Arafat faces multi-crises

July 22 2004

Arafat faces multi-crises
PV Vivekanand

THERE is a security crisis and there is a political crisis within the Palestinian ranks, but solving them would not advance the Palestinian dream of independence. Indeed, the crises facing Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat are indeed the worst he had to confront since he assumed the helm of his people's struggle for liberation. Unless he moved swiftly to contain the situation, it might be too late for not only his survival as the symbol of the Palestinian struggle, but also the very fate of that struggle itself, writes PV Vivekanand.
For the first time, elected representatives of the Palestinians are demanding that Arafat crack down on corruption in his foundering administration. It is all the more ironic that the charges of corruption has been levelled not against an elected government in a free and sovereign state, but against the leaders of a revolutionary liberation movement of a people who have made and are continuing to make sublime sacrifices for the cause and have paid the price in untold suffering for their resistance against foreign occupation of their land.
It is not easy for Arafat, who is under virtual house arrest at his headquarters in Ramallah, to fight corruption among the people around him; many of them rally behind him only because he has been keeping a blind eye to their corrupt practices, and many would simply drop him if he were to hold them accountable for their shady financial dealings.
Corruption took roots in the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from the very beginning if only because of the absence of any mechanism for accountability. It was a one-man show of Arafat, who went around Arab countries and collected hundreds of millions of dollars in aid for his liberation movement. He never accounted for the money to the donors or perhaps he did not feel the need to do so since he, as the living symbol of the Palestinian struggle for independence, was beyond reproach.
Arafat was "politically" careful with the money; he supported Palestinian refugee families recommended by his Fateh group, the dominant of the eight factions that made up the PLO, and then was selective in sharing the funds with other PLO factions; those whose positions, decisions and moves suited his thinking and interests got paid and others did not. That was the way he ran the PLO. At the same time, no one had any accurate idea about the PLO finances, including whether part of the money was invested abroad as was widely held. However, Arafat has never been accused of stashing away money for himself. The criticism was always against the way he played politics with PLO funds.
A simple example of Arafat's selective approach was seen in mid-1991 when he instructed his diplomatic representative in Amman, Jordan, not to settle the hotel bills of the leader of a leftist faction who had criticised him publicly. The faction leader had to borrow money from his cousins and friends in order to check out of the hotel.
Another example was when it was rumoured that Arafat had nearly $1 billion in PLO accounts under his control shortly after he signed the Oslo agreements in 1993. That rumour, his critics say, was instigated by himself because he wanted PLO factions which opposed the Oslo accords to support him in expectation that he was able to administer five-year autonomy of the West Bank and Gaza pending final status negotiations as envisaged under the agreement.
When the international community pledged nearly $2.5 billion as aid for the Palestinians to build themselves an entity in the Gaza Strip and West Bank following the signing of the Oslo agreements, the first thing Arafat would have expected was a direct transfer of the money to a bank account he controls. It jolted him to realise that the donors wanted every penny of their money accounted for and appointed the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the authority to decide how and where the money should be spent. It needed preliminary, feasibility and project studies before the UNDP would release any money to any project, and even at that there was no guarantee that every approved project would be financed.
Arafat and his associates never recovered from the shock of having to argue their case for ever dollar to be spent on building the Palestinian society in such a manner that everyone stood to lose something by returning to armed struggle.
The Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which was set up in 1996, was all but bankrupt when it was launched. It did not have money to pay the salaries of its policemen. There was no trace of the hundreds of millions of dollars that were reportedly controlled by Arafat, who started pressing for money to administer the PNA and its various agencies.
On several occasions, world donors got together and produced extra money to pay for PNA administration and then told Arafat he'd have to manage himself.
There has never been any credible auditing of the accounts of the PNA. Critics say many of those around him siphoned off PNA money through inflated contracts.
The security crisis developed with a spate of kidnappings that prompted Arafat to replace a police commander. However, he had to back down when he wanted to appoint his nephew and had to reverse the decision the next day amid major protests that saw the PNA office in Gaza set ablaze,
On Tuesday, Nabil Amr, a strong critic of Arafat, was shot and wounded at his home further highlighting the security problem and heralding what many fear to be armed clashes among rival Palestinian factions.
On top of that came a demand by the Palestinian parliament that Arafat accept his prime minister's resignation and appoint a government empowered to carry out reforms.
It was the Arafat camp's resistance to demands that prompted Prime Minister Ahmed Qorei to resign.
The Palestinian parliament is demanding that Arafat appoint a government "capable of carrying out its responsibilities," meaning giving it power to implement reforms. Similar calls have already been made on Arafat by the European Union as well as the Egyptian government.
Qorei is staying on as caretaker prime minister after Arafat
refused his resignation.
Arafat has also been pressed into revamping his security agencies. He had as many as eight different agencies, again reflecting his style of "not putting all the eggs in one basket."Effectively, having that many agencies meant that he could one against another and be assured that there is no one in overall charge except himself. This week, he reduced the number of security agencies to three, but he insisted that the head of the services report to him rather than the prime minister.
Qorei is seen to be betting that Arafat will be so embarrassed by the second resignation of a prime minister in little more than a year that he will hand over him genuine authority over security as well as authority to implement reforms. Arafat remains resistant, but he might not be able to hold out for long since the peace process is all but collapsed and he is rejected as negotiating partner by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
Arafat's critics say that his position in negotiations with Israel under the Olso agreements was weakened because of his preoccupation dealing with dissent in ranks and fighting down any challenge to his absolute leadership style.
Arafat, known as one of the smartest survivors of today's leaders of freedom struggles, has outlived many crises. However, this time around, he find himself in a much weakened position, with mounting pressure from all sides.
There are many who remain convinced that Arafat will come out of the present crises, but, given the realities on the ground in Palestine, that would not make prospects for peace any brighter since Sharon, backed by the US, is bent upon implementing his vision of a "disengagement" with the Palestinians but without giving the Palestinians their rights.
Sharon remains defiant against the July 9 International Court of Justice ruling as well a UN General Assembly resolution issued on Tuesday calling for the dismantling of the "security" wall that it is building in the West Bank.
“The construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated régime, are contrary to international law," said the IJC.
“Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto," it said. ,
“Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem," it said.
Israel had said even prior to the ruling that it would not abide by the court decision and it reiterated the same position and also rejected the UN General Assembly call.
Washington supports the Israeli position and that ends any debate over a realistic chance of Sharon being pressured into heeding the IJC and UN calls.
Sharon's defiance and his systematic elimination of Palestinian resistance leaders clearly indicate that there is little prospect for any meaningful negotiations for a peaceful settlements.
In order to pressure his international allies to continue to back him and pressure Israel into negotiations based on the internationally backed "road map" for peace, Arafat needs more credibility on the internal front and for that he needs to implement reforms.
The campaign for reform is led by a younger generation of Palestinians who are looking for results in their struggle against the Israeli occupation and who see the old guard as bogged down in corruption and rhetoric rather than action.
No one is denying that Arafat is the symbol of the struggle for liberation. It is his style of managing the struggle that has come under attack.
"The difference between Abu Ammar (Arafat) and myself is simple," veteran Palestinian leader George Habash once said. "Abu Ammar wants to become president of the state of Palestine while he is alive even if the state means enough land to stake down the Palestinian flag. I would be happy if my great grandson becomes a citizen of a free Palestine with all Palestinian rights restored even if it is 100 years from now."
No matter how one looks at the situation, Arafat is cornered. The question is: Will Arafat fight back from the corner still believing he would be able to impose himself on everyone or will be back down and accept the inevitability of reform that could only strengthen the cause and mission of his life?