Tuesday, January 22, 2002

World braced for terror

PV Vivekanand

WITH the military campaign in Afghanistan all but over, thousands of people around the world are living in terror anxiously awaiting the hammer to strike on them for no reason other than simply knowing some of the prisoners of war taken by the US in Afghanistan. Indeed many others might not even know of the sword swinging towards them.
The US has so far maintained a tight lid on the findings of its investigations with the thousands of Taliban and non-Afghan fighters of Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network.
Apart from gathering evidence about the Sept.11 attacks in New York and Washington, the US is seeking information on what it describes as "sleepers" of the Al Qaeda network who, according to Washington, are lying low in at least 50 countries from the Philippines to Canada awaiting word from each other to plan new attacks.
Intelligence sources say that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is building a "data base" of names and details of the "sleepers" drawing from information gained through interrogating the detainees held in Afghanistan and those moved to the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.
True that there here might be remnants of Al Qaeda in some countries, but it seems to be out of place for the US to assert that the group had built up such a large network of operatives. They say that the US assertion is providing ammunition for many governments to launch crackdowns that would otherwise be seen as violation of human rights. But that is a different issue altogether.
Information the "sleepers" is the prime objective of the US while dealing with the thousands of prisoners of war taken in Afghanistan. More often than not, simply knowing them could be dangerous for others, however innocent they might be. Many might even recollect knowing them but that is not going to be an issue for the CIA.
It is quite simple. Anyone who was an acquaintance of an Al Qaeda member is a suspect and risks detention and questioning wherever they are. That is what is happening today in some countries (Britain, Spain, Italy and Jordan are examples).
The CIA has not shared all the information it has with the partners of the US in the war against terrorism, and experts believe it would be selective in offering information and only when it is ready to do so.
The US cannot get to the alleged layers of "sleepers" without help from the local government, and information will be provided to them on a case-by-case, need-to-know basis, experts say.
Washington might also use the leeway of a law it adopted in the late 80s that allows it to try people accused of plotting or carrying out attacks against American citizens. An extension of that law permits US security and law enforcement agencies to even kidnap suspects for trial in the US.
There have been several instances since then where US agents lured suspected hijackers and kidnappers of American citizens into situations where they were kidnapped and ferried to the US to stand trial. They included a Lebanese national who was involved in the 1987 hijack of a Royal Jordanian airliner in which an American navy diver was killed. The suspect was lured to a luxury yacht in the Mediterranean by a woman agent and arrested as he boarded the vessel. He was flown to the US and given a life sentence after being found guilty by a US court.
Innocents could face ordeals if it was found that they have had the slightest brush with Al Qaeda members even if it was before the group was formed. That is the extent to which the CIA is willing to go in its campaign.
US intelligence documents drawn up since Sept. 11 identify dozens of cities and groups around the world as: "financing and banking centre," "militant training centre," "Islamist group with links to Al Qaeda," "Al Qaeda cell," and "Al Qaeda strategic planning centre." These include Mindano in the Philippines, Pakistani cities and towns including Peshawar, Khost, Islamabad and Karachi, Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sanaa and Aden in Yemen, Amman in Jordan, Nairobi in Kenya, Dar es Salam in Tanzania, Mogadishu in Somalia, Khartoum in Sudan, Algeria, Tripoli in Libya, Nicosia in Cyprus, Sofia in Bulgaria, Sarajevo in Bosnia, Milan in Italy, Hamburg n Germany, Madrid in Spain, Paris and London.
Interestingly, the list excludes India despite New Delhi's assertions that Al Qaeda operatives are living in hiding in the country. Iraq and Iran are also excluded from the list.
Included in the list are US cities like Portland, Boston, New York, Miami, Arlington (Texas), and Vancouver, Ottawa and Montreal in Canada.
Some of the governments have already been given some information on the presence on their soil of suspects, and some arrests have been made.
But the "big wave" of crackdown, either by the host government or by US agents has yet to come. And when it comes, it would be sweeping and all-embracing.

Wednesday, January 16, 2002

Waiting for the hammer

WITH the military campaign in Afghanistan all but
over, thousands of people around the world are living
in terror anxiously awaiting the hammer to strike on
them for no reason other than simply knowing some of
the prisoners of war taken by the US in Afghanistan.
Indeed many others might not even know of the sword
swinging towards them.
The US has so far maintained a tight lid on the
findings of its investigations with the thousands of
Taliban and non-Afghan fighters of Osama Bin Laden's
Al Qaeda network.
Apart from gathering evidence about the Sept.11
attacks in New York and Washington, the US is seeking
information on what it describes as "sleepers" of the
Al Qaeda network who, according to Washington, are
lying low in at least 50 countries from the
Philippines to Canada awaiting word from each other to
plan new attacks.
Intelligence sources say that the US Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) is building a "data base" of
names and details of the "sleepers" drawing from
information gained through interrogating the detainees
held in Afghanistan and those moved to the US naval
base in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.
True that there here might be remnants of Al Qaeda in
some countries, but it seems to be out of place for
the US to assert that the group had built up such a
large network of operatives. They say that the US
assertion is providing ammunition for many governments
to launch crackdowns that would otherwise be seen as
violation of human rights. But that is a different
issue altogether.
Information the "sleepers" is the prime objective of
the US while dealing with the thousands of prisoners
of war taken in Afghanistan. More often than not,
simply knowing them could be dangerous for others,
however innocent they might be. Many might even
recollect knowing them but that is not going to be an
issue for the CIA.
It is quite simple. Anyone who was an acquaintance of
an Al Qaeda member is a suspect and risks detention
and questioning wherever they are. That is what is
happening today in some countries (Britain, Spain,
Italy and Jordan are examples).
The CIA has not shared all the information it has with
the partners of the US in the war against terrorism,
and experts believe it would be selective in offering
information and only when it is ready to do so.
The US cannot get to the alleged layers of "sleepers"
without help from the local government, and
information will be provided to them on a
case-by-case, need-to-know basis, experts say.
Washington might also use the leeway of a law it
adopted in the late 80s that allows it to try people
accused of plotting or carrying out attacks against
American citizens. An extension of that law permits US
security and law enforcement agencies to even kidnap
suspects for trial in the US.
There have been several instances since then where US
agents lured suspected hijackers and kidnappers of
American citizens into situations where they were
kidnapped and ferried to the US to stand trial. They
included a Lebanese national who was involved in the
1987 hijack of a Royal Jordanian airliner in which an
American navy diver was killed. The suspect was lured
to a luxury yacht in the Mediterranean by a woman
agent and arrested as he boarded the vessel. He was
flown to the US and given a life sentence after being
found guilty by a US court.
Innocents could face ordeals if it was found that they
have had the slightest brush with Al Qaeda members
even if it was before the group was formed. That is
the extent to which the CIA is willing to go in its
campaign.
US intelligence documents drawn up since Sept. 11
identify dozens of cities and groups around the world
as: "financing and banking centre," "militant training
centre," "Islamist group with links to Al Qaeda," "Al
Qaeda cell," and "Al Qaeda strategic planning centre."
These include Mindanao in the Philippines, Pakistani
cities and towns including Peshawar, Khost, Islamabad
and Karachi, Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sanaa and
Aden in Yemen, Amman in Jordan, Nairobi in Kenya, Dar
es Salam in Tanzania, Mogadishu in Somalia, Khartoum
in Sudan, Algeria, Tripoli in Libya, Nicosia in
Cyprus, Sofia in Bulgaria, Sarajevo in Bosnia, Milan
in Italy, Hamburg n Germany, Madrid in Spain, Paris
and London.
Interestingly, the list excludes India despite New
Delhi's assertions that Al Qaeda operatives are living
in hiding in the country. Iraq and Iran are also
excluded from the list.
Included in the list are US cities like Portland,
Boston, New York, Miami, Arlington (Texas), and
Vancouver, Ottawa and Montreal in Canada.
Some of the governments have already been given some
information on the presence on their soil of suspects,
and some arrests have been made.
But the "big wave" of crackdown, either by the host
government or by US agents, has yet to come. And when
it comes, it would be sweeping and all-embracing.

Sunday, January 13, 2002

Blood through Baghdad streets

PV Vivekanand

AS expected, the focus has shifted to Iraq in the US-led war against terrorism. US officials are visiting friendly countries trying to figure out how far Washington could go in military terms against Iraq. What seems to be overlooked or sidelined is that the US has little evidence to prove that Baghdad is involved in international terrorism or had any links with the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington. If anything, in the view of the Arabs at large, the Iraqi leadership is more preoccupied with coping with the effects of 11 years of crippling trade sanctions on its people than indulging in the kind of activities that Washington deems as international terrorism.
Of course, Baghdad's support for the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) is irking the US since that might pose a challenge for Israel in its efforts to beat the Palestinians into submission in the peace process. By extension, the US might even deem it fit to classify Iraq's support for the Palestinian struggle as terrorism since some of the Palestinian resistance groups are branded as terrorist organisations.
The international context to military action against Iraq is equally important.
Many European countries, mindful of the vast oil and gas wealth of Iraq, maintain a steady relationship with the Saddam regime and have too much at stake to allow their best-laid, post-sanctions plans to go awry or be silent witnesses against the possibility that the country goes under the US tutelage. Prominent among them are France, Germany and Russia, whose leaders have cautioned the US against taking the war against terrorism to Iraq.
It is obvious that the US approach to Iraq is now based on the "old/new" definition given by President George W Bush to "international terrorism," when he said a few weeks ago that as far as he was concerned any country which develops unconventional weapons of mass destruction.
Allegations that Iraq had been secretly developing weapons of mass destruction since late 1999 when UN inspectors were forced to leave the country are the best arguments put up by the US, but the world has seen no solid evidence to support those assertions either.
In any event, there is little doubt that the prime objective of any American-led military action in Iraq, if and when launched, would be elimination of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Or at least that is what is understood. But by launching military action against Iraq, the US would be unleashing something it might not be able to control, and Washington knows it better than anyone.
A close look at the situation on the ground in Iraq could be as accurate as it could be deceptive. Saddam's foes argue that the people of Iraq are fed up of the suffering over the past decade caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait that brought in the sweeping sanctions and that they would be the US's natural ally in any American action undertaken through dissident Iraqi factions in exile to topple Saddam.
At the same time, let us not overlook that over the past years Iraqis have also come to see the US as their natural enemy and the cause of all their suffering. They know that it would take a Herculean effort backed by unwavering commitment and determination to dislodge the Saddam regime from power. It would not be walkover like Afghanistan for the US, and there would be heavy American losses when the going gets to the ground inside Iraq, and Iraqis aware how fast US enthusiasm could wane in the event of American lives being lost in conflict.
Iraqis have witnessed the US encouraging them to revolt against Saddam after the 1991 war but stopping short of extending support at the most crucial moment for the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south. That US posture left the rebel movements not only high and dry but also allowed the Iraqi government to launch a massive crackdown and bloodshed against the dissidents
(Perhaps it was the sense of guilt that prompted the US to declare the so-called "no-zones" in the north to "protect" the Kurds and in the south to "defend" the Shiites).
Against that backdrop, it would be naive for the US to take for granted that a military action against Iraq would have the support of Iraqis from within the country. Such support, at best, will be limited.
In the hypothesis that the US did manage to secure the support of the people of Iraq in its drive to eliminate the Iraqi regime, what happens thereafter is anyone's guess. But one thing is clear: the US would not be able to get a grip on things in Iraq.
The reasons are clear.
In the event that the Saddam regime is toppled, it means the total elimination of a multi-layered system that has no existence without Saddam. The first layer is Saddam's family, then his cousins and relatives, then people from Tikhrit (Tikhritis), Saddam's hometown, and then "co-opted" Shiite and Kurds, most of whom are not necessarily backed by their communities. The final layer is the leadership of the Baathist Party.
The entire system, which has for long acquired the hatred of Iraqis who have suffered at its hands, will collapse like a house of cards the moment Saddam goes. Blood will flow through the streets of Baghdad.

Saturday, January 12, 2002

US misadventure in the making

expected, the focus has shifted to Iraq in the
US-led war against terrorism. US officials are
visiting friendly countries trying to figure out how
far Washington could go in military terms against
Iraq. What seems to be overlooked or sidelined is that
the US has little evidence to prove that Baghdad is
involved in international terrorism or had any links
with the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington.
If anything, in the view of the Arabs at large, the
Iraqi leadership is more preoccupied with coping with
the effects of 11 years of crippling trade sanctions
on its people than indulging in the kind of activities
that Washington deems as international terrorism.
Of course, Baghdad's support for the Palestinian
uprising (Intifada) is irking the US since that might
pose a challenge for Israel in its efforts to beat the
Palestinians into submission in the peace process. By
extension, the US might even deem it fit to classify
Iraq's support for the Palestinian struggle as
terrorism since some of the Palestinian resistance
groups are branded as terrorist organisations.
The international context to military action against
Iraq is equally important.
Many European countries, mindful of the vast oil and
gas wealth of Iraq, maintain a steady relationship
with the Saddam regime and have too much at stake to
allow their best-laid, post-sanctions plans to go awry
or be silent witnesses against the possibility that
the country goes under the US tutelage. Prominent
among them are France, Germany and Russia, whose
leaders have cautioned the US against taking the war
against terrorism to Iraq.
It is obvious that the US approach to Iraq is now
based on the "old/new" definition given by President
George W Bush to "international terrorism," when he
said a few weeks ago that as far as he was concerned
any country which develops unconventional weapons of
mass destruction.
Allegations that Iraq had been secretly developing
weapons of mass destruction since late 1999 when UN
inspectors were forced to leave the country are the
best arguments put up by the US, but the world has
seen no solid evidence to support those assertions
either.
In any event, there is little doubt that the prime
objective of any American-led military action in Iraq,
if and when launched, would be elimination of Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein. Or at least that is what is
understood. But by launching military action against
Iraq, the US would be unleashing something it might
not be able to control, and Washington knows it better
than anyone.
A close look at the situation on the ground in Iraq
could be as accurate as it could be deceptive.
Saddam's foes argue that the people of Iraq are fed up
of the suffering over the past decade caused by Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait that brought in the sweeping
sanctions and that they would be the US's natural ally
in any American action undertaken through dissident
Iraqi factions in exile to topple Saddam.
At the same time, let us not overlook that over the
past years Iraqis have also come to see the US as
their natural enemy and the cause of all their
suffering. They know that it would take a Herculean
effort backed by unwavering commitment and
determination to dislodge the Saddam regime from
power. It would not be walkover like Afghanistan for
the US, and there would be heavy American losses when
the going gets to the ground inside Iraq, and Iraqis
aware how fast US enthusiasm could wane in the event
of American lives being lost in conflict.
Iraqis have witnessed the US encouraging them to
revolt against Saddam after the 1991 war but stopping
short of extending support at the most crucial moment
for the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the
south. That US posture left the rebel movements not
only high and dry but also allowed the Iraqi
government to launch a massive crackdown and bloodshed
against the dissidents
(Perhaps it was the sense of guilt that prompted the
US to declare the so-called "no-zones" in the north to
"protect" the Kurds and in the south to "defend" the
Shiites).
Against that backdrop, it would be naive for the US to
take for granted that a military action against Iraq
would have the support of Iraqis from within the
country. Such support, at best, will be limited.
In the hypothesis that the US did manage to secure the
support of the people of Iraq in its drive to
eliminate the Iraqi regime, what happens thereafter is
anyone's guess. But one thing is clear: the US would
not be able to get a grip on things in Iraq.
The reasons are clear.
In the event that the Saddam regime is toppled, it
means the total elimination of a multi-layered system
that has no existence without Saddam. The first layer
is Saddam's family, then his cousins and relatives,
then people from Tikhrit (Tikhritis), Saddam's
hometown, and then "co-opted" Shiite and Kurds, most
of whom are not necessarily backed by their
communities. The final layer is the leadership of the
Baathist Party.
The entire system, which has for long acquired the
hatred of Iraqis who have suffered at its hands, will
collapse like a house of cards the moment Saddam goes.
Blood will flow through the streets of Baghdad.
As that happens in the central part of the country,
the Kurds in the north, who have for long yearned for
statehood, would be busy setting up an independent
Kurdistan to represent the nearly 20 million Kurds who
live in the region. That prospect is anathema for
Turkey (as it is for Iran and Syria which have
sizeable Kurdish communities). But once the momentum
of destablisation of Baghdad picks up speed, there
would little political or military means at the US'
disposal to contain the Kurds.
In the south, Iran, which has for long sought control
of the holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala, would slice
across Iraq, effectively cutting off the
Shiite-dominated part of Iraq from the rest of the
country as the Kurds in the north and take over the
two holy sites. Given their history of oppression and
suffering under the Sunni-dominated Saddam regime, the
Iraqi Shiites in the south would be more than glad to
welcome their co-religionists.
That leaves the central region, including Baghdad,
where Shiites and Sunnis, friends of foes of the
regime, and the dozens of Iraqi opposition groups
would be fighting for each other's blood and for
spoils of war.
In the northwest, it is anyone's guess how Syria would
react to such a course of events unfolding in Iraq,
which, for many Syrians, is a strategic prize, in
view of the centuries-old ties across the border
despite the strain in political relations under
Saddam.
The Arab leaders of the region are fully aware of the
scenario and that is the main reason for their
argument against any US-led assault against Iraq under
the present conditions. They are apprehensive of the
spill-overs of what would be nothing short of a
full-fledged civil war among Iraqis and the prospect
of the country with the second largest proven reserves
of oil being divided.
An overwhelming majority of the 22 members of the Arab
League have warned the US against any military assault
against Iraq, before, during or after Washington's
Afghanistan campaign.
It is quite clear that it would require a long-term
collective effort launched by a majority of the dozens
of Iraqi opposition groups in exile (like the Northern
Alliance in Afghanistan) to maintain the unity and
territorial integrity of Iraq to prepare the people of
Iraq, whether Shiite or Sunni, and keep the situation
"contained" and suited for a smooth transition of
power while Saddam is "eliminated."
Then again, a "smooth transition" of power is simply
impossible in Iraq, given the violent history of that
country and deep-running conflicts among the country's
communities, tribes and clans.
It is Saddam's total and complete grip on power that
is keeping the country united, and no foreign
influence is going to be a substitute for his "iron
fist" and "scorched-earth" policy to keep his people
in check.
That is where the US faces its biggest challenge.
Since 1991, Washington has been trying in vain to
bring most of the prominent Iraqi opposition groups
under one umbrella. The result? Well, in December
2001, Washington suspended all financial aid to the
London-based Iraqi National Congress (INC), which has,
since 1989, claimed to be represent all Iraqi exiles.
The reason for the suspension was misuse of tens of
millions of dollars that the US had provided to the
group.
In real terms, the break between Washington and INC
represented the failure of a decade of intense US
efforts to produce a credible Iraqi opposition group
which could lead an anti-Saddam revolt.
At this juncture in time, it seems clear that the US
is unsure how to go about subduing Iraq. Quite simply,
the stakes are too high to be lost with a bungled
operation in Iraq not only for the US but also Europe
as well as the Arab World.