Friday, September 19, 2003

Arafat in Sharon gunsights

PV Vivekanand

FEARS are high that despite Israeli utterances to the contrary, plans should definitely be afoot to physically eliminate Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. It is only a question of how and when the plans would be implemented.
No Israeli might be directly involved in a possible operation and the accusing finger might be pointed at a Palestinian or Arab. Israel's notorious spy and security agencies, including Mossad and Shin Bet, have a record of having "arranged" such killings, prominent among them the murder of Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) in Tunis in January 1991.
It was a Palestinian bodyguard who shot and killed Abu Iyad and it was then alleged that he was acting upon the orders of the Abu Nidal group. However, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) could not get to the bottom of the affair or did not choose to release to the public what it had learnt. That left a deep impression among the people of the Middle East that it was indeed an Israeli mind that went to planning and executing the attack on Abu Iyad.
There could be many scenarios in Ramallah to serve Israel's goal of eliminating Arafat from the political equation.
With Tuesday's American veto of a UN Security Council resolution that called on Israel to refrain from expelling Arafat from Palestine or harming him otherwise, it is clear that no international pressure will force Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to abandon his plans to remove Arafat from the political scene.
Removing Arafat from theequation is one the central pillars in Sharon's strategy to eliminate all sources of Palestinian resistance.
Despite all the shortcomings attributed to him, Arafat symbolises the Palestinian struggle for independence and represents a rallying point for Palestinians. Sharon knows this well and hence his campaign to expel Arafat.
Sharon also hopes that the disappearance of Arafat from Palestine will destroy all traces of the Olso agreements and do away with any commitment to retain whatever has been achieved under the 1993 accords.
Notwithstanding its veto of the draft resolution, Washington is opposing Sharon's plan to deprive Arafat of a physical presence among his people not because it has any sympathy for the Palestinian cause or finds any use for the Palestinian leader as far as American interests are concerned; if anything, the US has
been the first to push the idea of easing Arafat out of
the equation.
Howeve,r Washington realises that exiling Arafat would give him the international scene to press his cause for Palestine and this would only bring about more headaches and pressure on the US administration.
It will be a folly to expect any revival of the "roadmap" for peace notwithstanding the reality that it is the only proposal on the table for the parties to pursue.
We could issue repeated calls for its revival, but, in effect, it remains only on paper and will remain so as
along as there is no change in the Israeli mindset.
Obviously, Sharon does not believe that he should be making any compromises with the Palestinians. He is convinced that it is only a matter of time before the Palestinians succumb to military assaults, ruthless killings and targeted assassinations and agree to accept his version of a peace agreement.
Against the backdrop of that mindset, Sharon might only put off his plans against Arafat and wait for the opportune time to strike at the Palestinian leader.
It will clear the ground for Sharon to make his rejection of the Oslo accord complete and set his own terms for peace with no reference to the 1993 Oslo agreements.
Obviously, the resignation of Mahmoud Abbas as prime
minister citing lack of Israeli co-operation and "internal problems" -- meaning fueds with Arafat -- has offered Sharon the opportunity he has been waiting for.
he could cite the Abbas resignation as the most vivid example of Arafat's machinations against peace and smoother, to an extent, European opposition against removing him from Palestine.
The Europeans and rest of the international community
will find their backing for Arafat somewhat undefensible in view of what Sharon could cite as the Palestinian leader's stands against the implementation of the "roadmap."
Had it not been for fears of unprecedented and perhaps uncontrollable Palestinian retaliation, Sharon would not wait for one second to order a death strike against Arafat if he thought he could get away with it.
Sharon is not worried about world pressure or condemnation of his actions since he knows he could defend himself saying he was
only acting in the interest of peace against a man
who, according to his argument, has done everything
to block the effort for peace.
The real and immediate danger is Sharon and his spychiefs and notorious agencies staging a repeat of the Abu Iyad killing in 1991.
Sharon has already crossed the point of no return with his public declaration that every Hamas leader is marked for death.
His posture indicates that he could not care less for the backlash that would come from the fiercely loyal supporters of Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and other leaders of the group.
Had Sharon been successful in killing Yassin and others through the missile and bombings of their homes in Gaza in September, then it would have meant waves of suicide attacks; for such would have been the height of Palestinian rage, fury, sorrow, grief, despair and frustration at Israel's arrogance that it could get away with anything in Palestine.
The danger is very much alive today. We could only hope against hope that sense will prevail and Sharon would realise, sooner or later, that violence begets violence and he would never be closer to his "dream" of acquiring Palestine without the Palestinians even if he manages to eliminate Arafat and Yassin and other leaders of the Palestinian struggle.