Thursday, July 24, 2003

What after Uday and Qusai?

Uday, the eldest son of Iraq's toppled leader Saddam Hussein, leaves a hospital in Baghdad on June 9 1997 following his recovery from an assassination attempt. His younger brother Qusay is seen walking beside him.

PV Vivekanand

THE BIGGEST question being asked after the US confirmed the death of Saddam Hussein’s two sons, Uday and Qusay, as well as Uday’s 14-year son on Wednesday is: Does this mean security and stability in the country and an end to the mounting daily attacks – an average of – against US soldiers occupying the country?
Hardly likely.
Indeed, the departure from the scene of Uday and Qusay might result in a slight scaling down of attacks, if only because the Saddam loyalist groups that stuck with the family after the Saddam regime was toppled in April might find themselves without a cause.
However, Saddam loyalists are not the sole or even major source of Iraqi resistance attacks. Those who insist otherwise and say the deaths of Uday and Qusai meant the beginning of the end of Iraqi resisance might learn if they look closely at the post-war scene in Iraq that the Iraqis do not really need Saddam as the rallying figure.
Many of them – suffering from the chaos, threat to life, and lack of water, food and power as well as steady jobs -- have more than enough reasons to be hostile to the American forces and this hostility is turning to attacks against US soldiers in the country.
Most are motivated by nationalistic pride while others could be fuelled by an urge to retaliate for what they see as an open American hostility towards Arabs and Muslims.
The cycle of violence is only likely to exacerbate and strengthen the resolve on the two sides and it is more likely that it would soon be an intense war of attrition between Iraqi guerrillas and American soldiers.
Quite simpy, Saddam and his loyalists are not the the only enemy the Americans face in Iraq face and .there was no evidence the brothers were directly guiding the guerrilla war.
Even if few heed Saddam's call to arms, aired in a tape apparently recorded before Uday and "crown prince" Qusay went down fighting US forces, analysts doubt that he and his sons alone have been behind all the guerrilla attacks that claimed two more American lives on Wednesday.
Grievances over the US invasion could fuel low-level warfare for some time.
"Is the resistance only coming from Saddam loyalists? No," said Hafez Alwan Humadi, assistant dean of the political science department at Baghdad University.
Many Iraqis with no love for Saddam or wish to see him back have been angered by the US occupation, including those who have lost family, property or privilege through the war, he said.
Saddam's supporters, on the other hand, seem to be a rapidly diminishing band, reducing his prospects of emulating Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan and eluding US capture or a bullet.
However, there are indeed those who feel bitterly indignant about the US presence in the country and the way the occupation authorities deal with the situation.
"They (Oday and Qusay) are Iraqi people," said Waad Hamadi, 43. "We would not have told the Americans (about their whereabouts)."
Hamadi called the man who is believed to have led the Americans to the hideout of Saddam’s two sons in Mosul "a traitor."
Seed Badr, 50, a gray-bearded taxi driver wearing a blue Arab robe, cursed the Americans. "This is terrorism. They are killers."
Indeed, there were many who said they would have preferred to see Uday and Qusay captured alive and put on trial.
Uday and QusaY seemed to have been sold out by a once trusted associate for big dollar rewards. Even if Saddam, with a $25 million price on his head, is far away from the northern city of Mosul where they died, his time may be running out.
"The net is closing around Saddam," said Frank Umbach, security analyst at the German Council on Foreign Relations.
"Iraq is different from Afghanistan where the opportunities to escape and hide are much greater...Saddam Hussein is also hated by much of his own population."
Larry Korb, a former assistant US defence secretary now at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, said the example of the informer in Mosul could sway more Iraqis behind the US troops, creating a domino effect of tips.
"People have been hedging their bets. Now, they're liable to come over to our side," he said. "If this guy who supposedly gave the intelligence (on the sons) gets the money -- and stays alive -- it could encourage other people to turn in Saddam.
"Somebody is going to know where he is."
Many Iraqis, whether out of a desire to be sure he is truly gone or to see him humiliated and brought to justice, would like to see Saddam taken alive. But the man born into poverty who revelled in the gun culture that cost the lives of so many Iraqi leaders before him is unlikely to give them satisfaction.
"We want to have a trial so he can pay for his crimes and we want him to be humiliated as he humiliated us," Humadi said. "(But) he will not surrender. Maybe he will commit suicide."
His sons and teenage grandson took on a huge US force including rocket-firing helicopters. Some analysts suspect Washington would rather not have to deal with the complications of capturing Saddam and holding him in captivity.
Yet even with Saddam eliminated, US troops face problems.
"I do not think that Saddam and his two sons are a very important part of the resistance," said Wamidh Nazmi, a politics professor at Baghdad University. "If they have any role it is a minimal one."
"Yes, you had many people in the Republican Guard, the army, the security forces who did better under Saddam," said British journalist and Saddam biographer Patrick Cockburn. "But they may not have been fighting to get Saddam back. They may have been fighting for other reasons: nationalism, Islamic fervour and local friction with the Americans or with those co-operating with the Americans."
Various groups, including at least one claiming affiliation to Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network have made claims of responsibility for attacks.
Western security experts also doubt that the deposed ruling clan and its shattered Baath party power structure has been capable of organising a co-ordinated resistance campaign from their -- probably -- scattered places of refuge.
That means what has been happening so far may not be greatly affected by the deaths of Uday and Qusai.
Most analysts do not think there would be any major impact from the deaths of Uday and Qusai.
US officials have concede there could even be "revenge attacks." A group of masked men appeared on an Arab television channel on Wednesday vowing retaliation.
But many doubt Saddam has sufficient followers left or the resources to mount any credible threat in Iraq or abroad.
At the same time, the possibility remains high that Saddam might stage a spectacular "last" attack to inflict maximum damage to the US occupation forces
Some American soldiers hope that resistance attacks may be stemmed if only because the deaths reduce the morale of the people who are attacking.
But others believe that while some people will be demoralised, others will be emboldened and take more drastic measures
However, the world leaders who voiced hopes that the death of Uday and Qusai would bring security and stability to Iraq would have known within themselves that it was wishful thinking. The crisis in Iraq could be loosely attributed to Saddam’s autocratic and oppressive rule but it would not end with even Saddam’s demise.
Moscow stood out among world capitals when it said only the development was still no guarantee for the future security and reconstruction of Iraq and "the restoration of the very basic needs of the Iraqi people."
"We judge any set of events first of all by how they affect the actual situation," said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yury Fedotov.
"The regime in Iraq has changed and the main efforts must now be focused on the process of reconstruction, an end to crime, the formation of state authorities, and the restoration of the very basic needs of the Iraqi people."
But Fedotov added in reference to the sons' death: "It is difficult for me to say how this fact can affect the future situation in Iraq."
The killing was also seen as showing the desperate measures US forces were resorting to as they grapple with anarchy in post-war Iraq.

Tuesday, July 22, 2003

Million-dollar Iraq scam

July 22 2003

Million-dollar Iraq scam

PV Vivekanand


AFTER Nigeria and several other African countries, it is now the turn of Iraq to be the staging ground for scams involving "millions of dollars" purportedly belonging to the ousted Saddam Russian regime.
A series of email messages have started surfacing, with the sender claiming to be in control of millions of dollars representing amounts stashed away by officials of the former Iraqi regime. The message suggests that the receiver make arrangements to receive the millions in his or her account and collect up to 20 to 30 per cent as commission and expenses.
There is little doubt that the message is similar to the scam as the so-called "Advance Fee Fraud," or "419 Fraud" (Four-One-Nine) named after the relevant section of the Criminal Code of Nigeria.
The scam is simple: the target receives an unsolicited fax, email, or letter containing either a money laundering or other illegal proposal. Sometimes it might even be very legal looking business proposal by normal means.
Common variations on the scam include "overinvoiced" or "double invoiced" oil or other supply and service contracts where corrupt officials want to get out of the country; crude oil and other commodity deals; a "bequest" left in a will; "money cleaning" where the corrupt official has a lot of currency that needs to be "chemically cleaned" before it can be used and he needs the cost of the chemicals; and "paying" for a purchase with a check larger than the amount required and asking for change to be advanced. The variations are very creative and virtually endless.
The resemblance between the Iraqi and Nigerian scam messages is unmistakable, particularly the way they build up an explanation as how to the millions came into the possession of the sender, how desparate the situation is and how easy the whole process of transfering the funds to the account of the receiver.
One such message, purportedly sent by Ali Abu Ibrahim -- "an aide in Saddam Hussein's presidential palace in Tikrit" -- offers $20 million, with "commission" for those who help him to secure the funds working out to $6 million.
Written in first person, Abu Ibrahim says he "managed to escape" with five metal boxes containing $20 million "to a neighbouring country which I shall disclose to you later because of the fear that I might be arrested by the new leadership."
The message says in part:
"These funds (were) since depostied with a security company in Europe which I shall disclose to you later, I've been living since then as a political refugee. I am seeking a reliable person who can assist me in moving this money out for safe banking and profitable investment.
"Honesty, I contacted you because I do not want to invest this money in Iraq and and due to my staus here as a politial refugee, I cannot think of such investment. Moreover, I would not want to take risk because this money is all I was able to take away and I am depending on this money. No body knows about th existence of this money, which is why I decided that investing this money abroad should be best for me.
"I will be honoured if I can be given the privilege of investing thie money with help. In view of this plight, I expect you to be trustworthy and kind enough to response to distress call to save my life and that of my relatives who are dependent on me and from a hopless future.
"If you agree, I hereby agree to compensate your sicnere and candid effort in this regard 20 per cent of the total money and annual five per cent of the after-tax returns for the first three years. Thereafter the term shall be varied: five per cent for expenses which may arise during the transaction, and phone bills inclusive.
"When the money is moved into your discreet account, you will be allowed to draw 20 per cent in your favour, with the remaining 70 per cent will be invested meaningfully for our future if possible in your area of busienss and different sectors of the economy in your country which are dividend-yielding.
"Whatever your decision," concludes the message, "please reach me immediately through my private phone and keep this letter tight secret for the interest of my family."

Thursday, July 10, 2003

Iraq resistance is growing

Iraqi resistance is growing

PV Vivekanand

THREE months have passed since Baghdad fell to the American and British military and the Saddam Hussein regime was ousted from power. The coalition forces seem set for a long haul in occupying the country and Iraqi resistance against them seems to be mounting. The success or failure of the occupation will be determined by the pace with which the US-led authority restores normalcy to the cities and towns of the beleaguered country.
IT IS uncertain at this point in time where the US occupation of Iraq would end up and whether it would produce a regime that would be accepted as legitimate by a majority of the people of Iraq and the rest of the Arab World, but one thing is clear: Attacks against the US military are unlikely to pressure Washington into withdrawing its forces from the war-shattered country.
For an overwhelming majority of Iraqis in southern and central Iraq, the immediate priority is restoration of law and order that would afford them the security conducive to making a living, and availability of basic services like water and power. In the north, which had been away from the control of the toppled regime even before the war, things are relatively better, with Kurdish groups maintaining law and order.
The risk that the Americans run elsewhere in Iraq is growing resentment over their failure to provide these basic essentials and the slow pace of reconstruction of the country.
Running contrary to Iraqis' hopes for a speedy return to normalcy is the steady incidents of resistance attacks and American preoccupation with eliminating the sources of resistance.
At least 29 American soldiers have been killed by hostile fire since US President George W. Bush declared an end to major combat in Iraq on May 1. Dozens have been wounded.
Also targeted are Iraqis co-operating with the occupation; seven recruits to an Iraqi police force were killed by a remote controlled bomb in the town of Ramadi, west of Baghdad, last week.
Some experts believe that the US military, equipped with the most advanced surveillance equipment and aggressive weapons, would eventually root out Iraqi resistance through an iron-fist, scorched-earth approach. The US forces would narrow down the sources of resistance and hit them hard, and corner those who are staging almost daily attacks.
The experts also note that the US has announced a reward of $2,500 for information leading to the arrest of assailants who kill a US soldier or Iraqi policeman.
The US has already offered a $25 million reward for information leading to the capture of Saddam or proof that he is dead and a $15 million price for similar information on his sons, Uday and Qusai.
The prediction of these experts that the US would eventually overpower Iraqi challengers is based on the apparent absence of a centralised resistance movement, notwithstanding the audio-tapes containing purported calls by Saddam for stepped-up attacks against the US forces in the country.
Those who forsee in this course of events argue that the 10 or so average daily "encounters" between Iraqi guerrillas and American soldiers do not account for a massive resistance movement and discount the theory that Iraq could prove to be "another Vietnam" for the Americans.
However, others argue that growing signs of organised resistance are emerging and the ranks of the resistance could swell if tens of thousands of desparate soldiers who became unemployed with the disbanding of the army opt to join in.
Plans announced this week call for a 25,000-strong army in about one year. That has little room for the 350,000 to 400,000 former soldiers.
Desparation over the lack of security and stability, basic services and jobs could also prompt others to seek to get rid of the Americans, according to observers who follow this school of thinking.
Iraqis who are prompted by personal, ideological and nationalistic reasons are also seen prone to be waging resistance. However, there is little sign of any co-ordination among the groups and there does not seem to be a central command which organises resistance attacks.
However, over the last two weeks, assailants have been using rocket-propelled grenades and mortars -- and remote controlled bombs as the case was in Ramadai -- in a sign of stepped up resistance.
As such, it remains open to conjecture whether the US would be able to cope with the increasing intensity of resistance while it seems to be continuing to alienate Iraqis by not moving fast enough to restore normal life in the country.

Southerners biding for time

The majority Shiites in the south are refraining themselves from ared resistance. Obviously, their leaders, despite internal differences, are hoping that they would get a larger share of power as and when the US fulfills its promise to rebuild and democratise the country.
The Shiites -- who make up to 60 per cent of the 24-million Iraqi population, would challenge the US in the short term only when their interests are questioned, and American strategists are careful not to antagonise them.
In the meantime, the Shiites are resorting to peaceful protest marches and demonstrations against what they see as decisions that undermine their drive to maintain domination of the area. They have made no secret of their desire to the see the back of the Americans at the earliest.
Americans are mindful that Iraqi Shiites could be used by Iran to counter Washington's moves in southern Iraq and broader political moves involving political power in Iraq. Bush administration officials have accused Tehran of meddling in Iraq's internal affairs through Shiite groups in southern Iraq, a charge Iran has denied.
The US has retained its option of using the Iranian dissident group, Mujahedeen e-Khalq, which has a sizeable presence in Iraq, to destablise Iran through cross-border action and propaganda beamed through radio and television.
It would probably be a re-enactment of the Saddam era scenario where Baghdad backed the Mujahedeen to counter Iran's backing for the Iraqi Shiite opposition group, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Today, the Americans have the Mujahedeen as a card against Iran and Tehran has pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiite groups in southern Iraq that it could use against the US if it suits Iranian interests.
However, it is highly unlikely that Iran would encourage its sympathisers in Iraq to resort to military resistance against the Americans. Washington has already piled pressure on Iran citing Tehran's nuclear programmes, and the theocratic regime there would do without having an open confrontation with the Americans.
The US civil administrator, Paul Bremer, might have sent a wrong signal to the religious leaders of the south when he avoided contact with them during a visit he made to Najaf on Wednesday.
Bremer staying away from tAyatollah Ali Sistani, leader of the Hawza theological institution and one of the most powerful and respected Shiite leaders, would have been seen as an affront to the community.
Sistani has accused the Americans of ignoring the Hawza and issued a religious order that only Iraqis should appoint those who would write a new constitution. That meant a direct challenge to American plans.

The northern equation

The Kurds in the north -- about 18 to 20 per cent of the populaton -- are busy laying the groundwork for the independent state that they dream of.
They are aligned with the US and the alliance is being cemented as an apparent American-Turkish rift is growing over Washington's rejection of Ankara's moves in northern Iraq to counter the emergence of an independent Kurdish state there. That rift was all the more visible last week when US forces detained 11 soldiers from Turkish special forcesin a raid on charges that they were trying to destablise the region by killing the US-installed mayor of Kirkuk. The soldiers were released after three days following top-level Ankara-Washington contacts, but the incident sent messages both ways: Turkey would not be dissuaded from pursuing action to pre-empt the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq and Washington would not allow Turkey to sow instability in the region.
At the same time, the US also reserves the option to back the Kurdish cause and thus keep the Islamist government in Ankara under pressure.
Whatever the course of events in the north, the Kurds would be the last to take up arms against the US military, and that effectively takes them out of the current military equation facing the US forces in the country.
Ankara could encourage the estimated two million Turkomen -- people of Turkish origin who remained in northern Iraq following the collapse of the Ottoman empire in the early 1900s -- to make trouble for the Americans and Kurds.
Reports indicate that Ankara is active among the Turkomen with a drive to resettle them in areas from where they were ousted during the Saddam regime's "ethnic cleansing drive" but is maintaining a low profile.
The US-Turkish proxy tug-of-war would have to emerge into the open since the stakes are too high for all sides involved. But that would not be an immediate factor in US considerations unless Ankara forces the American hand.

The main resistance threatre

Most of the anti-US attacks have occurred in the predominantly Sunni belt in the northeast of Baghdad and this have given rise to the theory that Saddam Hussein, who is allegedly flush with cash of more than $1.2 billion that he took from the central bank in the final days of the war that toppled him from power, is financing resistance and offering bounties to those who succeed in killing American soldiers.
In the hypothesis that this is true, then the question that comes up is: How long could Saddam continue to finance attacks as the US steps up the intensity of its actions against suspected resistance activists?
Indeed, $1.2 billion (provided that the Saddam-central bank story is true) would go a long way but not enough to wear out the Americans.
Cocnerns were raised last week that those who wage armed resistance could expand their effort to include Western civilians when a British television cameraman was shot dead at point-blank range.
Similar attacks have not been repeated, but that has done little to scale down apprehension that Western officials and businessmen visiting Iraq could be targeted.

Bid for legitimacy

Several countries, most of them from Europe and the former Soviet bloc, have joined the American forces in Iraq as peace-keeping troops or have agreed to send tropps there amid arguments in Washington for and against a dramatic increase in the number of American soldiers deployed there.
Some of those countries were seen as friends of Iraq during the Saddam era, but this perception could change if the Iraqis start seeing them as part of the US-led occupation force.
Obviously, the American objective in inviting other countries to join the Iraq operation is double-fold: It could reduce the pressure against American soldiers put up by the resistance and would also add an element of legitimacy to the occupation, given that the United Nations has refused to endorse a force that would serve under American command.
Pakistan's government has said that it might send troops to Iraq but that no decision would be taken without taking parliament into confidence.
The Indianb government, according to informed sources, has taken a decision in principle to accept an American request for troops and has notifed Washington of the decision. But the government faces strong opposition to the move. Observers believe that the government might simply assign a military unit before July 21, before parliament starts a regular session, hoping that it would be able with withstand opposition criticism in the legislature with a fait accompli.
Seven Iraqi exile groups which hope to make up a governing council in co-ordination with the US occupation authority have proposed that an Iraqi security force be deployed in cities to tackle crime.
Deployment of Iraqis familar with the territory and local norms could take care of internal security in the cities and also counter attacks against the foreign forces.
There was no reported American response to the proposal, which was formulated at a meeting this week in northern Iraq of the seven groups.

Political moves

Respected Iraqi politician Adnan Pachachi has said the seven groups would also take part in the governing council but that they would have executive authority and would not serve in an advisory capacity to the US authority in Iraq,
US administrator Paul Bremer has apparently accepted the demand and the council is expected to be announced in the next two weeks.
Shiites would be given more than 50 per cent of the 25 seats in the council and the rest would be divided among Sunnis and Kurds, according to sources quoted by news agencies.
The seven groups include the Iraqi National Congress, headed by Ahmed Chalabi, the Shi'ite Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Al Da'wa Party and two Kurdish political parties.
The council, the first step towards setting up an American-promised Iraqi administration of Iraq, should ideally be in control of most internal affairs, but it is clear that it faces several hurdles:
Iraqis have openly said they resent being ruled by exiles who remained out of the country for decades. However, not many Iraqis could be identified with leadership qualities at this point in time other than those who served under Saddam and they are not acceptable to both the US and most Iraqis.
For the moment, the exile groups are holding together despite their differing ideologies (or the lack of ideology) and agendas in the country.
The best and largest organised group among them is SCIRI, but the US treats the group at arms length in view of its close links with Iran.
The Kurdish groups are more focused in the north, and their priorities are different from those of other Iraqi groups - they want to advance their cause for independence.
Thrown into the equation are efforts to revive the Hashemite monarchy. Sharif Ali Bin Al Hussein, a London-based banker, has returned to Iraq and his supporters are calling for a constitutional monarchy. A rival group supports another Hashemite figure who lives in Jordan - Raad Bin Zeid.
The two groups have not come to grips with each other except through the media.
Do the Iraqis want a revived monarchy?
Some say that a monarchy could serve as a rallying point and unifying factor for the diverse Iraqi communities and tribes. Other say that democracy is the best option.
But the people of the war-shattered country is too far from any serious contemplation of such ideas. They want security, water, food, power and steady employment, and their resistance against anyone seen blocking the way would grow as every day passes without these demands being met -- and their first logical target is the coalition forces.

Friday, July 04, 2003

US going wrong in Iraq

By PV Vivekanand

THE US went wrong from the word go when it gave more weight to its military might than a pacifist approach of political persuasion in post-war Iraq, and it faces a deep quagmire in the country unless it moves fast against lost time to stabilise the Iraqis' most basic needs -- personal safety, electricity, water, health care, job security and regular salaries. This is the finding of international and regional experts who are alarmed over the deteriorating situation in Iraq, where the US military is getting more aggressive every day in the face of mounting resistance attacks.
Had the US tried a different approach, then it would not have been facing the quagmire that it is slowly slipping into in Iraq, say the experts.
The American military action freed the Iraqis from the oppressive rule of Saddam Hussein but pushed them into a much worse situation that the Saddam days in terms of daily life. The US forces gave prime consideration to securing oilfields and installations and ignored - and thereby seen as having encouraged - widespread looting, robberies rape and murder throughout the country. In fact, accusasions that the invading force was more interested Iraq's oil than the welfare of the Iraqis were heard even on April 9, the day Baghdad fell to the US force.
The American actions since then have convinced a majority of Iraqis that the US was not their liberator beyond the point of removing the Saddam regime to serve American interests that have little to do with caring for the people of Iraq or respecting their rights.
In Baghdad and other Iraqi towns male members of families keep watch with guns and take shifts to sleep, fearing armed robbers. Without their guns they feel naked, but the US forces insist that everyone surrender their weapons; not many have met a US-set deadline for giving up their guns.
It is indeed a festering sore. The US forces is not only offering safety and protection to the people of Iraq but is also seeking to deprive Iraqis of the means to protect themselves.
Power and water supplies are erratic; cost of living is shooting up and there is no regular pay, and many families are worse off than the Saddam days when the regime used to supply monthly rations.
Telecommunications are almost non-existent; the sense of normality offered by radio and television is lacking in view of the frequent outages.
If there was any inkling of an American inclination to look at ways to address the situation, that is fast disappearing with the US force's preoccupation dealing with Iraqi resistance; and if the situation continues, the vicious circle would only intensify and the US "administration" of Iraq would prove to be catastrophic for all.
The declared American drive to set up an interim Iraqi committee to help govern the country has been a source of consolation for many Iraqis who welcomed the involvement of their own people in running the country. But, the emerging undercurrents in the intense jockeying for power based on ethnic considerations and diverse ideologies have convinced them that having an effective Iraqi say in Iraqi affairs is not seen anywhere in the near future.
The absence of a central authority to address their problems has fuelled Iraqi anger and despair, say the experts in a report prepared by the International Criis Group.
"Ensconced in one of Saddam Hussein's vast palaces in Baghdad, (US) officials are not allowed to leave the palace grounds without military escort," it says. "They venture out infrequently and know little of Iraq and Iraqis. In turn, Iraqis have no venue, such as walk-in centres, where they can go to air problems, register complaints or hear first-hand from (US) officials," it adds.
The Iraqi frustration is also fuelled by the focus given to American corporates in reconstruction of their country. The Iraqis might not have adequate commercial foundations and equipment to undertake the job, but they are incensed by the feeling that Americans are fleecing their country and their resources and keeping out all others. Even at that, there is little to show on the ground that any reconstruction worth the name is under way.
The ICG underlines what the group sees as the mistakes that the American committed and are continuing to commit in post-war Iraq.
Among the many reasons for the instability in Iraq was the summary disbandment of the Baathist Party overlooking the three distinct kinds of Baathists -- diehard Saddam loyalists, those who joined the party out of expediency, and ideological followers, says the group.
According to the ICG, the vast majority of civil servants, police, judges, engineers and others belong to the second category and have the skills to make the country run again, but they are being sidelines and indeed taken to task for their past affiliation with the party.
"By banning all of them without distinction," the US rulers of Iraq have "ostracised a vital group - and may even end up uniting opposition to the occupation rather than alienating the Saddam loyalists," says the report.
It calls on the US to "seriously reconsider this order and return qualified senior managers to their positions if they do not have a proven record of corruption or abuse."
The ICG report says that there is also growing resentment among Iraqis who aspire to political power. "Even those who came from overseas feel that they are being offered far less than the Iraqi-run interim government that they thought the United States had agreed to before the war," it says. "The closest they are likely to get in the short to medium term is an interim council of 25 to 30 appointed by L. Paul Bremer, the chief US administrator in Iraq, without serious decision-making powers."
Disbanding the Iraqi military without offering its personnel alternative means to make a living was another major mistake of the Americans, according to the ICG. As a result, tens of thousands of young men were turned into the streets without employment, leaving them the option of a life of crime or joining resistance groups which give them something to do rather than wander around in search of non-existent jobs.
The disbandment of the army "has put hundreds of thousands of young men on the streets without serious prospects of work or compensation," says the IGC. "It is feared that many will join the gangs of thieves who roam the streets, or form the core of future armed resistance to the occupation. Some of these men were on the streets last week —  demonstrating against the US and demanding a fairer deal. Shooting at them — as the US forces did - is not the answer to these mens' problems."
"What is puzzling is that so little advance preparation appears to have been made for dealing with the problems that have arisen in Baghdad," says Hilterman. "Many if not most of them should have been anticipated based on years of experience with post-conflict transitions elsewhere.
"The Iraqis' faith in their new rulers is being undermined by ad hoc decision making, lack of cultural sensitivity and apparent neglect of the problems that rile them most. Urgent and focused action is needed if this discontent is not to be transformed into widespread and active opposition in the coming months," warns Hilterman.