Aziz kept out of info

By PV Vivekanand

“What do you mean Yvegny, you need an answer from the
President in 24 hours? It’d take me 48 hours to reach
my president.” These were the words of Tareq Aziz, who
was then foreign minister of Iraq, to Yvegny Primakov,
then a noted Russian journalist, who was on an urgent
mission to Baghdad in late 1990.
He was carrying a message from the then Russian president, Mikhail
Gorbachev, to Saddam Hussein offering a last-minute proposal to avert war over Kuwait.
He wanted a quick response to the offer in order to meet a deadline set
by George Bush senior as a special consideration for Gorbachev.
Aziz did reach Saddam in less than 24 hours and Primakov got his reply in 36 hours: Thanks but no thanks, Iraq would not withdraw from Kuwait.
Well, today the US forces Iraq have Aziz, 67,
under custody and are interrogating him on details of
the toppled Saddam regime’s machinations. Some even
venture to say that Aziz could even provide details
of Saddam’s whereabouts if the toppled leader is alive
or at least give a clear idea about his last movement.
That might indeed be possible. But the interrogators
would stand as much chance in gaining information from
Aziz on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction as
one could extract water from steel.
It is not because Aziz would or could withstand third
degree methods or he is determined not to reveal the
details. It is simply because he might not have any
such information. It is a safe bet that he would not
have known whether Saddam had any weapons of mass
destruction or, even if he did now, their nature, let
alone their alleged storage sites.
It might sound strange that someone who was seen as
close to Saddam as anyone have no idea about the
so-called weapons of mass destruction and does not
know where they are (allegedly) hidden.
That is where what Aziz told Primakov become relevant:
Although Aziz was part of Saddam’s inner circle, he
was informed of the regime’s actions only on a
need-to-know basis.
The reality, according highly informed sources, is that Saddam made sure Aziz never knew anything about the regime’s strategy on its weapons of
mass destruction or anything that could potentially be
extracted from the man, who was deputy prime minister
at the time of the latest US-led war toppled Saddam..
The reason: Saddam did not want to take the chance
that Aziz could be, at some point during his frequent
travels as his diplomatic pointman, coerced into
talking.
“We always knew that Aziz was told as little as
possible – not because Saddam did not trust him but
because Saddam believed in the adage ‘what the mind
does not know the tongue could not tell’,” says a
highly informed intelligence source. “Saddam did not
even discount the possibility that Aziz could even be
induced to part with whatever information he had
through use of truth serums and the like.”
Aziz was one of the most travelled Saddam aides and,
as far as Saddam was concerned, the minister always
carried the risk of being kidnapped by US agents or
even prompted to reveal what he knew without him being
aware of it (through use of truth serum or through any
of the many methods that does not involve the use of
force or torture). All the CIA might have wanted with
him was a few hours.
As such, Saddam never took the risk of even allowing
Aziz to know of his secret bunkers or his personal
security arrangements. And this was accepted by Aziz
if only because it placed him above suspicion of
having ever revealed anything to anyone.
During some personal moments during his frequent
visits to Amman after the 1991 war, Aziz had indicated
that he was often summoned to meetings with Saddam at
short notice, and was even blindfolded when Saddam’s
security men drive him to the president’s presence.
Again, Aziz welcomed the precautions because Saddam or
his people could not accuse him of having disclosed
the whereabouts of the president if only because he
did not know.
Of course, Aziz could reveal a lot about
how the regime worked and what role each of the Saddam
aides played. But he would know very little about
Saddam’s security arrangements with any accuracy. He
could provide clues but even that could be of little
help.
As such, it is definitely a myth that the US would be
able to secure from Aziz details of the locations
where Saddam hid his alleged stockpile of weapons of
mass destruction – if indeed the American claims have
any grain of truth that Iraq did have such weapons in
the first place.