Arafat faces multi-crises

July 22 2004

Arafat faces multi-crises
PV Vivekanand

THERE is a security crisis and there is a political crisis within the Palestinian ranks, but solving them would not advance the Palestinian dream of independence. Indeed, the crises facing Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat are indeed the worst he had to confront since he assumed the helm of his people's struggle for liberation. Unless he moved swiftly to contain the situation, it might be too late for not only his survival as the symbol of the Palestinian struggle, but also the very fate of that struggle itself, writes PV Vivekanand.
For the first time, elected representatives of the Palestinians are demanding that Arafat crack down on corruption in his foundering administration. It is all the more ironic that the charges of corruption has been levelled not against an elected government in a free and sovereign state, but against the leaders of a revolutionary liberation movement of a people who have made and are continuing to make sublime sacrifices for the cause and have paid the price in untold suffering for their resistance against foreign occupation of their land.
It is not easy for Arafat, who is under virtual house arrest at his headquarters in Ramallah, to fight corruption among the people around him; many of them rally behind him only because he has been keeping a blind eye to their corrupt practices, and many would simply drop him if he were to hold them accountable for their shady financial dealings.
Corruption took roots in the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from the very beginning if only because of the absence of any mechanism for accountability. It was a one-man show of Arafat, who went around Arab countries and collected hundreds of millions of dollars in aid for his liberation movement. He never accounted for the money to the donors or perhaps he did not feel the need to do so since he, as the living symbol of the Palestinian struggle for independence, was beyond reproach.
Arafat was "politically" careful with the money; he supported Palestinian refugee families recommended by his Fateh group, the dominant of the eight factions that made up the PLO, and then was selective in sharing the funds with other PLO factions; those whose positions, decisions and moves suited his thinking and interests got paid and others did not. That was the way he ran the PLO. At the same time, no one had any accurate idea about the PLO finances, including whether part of the money was invested abroad as was widely held. However, Arafat has never been accused of stashing away money for himself. The criticism was always against the way he played politics with PLO funds.
A simple example of Arafat's selective approach was seen in mid-1991 when he instructed his diplomatic representative in Amman, Jordan, not to settle the hotel bills of the leader of a leftist faction who had criticised him publicly. The faction leader had to borrow money from his cousins and friends in order to check out of the hotel.
Another example was when it was rumoured that Arafat had nearly $1 billion in PLO accounts under his control shortly after he signed the Oslo agreements in 1993. That rumour, his critics say, was instigated by himself because he wanted PLO factions which opposed the Oslo accords to support him in expectation that he was able to administer five-year autonomy of the West Bank and Gaza pending final status negotiations as envisaged under the agreement.
When the international community pledged nearly $2.5 billion as aid for the Palestinians to build themselves an entity in the Gaza Strip and West Bank following the signing of the Oslo agreements, the first thing Arafat would have expected was a direct transfer of the money to a bank account he controls. It jolted him to realise that the donors wanted every penny of their money accounted for and appointed the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the authority to decide how and where the money should be spent. It needed preliminary, feasibility and project studies before the UNDP would release any money to any project, and even at that there was no guarantee that every approved project would be financed.
Arafat and his associates never recovered from the shock of having to argue their case for ever dollar to be spent on building the Palestinian society in such a manner that everyone stood to lose something by returning to armed struggle.
The Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which was set up in 1996, was all but bankrupt when it was launched. It did not have money to pay the salaries of its policemen. There was no trace of the hundreds of millions of dollars that were reportedly controlled by Arafat, who started pressing for money to administer the PNA and its various agencies.
On several occasions, world donors got together and produced extra money to pay for PNA administration and then told Arafat he'd have to manage himself.
There has never been any credible auditing of the accounts of the PNA. Critics say many of those around him siphoned off PNA money through inflated contracts.
The security crisis developed with a spate of kidnappings that prompted Arafat to replace a police commander. However, he had to back down when he wanted to appoint his nephew and had to reverse the decision the next day amid major protests that saw the PNA office in Gaza set ablaze,
On Tuesday, Nabil Amr, a strong critic of Arafat, was shot and wounded at his home further highlighting the security problem and heralding what many fear to be armed clashes among rival Palestinian factions.
On top of that came a demand by the Palestinian parliament that Arafat accept his prime minister's resignation and appoint a government empowered to carry out reforms.
It was the Arafat camp's resistance to demands that prompted Prime Minister Ahmed Qorei to resign.
The Palestinian parliament is demanding that Arafat appoint a government "capable of carrying out its responsibilities," meaning giving it power to implement reforms. Similar calls have already been made on Arafat by the European Union as well as the Egyptian government.
Qorei is staying on as caretaker prime minister after Arafat
refused his resignation.
Arafat has also been pressed into revamping his security agencies. He had as many as eight different agencies, again reflecting his style of "not putting all the eggs in one basket."Effectively, having that many agencies meant that he could one against another and be assured that there is no one in overall charge except himself. This week, he reduced the number of security agencies to three, but he insisted that the head of the services report to him rather than the prime minister.
Qorei is seen to be betting that Arafat will be so embarrassed by the second resignation of a prime minister in little more than a year that he will hand over him genuine authority over security as well as authority to implement reforms. Arafat remains resistant, but he might not be able to hold out for long since the peace process is all but collapsed and he is rejected as negotiating partner by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
Arafat's critics say that his position in negotiations with Israel under the Olso agreements was weakened because of his preoccupation dealing with dissent in ranks and fighting down any challenge to his absolute leadership style.
Arafat, known as one of the smartest survivors of today's leaders of freedom struggles, has outlived many crises. However, this time around, he find himself in a much weakened position, with mounting pressure from all sides.
There are many who remain convinced that Arafat will come out of the present crises, but, given the realities on the ground in Palestine, that would not make prospects for peace any brighter since Sharon, backed by the US, is bent upon implementing his vision of a "disengagement" with the Palestinians but without giving the Palestinians their rights.
Sharon remains defiant against the July 9 International Court of Justice ruling as well a UN General Assembly resolution issued on Tuesday calling for the dismantling of the "security" wall that it is building in the West Bank.
“The construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated régime, are contrary to international law," said the IJC.
“Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto," it said. ,
“Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem," it said.
Israel had said even prior to the ruling that it would not abide by the court decision and it reiterated the same position and also rejected the UN General Assembly call.
Washington supports the Israeli position and that ends any debate over a realistic chance of Sharon being pressured into heeding the IJC and UN calls.
Sharon's defiance and his systematic elimination of Palestinian resistance leaders clearly indicate that there is little prospect for any meaningful negotiations for a peaceful settlements.
In order to pressure his international allies to continue to back him and pressure Israel into negotiations based on the internationally backed "road map" for peace, Arafat needs more credibility on the internal front and for that he needs to implement reforms.
The campaign for reform is led by a younger generation of Palestinians who are looking for results in their struggle against the Israeli occupation and who see the old guard as bogged down in corruption and rhetoric rather than action.
No one is denying that Arafat is the symbol of the struggle for liberation. It is his style of managing the struggle that has come under attack.
"The difference between Abu Ammar (Arafat) and myself is simple," veteran Palestinian leader George Habash once said. "Abu Ammar wants to become president of the state of Palestine while he is alive even if the state means enough land to stake down the Palestinian flag. I would be happy if my great grandson becomes a citizen of a free Palestine with all Palestinian rights restored even if it is 100 years from now."
No matter how one looks at the situation, Arafat is cornered. The question is: Will Arafat fight back from the corner still believing he would be able to impose himself on everyone or will be back down and accept the inevitability of reform that could only strengthen the cause and mission of his life?

Iraq hopes scaled down

July 21 2004

Iraq hopes diminish

pv vivekanand

Hopes that the transfer of power in Iraq to the interim government would reduce guerrilla attacks have been scaled down in the wake of an increase in bombings and ambushes against the US-led coalition soldiers and their Iraqi allies.
Reports drawn up by US intelligence agencies and the Defence Department now portray a dramatically different picture than earlier expectations that Iraqi resistance as well as militant attacks against the US-led forces would ebb away after the interim government took over on June 28.
The conclusion now is that as long as there is a flow of money and arms into Iraq, the attacks would continue and there is little the US military or the interim government could do to bring the situation under control without committing an additional 100,000 soldiers supported by an extra 100,000 Iraqi security men.
The US is reporteldy planning to increase the number of soldiers in Iraq by 10,000 to 15,000 reservists by the end of the year. Simulataneously, the interim government is also building its police force.
Even with the additional forces, it would take several months of a "no-holds-barred" crackdown in all parts of the country to restore any semblance of normalcy that would be conducive to conducting elections in January.. Such action means detention of tens of thousands for indefinite periods without trial.
The coalition forces are facing trouble on many fronts.
Saddam loyalists have assumed control of the town of Samarra spanning the Tigris River north of Baghdad. Taliban-style fighters have vowed a fight to death before they allow American forces to enter Fallujah west of Baghdad to search for "foreign fighters." The town of Ramadi is following the Falloujah example.
Moqtada Sadr's Mahdi Army soldiers are keeping their peace in southern towns, but the situation is so tense that troubles could break out at the first given chance.
The Kurds are in control of most of the north of Iraq and life is normal there.
Hardline militants of the Ansar Al Islam group, which was chased away from northern Iraq, are said to be regrouping on the Iranian side of the border in the north.
Basra in the south is booming with Iranian-controlled trade. And terrorised life is a feature of Baghdad in central Iraq.
Reports indicate that Samarra is controlled by remnants of Saddam's Republican Guards who have redonned their uniforms and are defhying the coalition forces and the US-supported Iraqi Civil Defence Corps.
They are successfully held off attempts by the US forces from patrolling the streets of the predominantly Sunni town since early July.
In Falloujah, a security force, also made up of remnants from Saddam's armed forces, is in charge, but it is working closely with Islamist forces from the town and is refusing to disarm them. American forces fear entering the town, but they do lob a few missiles off and on against suspected guerrilla hideouts. Such strikes are helping to fuel not only the anti-US sentiments but also rejection of the interim government's authority because the missile attacks are approved by Allawi.
The US military claims that supporters of Jordanian-born Islamist Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, who allegedly masterminded dozens of devastating attacks on civilian targets, are holed up in Falloujah.
In the south, Moqtada Sadr has instructed his Mahdi Army militia co-operate with the police in restoring order, but trouble could break out if the militiamen were to be asked to give up their weapons.
Iraqi police want the militiamen to surrender their weapons, but the Sadrists counter that they want the arms to fight and subdue people they describe as arms merchants and drug traffickers as well Sunni militants planning to create trouble.
In the north, Ansar Al Islam, made of Kurdish militants many of whom former trainees at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, have set up a camp on the Iranian side of the border.
The group maintained a camp in the village of Tawela stradling the Iraqi-Iranian border in north Iraq before the war. During the war, pro-US Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) fighters supported by American air power attacked and destroyed the camp. Some Ansar fighters were arrested but the bulk of Ansar camp esidents managed to escape across the border to Iran.
According to eyewitness accounts, Iranian security officials allowed only the Ansar camp residents across the border and refused other Iraqis who tried to enter Iran fleeing from the American military assault.
And now the Ansar Al Islam members are regrouping and have set up camps at the foot of an Iranian mountain range in Baramawa village, 20 kilometres west of Mariwan, and Darbandi Dizly near Daranaxa village further to the west.
Their presence is a threat the PUK and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) since Ansar Al Aslam opposed the PUK-KDP joint administration of autonomous Kurdistan in northern Iraq.
Ansar guerrillas have killed dozens of PUK members, including the "prime minister" of autonomous Kurdistan, who is now a vice-president in the interim government in Baghdad.

Worrying figures

The number of American soldiers killed in guerrilla attacks in the first 20 days of July is proportionately more than those who died in the entire month of June.
Statistics show that an average of two soldiers were killed every day in July from among the 160,000-strong coalition force (138,000 Americans and 22,000 allied soldiers); 38 have been killed between July 1 and July 20 compared with 42 in the month of June. However, the June figure was marked down from the 80 deaths in May and 135 in April.
More than 10,000 soldiers from the coalition were wounded since the war began, with more than 60 per cent of them unfit to be return to duty because of the severity of the injuries.
US officials had estimated that a maximum of 5,000 guerrillas falling under different groups — Saddam loyalists, Iraqi (Sunni and Shiite) opponents of the US role in Iraq and anti-American international jihadists — were active in Iraq. The figures were dramatically revised this month, with the total number of anti-US guerrillas from all groups estimated at more than 20,000.
The Americans and allied coalition forces are learning from their experience in Iraq how to deal with a guerrilla war, but the guerrillas are also perfecting their skills in mounting roadside bombings and suicide blasts as well as ambushes.
Large areas outside population centres are lawless, with not only guerrillas seeking targets but also hardcore bandits who rob anything and anyone entering their fiefdoms. The entire stretches of the highways running from Baghdad to the Jordanian and Syrian borders are no longer under the control of American or Iraqi government forces. Bandits roam the land and pick on anything that moves along those roads, witnesses have reported
An amnesty offered by the interim government is unlikely to draw in any sizeable number of fighters accepting it because assurances that they would be treated well sound hollow, given that Prime Minister Iyad Allawi is bringing back elements from the ousted Saddam Hussein regime known for their bruality and summary actions into the security forces and police.
Most worrying American strategists is what they see as the strong endurance power of Iraqis.
"The American planners did not take into consideration that Iraqis had lived under the tight UN sanctions for nearly 13 years and this has taught them to limit their needs," said a European expert. "There is no doubt that the US military and its coalition partners as well as the Iraqi security forces functioning under the interim government would have to double their numerical strength and also engage in a ruthless, all pervasive crackdown in order to check the resistance."
The pitfall in such an approach, the expert warned, is that the interim government and the coalition forces would alienate the Iraqi society further with arbitrary actions such as storming of homes, summary arrests, brutal interrogation methods, torture and detention without trial. Thousands of innoncents would be caught in the crossfire.
"The American and their Iraqi allies have a tiger by the tail," said the expert. "They cannot continue to take casualties at this rate but they cannot launch decisive action to stem the attacks without further fuelling the resistance while also drawing condemnation from the international community against what would be nothing but gross violations of human rights."
Allawi, who has set up a special agency to ferret out and eliminate the guerrillas, says that he has identified leaders of the resistance and his interim government is in a "dialogue" with them.
Obviously, the prime minister, a Shiite, is trying to convince the Sunni tribal leaders who fear that the majority Shiites would dominate the Sunnis in post-Saddam Iraq that they would not be victimised and their rights would be protected in a post-conflict Iraq. However, Allawi's assurances are set back by the firm positions adopted by the country's Shiite leaders, including Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani, who is sending out an impression from his southern powerbase that the Shiites are waiting for the elections to prove their clout in the country.

Uniting or dividing Iraqis?

July 20 2004

Uniting or dividing Iraqis"?

PV Vivekanand

The Iraqi National Convention, which is aimed at uniting Iraqis under the forerunner of a democratic umbrella, could turn to be a forum for dividing the people of the beleaguered country and deepen schisms between the ethnically diverse Iraqi society.
It is Iraqis' first experience in getting together with a view to interacting although the mandate of the conference is limited. At the same time, it could also be a stage for leaders of various religious, ethnic, social and political groupings to meet and discuss the situation in the country after the ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime.
Never before in recent history have the Iraqis been afforded an opportunity to attend a national conference where they could air their views without fear. "National conferences" were indeed held during the Saddam regime, but they inevitably tended to be forums to heap praise on Saddam and his government. Anyone who dared to criticise the regime risked his life. Therefore the upcoming convention should indeed be considered as a historic opportunity for the people of Iraq to start having a say in their affairs.
However, as reports from Baghdad indicate, politicians— mostly exiles who returned home after Saddam was ousted last year —  have already hijacked the event. But then, that is the way politics work and first-time experiments could not be expected to work out perfectly, say the organisers of the forum.
The conference is an idea of the United Nations. Lakhdar Ibrahimi, the then UN special envoy to Iraq, worked out the details. He proposed that 1,000 people representing all religions, sects, tribes, and social and political groups as well as academics attend the conference and select 100 from among the participants to form an interim assembly.
The structure of the conference as well as the interim assembly proposed by Ibrahimi would have ensured a fair and just balance based on Iraq's ethnic diversities. However, that structure is deemed to have been undermined by now.
According to Jawadat Al Obeidi, secretary-general of the Iraqi Democratic Congress, a group which includes 216 Iraqi political parties, "gifted and honest Iraqi personalities" have been sidelined and their efforts to attend the conference were stonewalled by members of the Supreme Commission for the Preparation of the National Conference.
The interim assembly will act as parliament and will advise the interim government headed by President Ghazi Al Yawar and Prime Minister Iyad Allawi which took office on June 28.
It will have the authority to veto legislation and appoint alternate ministers and could replace the president and vice-presidents, the prime ministers and cabinet members in the event of death. The assembly will also determine the country's budget for 2005 and draft Iraq's constitution.
Security is indeed an issue for the conference and guerrillas who oppose the US-backed process have stepped up their attacks. As of Wednesday, even the venue of the conference remained a closely guarded secret.
Twenty-one of the 100 seats are already "gone" — taken over by 20 members of the now dissolved interim governing council and Fuad Masoum, a Kurd who is in charge of convening the meeting. Only Iyad Allawi, the interim prime minister, and four other members of the defunct governing council who joined the interim cabinet opted not to "reserve" seats for themselves in the assembly.
Apart from sealing their seats, the 20 others have also staked claims for their allies and cronies in the assembly, meaning that the bulk of the rest of the seats — 79 — have already been spoken for. As such, critics argue that the meeting, which begins on Saturday, will be nothing but a stage-managed event where many aspiring Iraqi politicians would find they are destined to be left out, and many have already announced they would not be attending the forum. Some of them have said they do not want to be part of a conference that is being "arranged" by the "occupation" since they do not recognise the transfer of sovereignty to the interim government by the US and continue to consider the country as occupied by the US-led coalition forces.
On the other hand, signs of a Shiite effort to dominate the conference and the assembly itself have emerged. Leading that effort is said to be Chalabi, a one-time American favourite as Saddam Hussein's successor in post-war Iraq.
Chalabi, who fell out with the Americans over charges that he misled the US on Saddam's alleged weapons stockpile, misappropriated American funds granted for spying and provided confidential intelligence information to Iran, has definitely groped his way back to a position of influence with or without American help.
He is a member of the Supreme Commission for the Preparation of the National Conference.
Reports indicate that he, with help from an umbrella group representing Shiites, has made sure that a significant number of the 1,000 people being asked to attend the conference are his people. So have a few other "influential" former members of the interim governing council, reports say.
In principle, the Iraqi conference should be be structured along the Afghan loya jiga model and attended by tribal leaders, academics, scholars, intellectuals, youth delegates, artists, writers, poets, leaders of professional associations and unions and religous leaders.
Around 550 of the 1,000 participants in the convention will be representatives of Iraq's 17 provinces and about 350 will be representatives of political parties, religious, tribal and nongovernmental groups, and "high-profile personalities." Twenty-five per cent should be women.
Political and ethnic power struggles characterised the selection of representatives from the provinces. Christians are given three seats, but they are demanding another two. Yazidis, Assyrians and other minority groups are complaining of low representation for themselves.
Motqada Sadr, the firebrand Shiite leader based in Najaf, has boycotted the process.
Sunnis from central Iraq complain that they have not been given the opporunity to select their "genuine represenatives." The Muslim Clerics' Association, a mainstream Sunni religious group, has also said it will not take part in the conference.
The Sunnis as well as many Shiites say it is meaningless to attend an event whose conclusion has already been determined.
According to reports, it is only a formality that it would be announced at the conference that Sharif Ali Bin Al Hussein, a descendent of the Hashemite royal family which was toppled in 1958, will be the speaker of the Interim National Council in a move arranged by Paul Bremer, the US viceroy who left Iraq on June 28 after handing over "sovereignty" to the interim government.
It is "arrangements" like these that have upset many. They might agree that Sharif Ali is the right candidate for the job, but they oppose the idea that the US has already made all the decisions to be taken at the conference.
Prominent intellectuals and leaders upstart political parties have declined invitations to attend the conference. They say their presence will only be used to legitimise what they see as an illegitimate process.
"We won't give them the legitimacy of our participation," Sheikh Jawad Khalisi, an influential Shiite Muslim cleric, was quoted as saying by the Los Angeles Times.
Khalisi is part of an alliance of Shiite, Sunni Muslim and Christian leaders and prominent academics who include Baghdad University political science professor Wamidh Namdi and Sheihk Harith Dhari, a powerful Sunni imam, said the paper.
"Every country that has been occupied throughout history has had some of its sons who cooperated with the occupation and some of its sons who resisted the occupation. We're choosing to resist," Khalisi said.
Nadhmi recently told the Washington Post that he and seven others declined to attend the conference: "We are not going to be used to give legitimacy to a constitution or a committee which has been, directly or indirectly, appointed by the occupation."
Ibrahimi, the erstwhile UN envoy to Iraq, had prepared a list of names of participants. Chalabi, reports say, cited secret files his people have took away from the former government's offices that show that some of the Ibrahimi nominees nominees had close ties with the Saddam regime; that made sure they were excluded.
Despite the divisions and schisms, there is no doubt that the convention is the first step for national interaction among Iraqis in the post-Saddam era. Many in the region feel that the process should have been more transparent with a view to bringing to the fore the diverse ideas and convictions of the people of Iraq rather than being set off in a direction where decisions designed to serve external interests are likely to be imposed on the very people who have to live with those decisions.

Allawi signs emergency law

PV Vivekanand

Iraq's interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi
has signed into law sweeping new emergency security
measures aimed at fighting the raging guerrilla war
against US-led coalition forces and their Iraqi
allies.
The law called National Safety Law gives Allawi the
power to declare martial law and a state of
emergency, issue arrest warrants, impose curfews,
arrest suspects, ban associations, restrict movement
of foreigners, bar demonstrations, and open mail and
tap telephones.The measures will be temporary and will
apply only in parts of Iraq.
The state of emergency cannot extend past 60 days and
must be dissolved as soon as the danger has ended,
but it can be renewed every 30 days, with a letter of
approval by the prime minister and the president and
deputy presidents. The same applies to curfews, which
could be imposed for limited periods of time in
limited areas.
The law grants Allawi the right to declare emergency
law in "any area of Iraq where people face a threat
to the lives of its citizen because of some people's
permanent violent campaign to prevent the creation of
a government that represents all Iraqis."
Effectively, it changes little on the ground since the
same measures were adopted by the US-led occupation
forces which handed over sovereignty to the interim
government on June 28.
UN Security Council Resolution 1546 of June 8 still
grants the American military many powers to introduce
those measures if it finds fit to do so.
The law is the first concrete move Allawi adopted
after taking over from the US-led forces, which remain
the country to ensure security.
Under the new law, courts would stay open seven days a
week to ensure the interior ministry and police could
obtain arrest warrants.
The government is also expected to announce an
amnesty for those insurgents not directly involved in
guerrilla attacks.
The widely anticipated National Safety Law, which
draws heavily from legislation in force during the
Saddam Hussein reign, had been delayed several times
as the government finalised the details and consulted
with American officials.
The law represents a forceful response to ther
tenacious insurgency and lays the groundwork for a
forceful response to civil unrest. The law was written
with the input of lawyers and the ministers of justice
and of human rights.
Allawi's government has said it also plans to restore
the death penalty, which was suspended during the US
occupation authority's reign that ended on June 28,
but the new law does not contain any reference to it.
Allawi, in interview with a Spanish paper, said on
Wednesday: "We want a restricted death penalty, for a
limited time, until there are elections and Iraqis can
decide for themselves.
He said the interim government had not yet made a
decision on how the death penalty should be
implemented.
The National Safety Law says the prime minister has
the right to "impose restrictions on the freedoms of
citizens or foreigners in Iraq" in the event of a
"dangerous threat" or "the occurrence of armed
instability that threatens state institutions or its
infrastructure."
The prime minister also has the power to take direct
control of all security and intelligence forces in the
area under emergency rule. He can also "appoint a
military or civilian commander to assume
administration of an emergency area" with the help of
an emergency force, as long as the president approves
it."
Restrictions that the prime minister could order
include banning of travel, group meetings and the
possession of weapons.
The law allows for the detention of "those suspicious
by their behaviour and to search them or search their
homes and places of employment and to impose mandatory
residence upon them."
The law states that a 100-member interim national
assembly expected to be formed later this month could
oversee how the law is enforced.
The prime minister's decisions under emergency rule
are subject to the review of the court of appeals,
which can cancel the decisions. The law forbids the
prime minister to cancel the transitional
administrative law during a state of emergency. The
law was signed by American administrators and Iraqi
Governing Council members in early March and functions
as an interim constitution.
.The law prevents the prime minister from exercising
martial powers in the region of Kurdistan without
consulting officials there.
Human Rights Minister Bakhityar Amin said the new law
was an absolute necessity.
"The lives of the Iraqi people are in danger, they are
in danger from evil forces, from gangs from
terrorists," he said. Amin compared the law to the US
Patriot Act.
Justice Minister Malik Dohan Al Hassan said the
premier would need to get warrants from an Iraqi court
before he could take each step.
"We realise this law might restrict some liberties,
but there are a number of guarantees," Hassan said.
"We have tried to guarantee justice and also to
guarantee human rights."
However, the law was needed to combat the insurgents
who are "preventing government employees from
attending their jobs, preventing foreign workers from
entering the country to help rebuild Iraq and in
general trying to derail general elections," he said.

Amin said the human rights and justice ministries will
form a joint body to monitor all areas where the
emergency laws are declared and investigate any
allegations of human rights violations.
Hassan said that in case Iraqi forces are unable to
perform their tasks or are overwhelmed, the Iraqis
"will request the assistance of foreign forces."
A senior US military official speaking on condition of
anonymity, said the Americans believe the new law will
not detract from the efforts of coalition forces here.
"We'll still be able to go out and do our mission,"
the official said. "There may be a requirement or
need for increase of co-ordination with specific rules
and specific measures that are going to be put in
place by the Iraqi government."
The emergency law had been expected to include a
provision providing amnesty for guerrillas who fought
the Americans before the June 28 sovereignty transfer
because their actions were legitimate acts of
resistance.
Amin, the human rights minister, said the amnesty was
still under discussion and "will be issued soon, as
soon as it's approved by the cabinet and presidential
council."

Sex racket in Dubai

Two girls from Kerala who escaped from the
clutches of flesh-traders have unearthed organised
gangs involving Keralites luring girls from the
southern Indian state to the UAE with job offers and
then forcing them into prostitution.
The two separate cases have prompted Indian consulate
officials in Dubai to caution Indian women travelling
alone to anywhere in the Gulf on visit visas or
employment visas given to them by unknown parties
should verify the authenticity of the sponsor or
arrange to have a relative or a friend or someone
deemed reliable to receive them upon arrival.
It was always known that there were Keralite girls in
Dubai engaged in prostitution in small discreet, one-
or two-bedroom apartments in places like Deira, Bur
Dubai and Karama. However, it is the first time that
two of them have managed to escape and recounted
stories of how they were brought to the UAE on visit
was — with promises of employment —  and then whisked
away from the airport to virtual bondage and pressed
into the oldest profession against their will.
Rajni, 25, (name changed) from central Kerala, is a
graduate in hotel management. She was working in
Bangalore, but tensions within the family prompted her
to take up what then appeared to be a "chance" offer
of employment in the UAE. She came to Dubai and was
picked up from the airport and driven to what she
learnt later was "the godown" — a place where girls
like her are told that their job is to sexually
entertain "clients."
The process of turning girls like Rajani into
prostitutes is known in the trade as "training" and
involved other Keralite women who are either already
in the trade or arrange "clients" for prostitutes and
take a commission.
Rajni refused, and next thing she knew was she was
raped and severely beaten up. She was locked up in a
room and denied food and water for several days until
she agreed to engage in prostitution.
All her "operators" as well as "clients" were from
Kerala.
Whenever she refused to "co-operate" she was beaten up
and starved. After a few days, she was being moved
from apartment to apartment at three-day or four-day
intervals.
She was kept under constant watch and was not allowed
to contact her family except on certain days when she
was handed a mobile phone and permitted to speak a few
words of pleasantries and niceties.
It took her more than three months to find a
"sympathetic client" — again, a Keralite — who agreed
to help her.
Rajni managed her escape while she was being moved
from one apartment to another in a taxi. She contacted
the man who promised to help her and she ended up at
a centre run by the Indian Welfare Association from
where she was flown home last week after the consulate
here issued her an outpass (since her passport was
held by her "operator") air passage provided by
well-wishing donors.
Chandni, 30, (name changed) a divorced mother of three
children, came to Dubai to work as a housemaid but on
a visit visa and ended up "entertaining" men.
After several weeks of an ordeal very similar to
Rajni, Chandni, with help from a "client," fled from
her "operator." However, her problems did not end
there. Her "operator" threatened the man who helped
her and took from him 7,000 dirhams in order to
"release" Chandni.
Chandni flew home on Monday.
These two cases are only the tip of an iceberg, by
most accounts.
Sources familiar with the racket say that a dozen or
so men and women are at its helm and they have
"agents" throughout Kerala always on the lookout for
vulnerable women — divorcees, those having serious
family problems, and those in financial crises — in
small villages and towns.
They approach such women with job offers in the Gulf
and the bait is easily swallowed, particularly that
the women are promised that they would be able to sent
home at least Rs15,000 a month.
Once they end up in the flesh trade here, they are
trapped. They cannot break away from from the gangs
and would not want to inform their family of the
reality of the situation — even if they had the
opportunity —  because of the social stigma.
According to the sources, there are several hundred
Keralite women who have been brought here and forces
into prostitution.
"Only a small percentage of them knew beforehand that
they would be working as prostitutes here," said one
source.



As more cases emerge of Keralite women being brought
to Dubai on promises of employment and forced into
prostitution, police sources say they are unable to
act against the culprits in the absence of specific
complaints.
"We take immediate and stern action whenever a
complaint is filed," said a source. "We cannot act
based on generalities or media reports."
Wherever specifics are brought to their attention, the
immigration authorities conduct raids and detain
suspects on charges of violating immigration laws,
which is a regular feature in most cases, according to
the sources.
In the cases of Rajni and Chandni, complaints were
filed and those involved have been detained pending
prosecution.
An Indian source familiar with the approach of the
immigration authorities revealed several recent cases,
all of them involving only Keralites.
One of them involved a former employee of the defence
department who was engaged in strong-arm tactics. The
man used proxies to procure Keralite girls engaged in
prostitution and keep them as hostages in areas
outside Dubai. Other proxies will then inform the
"operator" of the girls that the issue could be
settled if the man was named as mediator.
The "mediator" then acts on behalf of the operator to
secure the release of the girls on payment of several
thousand dirhams, with no one suspecting him to be the
real culprit. Inevitably, the girls were sent back to
the "operator."
"He continued for some time and made some big money,
but then the authorities caught him on a specific
complaint some eight weeks ago," said the Indian
source. "He was found to have violated immigration
laws and was deported, with a ban on re-entry for one
year.
"However, the authorities found out that the man had
returned carrying a different passport after three
weeks. Apparently he sneaked back through Buraimi (in
Oman on the border of Al Ain, but administered by the
UAE).
"The man went underground when he suspected that he
was being hunted and spread word that he left the
country, but the authorities know that he is still
around and they are determined to nab him," said the
source.
During a recent raid of an apartment where 10 Russian
and two Indian girls were found engaged in
prostitution, a man who stood guard at the door jumped
down from the fourth-floor and injured himself. The
youth turned out to be the first man's nephew."
In another case, a middle-aged man was found to have
brought his 20-year-old unmarried niece to Dubai and
handed her over to flesh traders. The reason: He was
settling a score with his sister, the girl's mother,
in a dispute over property.
The authorities caught him and deported him on
immigration charges when the girl filed a complaint.
Rates for the girls range from 50 dirhams for a
one-time engagement upwards depending on a
classification of "regulars," "newcomers," "VIP," and
"VVIP" commanding up to 1,000 dirhams for a night.
"The charges are split among several parties, with the
girl getting less than 15 or 10 per cent," according
to the source. "For example, she might get 10 dirhams
from the 50 dirhams a customer paid. If she is lucky,
she might get some tip from the client."
Another case involved a young Keralite girl settled in
Tamil Nadu brought her as employed as an office
executive. Things went well for several weeks before
she was confronted by the Keralite manager who accused
her of being responsible for the company's alleged
loss of tens of thousands of dirhams. She was told she
had to make good the loss or be ready to go to prison
for at least two years. The third alternative:
"Entertain" some of the company's "clients."
Several weeks later, the girl found herself unable to
do anything but to continue to have sex with dozens of
"clients" everyday from a two-bedroom apartment in
Deira. She has by now realised the company, her
employment and the company's losses were all stage
managed into trapping her.
Now she does not want to go back home. "All I want is
to make enough money for me to buy a small house
somewhere far away from my family and settle down
there," she says. "I can't face my family."Shoba (not
real name), 31, a widowed mother of two from a village
near Trichur, recalls that she was brought here three
years ago to work a housemaid. "I was taken to an
apartment in Dubai and told my job was to sleep with
men," she said. "I refused, and they locked me up and
starved me for more than two weeks and regularly beat
me up until I lost my ability to resist and agreed to
whatever they told me to do."
Shoba was rescued by a Keralite customer, who paid her
"operator" 11,000 dirhams for her "release." Prakash
(not real name) married her. Subsequently, he lost his
job and he had no option but to draw from his
experience and that of his wife Shoba to run a
brothel themselves.
However, they swore that they never brought any girl
to the UAE to work as a prostitute.
"We just used our apartment for clients to have sex
with girls, who were sent her as a regular rotation by
other operators with whom we had an understanding,"
said Prakash in a conversation before he and Shoba
left the UAE two months ago. "We used to make 300 to
400 dirhams every day."
For those Malayalis who might take a fancy to any of
the girls and want her as a discreet "keep" and could
afford to pay, the charge for her to be "released"
from the bondage of her "operator" is anywhere upwards
of 15,000 dirhams in cash. Then she, her maintenance
and legal status and whatever else become his
responsibility.

Sept.14

DUBAI: A 23-year-old girl from Kerala who paid a hefty
amount to her friend's mother for what she thought was
an employment visa in the UAE was on her back home on
Tuesday after she escaped from a group of flesh
traders, also from Kerala.
It was the latest case of rescue of Keralite girls
lured to the UAE with job offers and then forced into
prostitution by organised Keralite syndicates. Four
such girls were rescued and sent home in the last
three weeks.
Several more are waiting for immigration clearance for
their temporary outpasses — since their passports were
taken away from them immediately after they landed at
the airport by the persons who brought them here in
the first place.
Reports of the cases have emboldened many who know of
similar others to contact media personnel as well as
the Indian consulate here with appeals for help.
Two of the girls who went back have spoken to
newspapers in Kerala of how they were "recruited" for
jobs with tempting salaries but turned into
prostitutes after they landed here.
The latest escapee, who hails from an impoverished
family from central Kerala, landed in Dubai on Sept.4
and taken to an apartment on the border between Dubai
and Sharjah.
The girl had discontinued a degree course in Kerala
after one year because of financial problems at home
and completed a course in computer applications.
She was contacted by the mother of one of her friends
offering the job of a "computer operator" in the UAE
in return for Rs75,000. Her family somehow raised the
money and paid the woman, who arranged a visit visa
for her and sent her here on a flight from Coimbatore.
Coimbatore is the take-off airport of choice of the
racketeers since immigration officers at Trivandrum,
Calicut and Cochin airports are deemed strict in
verifying the papers of women travelling alone to the
Gulf.
The girl was received by two men at Dubai airport and
taken to a flat situated opposite the sprawling Sahara
Shopping Mall on the line straddling the emirates of
Dubai and Sharjah. There were two other girls in the
flat and in a matter of hours she realised that she
had walked into a trap.
"I did not know what to do after the other girls told
me about their stories of how they ended up as virtual
slaves in custody and forced to become prostitutes,"
she recounted. "They told me how they were beaten up
mercilessly and starved when they refused to entertain
'clients', and kept that way until they agreed to do
whatever was asked of them," she said.
There were two men in the flat who were in charge of
the girls. One of them, named only as Satish, told the
newcomer to be "ready for the interview, but you know
by now what the interview will be."
"I lived in terror for the next two days during which
the other girls in the apartment were replaced," said
the girl. "Men used to come to the flat but someone
Satish or anyone else did not force me into anything."
On the second day, at around 8pm, she and other girl
were asked to dress up to go out. "We were brought
down by Satish and handed over to two men in a car,"
she said. "As the other girl got into the car, I
simply ran the other way thinking that even if I died
it would be better than what as awaiting me if I had
gotten into that car."
"I had no idea where I was running, but kept on going
and I almost bumped into a man who stopped and asked
me in English what the problem was, and I told him,
'please help me I am running away from someone'."
The man, Abdullah, a native of Andhra Pradesh,
appeared to have immediately understood the problem
and he helped her hide in a ditch for some time until
the hunt for her appeared to have died down.
Then Abdullah helped her up and took her to another
area in a taxi. During the ride she told him of her
story in bits and pieces of English, Hindi and Tamil.
She had — in fact that is what saved her — a slip of
paper with a telephone number of a friend of her
father, and Abdullah contacted that number and
checked. The man said he knew the girl and that he was
staying in the UAE with his wife and two children.
Abdullah asked the friend to come and take the girl
but on one condition: He had to bring his wife and
children. The man did and the girl was handed over to
the family.
The next day the girl contacted the Indian consulate
and was issued an outpass since she did not have her
passport (somehow she had the air ticket with the
return coupon in order). The consulate also issued a
letter to the local authorities that helped her clear
immigration procedures without having to produce her
passport.

Breme'rs 'fatwas' for Iraq

The US has bound the interim government of
Iraq in a series of mandatory restrictions in an
attempt to keep it as a puppet in American hands after
this week's transfer of sovereignty. Effectively,
these restrictions are nothing but legalised
colonialisation, critics say.
Nearly 150 Americans are installed in key positions in
various ministries and departments on five-year
contracts that could not be nullified by the interim
government. These officials have virtual veto power
over any decision taken by the concerned ministries
and departments. Their contracts could be anulled only
by a two-third majority of a to-be installed national
assembly of 100 Iraqis who would be named at a
national conference to be held in July.
In addition, Paul Bremer, the American overseer who
would leave office on Wednesday, has also named more
than 20 Iraqis to jobs that he describes as aimed at
checking corruption and ensuring transparency of
governance. In essence, these Iraqis are seen as
American stooges whose job is to impose and promote
the American concept of governance that hardly match
the realities on the ground in Iraq and the
peculiarities of a Middle Eastern Arab Muslim society.
Bremer has signed nearly 100 decrees — which his
critics have nicknameded "fatwas" (edicts) —  that are
obviously aimed at restricting the interim government
from taking or implementing any decision that runs
contrary to the American-designed shape of Iraq. These
"edicts" could be overturned only by a majority of
members of the interim cabinet as well as the
president and two vice-presidents. Given that most
members of the interim government are US-picked and
are bound to Washington one way or another, this is an
insurance that the "edicts" remain in place even if
some in the interim government might not approve them.

Among the most controversial of the "edicts" are:
-- a suspension of the death penalty.
-- an election law that a seven-member panel that
wields a veto power against any political party and
candidate in elections.
-- one of every three candidates of any recognised
political party must be a woman.
-- formation of committees that have sweeping powers
over communications, the media, and the stock market.
-- a commission which will have the authority to send
government officials, including members of the interim
cabinet, for trial on corruption charges.
-- a ban on former members of the Iraqi army from
holding public office for 18 months after their
retirement or resignation.
-- punishments of up to 30 years in jail for those
convicted of selling weapons.
-- a ban on former militiamen from being absorbed to
the Iraqi military and from campaigning for election
candidates.
Some of Bremer's edits are "administrative" in nature.
These include:
-- an anti-money laundering law that mandatorily
subjects to scrutiny any transaction involving $3,500.
-- an industrial-design law to protect microchip
designs.
-- a ceiling of 15 per cent on any tax.
-- a ban on violation of intellectual property laws.
-- a ban on employment of anyone under the age of 15.
A scrutiny of Bremer's "edicts" will show that few of
them are compatible with the way of life in Iraq.
For instance, the suspension of the death penalty is
imposed on a country where tribal feuds are settled
through the barrel of a gun on the "an-eye-for-an-eye"
principle of the desert. Therefore, if the judiciary
does not have the authority to order the execution of
a convicted murderer, then the tribes would seek to
settle the score by killing the murderer or even a key
member of his or her clan as revenge even before the
issue goes to court.
The proposed ban on political parties has already
drawn protests, with Iraqis saying that why should an
American-imposed body have the right to veto parties
and candicates in elections in Iraq.
While the Saddam Hussein regime was liberal in
approach to women and given women broad rights,
Iraqis, as other Arab Muslims of conservative
societies, will resent the imposition of a
one-in-three quota for women candidates in elections.
The 30-year mandatory punishment for weapon sellers
will immediately be rejected since almost every
household in Iraq has more than a firearm. Often, such
weapons are sold by families as last-resort means.
Therefore a ban on selling a weapon and such a high
penalty could never be accepted by Iraqis.
The ban on militiamen from joining the armed forces
runs contrary to the plans of the interim government,
which has already launched a process where all
militias — except those of the Kurds in the north
— will be disbanded and absorbed into the security
forces.
The ban on children under 15 from taking up employment
will be rejected outright. In a country where there is
little employment and where many families have lost
male adults earning a livelihood, children are the
sole wage-earners. Those families will go hungry if
the children are banned from working.
The interim government is unlikely to obey Bremer's
edicts, and such an approach will pit the interim
ministers against the "agents" Bremer has put in
place. The result: A perennial state of friction that
would not bode well for the interim government to
carry out its assigned task of shaping Iraq's future.

$3,415 per American family

The invasion and occupation of Iraq would
have cost the average US household at least $3,415 by
the end of this year, says a expert study.
The Washington-based think tank, the Institute for
Policy Studies (IPS), also says that not only have US
taxpayers paid a "very high price for the war," they
have also become "less secure at home and in the
world."
In a report entitled "Paying the Price: The Mounting
Costs of the Iraq War," IPS states that the US would
have spent $151.1 billion on the invasion and
occupation of Iraq by the end of the year. This
translates into $3,415 per American household.
The report points out that $151.1 billion could have
paid for comprehensive health care for 82 million
Americanchildren or the salaries of nearly three
million elementary school teachers.
The same amount, it says, if spent on international
programmes, could have cut world hunger in half and
covered HIV/AIDS medicine, childhood immunisation, and
clean water and sanitation needs of all developing
countries for more than two years.
Apart from the financial costs, the report says, the
US also absorbed "costs in blood" that are "by no
means insignificant."
More than 850 US troops have been killed since the
start of the war on March 20, 2003, just over 700 of
them since President George Bush declared the end of
major hostilities on May 1, 2003. In addition, more
than 5,134 troops were wounded until mid-June 4,600
of them since the official end of combat. Nearly
two-thirds of the wounded received injuries serious
enough to prevent them from returning to duty.
The toll among Iraqis is much higher.
According to the IPS report, t between 9,436 and
11,317 Iraqi civilians have been killed as a direct
result of the US. invasion and ensuing occupation,
while an estimated 40,000 Iraqis have been injured. In
addition, during "major combat" operations both during
the invasion and after May 1, 2003, the report
estimates that between 4,895 and 6,370 Iraqi soldiers
and insurgents were killed as of mid-June.
The IPS report also refers to the long-run health
impacts of the estimated 1,100 to 2,200 tons of
ordnance made from depleted uranium (DU), which caused
illnesses among US soldiers in the first Gulf War and
led to a seven-fold increase in child birth defects in
southern Iraq since 1991, that were expended during
the March 2003 bombing campaign.
The report also highlights the psychological impact of
the warm, post-war resistance and crimes, including
murders, rapes, and kidnapping. It points out that
deaths from violence rose from an average of 14 per
month in 2002 to 357 per month in 2003.
Other points that the report highlights include:
— Iraqi women do not enjoy safety and security outside
their homes.
– Many Iraqi children cannot attend school.
— Water and electricity networks are far short of
meeting the demands as a result of sabotage by
guerrillas and corruption by companies like
Halliburton.
— Iraq's hospitals and health systems have been
overwhelmed by a combination of lack of supplies and
unprecedented demand created by the ongoing violence.
The IPS report also highlights that the US has
suffered a seriouos blow to its own standing and
credibility in the international scene among both
Muslims countries as well as America's traditonal
allies in Europe. The US actions also led weakening
the UN and international law by the wars against
Afghanistan and Iraq and the inhumane treatment of
detainees in both wars.
In conclusion, the report states that the US have to
pay the price for its invasion of Iraq for a long
time. It refers to to an assessment by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
that the Iraq war has led to a swelling of the ranks
of anti-US groups, particularly Al Qaeda.
Accordingn to the IIS, Al Qaeda's membership at
18,000 with 1,000 active in Iraq.

The lamb and the tiger

by PV Vivekanand

A folk tale speaks about a tiger that seeks to savour
the flesh of a lamb drinking water downstream. It
accuses the lamb of polluting the water. The lamb
replies it is innocent since he is downstream and the
tiger upstream. "Oh, then it is your grandfather who
polluted the water some years ago," replies the tiger
and pounces on the lamb.
We are reminded of this tale every time we hear the
American allegation that Saddam Hussein had links with
Osama Bin Laden despite an independent commission's
findings to the contrary. Washington's
behind-the-scene efforts to make the charge stick are
at best pathetic.
The only difference is that Saddam Hussein was no
lamb.
Russia has joined the American bandwagon with an
assertion by Vladimir Putin that Russian security
agencies repeatedly had warned the White House after
Sept.11, 2001, that Saddam was planning "terrorist
attacks" against targets both outside and inside the
United States.
"This information was passed through channels to
American colleagues," according to Putin. "George Bush
had a chance to personally thank a chief of one of the
Russian secret services for the information that he
considered very important."
Indeed, the assertion, which lacks in details, could
help the US effort to justify the invasion of Iraq as
well as US President George W Bush's standing among
American voters since the Democrats have accused Bush
of launching the war with little justification.
"It appears Mr. Putin is trying to help Mr. Bush win
his second election, that Moscow is becoming a player
in the American political scene," Lilia Shevtsova, a
political scientist at the Moscow Carnegie Center, was
quoted as saying by the Baltimore Sun. The inference
is that Putin might feel more comfortable dealing with
Bush as president of the US than his Democratic rival
John Kerry and is hence pitching his lot into run-up
to the US presidential elections in November.
Without going into details, Bush himself has insisted
that Saddam's Iraq was linked to Bin Laden's Qaeda.
But neither Bush nor anyone else has come up with hard
evidence.
Middle Eastern circles endorse the finding by the
American independent commission investigating the
Sept.11 attacks that no proof exists of co-operation
between Al Qaeda and Saddam.

Linkage not possible

Allegations of a tie-up between Bin Laden and Saddam
were seen with scepticism in the Middle East whenever
such charges were made in the US.
Most analysts and observers in the Middle East think
such a linkage is not possible because the two,
despite their fierce anti-US postures, followed
different, dramatically divergent paths. Bin Laden
never considered Saddam as a Muslim faithful and
steadfastly rejected the Iraqi strongman's overtures
to set up an alliance.
Bin Laden blamed Saddam for the Mideast's troubles as
much as he blamed the US and Israel. He saw Saddam as
having set the ground for the US to set up a permanent
military presence in the Gulf region by invading
Kuwait in 1990.
Bin Laden was a bitter critic of Saddam for using
Islamic tenets whenever it suited and ignoring them
otherwise. A classic example cited by Bin Laden was
Saddam's imposition of parts of the Shariah (Islamic
law) in Iraq, like bans on alcohol and nightclubs and
enforcement of the Islamic dress code at times when it
suited him. The ban was imposed and implicitly lifted
at regular intervals during the Saddam reign in Iraq.
As far as Bin Laden was concerned Saddam was not a
true Muslim and this, in his eyes, ruled him out as an
ally. If anything, according to sources who knew Bin
Laden in the early 90s, the Yemeni-born Saudi militant
considered Saddam as a traitor of the Islamic and Arab
cause since he felt that the Iraqi strongman would
respond positively to any American overture to settle
Washington-Baghdad differences and rejoin the American
camp if the US administration invited him to do so.
"Saddam Hussein is in fact an infidel who is trying to
use Islam to serve his politics and secure support
among the faithful in Iraq," Bin Laden was known to
have commented to some of his "Arab Afghan" supporters
— Arabs, who like Bin Laden himself, volunteered to
fight against the Soviet army in Afghanistan during
the 1980s. He also maintained that the people of Iraq
should be seen separate from the regime since "they
were Saddam's innocent victims" just as "the
Palestinians were the victims of Israel."

Secret report

A secret British intelligence report, which was
suppressed by the government in late 2002, said it was
not possible that Bin Laden and Saddam could have
forged an alliance if only because their "ideological"
differences were too wide. The same report also said
that there was no evidence of an Al Qaeda-Baghdad
link.
After the August 1998 Al Qaeda bombings of the
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the
retaliatory American attacks against a Bin Laden camp
in Afghanistan, Saddam reportedly extended an
invitation to Bin Laden to go to Iraq and take shelter
there against any further American military action.
Saddam promised him "absolute" safety and protection.
The Al Qaeda leader not only turned down the
"invitation" but also berated Saddam for thinking that
a "true believer" such as Bin Laden himself would
accept such an invitation from a "non-believer" like
Saddam.
Indeed, according to the sources, Al Qaeda activists
from Egypt, Sudan and other countries might have
visited Iraq while Saddam was in power, but this never
constituted any basis for an alliance as alleged by
the US.
Against this backdrop, persistent claims made by
senior American officials that Saddam and Bin Laden
had strong links sounded hollow and without substance.
US Secretary of State Colin Powell raised a big hue
and cry in mid-2002 that Ansar Al Islam, an Al Qaeda
affiliate, was housed in northern Iraq and was
developing chemical weapons there.
In less than 24 hours after Powell made the
allegation, the horde of Arab, regional and
international media based in the region rushed to the
area only to find a couple of ruined buildings there.
The only chemicals worth mentioning that were found in
the area was a packet of detergent that someone had
forgotten in a makeshift washing room.
So much for American intelligence findings.
However, the catch in the situation was always that
while administration allegations against Iraq were
played up, results of on-the-ground inspections were
played down, and not many got to read or hear the
actual findings. They were left with the first
impressions of the charge itself.
Contrary to what many Mideastern pundits argue, the US
investigating commission asserts that Bin Laden had
made overtures to Saddam but the Iraqi strongman never
responded.
It could indeed be true that someone, somewhere in the
Bin Laden camp might have made such requests, but it
is highly unlikely it came from Bin Laden to Saddam,
say Arab intelligence agencies.

False claims

The American investigating commission's failure to
find any evidence that Al Qaeda and Iraq had links
pulls the rug from under the feet of steadfast claims
made by President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and
other administration officials.
Even last week, Cheney claimed Saddam "had
long-established ties with Al Qaeda," but what he had
to cite as evidence was an already discredited report
that Mohammed Atta, leader of the 19 Sept. 11
hijackers, met in Prague, Czech Republic, with a
senior Iraqi intelligence official before the attacks.
The investigating panel concluded no such meeting had
occurred.
Putin's assertion that Saddam plotted terror attacks
against the US after Sept.11 brings forth several
elements into consideration.
It was assumed as early as November 2001, one month
after the US launched the war against Afghanistan,
that Iraq was the Bush administration's next target.
Bush said his interpretation was that his war against
terror include those countries which "terrified" their
neighbours with their weapons of mass destruction.
That was the clearest signal that he intended to wage
war on Iraq no matter.
Surely, if even the man on the street could sense that
Bush was on an irreversible course towards war against
Iraq, then Saddam and his advisers and strategists
should have also known of the inevitability of war.
From that point onwards, Saddam tried desperately to
avoid war. Despite his public anti-US rhetoric, it was
clear since July 2002 that he would have complied with
every American and UN demands in connection with
charges that he had a massive stockpile of weapons of
mass destruction. The truth, as it had emerged, was
that he did not have any. He did not risk anything by
allowing UN inspections and accepting other UN demands
aimed at ensuring that he did not resume his weapons
programmes.
However, Bush, nudged by his neo-conservative
pro-Israeli advisers, had made up his mind and
Saddam's offers of compliance were steadfastly turned
down. There was nothing in the world Saddam could have
done to change the course towards war.
The pattern of American behaviour since late 2001
clearly showed that the objective was indeed invasion
of Iraq, topple Saddam and occupy Iraq until the
country is reshaped as the most "American-friendly" in
the Middle East after Israel.
By late 2002, it became very clear that war would be
launched anytime. All the American manoeuvrings
through the UN under European pressure had only one
objective: Give no room for Saddam to get off the hook
even if he were to go on his knees.
It was during this period, according to Putin, Saddam
allegedly had plotted terror attacks against the US.
Logic does not agree with that assertion.
Notwithstanding all his shortcomings, Saddam would not
have been as naive as not to realise that any such
action against the US would have brought an immediate
military action upon Iraq and would have made
meaningless any effort to avert the war.
Many in the Middle East see as credible recent
revelations that Saddam had, through a Lebanese
intermediary, made a last-ditch offer to open all his
military facilities to the US without reservation and
meet any American demand as long as he remained in
power. That fits in with the overall picture that
Saddam knew that war was inevitable and was trying to
hang onto to the slimmest straw.
Against that reality, it seems inconceivable that
Saddam might have been plotting terror attacks against
the US at a time when he was desperately attempting to
ward off war that would inevitably topple him.
But then, that is what the lamb tried and failed.

No Saddam-Bin Laden ties

by pv vivekanand

THE FINDING by an American independent commission
investigating the Sept.11 attacks that no proof exists
between Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein
should not be surprising. It was always known in
Mideastern circles that a tie-up between Bin Laden and
Saddam was never possible because the two, despite
their fierce anti-US postures, followed different,
dramatically divergent paths, religiously
ideologically, politically and otherwise.
Bin Laden, a truly committed Muslim with strong
convictions and beliefs, never considered Saddam as a
Muslim faithful and steadfastly rejected the Iraqi
strongman's overtures to set up an alliance.
Bin Laden blamed Saddam for the Mideast's troubles as
much as he blamed the US and Israel. He saw Saddam as
having set the ground for the US to set up a permanent
military presence in the Gulf region by invading
Kuwait in 1990.
Bin Laden was a bitter critic of Saddam for using
Islamic tenets whenever it suited and ignoring them
otherwise. A classic example cited by Bin Laden was
Saddam's imposition of parts of the Shariah (Islamic
law) in Iraq, like bans on alcohol and nightclubs and
enforcement of the Islamic dress code at times when it
suited him. The bans were imposed and implicitly
lifted at regular intervals during the Saddam reign in
Iraq.
As far as Bin Laden was concerned Saddam was not a
true Muslim and this, in his eyes, ruled him out as an
ally. If anything, Bin Laden considered Saddam as a
traitor of the Islamic and Arab cause since he felt
that the Iraqi strongman would respond positively to
any American overture to settle Washington-Baghdad
differences and rejoin the American camp if the Bush
Senior administration, the Clinton administration or
the Bush Junior administration were inclined to do so.
"Saddam Hussein is in fact an infidel who is trying to
use Islam to serve his politics and secure support
among the faithful in Iraq," Bin Laden was known to
have commented to some of his "Arab Afghan" supporters
-- Arabs, who like Bin Laden himself, volunteered to
fight against the Soviet army in Afghanistan during
the 1980s. He also maintained that the people of Iraq
should be seen separate from the regime since "they
were Saddam's innocent victims" just as "the
Palestinians were the victims of Israel."
A secret British intelligence report, which was
suppressed by the government in late 2002, said it was
not possible that Bin Laden and Saddam could have
forged an alliance if only because their "ideological"
differences were too wide. The same report also said
that there was no evidence of an Al Qaeda-Baghdad
link.
After the August 1998 Al Qaeda bombings of the
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the
retaliatory American attacks against a Bin Laden camp
in Afghanistan, Saddam extended an invitation to Bin
Laden to go to Iraq and take shelter there against any
further American military action. Saddam promised him
"absolute" safety and protection.
The Al Qaeda leader not only turned down the
"invitation" but also berated Saddam for thinking that
a "true believer" such as Bin Laden himself would
accept such an invitation from a "non-believer" like
Saddam.
Indeed, according to the sources, Al Qaeda activists
from Egypt, Sudan and other countries might have
visited Iraq while Saddam was in power, but this
never constituted any basis for an alliance as alleged
by the US.
Against this backdrop, persistent claims made by
senior American officials that Saddam and Bin Laden
had strong links had sounded hollow — to those who are
familiar with the thinking of the two — and without
substance.
On the other hand, the US investigating commission
asserts that Saddam had never responded to requests
for help from Bin Laden in 1994. The reality,
according to highly credible and informed sources in
the Middle East, was that such a request was indeed
made by an unidentified Sudanese member of Al Qaeda
but without Bin Laden's knowledge. That Sudanese,
identified as Mamdouh Kais, was killed in a 1997
accident in Afghanistan, according to the sources.
Arab intelligence agencies which have more to fear
from a Bin Laden-Saddam alliance than the West have
asserted that they could not establish a link between
Al Qaeda and Baghdad.
The investigating commission's failure to find any
evidence that Al Qaeda and Iraq had links pulls the
rug from under the feet of steadfast claims made by
President George Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and
other administration officials.
Even last week, Cheney claimed Saddam "had
long-established ties with Al Qaeda," but what he had
to cite as evidence was an already discredited report
that Mohammed Atta, leader of the 19 Sept. 11
hijackers, met in Prague, Czech Republic, with a
senior Iraqi intelligence official before the attacks.
The investigating panel concluded no such meeting
occurred.

Abu Ghraib photos

Qadhafi and plot to kill Abdullah

IT is unlikely that Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi will
face any international punishment for his alleged plot
to assassinate Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. If Qadhafi
were to be punished, then it would prove too
embarassing for the Bush administration, which had
touted his pledge in December to renounce terrorism
and abandon weapons of mass destruction as a major
victory of the US-led war against terrorism.
The US cannot cannot afford to see Qadhafi as having
committed a unredeemable sin by allegedly plotting to
kill Crown Prince Abdullah. It In the short run, there
would be a lot of talk about punishing Qadhafi but
these would fade away, with Iraq, Palestine and
American elections as well as Washington's push for
Arab reforms taking centrestage.
The key here is that the US had known since September
of the alleged Libyan plot to kill Prince Abdullah and
kept back the information from the Saudis. No doubt
the top officials of the Bush administration had known
about it throughout. Therefore last week's pledge by
President George Bush that he was concerned and the
affair would be thoroughly investigated sounds hollow
since it is based on the asusmption that he came to
know about it only now; whereas it is illogical that
he was not immediately informed by US intelligence
agencies of a plot against the de factor ruler of a
country as important as Saudi Arabia when it was
discovered.
According to reports in the American and Saudi media,
the alleged plot to kill Abdullah involved Qadhafi and
his top intelligence agents as well as Abdul Rahman
Alamoudi, an American Muslim leader jailed in
Alexandria, Virginia, on federal charges of having
illegal financial dealings with Libya; and by
Mohammeed Ismael, a Libyan intelligence officer in
Saudi custody.
Alamoudi was detained by British authorities last
August as he boarded a flight from London to Syria
with $340,000 in cash. They suspected he was carrying
the money for the Palestinian group Hamas. He denied
it and said a Libyan had simply gave him the money at
his hotel room with no explanation. Then he said the
money came from the Libya-based World Islamic Call
Society. Then he said the money came from Libyan
intelligence.
He was sent to the US where he faced charges of
violating the US sanctions agains Libya - travelling
to Libya and receiving money from Libyans.
Then, in a bid to escape from the charges, he made a
deal with the US authorities and revealed the plot
against Abdullah.
Alamoudi is the founder of several Islamic groups
including the American Muslim Council, and is an
occasional White House visitor during the Clinton and
current Bush administrations.
He said he was summoned to Libya by top intelligence
officer Abdullah Sannousi, who introduced him to
Mohamed Ismael, another intelligence agent, in a
meeting attended by Sannousi's deputy Mousa Koussa.
Alamoudi and Ismael worked together since then.
Almoudi received at least $3 million from Libya and
met Saudi dissidents in London to hire them for the
killing.
He said he had met Qadhafi twice since then and both
times the Libyan leader told him to speed up the plot
to kill Abdullah.
The plot began in May 2003, shortly after Qadhafi and
Abdullah had a fierce verbal clash at an Arab
emergency meeting in Egypt. Qadhafi accused Saudi
Arabia of agreeing to give military facilities to the
US for invading Iraq and Abdullah retorted that
Qadhafi himself was helped by the US to assume power
in Libya in a coup.
Prince Abdullah shouted at Qadhafi: "Your lies
precede you and your grave is in front of you."
Alamoudi's version was corroborated by Ismael, who was
arrested in October last year. According to Saudi
newspaper reports, he was arrested after police were
alerted by an employee of a money exchange company who
grew suspicious about a $1 million transfer that had
come in Ismael's name.
Ismael tried to explain that the money was to be spent
for expenses related to the Umra pilgrimage of several
"leading" women from Libya.
The money exchange employee alerted Saudi police and
Ismael was kept under observation. But he was not
arrested in Saudi Arabia. He was apparenlty allowed to
leave the country and was detained in Egypt and sent
back to Saudi Arabia.
Four Saudi dissidents was arrested from a hotel
outside Mecca whether they had gone to collect money
for their role in the plot.
Saudi police questioned Alamoudi and the four, and the
plot was unveiled.
By then, American authorities had also known the
details of the plot from Alamoudi and the two versions
matched.
In the meantime, American-Libyan relations grew
stronger. Qadhafi had offered in secret talks with the
US and UK to renounce terrorism and abandon his
secret weapons projects in mid=2003 and in December
he made the public pledge to drop his weapons plans
and renounced terrorism.
The US is indeed concerned that Qadhafi should be
keeping his pledge, but the explanation, if any is
available, is that the plot against Abdullah came
before his pledge and therefore he is a changed man
now.
The American approach to the affair is rather low key.
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher
acknowledged that Washington had known of reports
"that Libya was in contact with Saudi dissidents who
have threatened violence against the Saudi royal
family" before Qadhafi's pledge on Dec.19 abandoning
his weapons programmes and renouncing terrorism.
"We raised those concerns directly with the Libyan
leadership, and they assured us that they would not
support the use of violence for settling political
differences with any state," said Boucher. The
allegations were one reason the US had not removed
Libya from the State Department's list of nations that
support terrorism.
President Bush said last week: "We're going to make
sure we fully understand the veracity of the plot
line. . . . When we find out the facts, we will deal
with them accordingly. . . . I have sent a message to
(Qadhafi) that if he honours his commitments to resist
terror and to fully disclose and disarm his weapons
programmes, we will begin a process of normalisation,
which we have done."
Libyan Foreign Minister Abdul Rahman Shalqam has
denied the allegations "completely and categorically."

In the meantime, investigations are continuing, with
Americans and Saudi officials seekign to to interview
at least two of Alamoudi's US associates, who
apparently are overseas.
The US and Saudi Arabia are also pressing British
officials to intensify their investigation of Saad
Faqih, a Saudi dissident in London suspected of having
played a role in the Libyan plot. Faqih has denied
any connection to the plot. Faqih acknowledged having
known Alamoudi for years but denied being funded by
him or by Ismael.
Saudi dissidents in London are suspected of having
given Alamoudi and Ismael clues to locate men in
Saudi Arabia willing to join an assassination plot
that involved the use of small arms or
rocket-propelled grenades.
In technical terms, if the charge against Libya is
proved true, then it could lead to reinstatement of
international sanctions on Libya that were lifted by
the United Nations Security Council last September
after Tripoli government renounced terrorism, admitted
responsibility for the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing and
agreed to pay $10 million compensation to the
families.
However, to acknowledge that he had gone wrong in
dealing with Qadhafi would be embarassing for Bush,
who had highlighted Qadhafi's pledge against
developing weapons and supporting terorrism as a one
of the most tangible results of the US-led war against
terrorism. Washington would only seek to absolve
Qadhafi of any wrongdoing.

Saddam's oil vouchers

Separate investigations by the UN, the US
Congress and an auditor appointed by the now-defunct
Iraqi Interim Governing Council (IGC) have unveiled
different forms of oil export scams run by the ousted
Saddam Hussein regime.
In all, the regime is said to have sold several
billion dollars worth of smuggled oil. The money has
not been accounted for, but it is unlikely that the
cash was ever sent to Iraq. The money changed hands
through carefully concealed bank transfers and in cash
outside Iraq under instructions issued by the regime.
One channel was to inflate the invoices of goods
supplied to Iraq under the UN's oil-for-food
programme. The Saddam regime had the final say about
what was to be imported under the programme —  mainly
food, medicine and related supplies — and at what cost
while the UN collected proceeds from the sale of Iraqi
oil.
The regime made secret deals with suppliers of food,
medicine and related items to inflate the costs. The
supplier submitted the invoices to the UN and
collected the money, and remitted the inflated
difference to secret accounts of the Saddam regime
outside Iraq. The regime used the money to benefit its
top leaders and to pay bribes to friendly politicians
and groups as needed.
During the seven-year oil-for-food programme that
ended in October 2003, Iraq exported $65 billion and
more than $38 billion in food and medicine had been
delivered to the Iraqi people. It is not known how
much money was involved in the inflated invoices.
The difference in the exports and imports went to a UN
fund that paid compensation to victims of the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
The second scam run by the Saddam regime was through
smuggling oil in violation of the UN sanctions imposed
after the invasion of Kuwait.
The regime used to pump around 200,000 barrels of oil
through a pipeline that runs from Kirkuk in northern
Iraq to Syria's Banias port.
Oil companies took delivery of the oil from Banias
port upon producing coded slips issued by Iraq's
State Oil Marketing Company or SOMO.
The US knew about this, but could not do anything to
stop the smuggling through Syria because Damascus
refused to co-operate with Washington.One of the first
things the US military did after invading Iraq and
toppling Saddam last year was to close down the
pipeline.
The scam through Syria allegedly benefited about
270 foreign government officials, legislators,
political activists and journalists as well as
companies from more than 52 countries who are said
to have received money from Saddam for supporting him
in international and regional forums.
The Saddam regime issued "oil vouchers" to various
beneficiaries who could then sell them to oil dealers
or agents operating from Rashid Hotel in Baghdad. The
agents would then sell the vouchers to oil companies
which, in turn, would submit them to the State Oil
Marketing Company or SOMO and collected coded slips
that entitled them to collect the oil from Banias
port. Both the beneficiary and the agent collected
quick and handsome profits. More often than note,
beneficiaries sold the vouchers at an average of $3
per barrel for instant cash.
The beneficiaries of the scam allegedly included
Western, Arab and Asian politicians and groups (the
list includes the Indian Congress Party, which
allegedly received one million barrels, according to
Al Mada, an Iraqi newspaper, which released the list.
The Congress Party has issued a categorical denial of
the allegation).
Another alleged beneficiary was Benon V Sevan, the
former director of the UN oil-for-food programme. He
has denied the charge, but a secret memo based on an
inspection of documents recovered from the former
regime's offices claim that Senan collected the oil
vouchers and channelled the proceeds to a Panamanian
trading company.
The alleged beneficiaries of oil vouchers included
19 political parties, and numerous politicians and
journalists. Russia led the way among countries, with
46 recipients for a total of about 2.5 billion
barrels. Significant individual recipients include
British MP George Galloway, the president of
Indonesia, the prime minister of Libya, the former
prime minister of Yemen, a former French minister of
interior, Patrick Maugein who, according to French
sources, is a financial supporter of French President
Chirac, the sons of the former Egyptian leader Gamal
Abdul Nasser, the President of Lebanon Emil Lehoud,
the former Syrian minister of defence Mustafa Tlass,
several Jordanian politicians and others.,
Some of them have issued categorical denials, some
have said they were offered oil vouchers but turned
them down and others said they had accepted the
vouchers on behalf of someone else or for charity
projects.
Another channel adopted by the Saddam regime to beat
the UN sanctions was to smuggle oil through barges and
small ships through the Gulf. The vessels used to
collect the oil from Umm Qasr in southern Iraq and
followed a route hugging the Iranian shore before
entering Gulf waters where the oil was pumped to
larger ships bound for the Far East. Gulf-based Iraqi
agents collected the money.
The regime also sent truckloads of oil to Turkey
through Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. Although
they were avowed enemies of the Saddam regime, Kurdish
militia groups allowed the trucks through because they
benefited in cash — they collected a "toll" from
every vehicle.
"Oil vouchers "were also distributed to companies and
individuals from Sudan, Yemen, Cyprus, Turkey,
Vietnam, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, the UAE,
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Panama, Thailand, Chad,
China, Nigeria, Kenya, Ireland, Bahrain, and the
Philippines. Two Saudi companies were also listed.
The full disclosure of the names and details of the
alleged foreign beneficiaries of Saddam's oil bribes
could be devastating to those named.
At this point in time, Ahmed Chalabi, the head of the
Iraqi National Congress, who has fallen out of favour
with the US, is believed to be in possession of the
entire files that contain all details. He has refused
to hand them over to the US.
A US-backed Iraqi police raid of Chalabi's offices and
residence last month was seen as an effort to locate
those documents.
Washington has distanced itself from its one-time pet
Chalabi, who is now accused of spying for Iran,
misappropriating tens of millions of American money
allocated for pre-war anti-Saddam campaigns and for
intelligence operations in post-war Iraq,
profiteering from reconstruction contracts in the
country and implicitly undermining American political
efforts there.

Bitter fights ahead

The newly installed interim authority in Iraq is the
best bet for the US to advance its designs in the
Middle East. However, developments in the last week
clearly showed that Iraqi politicians and leaders of
various ethnic groups have a mind of their and this
might not exactly be dancing to Washington's tunes.
Both sides, despite pledges of co-operation with each
other, are destined to fight it out at every juncture
of Iraq's course towards shaping its own political
future.
The US plans for Iraq has turned a key corner with the
installation of an interim government, which will
formally take charge on July 1. The next item on the
US agenda is "legitimising" its military occupation of
Iraq by sealing a special agreement with the interim
government while also securing a United Nations
Security Council resolution which is purposely kept
ambiguous about withdrawing US military forces from
the embattled country.
No matter what angle one would look at the situation,
it is loud and clear that the US will maintain its
military presence in Iraq for the foreseeable future
and exercise absolute control over the country through
direct and indirect means.
The US has already devised mechanisms that give it
absolute power over all political and administrative
decisions taken by the interim government.
Upto 150 American officials will be installed under
contracts signed by the US-led Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) — these contracts are binding on the
interim government — and these US officials will hold
direct authority over all the key institutions — state
finances, the armed forces and media and
communications.
Earlier, the US envisaged that the interim government
will have little control over its armed forces, but
the revised version of a draft resolution at the UN
Security Council gives the interim government control
over the Iraqi army and police.
However, the interim government would have no
authority to make or change laws and will be unable to
make major decisions within specific ministries
without tacit US approval.
An example is a media and telecommunications
commission appointed by US overseer Paul Bremer. The
body will have immense powers over the media,
including the power to shut down news agencies and
newspapers. Fines of millions of dollars could be
imposed on television channels for violating the "code
of conduct" laid down by the US.
A US-appointed Board of Supreme Audit will have
representatives in every Iraqi ministry, with powers
to monitor all contracts and expenditure.
The US-installed members of the board will have a
five-year term of office and cannot be removed except
by a two-thirds vote in a Iraqi parliament as and when
it is elected. American “advisors” will remain in
every ministry, reporting to a virtual parallel
government operating out of the American embassy in
Baghdad, which, with over 3,000 staff, will be the
largest in the world, and run by John Negroponte, a
man known for ruthlessness in Vietnam and Latin
America in the 60s and 70s.
It does not really matter to the Americans that the
revised draft UN Security Council resolution says that
the interim authority could ask Washington to
withdraw its forces at any time from Iraq since the
US knows there would never be any such request since
those supposed to be making the request are
American-controlled.
The unseen string is the power of American funds that
are being spent in Iraq. That is the leverage that the
US would be using to have it way in the country.
The revised draft of the sought-for UN Security
Council resolution states that the interim government
will be "fully sovereign" and reaffirms the right of
the Iraqi people to determine their political future
freely, control their natural resources and coordinate
international assistance.
That catch in the resolution is: While it notes "that
the presence of the multinational force in Iraq is at
the request of the incoming interim government," it
doesn't specifically give the new leaders the right to
ask the force to leave.
Instead, it anticipates that the incoming government
will make a formal request "to retain the presence of
the multinational force" and leaves room for the date
of that request to be included in the resolution.
That is where the interim government would be coerced
into signing a proposed "Status of Forces Agreement"
under which it would request that the US military will
stay on in Iraq until the interim government is
capable of assuming security of the country.
The new interim prime minister, Iyad Allawi, has
already said the US military will be asked to stay on
and promised that Iraq's security forces will be a
"pivotal partner" with US and other coalition troops
in the fight to restore security to Iraq.
This is not likely to happen any soon, and hence the
January 2006 deadline —  the installation of a
constitutionally elected government —  will remain
only a clause in the resolution with as much as value
as the paper it is written on.
That is the American grandiose plan. The only unseen
element in the plan is how the people of Iraq are
going to recognise and respect the interim government
in the days, weeks and months ahead.
If the signs on the ground are any indication, it will
be tough going for the interim government, and, by
extension, to the US.
The interim government will not be able to assume
control of security without American military help,
and no election worth the name could be held as long
as the American military could not pacify Iraqis. With
the mounting Iraqi resistance against occupation, the
deadline set for electing a government does not seem
realistic.
Washington knows that well, but it would not be the
one to tell the world that its plans for Iraq have
little to do with freedom and democracy for Iraqis but
aim at consolidating the American grip on the oil-rich
Gulf region.
The interim government, or at least some of its
members, have shown that they are determined to assert
their independence and aim for full sovereignty
despite the obvious American effort to retain absolute
control of the country. That was what we saw when the
now dissolved Interim Governing Council (IGC) insisted
on its own choice for president, Sheikh Ghazi Yawar,
rather than Adnan Pachachi, who was backed by the US.
It was as much a signal to the US that things might
not be going Washingtons' way no matter how carefully
the plans were laid down months ago.
It is no easy sailing for the caretaker government.
The biggest challenge it faces is securing the
endorsement and support of a majority of the country's
25 million people, of whom Shiites have a majority of
60 per cent.
It has to tread a delicate line between serving the
interests of the people of Iraq and risking being
labelled as American agents if its decisions are seen
dictated by Washington.
Notwithstanding the language in the UN draft
resolution and declarations from Washington that Iraq
would soon have "full sovereignty," the interim
government and the US would be engaged in a
long-running battle involving bottlenecks in
appropriation of the country's oil revenues,
reconstruction contracts and local administration.
On the political front, the US will veto any move to
characterise Israel as an enemy or to even censure the
Jewish state for its occupation of Arab territories.
However, the interim authority would draw Iraqi fire
if it is deemed as staying silent on Israeli actions
against the Palestinians.
Similarly, the US would be keeping a close eye on
Iraq's relations with other countries and would
intervene at any point it feels such ties have a
negative effect on American interests.
Having advanced its goals of ensuring energy security
and assuring itself of a say in the international oil
market by taking control of Iraq and having eliminated
a potential military threat to its ally Israel by
removing Saddam, Washington is unlikely to give up
its stranglehold on the country and deprive itself of
a weapon which it wants to use to achieve its third
elusive objective: Regional stability of the type that
serves American interests.