Thursday, June 19, 2003

US counts dud cards in Iran

PV Vivekanand


THE failure of the clerical regime in Tehran to
address the bread-and-butter issues of their people
and overzealous imposition of religious restrictions
that stifled personal freedoms are the best bet the US
has in its bid for regime change in the Islamic
republic.
The American charges that Iran is seeking nuclear
weapons and is harbouring Al Qaeda terrorists are
cosmetic as far as the people of Iran are concerned.
They see those charges as simialr to the American
build-up against Iraq, and, if anything, they would
stand behind the regime against external meddling in
their internal affairs.
But the US-inspired slogans against "oppression,
denial of jusitce, disrespect for human rights" might
work to incite Iranians into demonstrating against the
regime since such is the track record of the
theocratic governance of Iran since the ouster of the
shah in 1979.
Contrary to the Iranian people's expectations of a
liberal democracy, public freedoms and economic
opportunities, the post-shah regime headed by the late
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini tightened the norms of
life in the society and focused on fighting a running
conflict with the US.
Indeed, Khomeini, who died in 1989, was successful of
freeing his country from US domination, but he scored
little else to serve his people's needs of better
living standards, employment and political freedoms.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini, did no
better.
Throughout the period since the 1979 upheaval that
saw the ouster of the shah, the theocrats in Iran
dominated governance as well in line with the Shiite
ideology where the religious leadership also maintains
political leadership. Therefore, the president and his
cabiinet were also tied down to the decisions of the
religious establishment under the Vilayet-e-Faqih
system adopted by the Shiites.
On the economic front, the religious esatablishment
created organisations beyond the control of the
government to supervise the elected branches and in
direct control of the armed forces, the judiciary and
the wealthy charitable foundations that account for
nearly half of all economic activities in the country;
hence the tight-fisted rule of the theocrats also
meant that Iranians were never offered the right
economic opportunities that their oil-rich country
should have offered them.
Khamenei exercises absolute power and his hardline
camp dominates the Council of Guardians, which has the
final say in any government move, and the Expediency
Council, headed by former president Ali Akbar
Rafsanjani, a relative moderate but whose voice is
drowned by the hardliners.
Khamenei serves as the ideologue of the conservative
camp and Rafsanjani, as head of the Experiency
Council, acts as the link between the relgiious
establishment and elected bodies.
Any move towards fundamental reforms made by the
current regime of Mohammed Khatami is vetoed by the
hardliners, and the ineffective resistance of the
government against such domination has even alienated
it from the public.
It was with great hope that the Iranians voted in
Khatami as president in 1997, but it soon became
apparent that the religious leaders had no intention
to let him carry out reform. They fought him every
step of the way, with the net result that the people
of Iran gave up any hope for positive change in their
life.
The voters had hoped that Khatami would reinvigorate
the Islamic revolution and prompote freedom of
thought, speech, dress, and social interaction;
education, housing, healthcare and employment. Between
1997 and 2000, the conservatives who had a majority in
parliament kept Khatami's reforms at arms distance. In
2000, the Khatami camp won majority control of the
Majlis, but the conservatives continued to block him
through the Guardians Council. Dozens of eformists
were jailed, nearly 100 reform newspapers were closed
down and popular protests were put down violently by
harcord supporters of the clerical establishment.
What we see today in Iran is a reflection of the
mounting frustrations of the Iranian people. The daily
protests in the last 10 days in Tehran and other
cities of the country are indeed encouraged and even
incited by the US and its Iranian agents, most of whom
are based outside the country but have connections
inside. Supporting the US campaign to stir internal
trouble that Washington hopes would eventually lead to
a movement strong enough to topple the Khamenei regime
are the successors of the shah as well as leaders of
the Iranian Jewish community in the US.
What are Iran's options today to successfully fight
off the American pressure?
There are no overnight solutions that would make the
people of Iran immune to external incitement to rise
up against the regime. Even if there were, the
religious establishment could not be expected to
embrace them since they involve cornerstones of what
the Khamenei camp believes as the foundations of the
Islamic republic.
However, the survival of the regime depends on how it
goes about handling the ongoing protests on the
internal front and warding off American threats citing
the country's alleged nuclear programmes, meddling in
Iraq's internal affairs, aiding "international
terrorism," and supporting "terorrist organisations"
such as the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups
and Lebanon's Hizbollah.
When university students started protests at night
against what was rumoured to be government plans to
privatise universities, a few non-student activists
took to the streets and expressed backing for the
students by honking their vehicle's horns.
Hardline supporters of the clerical establishment hit
back by storming university dorms and assaulting
students. The government intervened and ordered the
arrest of those who attacked students.
Then it was the turn of the religious establishment to
take the next step. It seemed to have realised that
extending a hand of protection to the hardliners might
be counterproductive; therefore it decided not to
muscle the government to release those arrested. That
could indeed be a starting point for the hardline camp
to let loosen their grip on life in Iran and the
faster they do it the better for themselves and their
people.
That is the status quo in Tehran today. But the
protests are far from over, with the US engaged in a
multi-pronged effort to discredit the Khamenei camp
and oust the Khatami regime. It has not reached the
military point yet. The US seems to be marking time to
the point that the internal protests gather enough
moementum and strength before moving in with military
might to back the protesters. The countdown has
started, as far as American strategists are concerned.
But they might be in for a surprise since the Iranians
have an excellent record of uniting against common
threats.... and that might be America's undoing in
Iran.