Monday, July 29, 2002

Iraqi exiles on diverse courses

by pv vivekanand

AGREEMENT among the six major groups of Iraqi dissidents is key to any US plan to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein, but Washington might find it elusive not only because of the uncertainties of its campaign and regional undercurrents but also the conflicting agendas of the various parties to the oust-Saddam scenario before, during and after it is played out.
Without a unified approach grouping the six factions representing the political and military segments of Iraqis they claim to represent, it is a no-go for the US to implement its plans. Latest reports speak of a purported plan to launch a sudden invasion of Iraq in October and achieve its objectives before the end of the year.
Washington, worried by clear signs of divisions among the groups, has invited their leaders for talks on Aug. 9, but the change in fundamentals that are vital to an agreement among them is unlikely by October or beyond as long as the US does not make it clear whom it wants to install as Saddam's successor i.e. in the hypothesis that it manages to topple the Iraqi president and assumes a position of strength where it could call the shots in Baghdad.
Apart from the problems in trying to find common ground among the diverse agendas of the dissident groups, it would be very difficult for the US to achieve parity between its own "political and strategic as well as oil interests" in Iraq with the interests of Iraqi exiles at this stage with a view to ensuring that an Uncle Sam man is installed in Baghdad.
The six invited to the Washington meeting are:
Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr Al Hakim, leader of the Iranian-backed Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Ahmed Chalabi, chairman of the London-based Iraqi National Congress (INC), Sharif Ali Hussein of the INC, Masoud Barzani, head of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) based in northern Iraq, Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and also based in northern Iraq, and Iyad Alawi of the Iraqi National Accord , which claims to represent dissident Iraqi army officers from all sects in the country.
Each of these six men represents distinct and conflicting interests, and none of them is likely to join meaningful alliances without guarantees that their interests would be protected. But the US would not be able to provide that guarantee with convincing assurances because of the very disparity in their respective positions.
The only cause they share is the ouster of Saddam, and it's anyone's guess how these groups plan to behave in the run-up to the hypothetical ouster of Saddam and in a post-Saddam Iraq.
It is not clear who would attend the Washington meeting.
It is unlikely that SCIRI would accept the invitation but all others are likely to.
In Damascus, the Syrian representative of SCIRI, Bayan Jabber, said his group was invited but had not decided if it would attend. Others have indicated they might go.
In any scenario, Iranian-backed Ayatollah Hakim will seek to ensure that the majority Shiites of Iraq would have a dominant say in the future of a post-Saddam Iraq, but the US, wary of Hakim's Iranian connections, would not want to see Shiite domination of Iraqi affairs.
It is also unclear how Hakim could find compatibility between joining an alliance for military action against Iraq and Tehran's vehement rejection of such a course of events.
Obviously, Iran feels that it could be the next target for American action after Iraq, and Tehran could be counted on to do everything in its power to throw a spanner in the works to ensure that Washington does not achieve its objectives in Iraq. That is arguably one of the strongest wild cards in the equation.
Chalabi and Sharif Hussein claim to represent the democratic school among Iraqis, but the INC's influence among its constituents is limited. Reports from Washington indicate that officials do not trust the INC, particularly when it comes to funds.
Chalabi, who fled Jordan in 1988 in a $300 million scandal after operating a bank there for more than 10 years, has been accused of diverting anti-Saddam US funds.
Chalabi has boasted to this writer, immediately after the war of 1991, that the day was near when he would occupy the presidential palace in Baghdad while one of his old-time lieutenants -- chief foreign exchange dealer at his collapsed Petra Bank in Jordan -- would be his "finance minister."
Sharif Hussein is a descendant of the Hashemite family which ruled Iraq until it was ousted in a bloody coup in 1958, and he has remained a mysterious figure playing his cards close to his chest despite his role in the INC as leader of the small Constitutional Monarchy Movement.
Chalabi and Sharif Hussein are known not to see eye-to-eye on many issues, but the two have tried to put up a picture of close alliance in recent times, and that the US found it fit to invite both of them to the Aug. 9 meeting is an implicit recognition of the differences between them.
Talabani and Barzani, the Kurdish leaders who hold sway in northern Iraq -- or what they call Kurdistan -- under an uneasy alliance after bitter fighting, claim to represent the interests of the nearly five million Kurds living in Iraq.
Doubts are cast on their political inclinations after they worked out a modus videndi under American pressure. The two are the two main powers in the northern Iraq, which is beyond the control of the Baghdad government.
The two groups seem to be more interesting in collecting taxes and tolls from local residents as well as Baghdad-bound vehicles passing through their territory with goods and back across the border to Turkey with oil in violation of the UN sanctions against Iraq.
The KDP is known to be flirting with Baghdad and it was with Saddam's army support that the group managed to consolidate its grip in the north after a round of fierce fighting in 1996.
Both Talabani and Barzani are likely to be wary of any US plan to topple the Saddam regime without assurances that their fiefdoms would not be challenged and their revenues are guaranteed. Equally important, they would demand iron-clad promises that the US would not desert them and leave them in the lurch half-way through military action against Saddam.
In return, the US would demand from them a pledge that they would not seek to secede from Iraq and to set up an "independent and sovereign Kurdistan" -- the dream of the 30 million Kurds scattered in the region but anathema to Turkey, Syria and Iran.
It is easy to figure out why such an entity would be rejected by the region's countries. The so-called Kurdistan in northern Iraq represents, according to a nationalist Kurdish website, only 18 per cent of the "Kurdish homeland." The rest of the territory, it says, was usurped following World War I: Turkey took 43 per cent of the followed by Iran (31 per cent), Syria (six per cent) and the former Soviet Union (two per cent).
With sizeable Kurdish populations in these areas, fears are strong that "Kurdistan" would not be happy to remain in the 18 per cent in Iraq.
Finances are also expected to play a major influencing role the choices of the Kurdish groups.
Under the UN's oil-for-food programme with Iraq, the Kurds living under KDP and PUK control in the north get 17 per cent of the proceeds from exports of Iraqi oil under UN supervision. This has helped improve the post-war lot the Kurds and indirectly boosted the standing of Talabani and Barzani. As such, neither of them is likely to upset the applecart without ensuring that their constituencies would not be deprived of the relative improvement in life brought about by the oil proceeds.
Iyad Alawi of the Iraqi National Accord says he represents dissident Iraqi officers both in and out of the country. His group was once seen closer to the US (it was under American pressure the late king Hussein of Jordan allowed Alawi to open an office in Amman in 1996).
Obviously, according to sources close to the Iraqi National Accord, the group believes that the military should be in control of Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the hoped-for ouster of Saddam.
Without a strong military grip throughout Iraq, the group reportedly argues, the country would simply disintegrate.
The Iraqi National Accord claims the support of top Iraqi officers who deserted the country after the 1991 war and also of that of many who continue to serve the regime. The claim has never been put to test.
Thrown into the bargain are assertions by Iraqi exiles that Washington has already shortlisted some 15 former Iraqi generals and would designate one of them to take over Baghdad as Saddam's succesor.
Obviously, it implies that democracy is far from the US mind in a post-Saddam Iraq.
Lending credit to that argument is the complaint by the INC that despite its "commitment" to democracy Washington is not giving it the due consideration it thinks it deserves.
One of those "shortlisted" generals is said to be former army chief Nizar Al Khasraji who served as Iraq's army chief of staff when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. He fled Iraq after the 1991 war and now lives in Copenhagen. The US plans involving him appear to have suffered a setback after the Dutch government launched an investigation into charges that he led an Iraqi military campaign against Kurds after the eight-year Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988.
The US accuses Saddam and some of his close associates of war crimes for the anti-Kurd operations and it would be out of place for Washington to continue to groom Khasraji after limelight has fallen on him as one of those who had masterminded and carried out the alleged crimes against Kurds.
The deep splits among the Iraqi exiles over aspirations for power and strategies forced the INC to call off plans to announce a "government in exile" on Saturday.
The fundamental difference is over who should be named as what in the "government in exile." It is widely perceived that the line-up would be followed in as and when -- and of course "if" -- the "exiles" move into Baghdad. As such, naming the "functionaries" would be as good as tipping the hands of the various groups. Beyond that is the reality that most of those who are left out would opt to remain outside the coalition and might even try to torpedo its moves.
Furthermore, there are some who want a role in running Iraq but are not ready to emerge into the open yet, and they, if the exiles are to be believed, include a few within the Saddam regime who would be signing their fate if prematurely identified as sympathisers of the anti-Saddam campaign.
The difficulties and differences facing the Iraqi exile groups were no more pronounced than when they could not even announce in public the names of the members of a committee they elected at their recent London meeting and they could not agree on who should chair it.
Against the array of divergent interests and agendas, it would be an almost miracle if the US managed to cobble the exiles together into a coherent alliance with the potential to serve its interests in Iraq -- that is, indeed, not to mention the fundamental fault lines in the US approach in defiance of Arab and international public opinion against its plans to oust the leadership of a sovereign country.

Sunday, July 21, 2002

US poised to hit Iraq

by pv vivekanand

IF reports are accurate, then a US military strike against Iraq is imminent although it defies logic even in military terms, terrain and weather and of course the regional situation in the Middle East. Perhaps that is the mysterious element in the American approach to executing its declared plan to oust Iraqi President Saddam Hussein despite international opposition.
Be that it may, the fact remains that there is no well-established legal basis for the US plan within or outside the UN framework.
UN Security Council Resolution 665 adopted in August 1990 authorised the use of force against Iraq since that country had invaded another sovereign state, Kuwait, and Resoluton 678 of November of the same year set the Jan. 15 deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait or face war. The international community, including a majority of members of the Arab League, backed the use of force against Iraq at that time after Baghdad refused to quit Kuwait.
The mission was accomplished and Iraq was evicted from February1991 and the authorisation for war offered by UN Security Council resolutions 665 and 678 was terminated when Resolution 687 was adopted in April 1991 formally ending the military action launched by a US-led coalition of 31 countries.
Since then, the UN Security Council has adopted dozens of resolutions related to Iraq, but all of them covered the various by-products of the 1990 Iraqi invasion and the 1991 liberation of Kuwait and none of them prescribed another war or an invasion of Iraq and ouster of its leadership. Those resolutions dealt with the UN trade embargo against Iraq and the conditions under which the sanctions could be lifted and with the "oil-for-food" programme.
In fact, there is no UN endorsement of the "no-fly" zones imposed and patrolled by the US and UK in the north and south of Iraq, and, by extension, their frequent attacks on Iraq in retaliation for alleged provocations have no legal basis within the UN system. Nor was there any UN endorsement of the several rounds of massive missile attacks and bombings of targets in Iraq carried out by the US.
In the framework of the various resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council since the Gulf war of 1991, there is no authorisation for the use of force against Iraq related to its shortl-lived occupation of Kuwait.
In strict legal terms, Iraq's refusal to allow the return of UN inspectors could be construed as defiance of the UN Security Council resolutions that calls for the elimination of Baghdad' alleged weapons programme. However, there is no UN stipulaton for military action for its perceived rejection of the world body's decisions and demands.
Indeed, the Bush administration could revoke the US right to defend itself as a justification for military action in the wake of the Sept.11 attacks in New York and Washington as it did in order to execute the Afghanistan war. The right to self-defence is clearly enshrined in the UN Charter. But can the US rely on the same right to strike against Baghdad now?
Asserting that Iraq was linked to the Sept. 11 attacks and proving it beyond reasonable doubt are two different things. Even in the hypotheis that the US manages to establish such a link -- as it is obviously trying to do through relying on Iraqi defectors with little or no credibility -- would that provide the legal umbrella for a US invasion of iraq?
One of the reasons cited by US President George W. Bush for his moves against Iraq is the alleged Iraqi development and possession of weapons of mass destruction that he contented Baghdad was using to "terrorise" the region.
According to Bush, action against countries "terrorising" neighbours with weapons of mass destruction is part of the US-led war on terrorism; but then how many of Iraq's neighbours are complaining of being "terrorised" by Baghdad? If anything, all of them have opposed the US plan for military action against Iraq and are highly concerned about the repercussions of such a course of events in the region.
No doubt Washington strategists and legal experts are too familiar with the thin ice Washington is skating on towards invading Iraq; and it is obvious why the US reacts with vehemence whenever any government refers to the lack of a legal foundation for its plans to topple Saddam Hussein.
Obviously, the Bush administration is too aware of the futility of an exercise to secure UN endorsement for its designs even from the very same UN members it contents are threatened and terrorised by Baghdad. Any such effort would only open a Pandora's box from where skeletons would emerge of American unilateralism.
As far as Washington is concerned, UN authorisation for whatever action against Iraq already exists in UN Security Council resolutions -- although it fails to be specific -- and of course tough luck if the world fails to see it that way.
The US stand is an affront to the international community and the very foundations of the UN as a watchdog to ensure justice for all, but the sad reality is that no one seems to be able or willing enough to contain the self-assumed US posture of as the sole policeman, judge and executioner of the world.

Sunday, July 07, 2002

Axis of evil ruse

by pv vivekanand
By declaring Iraq, Iran and North Korea the "axis of evil," US President George W Bush appears to have taken in more that Washington could chew by espousing unilateralism that has alienated his European allies.
Since his state of the union address on Jan.29, Bush has faced a barrage of criticism from Europeans, many of whom outrightly rejected his clear pointer that the next targets in the US-led war against terrorism were Baghdad, Tehran and Pyongyang. They have warned that Washington should not expect them to remain partners in the coalition that backed the US campaign in Afghanistan.
It was indeed clear for some time now that Bush would be targeting Iraq and others in the US-led drive against terrorism, particularly after he clarified that he defined all countries which develop weapons of mass destruction as supporters of terrorism. And his Jan. 29 speech has come to be known was the Bush doctrine, which is now challenged by his European allies. And they have good reasons too.
In the case of Iraq, US intelligence agencies tried hard but in vain to establish a link between Baghdad and the Sept. 11 terror attacks in New York and Washington. Reports that the man said to have been the leader of the attacks had met with an Iraqi diplomat in Eastern Europe in early 2001 have come to naught in helping Washington establish a case against Baghdad.
That the US was paving the way for expanding the war against terrorism was made clear in October when Washington formally notified the United Nations that it might target other countries in the war against terrorism and senior Bush administration officials mentioned Iraq as a potential target.
Since then, Arab leaders and the Arab League itself have issued repeated warnings to the US against launching military operations against Iraq or any other Arab country in the name of the war against terrorism.
Joining them were European leaders who had then used diplomatic language to dissuade Washington from pursuing a military assault against Iraq.
But last week, they were unambiguous, saying they want nothing to do with such a course of action.
European Commission pokesman Gunnar Weigand said the European Union leaders "do not agree with that kind of policy."
While the EU shared American concerns over global issues such as human rights, terrorism and proliferation of weapons, the bloc does not "share is the policy desired to achieve these objectives. We believe that engagement and rapprochement...should be used to achieve these aims."
Javier Solana, the EU's foreign policy chief, called on Washington to act multilaterally and not as a "global unilateralist."
Surprisingly Germany had been in the forefront of opposing military action against Iraq, and it left nothing unsaid.
"We Europeans warn against it," said German Deputy Foreign Minister Ludger Vollmer. "There is no indication, no proof that Iraq is involved in the terrorism we have been talking about for the last few months... this terror argument cannot be used to legitimise old enmities."
Vollmer could not have been more clear in referring to the growing belief that the "axis of evil" charge is the forerunner of a US drive to settle political scores by destablising Iraq and indirectly topple the regime of Saddam Hussein — an objective the US failed to achieve in the 1991 Gulf war.
There is also a strong vein of thought in Europe, and indeed in the Arab World, that the US focus on Iran as a potential target in the war against terrorism has more to do with Israeli interests than US policy and the campagin against terror.
There is little doubt that Bush would find it difficult to enlist European partners in military action against Iraq or Iran.
Most EU member countries agree that the best approach to solving the problem, if any at all, is through dialogue in line with the European bloc's policy of engaging with countries rather than seeking to isolate them.
Even in Britain, the staunchest US ally in Europe, the "axis of evil" comment has drawn dismay. Home Secretary Jack Straw said the Bush assertion was aimed at the American elecotrate ahead of the forthcoming congressional elections and could not be part of a military strategy.
Washington's frustration over the British stand was spelt out by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. "This is not about American politics, and I assume that when the British government speaks about foreign policy, it's not about British politics," she retorted to Straw.
But it should be dawning on Washington that it would not be an easy go to secure international endorsement of military action against Iraq or Iran.
Many countries, mindful of the oil reserves and trade potential of the two countries, have set up strong relations with them; in Iraq's case, business worth tens of billions is waiting for an end to the 11-year-old UN sanctions against Baghdad. The sanctions are already fraying, and it is only a matter of time before few governments would think twice about doing business with Iraq even if in violation of the sanctions.
Indeed, there is strong European suspicion that it is not simply "old enmities" at play in the US strategy towards Iraq.
The Europeans are aware that Washington is unhappy that they have made inroads and set up ground to do post-sanctions trade with Iraq while American businesses were restrained by the law of their country from pursuing the same goal.
"By launching military action against Iraq, the US would precipitate a major crisis that would upset the European apple cart and bring new rules into play for doing business with Iraq," commented an Asian diplomat. "That would be the end of years of European efforts to gain a firm foothold in that country."
If any consolation, there is consensus across the Atlantic: Military action against Iraq would not be limited to a few missile strikes or bombings against strategic installations in that country –– it would aim at replacing the Saddam Hussein regime in Baghdad, and this would not be an easy task at all without European support.
The European case against the US targeting Iran is even stronger.
Europe has been closely observing the political tug-of-war between the (relatively) moderate regime of President Mohmmed Khatami and the conservative theocratic establishment in Iran since 1997. They have seen a slow shift to moderation in Tehran under Khatami's leadership, and they would like to encourage it.
Europeans are indeed aware of the clout that the Iranian religious establishment wields, and they have recognised that they should not expect miracles from Khatami.
Many European diplomats believe that even if the Israeli charge was true that Iran was behind a recently intercepted arms shipment in the Red Sea, the real "culprit" was not the Khatami government but hardline elements in the clerical establishment in Tehran.
In any event, the Europeans remain convinced that the key to dealing with Iran is encouragement for the "moderate" camp in Tehran rather than confrontation over the US charge that Iran had links with Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda group.
Europe recognises that Al Qaeda fighters fleeing US forces in the Afghan war could have sneaked across the border to Iran, but they believe Tehran should not be seen as an Al Qaeda supporter.
They see the Iranian refusal to co-operate with the US in countering Al Qaeda as stemming from Tehran's conviction that such moves would allow Washignton to exploit the situation and make intelligence inroads in Iran.
"Tehran prefers to deal with the Al Qaeda problem, if there is one, on its own," said a European diplomat. "It wants no US role in the affair and is determined to keep the US out. Sharing intelligence information with the US is the last thing it wants to do."
Some speculate that the US frustration over its failure to mend fences with Iran despite repeated overtures to Tehran is also behind the hostility.
Washington has also charged that Iran was "meddling" in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, an allegation that both Tehran and Kabul have denied.
There is a strong Israeli angle to the US-Iran equation, and Bush's "tough" posture might also have to do with his desire to do away with a constant source of "concern" for the US protege in the region.
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon underlined it when he said last week that "Iran calls for the destruction of the state of Israel and elimination of the Jewish people. That's why it was so important for President Bush to name them as sponsors of terror."
It is no secret that Israel has seen in Iran a potential threat in the event of a regional conflagration. Israel has for long watched with apprehension Iran aquiring and developing long-range missiles and Tehran's nuclear programme.
Suggestions have remained alive for several years that Israel might even launch "pre-emptive" strikes against Iran's nuclear installations, which Tehran says are intended for peaceful purposes, and other military facilities.
Iran is a staunch supporter of the Lebanese resistance movement Hizbollah, which managed to force Israel to withdraw from parts of Lebanese territory in mid-2000 after many years of fighting the Israeli army and its proxy forces in southern Lebanon.
Sharon has already picked up the fight against Iraq and Iran. One of the items on the agenda for talks between Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Washington on Thursday was expected to be Israel's "fears" of the "threats" posed by Iraq and Iran to the Jewish state.
Aides have said that Sharon would be lobbying Bush for unspecified American action against Iran and iraq.
Russia has come out fighting from Iran's corner against the US charge against Tehran.
Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov said on Sunday that there was no evidence that Iran had connections with terrorist organisations. He accused the US of following double standards.
French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine warned that the interests of the rest of the world were under threat from a "simplistic" US foreign policy that emerged after the Sept. 11 attacks. "Today we are threatened by a simplism that reduces all the problems of the world to the struggle against terrorism, and is not properly thought through," said Vedrine.
Vedrine expressed criticism of the Bush doctrine, a decision by Washington to subordinate all foreign policy decisions to the needs of the "war against terrorism," and of unilateralism in general.
He accused the US of acting "unilaterally, without consulting others, taking decisions based on its own view of the world and its own interests ... refusing any multilateral negotiation that could limit their decision-making, sovereignty and freedom of action."
According to Vedrine, said Europe also had a duty to stand up to the US "hyper-power" over the globalisation of the free market
French Defence Minister Alain Richard said France would not follow Bush's example in vastly increasing defence spending to cope with the new threats of the post-Sept. 11 world.
"We do not share the analysis expressed by President Bush on the threats to international peace and security," he told the French parliament.
Against such opposition from the powerful European bloc, will Bush go it alone?
There are some who suggest he might.
The technology that the US used in the Afghan war established that the sole superpower
doesn't need its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) partners "to fight a distant war, as it demonstrated in Afghanistan, where it basically won alone, except for small but important contributions from Britain, Canada and Australia," Thomas Friedman wrote in the Guardian.
Friedman hammered home an emerging scenario where the US might simply decide its interests were good enough to launch military action wherever it found fit to do so so -- with or without is Nato partners.
"We are increasingly heading for a military apartheid within Nato: America will be the chef who decides the menu and cooks all the great meals, and the Nato allies will be the bus boys who stay around and clean up the mess and keep the peace - indefinitely," according to Fried