reject the post-Saddam Hussein, US-drafted interim constitution that insists on a two-third parliamentary majority for a government. However, that would mean alienating the Kurds and another step towards disintegration of the country since the Kurds could break away from Baghdad and set up their own entity in the north if their emergence as kingmakers in the country is not recognised and respected.

Jaafari favourite

As of Wednesday, Ibrahim Al Jaafari, head of the Dawa Party, one of the two dominant groups in the Shiite list, who is a vice-president in the interim government, emerged as the favourite for the powerful post of prime minister in a Shiite-Kurdish alliance where the Kurds would be given the ceremonial post of president. They want Jalal Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, to be president.

The Kurds also want some key ministries in exchange for their supporting a Shiite prime minister and government.

The Kurds have won 25.4 per cent of the votes and it makes an ideal coalition partner, but then a Shiite-Kurdish coalition would technically" need another four per cent for a two-third majority.

However, in the final count, the Shiite list is expected to have about 140 seats -- two seats more than needed for a simple majority -- in the assembly once those votes that went to candidates who did not get enough to secure a seat are redistributed. The Kurds will have about 70 and interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's Iraqi National Accord (INA) will have 40. That meant a Shiite-Kurdish coalition having 210 seats, five seats more than a two-thirds majority.

A key factor here is the natural alliance between the Kurdish parties and the INA. Both sides are backed by the US and that had been the tie-up between them so far.

The INA got 13.6 per cent of the votes, and a hypothetical Kurdish-INA coalition -- which will have a combined strength of 110 seats in the assembly in the final count -- could prevent the Shiite list from forming a government without their support.

Definitely, the Kurds would not want to throw a spanner in the works since they are seeking the presidency and they need the Shiite list's backing in order to capitalise on their newfound legislative clout.

No doubt, the Americans, who have lost their bet on Allawi, could try to call the shots with the Kurds and force them into demanding that Allawi be named prime minister as a consensus candidate in return for the Kurd-INA alliance join the Shiite list in a coalition.

However, that would mean the Kurds demanding the posts of both president and prime minister, a demand that will surely be shot down by the Shiites.

Sunni political groups that shunned the election will be invited to participate in the new government and in drafting the constitution.

If whatever coalition that is formed wants to bring in the Sunnis, then the Sunnis have to be given at least one prominent position in the government. Again, that intensifies the battle for top posts.

The Shiite list had several aspirants for premiership. They included Adel Abdel Mahdi, the interim finance minister who belongs to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the other dominant group in the Shiite list, Ahmed Chalabi, once the candidate favoured by the US, and Hussein Shahristani, a physicist.

The SCIRI was reported to have withdrawn Mahdi's candidacy in favour of Jaafari on Wednesday and thus clearing the way for a Shiite-Kurdish alliance.

Allawi's importance

However, some analysts say it is too early to write off Allawi, a US-backed Shiite who describes himself as secular, as a compromise to unite religious and ethnic groups.

The other groups which fielded candidates in the elections did badly. The Sunni group of interim President Ghazi Al Yawar got one per cent of the votes; elder statesman Adnan Pachachi failed to win a single seat. In all, the Sunnis, most of whom stayed away or were prevented from voting, got five seats.

After the results of the elections are confirmed on Wednesday, if they are unchallenged, the National Assembly will approve a prime minister by early March.

There is a tacit agreement that the prime minister will be a Shiite, the president a Kurd and one of two vice presidents a Sunni.

However, the Kurds and Sunnis will not accept a clerical Shiite because they want to pre-empt Sharia, or Islamic law, being enshrined in the constitution as the primary source of law as suggested by some leaders of the Shiite alliance.

Sadr factor

In another blow to the US, Jaafari, who is emerging as the favourite to become the prime minister, wants to bring in Moqtada Sadr, a firebrand cleric who has challenged the US dominance of the country, into his cabinet.

At one point Sadr was among America's top enemies in Iraq, with the US military declaring him wanted dead or alive.

One of the first things that Sadr, who is known to have ties with figures in Iran, an archfoe of the US, did after the Jan.30 elections was to call for the US to set a deadline to leave Iraq.

No doubt, the neocon plotters of the invasion and occupation of Iraq are scratching their heads in Washington trying to figure a way out of the quagmire they created for the US by failing to take seriously the complexities of the Iraqi society and the forces that would emerge to the centre-stage once Saddam Hussein was toppled.

Indeed, they might manage to come up with a compromise. But then that would only be a stopgap measure since the going would get much tougher once the National Assembly gets down to drafting a permanent constitution that would be acceptable to the country's three major constituncies -- Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds -- given the deep divisions among them in perceptions of the future of Iraq.

Allawi deatl a big blow

BY PV VIVEKANAND

THE future of interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and through him the American plans in have been dealt a severe blow by the wide margin that the Shiite list endorsed by Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani has gained in the Jan.30 elections.
Indeed, there is an off-chance that Allawi could still emerge as a compromise candidate and seek to hang onto the job as prime-ministership based on the votes that the country's northern Kurdish groups gained in the elections. However, the Shiite list is unlikely to accept Allawi as prime minister. One of it leaders, Ibrahim Al Jafaari, has already staked a claim to that job.
On its own, the group led by Allawi and President Ghazi Al Yawar is seen as securing around 15 per cent of the votes cast, but they could team up with the Kurds, who are expected to gain around 20 per cent of the votes. Thus the strength of the Allawi-Kurd alliance would be around 35 per cent of the total votes cast for the 275-member assembly. That is enough to give Allawi the bargaining power to prevent the United Iraqi Alliance of the Sistani camp from going ahead on its own and form a government since it would denied the required two-thirds majority in the assembly.
The Allawi-Yawar group also benefited from the support of Ayatollah Hussein Sadr of Baghdad, who does not agree with the way Sistani leads the Shiite community.
How Yawar, head of a powerful Sunni-Shiite tribe, would fit into the scheme of things is unclear yet.
In the final count, the United Iraqi Alliance list of 228 candidates representing 16 political groups headed by Abdul Aziz Al Hakim’s Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Jafaari’s Al Daawa is expected to gain up to 140 to150 seats on its own and thus emerge as the largest party but it would have to depend on potential coalition partners to form a two-third majority government.
The main Shite list contender against Jaafari to the post of prime minister is said to be Adel Abdel Mahdi, who is now finance minister.
Aziz Hakim, the cleric who headed the list, has indicated he is not interested in prime ministership.
The Kurds — represented by the United Kurdish list set up jointly by Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani — could turn out to be the kingmakers here. They account for about two million of the eight million votes cast, and this is seen to give them around 60 seats, or around 20 to 22 per cent of the votes compared with their 16 to 18 per cent content in the Iraqi population (the Kurds are accused artificially inflating their support in Kirkuk by importing tens of thousands of armed voters from across Kurdistan. Turkey, alarmed by the growing strength of the Kurds, has demanded an American explanation and has hinted at the use of Turkish military force to rectify the distortion). The Kurds also garnered some 400,000 overseas voters in the United States and Europe.
Again, the Kurds on their own could not prevent the formation of a Sistani camp government. They have to team up with the Allawi group, but the two are natural allies, given that both of them enjoy American backing and have been in the forfront of implementing American-designed programmes in the country since the ouster of Saddam Hussein.
In yet another slap to the US, Jaafari, who is emerging as the favourite to become the next prime minister of Iraq, wants to bring in Moqtada Sadr, a firebrand cleric who has challenged the US dominance of the country, into his cabinet.
In a series of interviews over the weekend, Jafaari described Sadr as a responsible person who is capable of contributing to the reconstruction of Iraq.
Jafaari noted that Moqtadr Sadr's father was killed by Saddam Hussein, and the young cleric has a large number of followers.
At one point Sadr was among America's top enemies in Iraq, with the US military declaring him wanted dead or alive.
Sadr called on Friday for the US to set a deadline to leave Iraq, something Washington is not prepared to do. Sadr is also known to have ties with figures in Iran, an archfoe of the US.
Allawi is trying to jockey himself into a position as a consensus candidate for premiership. However, unless his group and the rest of other parties, including the powerful Kurds, come up with an absolute one-third of the votes, the United Iraqi List will have an open ground and a free hand — with two-thirds of the vote — to form a government on its own without any challenge.
That would be clear in about a week's time.

Thursday, February 10, 2005

Squeezing Syria


February 10 2005

Squeezing Syria

pv vivekanand

THE US and Israel are engaged in an effort to strip Syria of what it considers as its strategic assets and bargaining chips in regaining its Golan Heights from Israeli occupation and affirming its role as a key regional player. Obviously, Damascus is resisting the pressure because it is aware that meeting the American/Israeli demands would leave it vulnerable and force it to accept Israeli terms for "peace" that would not involve the return of the Golan Heights to Syrian sovereignty. At the same time, Syria is willing to meet the demands half-way at this point, with the other half being met only in the context of a firm and irreversible peace deal that ensures the return of the Golan Heights and preserves Arab national dignity. That Syrian position clashes head on with the American/Israeli determination to deprive Damascus of negotiating strengths before trying to force down its throat the Israeli version of a deal for peace. As such, it is unlikely that any moves would materialise soon to bring Israel and Syria to the negotiating table.

Hopes were raised that moves would be made towards reviving Syrian-Israeli peace talks along with the effort to relaunch Israeli-Palestinian peace talks at the Sharm Al Sheikh summit on Tuesday. However, instead of responding positively to Syrian calls for resumption of talks, the US has opted to tighten pressure on Damascus by insisting that it is supporting "terrorism" and "destabilising" the region. The Middle East does not need to be told whose actions have destabilised and continue to destabilise the region; all it needs is a look at Iraq, but then that is only part of the scenario. People in this region know that Syria is serious in its efforts to engage Israel in genuine negotiations and secure the return of the Golan Heights, which the Jewish state occupied in the 1967 war. The US also knows Damascus is serious, but Washington is playing to the tunes of Israel, which is not interested in talks with Syria until it becomes clear that the return of the Golan is not central to making peace. In simple terms, Israel wants Syria to come to the negotiating table without demanding the return of the Golan and then the mighty Jewish state might consider making peace on its own terms. This is the equation today.

Meeting requirements

The pattern of Syrian moves and public statements clearly establishes that Damascus is trying to meet the basic American-dictated requirements for resumption of talks, but it finds some of those demands as part of the American/Israeli agenda to weaken it. These include:

-- Suspending alleged support for groups and individuals waging the guerrilla war in Iraq across the border. The problem here is that the US has not been specific in pinpointing the groups and alleged groups and individuals it says are based in Syria. Media reports in the US have named some, but it has not been established that those people are indeed present in Syria. Indeed, some of them have been proved to be based in Europe. But the same media organisations which carried the initial allegation are not willing to acknowledge it. Furthermore, it goes against the Arab nationalist grain of Syria to launch a crackdown on Iraqis present in the country and hand over suspects to the US as Washington demands. Obviously Damascus believes that doing so would deprive it of the image it has built for itself as a staunch defender of Arab rights, which Arab nationalists see as at stake in Iraq under American occupation. Complying with the American demand would mean, in Syria's eyes as well as those of a majority in the Arab World, that Damascus is co-operating with plots that aim at establishing American/Israeli superiority in the region.

Backing talks

-- Supporting the ongoing moves to revive Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Syria has already affirmed its backing for the moves and implicitly expressed hope that they would lead to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Leaders of Palestinian groups waging armed resistance in the occupied territories and opposing the US-sponsored peace talks are indeed present in Syrian territory, but there is little substance to American and Israeli contentions that they are behind the actual resistance operations, which Washington and Tel Aviv describe as terrorism (Incidentally, Syria has for long been calling for an international definition of "terrorism" and set a clear line between acts of legitimate resistance and terrorist actions and the US has always stonewalled the Syrian call).

-- Withdrawing Syrian soldiers from Lebanon and stop "meddling" in Lebanese affairs. Syria has already pulled back part of its 15,000-strong unit deployed in Lebanon and is expected to complete the pullback by the end of this year. However, the second part of the American demand is difficult to be met, given the traditionally strong links between Syria and Lebanon. Damascus considers its influence in Lebanon as natural and its right as a regional player, but it would be ready to scale it down in the context of a peace agreement with Israel. Again, the problem here is that the US wants it the other way around.

-- Withdrawing support for groups such as Lebanon's Hizbollah. Again, contrary of the blanket American and Israeli assertion that Damascus pulls the Hizbollah strings, people in this region know that the Syrian-Hizbollah link is very delicate. Hizbollah leaders would listen to Syria only as far as it suits their thinking and what they consider as their interests, and the equation would be scrambled if Damascus tried to twist their arms.

In that hypothesis, Hizbollah could threaten Syrian interests in Lebanon and, obviously, Damascus fails to see why it should initiate moves in that direction at this point in time.

Similarly, Syria would not stand in the way of Iranian-Hizbollah relations because of the alliance between Damascus and Tehran, the two capitals which are being targeted by the US after ousting Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

The impression that one gets is clear: Syria is ready to do what it takes for peace and stability in the region, but the US and Israel want to strip Damascus of what it considers as its strategic assets that strengthen its position in negotiations with Israel. Syria might indeed be amenable to adjusting its positions but these could come only after a peace agreement is worked out with Israel based on Syria's legitimate political and territorial rights.

That brings up the key question whether Israel would ever respect the Syrian rights?

Source of water

One thing is clear: Israel has no intention of returning the Golan Heights to Syria, not because of the "strategic military value" of the plateau that overlooks northern Israel but because it is the main source of water for the Jewish state.

Given the scarcity of water in the region and its paranoia of being hemmed in by upstream neighbour Syria, Israel would never give up the Golan. At best, it might be willing to make a face-saving compromise for Syria by returning part of the Golan and would never agree to return the whole of the strategic Heights, which overlook the See of Galilee in northern Israel.

Israeli paranoia

Israel argues that since the Golan overlooks northern Israeli towns a withdrawal from the Heights would leave northern Israeli towns vulnerable to Syrian missile and infantry attacks. Given that Syria possesses missiles capable of hitting almost everywhere in Israel, the "security" claim has always sounded hollow.

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has consistently opposed a withdrawal from the Syrian plateau. Sharon's predecessor, Ehud Barak, offered to withdraw from parts of the Heights in 2000, but insisted on retaining some of the territory. Syria insisted on the entire area be returned to it.

Notwithstanding the Israeli posture in the negotiations, it was clear that it was only seeking to put up insurmountable hurdles in the Syrian quest for the return of the Golan.

An Israeli army general said in August last year that his country does not need to keep the Golan Heights under occupation in what was seen as boasting by the Israeli military that it is capable of "defending" Israel without having military forces present on the Heights.

The general's statement was only an affirmation that retaining the Golan Heights is not central to Israeli security and was not seen as an indication that Israel might consider returning to Syria.

That water plays the central role in the Israeli posture is clear.

Sharon, a military general who has also served as Israel's minister of defence as well as of water, could not but be acutely aware of the importance of the Golan Heights for his country's paranoia and preoccupation with securing water sources.

The Golan is the source for more than 55 per cent of Israel's fresh water needs.

Given the scarcity of water in the region, Israel would never give up the Golan. At best, it might be willing to make a face-saving compromise by returning part of the Golan but would never agree to return the whole of the Heights.

Securing water sources has been an Israeli priority since its founding in 1948 and it remains a preoccupation today; the per capita consumption of water in Israel is eight times that of the Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank, which accounts for 18 per cent of Israel's needs of drinking water.

In 1950, the then Israeli prime minister, Ben Gurion, declared that Jews were fighting a "battle for water" and that the Jewish existence in Palestine was contingent on the outcome of such a battle.

Some 20,000 Jewish settlers live on the Golan Heights and Israel has launched expansion projects on the Heights.

Seen in light of these realities, it is not surprising that the US-Israeli camp is stepping up pressure on Syria. It is highly unlikely that there would be any positive response to the Syrian overtures for peace talks until the US and Israel are convinced that they would be able to twist the Syrian arm into accepting a deal that excludes the return of the Golan Heights in a manner that satisfies the Syrians.

Friday, February 04, 2005

Shape of things in Iraq

THE SHAPE of things to come in Iraq remains blurred as the counting of the ballots cast in Sunday's elections has ended and the numbers and details are being fed into computers before the results are formally announced, perhaps next week. Political bargaining seems to have already started among groups on forming a coalition government based on an asusmption that no group would win a two-third majority in the polls. The insurgents are active, but the new reality of an elected assembly in the country could act as a counterforce against them, particularly given that the elections themselves seems to have given a new spirit to most Iraqis, writes 'Inad Khairallah
The Jan.30 elections in Iraq were generally hailed across the world as a success, mostly because millions of Iraqis turned out to vote despite the very real danger to their life posed by insurgents who had threatened to hit anyone and everyone who participated in the process.
Was it a success of the tight security arrangement organised by the US-led coalition forces?
Or was it a success because the Iraqis voted for the first time in 50 years in an environment free from coercion?
Or was it a success because relatively few people died in insurgent attacks on election day?
Or was it a success because the US showed the world that it could organise elections in a chaotic country like Iraq after messing it up?
Or was it a success because the election was the harbinger of American-style democracy in an Arab country that has known only autocracy in its recent history?
Above all, whose success was it?
Was it American? Was it Shiite? Was it Iraqi?
The answers to all these question might probably be: "A combination of all these and more."
US President George W Bush was to outline his plans for Iraq a few after print time, but no surprises were expected from him. His campaign to convince other world leaders that the new government emerging from the elections should be supported clearly indicated that he is staying the course without committing himself to any deadline for an American withdrawal from Iraq.
Simply put, there is no "exit strategy"; at least not yet.
In the meantime, questions are also many over the options of the various parties involved in Iraq, and all eyes are on the majority Shiite community led by Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani.
In an interview with Democracy Now! one day after the Jan.30 elections, respected British journalist Robert Fisk gave his assessment. Here are some major excerpts:
"As a person who is regularly cynical about the Middle East, and I think with good reason, it was a very moving experience to see so many hundreds and thousands of Shiite Muslims in Baghdad walking against the sound of bombs and mortar fire.
.".... The Shiites decided to vote. They abided by the instructions of the supreme Shiite leader, the marja, Ali Al Sistani who said it was more important to vote than fasting at Ramadan or prayer.
"The catch, of course, is that the Shiites were not voting for democracy, although they'd very much like to have it and believe in it. Many of them expressed their views forthrightly inside the polling station. They were coming to vote because Sistani told them to. 'We're coming to vote because we weren't allowed to do so before. We're coming to vote because we want the Americans to leave.'
"Now it is all very well for the American media that they came to vote for democracy. They probably did. But they also came because they think and believe and are convinced of the fact that by voting that they'll have a free country without an occupation force. If they are denied this, if they feel they are betrayed that their vote is worth nothing, of course a different question arises.
"What will they think of democracy and will they join the insurgency? "The Kurds, of course, voted for their own autonomy and they are the most pro-American of all Iraqis and in a sense, you see, although they voted in the Iraqi election, they were in a sense trying to continue to vote themselves out of Iraq. The more autonomy they had, and the flags you saw in the streets were Kurdistan not Iraqi, the nearer they are to the independents which Kurdish people have been demanding for so many decades. Indeed at least 200 years.
"So, what you've got was an election which showed immense courage on behalf of the Shiites. Perhaps less courage on the Kurds who anyways live in the most stable area of Iraq. Nonetheless, they went to vote and have been threatened in the past and a total abstention by Sunni Muslims and the latter, of course, is — this is the problem.
"If there is to be a national assembly, which is generally representative of the Iraqi people and this election was for a government, not for an assembly to choose a constitution, upon which there must be a referendum, another election for a new government, and then what is the legitimacy of a new parliament? It's 20 per cent of the population. The only section of the population which is actively and violently resisting the Americans is not represented. This is the real problem, you see. Either the Shiites are going to find themselves betrayed because what they want is not going to be forthcoming; of course they want to run the next government. They want to be -- they would like this to be a Shia country. They don't want an Islamic republic, but they want power because they are 60 per cent of the population and for 100 years, they haven't been able to be represented in that way.
"What this election has done is not actually a demonstration of people who demand democracy, but they want freedom of a different kind, freedom to vote, but also freedom from foreign occupation. And if they are betrayed in this, then we are going to look back and regret the broken promises. But certainly even the Iraqi soldiers guarding one of the polling stations and the fact that they were all wearing black hoods so they couldn't be identified tells you the dismal sense of security here with the same thing -- we want the Americans to go. But, of course, we're not seeing any promises to do that.
ghdad where the elections have just concluded.
"The issue is what is going to be the American involvement in providing Iraq with its next interim government. Again, I repeat this election was for a national assembly to write a constitution, which will have to be approved by a referendum, which in December there would then have to be another election for a real quote-unquote government.
The issue here you see is this: In the aftermath of these elections and we don't know the results and won't know them for days to come, it is quite possible that the administration here, which, of course, is effectively in the hands of the United States and here Ambassador (John) Negroponte will be involved, will try to form a government coalition. This would include certain leading Shiite politicians who won seats in yesterday's election. It would include some Sunnis who were running, in some cases, on Shiite tickets. This was a list system, proportional representation election, and of course, it would undoubtedly include some Kurds. Now, it would look very nice and democratic and free if a coalition government could include Shiites and Sunnis and Kurds. And that I'm sure is what the Americans would like to see. But then the largest Shiite alliance, which scored seats in the election, could turn out to be the official opposition and Shiites would then say, well, it is very nice to have this lovely coalition of all our ethnic groups. But we won the election. We are 60 per cent of the people and now we're in a coalition where we don't have the majority of power and our largest party is confined to being the opposition in parliament. And that, at the moment, is the biggest danger, that we're going to see such administrative refining of the results that we will produce and Westernise infinitely fair coalition government comprising Sunnis and Shiites and Kurds, but which will not represent the overall election results, which must show a Shiite majority.
"I mean there are actually members of the largest alliance of Shiite groups saying now that they are certain they've got more than 50 per cent of the vote.... . Now if that's the case, the Shiites will say, well hold on a second, we're the majority, we got the most votes, we got the greatest number of seats and you are making us part of a coalition and the biggest party of the opposition in parliament and that, of course, would then be betrayal just as it would be if they suddenly signed that the American and British and other foreign forces, they are not going to leave.
"So, we eventually – I mean we set up an enormous amount of expectations for this election. And I have got to admit, I have to admit having seen it and been there and walked with people to the polling stations in Baghdad, that the Shiites who wanted to vote did so unanimously and with great courage.
"Are they now going to be portrayed by the slippery process of coalitioning a government, which will suit the West, which will, of course, include Kurds and then of course must include some Sunnis as well or are they going to be effectively told, ok, the Shiites now have what you people in America like to call empowerment. This is now effectively a Shiite republic, not an Islamic republic, but this country is a Shiite country, which it is, of course, in real life. Will the election result, will the parliament, will the next government actually reflect the reality on the ground? If it does, then we are moving if it doesn't, then it would be better that the elections would not be held."
Fisk has been following the developments in Iraq firsthand and he should know. And there would not be many people who would disagree with his assessment.
For one thing, barring wholesale twisting, it is clear that the Sistani camp would emerge as the majority winner in the elections, and it will be Sistani who would be calling the shots on the shape of the next government.
Although it might take a few days more before the winners are announced, leaders of political parties have already started hard bargaining to form a new Iraqi government.
The United Iraqi Alliance, which has Sistani's backing, is likely to be pitted against a group led by the interim prime minister, Ayad Allawi, the race to form the government.
Both groups have pledge that they are committed to a secular Iraq and want all sects of the country to have a share in government.
There are Sunni candidates who are in the lists of both groups and their presence would lend legitimacy to the coalition government's set-up. However, Wednesday's declaration by the major Sunni alliance which called for a boycott of the polls that the Sunnis would not recognise the post-election government has thrown a major dampner on hopes of a smooth creation and functioning of an executive authority in the country.
The interim constitution says that the elected 275-member National Assembly must first choose a president and two deputies by a two-thirds majority. The president and deputies then pick a party or coalition, along with its choice of a prime minister, to form a government. Simply put, a two-third majority of the assembly is an absolute must for anyone hoping to gain power.
It is deemed unlikely that the Sistani camp would secure an absolute two-third majorty of the seats that it needs to form a government on its own. Leaders of the United Iraqi Alliance say the do have a formula to form a government, but Allawi's Iraqi List could foil their plans if it on its own or with coalition partners manage to secure more one third of the seats. It could then block emergence of the Shiite coalition to power.
Then there could only be a compromise:, Allawi offers himself to the coalition as a candidate for prime minister, or he could try to pick off members of the Shiite coalition and make a coalition for himself.
How would that go down with people like Ahmed Chalabi, who has a running conflict with Allawi?
In the meantime, it remains to be seen whether the success of the election is the beginning of the end of the insurgency since it seems to have given a newfound uplift to the mindset of the people of Iraq.
It all depends on how soon a government will be set up in Iraq and how the insurgents would deal with the new reality that, despite flaws, the country now has an assembly of elected representatives and would soon have a government.

Wednesday, February 02, 2005

Russian bear missiling its way?

February 2 2005
Russian bear on a comeback trail
pvvivekanand


RUSSIA is staging a political and military comeback to the Middle East. President Vladimir Putin is keen on it and so are several Arab players, including the Syrians and Palestinians, as well as Iran, which would like to use Moscow as an ally in its running feud with the US.

Predictably, Israel is worried and the US has mounted a campaign to ensure that Russia does not pose a direct or indirect threat to the combined American-Israeli interests to contain any regional challenge to the Jewish state's military supremacy and quest for regional domination.

Putin does not have to work too hard to regain the foothold that the former Soviet Union had in the Middle East. The channels and tracks are there for him to return. Moscow has always championed the Palestinian cause, maintained a strong and steady relationship with Syria and refused to back down from its nuclear deals with Iran despite intense American pressure.

However, it kept a low profile in the region's political affairs in the last decade, and now, it seems, Putin has realised the time is opportune to strengthen the profile. No doubt, he is aware that American-Arab relations are under a strain following the Sept.11, 2001 attacks in the US, the American invasion and occupation of Iraq and Washington's firming up of its alliance with Israel; and hence a Russian alignment with the Arab position would be welcomed with enthusiasm.

He is also aware that the US involvement in Iraq has turned problematic for Washington and things could turn worse for the Bush administration there. The Russian president would like his country to be on the spot to take advantage of the situation. It suits him well to use the Syrian, Palestinian and Iranian cards to stake a fresh claim for a prominent Russian role in the Middle East. And that is what he is trying to accomplish.

At the same time, it is subject to debate how influential a political role Putin could play in the Middle East amid the US efforts to reshape the region to suit American-Israeli interests, starting with Iraq and continuing with Syria, Iran, Lebanon and other countries.

That Russia is returning to the scene was made clear with the visit to Moscow last month of two key Mideastern players -- the Syrian and Palestinian presidents.

Syrian President Bashar Al Assad's visit resulted in Putin deciding to write off nearly $10 billion of Syria's military debts and advancing a deal under which Russia will supply anti-aircraft missiles to Syria.

Israel's worry

Israel has been pressuring Russia against the missile deal and Putin was reported to have assured Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that the sale was not imminent, but that does not seem to have soothed Israeli fears.

Reports in the Israeli press indicate that Syria and Russia are close to finalising the $70 million deal for the sale of 20 SA-18 Igla-S batteries mounted on armoured personnel carriers.

The SA-18 Igla-S is one of the most effective missiles against low-flying aircraft on the market. The Syrians were supposed to have received the shoulder-held version of the missiles, but American pressure forced Russia to amend the deal. Now they would be mounted on APCs and Russia says they would not be operative if detached from the APC moorings.

Syria has also acquired Kornet AT-14 anti-tank missiles from Eastern Europe.

Washington's warning

In both cases, Washington has warned that if those weapons turn up in Iraq or Lebanon, America will be free to take military action against Syria.

Assad has defended his country's right to acquire surface-to-air missiles from Russia saying "these are weapons for air defence, meant to prevent aircraft from intruding in our airspace."

Israeli analyst Gerald Steinberg has said that Syrian possession of the Russian missiles "is very problematic and will pose a challenge to Israeli military planners."

In talks with Putin, Bashar gave an explicit invitation to Russia to come back to the political scene in the Middle East by reviving its Soviet-era influence in the region.

"Russia has an enormous role, and has a lot of respect from Third World countries ... which really hope that Russia will try to revive the positions it used to hold," Assad said in Moscow. He also used the opportunity to slam American policy, saying the US approach to Iraq was "disastrous."

Moscow has several times condemned the American threat to Syria of sanctions if Damascus did not withdraw its alleged support for guerrillas fighting the US-led coalition forces in Iraq and "terrorists" -- meaning Palestinian groups based in Syrian territory.

Russia abstained on a vote in the UN Security Council in September on a joint US-French resolution demanding the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and non-interference in the Lebanese presidential elections.

Russia has described Syria as one of its "most important partners" in the Middle East.

During Assad's visit, Russia and Syria signed a number of oil, gas and transport-related deals aimed at reviving business ties.

Putin and Assad also used the visit to declare that Russia and Syria were fully supportive of efforts by the new Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, to resume peace talks with Israel.

Abbas himself was in Moscow late last month. At the end of the visit, he and Putin signed a joint statement pledging commitment to the Quartet-backed road map plan and calling for Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a step towards peace.

It was Abbas's first official visit abroad after being elected successor to Yasser Arafat and he described it as a show of "the respect the Palestinian people feel towards the Russian people and it shows the important role that Russia plays on the world arena, above all in the Middle East, namely in the Quartet, in which Russia is a most notable representative."

The joint statement said that within the framework of the road-map plan, Russia and Palestine believe Israel must withdraw troops from Gaza and the West Bank, a move that would serve as the "first step in ending the Israeli occupation of Palestine."

"There is no doubt Russia's presence on our side, our co-operation on a bilateral basis, its role in the mediating Quartet will be decisive in establishing peace in the Middle East," said Abbas.

Role in Iran

On the Iranian front, the Russians are said to be building a strong air defence system around Iran's key nuclear installations to ward off possible American or Israeli attacks against them after Moscow undertook to secure Iran's nuclear industry. A secret Moscow-Tehran agreement includes the supply and installation of sophisticated air defence equipment to military planning and operational co-operation, according to reports.

The first phase of the work was over in mid-January when Russian experts from the Raduga OKB engineering group in Dubna near Moscow completed the installation of two advanced radar systems around the Bushehr nuclear reactor on the Gulf. Work is under way on the second phase, with the Russians installing the same system at Iran's uranium enrichment plants -- which the US says could be used for military purposes -- in Isfahan in central Iran.

These improved mobile 36D6 systems, code named Tin Shield, upgraded the air defence radar protecting Iran's key nuclear facilities from missile attack, according to military experts and intelligence reports.

The Tin Shield 36D6 is a mobile radar system designed to detect air targets and perform friend-or-foe identification. It is highly effective in detecting low, medium and high altitude targets moving at almost any speed, including winged missiles and American or Israeli cruise missiles. It is capable of providing the target and bearing of active jamming, as well as integrated computer-aided systems of control and guidance of anti-aircraft missile complexes.

Tin Shield can operate independently as an observation and air detection post, as part of computer-aided control systems or as an element in an anti-air guided missile complex, where it carries out reconnaissance and targeting.

By providing the system to the Iranians, Moscow has placed a serious hurdle in the way of any American and Israel military action to curb Iran's nuclear armament.

Couple that with the missile deal with Syria, and no wonder Israel and the US are upset.

However, it remains to be seen how Putin opts to play his cards.

American-Russian relations, with Putin at the helm in Moscow, have at best been ambiguous. While Putin needs American-supported Western assistance, he has often rebelled against Washington on issues that are of deep concern to Russia. It could not be judged whether he is a friend or foe of the US because of his mercurial behaviour.

Indeed, Washington strategists have their general assessment of what to expect from Putin, but it is unlikely that they could predict with any accuracy how he would turn at any given point. Their best understanding of the man seems to be based on intelligent guesswork at times of crises.

Some might argue Moscow never left the Middle Eastern scene, but a close observation would clearly indicate that it was too preoccupied with internal issues since the collapse of the Soviet Union to adopt an effective stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is not that Putin has now settled his domestic problems to rest and is turning to the Middle East. Regardless of the issues at home, he needs to re-establish a Russian role as the US pursues its effort to reshape the Middle East.

Russia could not afford to miss the opportunity to place itself as a counterforce -- regardless of its actual impact on the ground -- to the US if only to build its political and economic relations with the Arab World and that is the driving force behind Putin.

The unknown in the equation is how far he would push it and whether he would step back when the going gets tough with the US.