Sunday, January 13, 2002

Blood through Baghdad streets

PV Vivekanand

AS expected, the focus has shifted to Iraq in the US-led war against terrorism. US officials are visiting friendly countries trying to figure out how far Washington could go in military terms against Iraq. What seems to be overlooked or sidelined is that the US has little evidence to prove that Baghdad is involved in international terrorism or had any links with the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington. If anything, in the view of the Arabs at large, the Iraqi leadership is more preoccupied with coping with the effects of 11 years of crippling trade sanctions on its people than indulging in the kind of activities that Washington deems as international terrorism.
Of course, Baghdad's support for the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) is irking the US since that might pose a challenge for Israel in its efforts to beat the Palestinians into submission in the peace process. By extension, the US might even deem it fit to classify Iraq's support for the Palestinian struggle as terrorism since some of the Palestinian resistance groups are branded as terrorist organisations.
The international context to military action against Iraq is equally important.
Many European countries, mindful of the vast oil and gas wealth of Iraq, maintain a steady relationship with the Saddam regime and have too much at stake to allow their best-laid, post-sanctions plans to go awry or be silent witnesses against the possibility that the country goes under the US tutelage. Prominent among them are France, Germany and Russia, whose leaders have cautioned the US against taking the war against terrorism to Iraq.
It is obvious that the US approach to Iraq is now based on the "old/new" definition given by President George W Bush to "international terrorism," when he said a few weeks ago that as far as he was concerned any country which develops unconventional weapons of mass destruction.
Allegations that Iraq had been secretly developing weapons of mass destruction since late 1999 when UN inspectors were forced to leave the country are the best arguments put up by the US, but the world has seen no solid evidence to support those assertions either.
In any event, there is little doubt that the prime objective of any American-led military action in Iraq, if and when launched, would be elimination of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Or at least that is what is understood. But by launching military action against Iraq, the US would be unleashing something it might not be able to control, and Washington knows it better than anyone.
A close look at the situation on the ground in Iraq could be as accurate as it could be deceptive. Saddam's foes argue that the people of Iraq are fed up of the suffering over the past decade caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait that brought in the sweeping sanctions and that they would be the US's natural ally in any American action undertaken through dissident Iraqi factions in exile to topple Saddam.
At the same time, let us not overlook that over the past years Iraqis have also come to see the US as their natural enemy and the cause of all their suffering. They know that it would take a Herculean effort backed by unwavering commitment and determination to dislodge the Saddam regime from power. It would not be walkover like Afghanistan for the US, and there would be heavy American losses when the going gets to the ground inside Iraq, and Iraqis aware how fast US enthusiasm could wane in the event of American lives being lost in conflict.
Iraqis have witnessed the US encouraging them to revolt against Saddam after the 1991 war but stopping short of extending support at the most crucial moment for the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south. That US posture left the rebel movements not only high and dry but also allowed the Iraqi government to launch a massive crackdown and bloodshed against the dissidents
(Perhaps it was the sense of guilt that prompted the US to declare the so-called "no-zones" in the north to "protect" the Kurds and in the south to "defend" the Shiites).
Against that backdrop, it would be naive for the US to take for granted that a military action against Iraq would have the support of Iraqis from within the country. Such support, at best, will be limited.
In the hypothesis that the US did manage to secure the support of the people of Iraq in its drive to eliminate the Iraqi regime, what happens thereafter is anyone's guess. But one thing is clear: the US would not be able to get a grip on things in Iraq.
The reasons are clear.
In the event that the Saddam regime is toppled, it means the total elimination of a multi-layered system that has no existence without Saddam. The first layer is Saddam's family, then his cousins and relatives, then people from Tikhrit (Tikhritis), Saddam's hometown, and then "co-opted" Shiite and Kurds, most of whom are not necessarily backed by their communities. The final layer is the leadership of the Baathist Party.
The entire system, which has for long acquired the hatred of Iraqis who have suffered at its hands, will collapse like a house of cards the moment Saddam goes. Blood will flow through the streets of Baghdad.