Saturday, January 12, 2002

US misadventure in the making

expected, the focus has shifted to Iraq in the
US-led war against terrorism. US officials are
visiting friendly countries trying to figure out how
far Washington could go in military terms against
Iraq. What seems to be overlooked or sidelined is that
the US has little evidence to prove that Baghdad is
involved in international terrorism or had any links
with the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington.
If anything, in the view of the Arabs at large, the
Iraqi leadership is more preoccupied with coping with
the effects of 11 years of crippling trade sanctions
on its people than indulging in the kind of activities
that Washington deems as international terrorism.
Of course, Baghdad's support for the Palestinian
uprising (Intifada) is irking the US since that might
pose a challenge for Israel in its efforts to beat the
Palestinians into submission in the peace process. By
extension, the US might even deem it fit to classify
Iraq's support for the Palestinian struggle as
terrorism since some of the Palestinian resistance
groups are branded as terrorist organisations.
The international context to military action against
Iraq is equally important.
Many European countries, mindful of the vast oil and
gas wealth of Iraq, maintain a steady relationship
with the Saddam regime and have too much at stake to
allow their best-laid, post-sanctions plans to go awry
or be silent witnesses against the possibility that
the country goes under the US tutelage. Prominent
among them are France, Germany and Russia, whose
leaders have cautioned the US against taking the war
against terrorism to Iraq.
It is obvious that the US approach to Iraq is now
based on the "old/new" definition given by President
George W Bush to "international terrorism," when he
said a few weeks ago that as far as he was concerned
any country which develops unconventional weapons of
mass destruction.
Allegations that Iraq had been secretly developing
weapons of mass destruction since late 1999 when UN
inspectors were forced to leave the country are the
best arguments put up by the US, but the world has
seen no solid evidence to support those assertions
either.
In any event, there is little doubt that the prime
objective of any American-led military action in Iraq,
if and when launched, would be elimination of Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein. Or at least that is what is
understood. But by launching military action against
Iraq, the US would be unleashing something it might
not be able to control, and Washington knows it better
than anyone.
A close look at the situation on the ground in Iraq
could be as accurate as it could be deceptive.
Saddam's foes argue that the people of Iraq are fed up
of the suffering over the past decade caused by Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait that brought in the sweeping
sanctions and that they would be the US's natural ally
in any American action undertaken through dissident
Iraqi factions in exile to topple Saddam.
At the same time, let us not overlook that over the
past years Iraqis have also come to see the US as
their natural enemy and the cause of all their
suffering. They know that it would take a Herculean
effort backed by unwavering commitment and
determination to dislodge the Saddam regime from
power. It would not be walkover like Afghanistan for
the US, and there would be heavy American losses when
the going gets to the ground inside Iraq, and Iraqis
aware how fast US enthusiasm could wane in the event
of American lives being lost in conflict.
Iraqis have witnessed the US encouraging them to
revolt against Saddam after the 1991 war but stopping
short of extending support at the most crucial moment
for the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the
south. That US posture left the rebel movements not
only high and dry but also allowed the Iraqi
government to launch a massive crackdown and bloodshed
against the dissidents
(Perhaps it was the sense of guilt that prompted the
US to declare the so-called "no-zones" in the north to
"protect" the Kurds and in the south to "defend" the
Shiites).
Against that backdrop, it would be naive for the US to
take for granted that a military action against Iraq
would have the support of Iraqis from within the
country. Such support, at best, will be limited.
In the hypothesis that the US did manage to secure the
support of the people of Iraq in its drive to
eliminate the Iraqi regime, what happens thereafter is
anyone's guess. But one thing is clear: the US would
not be able to get a grip on things in Iraq.
The reasons are clear.
In the event that the Saddam regime is toppled, it
means the total elimination of a multi-layered system
that has no existence without Saddam. The first layer
is Saddam's family, then his cousins and relatives,
then people from Tikhrit (Tikhritis), Saddam's
hometown, and then "co-opted" Shiite and Kurds, most
of whom are not necessarily backed by their
communities. The final layer is the leadership of the
Baathist Party.
The entire system, which has for long acquired the
hatred of Iraqis who have suffered at its hands, will
collapse like a house of cards the moment Saddam goes.
Blood will flow through the streets of Baghdad.
As that happens in the central part of the country,
the Kurds in the north, who have for long yearned for
statehood, would be busy setting up an independent
Kurdistan to represent the nearly 20 million Kurds who
live in the region. That prospect is anathema for
Turkey (as it is for Iran and Syria which have
sizeable Kurdish communities). But once the momentum
of destablisation of Baghdad picks up speed, there
would little political or military means at the US'
disposal to contain the Kurds.
In the south, Iran, which has for long sought control
of the holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala, would slice
across Iraq, effectively cutting off the
Shiite-dominated part of Iraq from the rest of the
country as the Kurds in the north and take over the
two holy sites. Given their history of oppression and
suffering under the Sunni-dominated Saddam regime, the
Iraqi Shiites in the south would be more than glad to
welcome their co-religionists.
That leaves the central region, including Baghdad,
where Shiites and Sunnis, friends of foes of the
regime, and the dozens of Iraqi opposition groups
would be fighting for each other's blood and for
spoils of war.
In the northwest, it is anyone's guess how Syria would
react to such a course of events unfolding in Iraq,
which, for many Syrians, is a strategic prize, in
view of the centuries-old ties across the border
despite the strain in political relations under
Saddam.
The Arab leaders of the region are fully aware of the
scenario and that is the main reason for their
argument against any US-led assault against Iraq under
the present conditions. They are apprehensive of the
spill-overs of what would be nothing short of a
full-fledged civil war among Iraqis and the prospect
of the country with the second largest proven reserves
of oil being divided.
An overwhelming majority of the 22 members of the Arab
League have warned the US against any military assault
against Iraq, before, during or after Washington's
Afghanistan campaign.
It is quite clear that it would require a long-term
collective effort launched by a majority of the dozens
of Iraqi opposition groups in exile (like the Northern
Alliance in Afghanistan) to maintain the unity and
territorial integrity of Iraq to prepare the people of
Iraq, whether Shiite or Sunni, and keep the situation
"contained" and suited for a smooth transition of
power while Saddam is "eliminated."
Then again, a "smooth transition" of power is simply
impossible in Iraq, given the violent history of that
country and deep-running conflicts among the country's
communities, tribes and clans.
It is Saddam's total and complete grip on power that
is keeping the country united, and no foreign
influence is going to be a substitute for his "iron
fist" and "scorched-earth" policy to keep his people
in check.
That is where the US faces its biggest challenge.
Since 1991, Washington has been trying in vain to
bring most of the prominent Iraqi opposition groups
under one umbrella. The result? Well, in December
2001, Washington suspended all financial aid to the
London-based Iraqi National Congress (INC), which has,
since 1989, claimed to be represent all Iraqi exiles.
The reason for the suspension was misuse of tens of
millions of dollars that the US had provided to the
group.
In real terms, the break between Washington and INC
represented the failure of a decade of intense US
efforts to produce a credible Iraqi opposition group
which could lead an anti-Saddam revolt.
At this juncture in time, it seems clear that the US
is unsure how to go about subduing Iraq. Quite simply,
the stakes are too high to be lost with a bungled
operation in Iraq not only for the US but also Europe
as well as the Arab World.