May 11 2005
Hamas spanner and Sharon's formaldehyde
PV Vivekanand
ISRAELI Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's decision to put of the planned evacuation of the Gaza Strip by three weeks to mid-August suggests that he is keeping the door open for turning the area as a possible bargaining chip if the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) wins the July 17 elections to the Palestinian Legislative Assembly.
A Hamas victory in the July 17 elections means a severe blow to Israel's plan to impose its own version of a peace agreement on the Palestinians since Hamas would put up stiff resistance to the plan.
The mainstream Fatah group led by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is seen as likely to accept some compromise with Israel, and hence the Israeli fear that a Hamas-led Palestinian legislative assembly -- meaning a Hamas-led Palestinian National Authority (PNA) or a Palestinian government with strong Hamas representation -- could wreck the Israeli plan.
Officially, Sharon's reason to put off the Gaza evacuation is that the withdrawal date will coincide with a Jewish period of mourning. But then, that is no surprise development since the Jewish calendar sets the dates for religious events decades in advance.
The evacuation of all 21 Jewish settlements in Gaza and four of 120 settlements in the West Bank had been slated to begin on July 20.
In simple terms, the result of the Palestinian elections on July 17 might not be released by July 20 and hence Sharon wants to retain room for his options by delaying the withdrawal.
Post-election watch
Sharon wants to be in a position to clearly assess the course of the Palestinian post-election developments and determine whether Hamas could prevent the imposition of his terms and conditions for peace on the Palestinians after the Gaza withdrawal.
In the event of a Hamas victory in the polls, Sharon could retain the Gaza Strip and demand that Hamas should agree to disarm itself before he goes ahead with the withdrawal as an opening gambit.
However, Sharon is determined to evacuate Gaza, not the least because the territory, a hotbed of Islamist militancy, has always been ungovernable for his occupation forces.
It is known that all Israeli governments since the 70s wanted to quit the Gaza Strip because they had no advantages in continuing to occupy it. If anything, controlling Gaza had always been a source of headaches for Israel.
Nor does Gaza have any "nationalist" or "religious" importance that prompts Israel not to let it go whereas most Israelis consider the West Bank is part of the "promised land" and would not want to return it to the Palestinians.
Even Benyamin Netanyahu, who is more hawkish than Sharon in real terms, made it clear during his premiership in the late 90s that he wanted to relinquish the Gaza Strip and to let the PNA, then led by the late Yasser Arafat to grapple with the problems there.
A majority of Israelis back Sharon's plan to leave Gaza, where 9,000 settlers live in enclaves that need protection by a large Israeli military unit costing tens of millions of dollars a year.
That Israeli approach was underlined on Tuesday by Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz, who rejected a suggestion by Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom that the planned Gaza withdrawal could be derailed if Hamas wins the parliamentary election.
"The 'disengagement' will not be cancelled," declared Mofaz.
Sharon himself affirmed that the Gaza withdrawal would go ahead regardless of Hamas's showing in the elections.
"For Israel, this move, this disengagement, is very important," he said on Monday.
Later in the day, Shalom said Israel would have to rethink the Gaza pullout if Hamas won control of the PNA in the elections.
"Do you think there is a way to negotiate with them (Hamas) while their main aim and their main goal is to destroy the State of Israel?" he said. "Is there any way to make progress with the disengagement plan, and with the process we would like to have with the (PNA), if the Hamas would be in power?"
Shalom said that if Hamas were to win the elections, there would be "no logic" in handing over more territory to the Palestinians, and no logic in facilitating the establishment of what he called "Hamastan."
He said the PNA should do everything possible to prevent Hamas running for election unless it cancels its military wing. "We must all reject the inclusion of Hamas in the Palestinian political system. There is no place, nor can there ever be, in a democratic society for a political party which bears arms."
"It seems to me unreasonable to move forward with the implementation of the disengagement plan as if nothing had happened and hand over the territories only for Hamas to create there a 'Hamastan'," Shalom told a seminar in Tel Aviv.
Mofaz shot it down on Tuesday.
"It's true Hamas has been strengthened. There is the reality of the Palestinian (National) Authority and the reality of the terror groups, but I think we must make enormous efforts to implement the disengagement plan," Mofaz told army radio.
Jewish resistance
On a parallel front, Sharon faces tough resistance from some of the hardline Jewish settlers against the withdrawal and the three-week postponement gives them that much more time to organise themselves. But that is a calculated risk that Sharon is taking. It is highly improbable that Jewish blood would be spilt in confrontations between settlers and army soldiers, and the Palestinian scene remains Sharon's preoccupation.
Hamas has already put up a strong performance in elections to municipal councils. It won 30 of the 84 councils in the West Bank and Gaza while Fatah won 50.
The Fatah victory faded into the background against the Hamas triumph since Hamas won most of the (urban) areas whereas Fateh won in outlying areas. This meant that Hamas would have a better showing in the elections to the legislative elections seats are determined on the basis of nationalist party lists and not individual candidates as was the case in the municipal elections.
Israeli intelligence reports predict a Hamas victory of between one third and half of the seats in the offing.
Plan in reserve
Indeed, Sharon has a plan in reserve to meet the eventuality of having a Hamas-led PNA. Under that plan, revealed by his adviser Dev Weisglas in October, Israel will simply evacuate the Gaza Strip, effectively "annex" the West Bank and close the so-called "peace process" file, with firmed up arrangements in place to fight off Palestinian armed resistance. The "separation" wall Sharon is building along the West Bank is the central pillar of that approach -- meaning a "scorched-earth" policy which stops at nothing in the effort to eliminate any challenge to Israel's occupation of the West Bank.
In the interim, Sharon is willing to give Mahmoud Abbas a shot at working out a peace agreement on Israel's terms, but he does not want Hamas to throw a spanner in the works either.
However, Sharon continues to retain the option of freezing the peace process after quitting Gaza.
AS Weisglas put it, "The significance of our disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace process. "It supplies the formaldehyde necessary so there is no political process with the Palestinians."
His reference to "formaldehyde" was deemed as very apt since it is the favourite of funeral parlours to mask death, and death indeed is what Sharon has mind for the quest for peace at any point that he feels it is going against his plans.
Thursday, May 12, 2005
Tuesday, May 10, 2005
Aoun a man to watch
Aoun - A man to watch
FORMER army chief Michel Aoun, 63, a staunch anti-Syrian, is back home in Lebanon nurturing presidential ambitions after 15 years of exile in France and is reputedly the preferred American-French candidate for the job.
How far the US and France would push their influence in Lebanese affairs to have Aoun succeed Emile Lahoud in this month's elections remains to be seen. But the country's majority Shiites, represented by pro-Syrian Hizbollah, would put up a bitter fight to foil the American-French plan. And so would others who see Aoun's calls for changes in the Lebanese political system as a clear threat to their traditional power bases in the country that have been kept intact since the collapse of the Ottoman empire.
Then, Aoun would have to grapple with challenges to the post from his fellow Christian leaders, and the backing of the Maronite Christian patriarch would be decisive.
If Aoun assumes Lebanese presidency, then it would signal a complete revamping of Beirut-Damascus relations. It could very well turn out to be the final chapter of the changes that swept Lebanon in the wake of the Feb.14 assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Al Hariri.
Aoun seems to represent one of the rare convergences of US and French interests in the Middle East.
Washington and Paris led international pressure against Syria to end its nearly 30-year old domination of Lebanon following the Hariri assassination and now they are determined not to allow the pro-Syrian camp to assume power in the country.
But Syria, which has withdrawn its military and intelligence agents from Lebanon, has not written off Lebanon. Damascus will continue to play an influential, albeit behind-the-scene, role in Lebanese politics through its allies, who include the powerful Hizbollah as well as the Amal movement led by Nabih Berri, a segment of the Sunni community and a few Christian leaders.
(Indeed, the Syrians have many other options to make things tough for the Lebanese but that is a different story altogether).
The May 29 elections will show how far Syria has managed to retain its influence in Lebanon, but it is irrefutable that Lebanese politics have undergone irreversible changes after Hariri's assassination.
Otherwise, Aoun would not have returned to Lebanon as a long-lost hero. Had he landed prior to Hariri's death, then he would have faced charges of treason for having spoken up against the Syrian domination of his country.
Aoun staged a revolt against Syria before being ousted and exiled to France in 1990. Since then, he waged a bitter anti-Syrian campaign.
On Wednesday, a Lebanese court dropped several outstanding charges against him, lifting the last hurdle to his return. The charges included that of treason, for having accused Syria of being behind the murder of two Lebanese ex-presidents and of "occupying Lebanon." He was instrumental in getting the US Congress pass the Syria Accountability Act and the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for Syria's departure from Lebanon.
US-French interest
Even before Hariri's remains were buried, Washington and Paris reached agreement that Aoun should replace the Syrian-backed Lahoud as Lebanon's president as part of their effort to reshape the Syrian-Lebanese political landscape.
French President Jacques Chirac, who was a close friend of Hariri, insisted that Aoun be backed as the next president of Lebanon and the American administration endorsed Chirac's proposal, according to reports.
Washington and Paris sent special envoys to Beirut and secured the support of the main political leaders in Lebanon -- Druze leader Walid Junblatt and the Maronite Christian patriarch, Archbishop Nasrallah Sfeir -- for Aoun's return home but not necessarily for his quest to occupy the Babda presidential palace.
Aoun, who leads the Free Patriotic Movement of Lebanon, is a Christian and therefore qualifies to be president.
Aoun is broadly popular among Lebanon's large Christian minority, and many among them hope he would be their president. Indeed, many Lebanese Christians who had fled the country or migrated during the civil war were present in Beirut on Saturday to welcome back Aoun and voice support for him.
The young generation favours his call for a secular Lebanon -- meaning doing away with the present system which makes it mandatory that the president is a Christian, the prime minister a Sunni and parliament speaker a Shiite. But, the old guards of Lebanon, whether from the pro- or anti-Syrian camp, might not look at his posture so kindly.
For them, his rhetoric -- "minds must be changed and we must get rid of the political feudalism and religious system that dates back to the 19th century" -- means nothing but sharp axes at the roots of their wealth and influence.
Aoun thrust home the point when he declared: "We no longer want old feudal models, religious sectarianism that kills... we want also to fight political money that has corrupted the republic and taken Lebanon to the verge of bankruptcy."
What real chances does Aoun stand in his quest for presidency?
Until the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, he fit the bill for many Lebanese Christians who saw him as the "conscience" of the country. Now that the Syrians have departed, the perceptions are changing.
Aoun could not claim credit for forcing the Syrian departure. That goes to the people of Lebanon and political leaders who consistently roused the crowds into staging massive anti-Syrian demonstrations.
There are many who now see Aoun as divisive rather than a unifying factor, given his pitched calls for fundamental political changes. Many would also be closely looking at how Hizbollah responds to his expected candidacy. At this point in time, Aoun is calling for dialogue leading to Hizbollah being disarmed, but the powerful Shiite group would respond violently to any effort to strip its of its status and strength as an armed movement.
One thing is certain: The US and France will unleash everything they have in order to see Aoun elected as president, for he is key to their plans for a new Lebanon that suits their interests.
Tuesday, May 03, 2005
Dynamics of change
pv vivekanand
With the last of the Syrian soldiers and intelligence agents crossing the border on Tuesday, the way has been cleared for parliamentary elections in Lebanon on May 29.
It is widely accepted that a fair and free election in Lebanon would produce a political system where Syria or pro-Syrian parties would no longer be calling all the shots.
Obviously, the US is hoping to eventually nudge the to-be elected Lebanese government into signing a peace agreement with Israel without linking it with the Syrian channel of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whether Washington would be successful in scoring that goal depends on many factors, not the least of which will be the stiff resistance put up by the Shiite majority's representative, Hizbollah.
In Damascus, President Bashar Al Assad is not waiting for the next American/Israeli move for a "regime change." He has launched his own moves, which will open the door for political parties.
One of Assad's main objectives is to challenge a US legislation calling for "Assistance to Support a Transition to Democracy in Syria."
The draft legislation authorises the US to finance dissident political groups and thus implicitly nurture opposition to the regime from within the country.
It reads: "The president is authorised to provide assistance and other support for individuals and independent non-governmental organisations to support transition to a freely elected, internationally recognised democratic government in Syria."
No doubt, Assad had the US draft bill in mind when he went on record while meeting Spanish journalists in March -- around the time the bill was sent to the House of Representatives in the US -- that "the coming period will be one of freedom for political parties" in Syria.
Under Bashar's plans, which he has already put into motion, a new law on political parties it is expected to be announced at a June conference of the Baathist party.
The law will eliminate the "socialist-only" approach adopted by the late Hafez Al Assad open up the political system for new players, but with confinements on their options to grab power.
The new law will replace a 1974 bill which created the dominant National Progressive Front (NPF), a coalition headed by the Baath Party and including other socialist parties such as the Arab Unionist Party, the Democratic Socialist Party and the Unity Socialist Party. But the real power rested with the Baathists.
The expected legislation will recognise parties not affiliated with the NPF with the only condition that they should not be based on religion (an insurance against the powerful Muslim Brotherhood and its arms) or on minority orientations (since the country has ethnic Kurdish, Armenian and Circassian groups).
According to analysts, the first party expected to receive a license is the Syrian Socialist National Party, which they say is expected to secure the widest popularity in Syria.
Assad has also signalled political reconciliation by lifting a ban on issuing or renewing passports of dissident Syrians living in exile and promising not to persecute them for their political beliefs.
Under this gesture, General Jasem Alwan, who believed in the pan-Arab ideologies of Abdul Gamal Nasser of Egypt and a vociferous critic of Baathists, Yusuf Abdelki, a popular artist who professed communist views, have already returned home to Syria.
Others are on their way back.
Obviously, Assad is confident that the Baathists will remain the dominant party and others could not come nowhere near it even if the system was thrown open.
The US and critics of Syria might feel otherwise, but in reality the Baathist Party is very strong in Syria and its supporters would not be easily swayed to switch parties since they have been for long indoctrinated with Baathist views.
Simply put, Bashar has no worry that Baathist power would face no change even if a multi-party system emerges in Syria. Dissidents will welcome it and even try to gain the upper hand, but it would not be possible for them to succeed: Assad in a constitutional amendment provides the Baath Party the sole leadership status in the country.
Therefore, for Assad, the best option is to let other parties exist and thus pre-empt charges of a closed political system, which is being cited by the anti-Syrian strategists in Washington who drew up and presented the "Assistance to Support a Transition to Democracy in Syria" to the House of Representatives in March.
Without doubt, Assad could indeed do with getting rid of part of the legacy of hislate father, who ruled the country withan iron-fist since 1970 until his death in 2000 and tolerated no dissent. Under Hafez Al Assad, hundreds of political prisoners were locked up for decades and gross violations ofhuman rights were reported.
Hafez Al Assad and Saddam Hussein of Iraq were from the same mold and followed the same thinking and practices when it comes to protecting theirregimes and power. Indeed, Bashar Al Assad's crash reform programme is a dangerousgame for himself since the old guard of the Baathist Party are said to be warning him against the proposed reforms. He faces resistance to his moves from such powerful figures as Baathist Party acting Secretary-General Abdullah Al Ahmed and the three vice presidents -- Zuheir Masharqa, Abdul Khalim Haddam and Mohammed Jaber Jabjush.
They have warned Assad that if he goes through with his plan he risks the end of his regime once and for all. But Bashar has no choice but to shore up his regime and political support from the people in a way thatwould get international approval and for that he needsto get rid of the Baathist baggage. "I don't want to see foreign troops in Syria forcing us to accept the sort of reforms imposed on Iraq,"Bashar is said to have told a close adviser. "We can carry out those reforms on our own."Effectively, these reform will mean turning the Baath Party from a Marxist-socialistideological movement to a pragmaticruling party which plays the game by democratic rules but within the confines of a system that does not lead to the collapse of his regime or the party's grip on power. At the June convention, a new name for the party will beannounced along with updated goals and a fresh motto that will replace the current motto of "Arab Unity, Liberty and Socialism" in party literature. The new name proposed is the National Ruling Party of Syria.
Assad wants to be ready with the overhauled political system at the June convention, the second to be held afterthe death of his father.His reform will cut off the strong links between the military and the Baathist party. At present, every army appointment has to be approved bythe party, meaning that if one is not a party memberhe will not be employed by the army (as the case wasin Saddam Hussein's Iraq).He is dismantling the Pan-Arab Commission of the Baath Party, close its Damascus offices and dismissits staff.
This commission has strong relations withBaathist groups in other Arab countries, particularlyJordan and Lebanon. Bashar Al Assad also wants to rewrite the national constitution and introduce an open market economy. The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon also meant the loss of billions of dollars in revenue for Damascus, and Assad cannot afford to have international economic sanctions imposed on his country as warned by the UN.
Bashar has established an economic committee to restructure the Syrian economy and oversee itstransition to a market economy.
There are many variables and constants that would influence the way ahead for Syria in its quest to squirm out of the American-written script which includes regime change in Damascus.
These include:
-- The outcome of the May 29 elections in Lebanon.
The US is seeking an American-friendly regime in power in Beirut, and the emerging alliance grouping the Maronite Christians, the Druze and the Sunni camp loyal to the assassinated prime minister, Rafiq Al Hariri, fit the bill, but only to an extent. None of the leaders of these groups could overlook or sidestep the links between the peoples of Lebanon and Syria through marriage and other family relationships as well as business tie-ups. Therefore, they are unlikely to allow themselves to be persuaded to cut off Syria and go their own way to sign a separate peace agreement with Israel.
Furthermore, the pro-Syrian political forces in Lebanon are far from being written off, and these include the powerful and committed Hizbollah. They would continue to assert a decisive role in Lebanese affairs, and no government in power in Beirut would be able to defy their wishes, particularly in issues such as ties with Israel.
-- Allegations of a Syrian role in the Hariri assassination.
No one with any insight into the intricacies of the region believes that the Syrians were so naive to have orchestrated the killing. It is difficult to perceive the Syrian strategists to plot and carry out the murder since the first party to be accused of staging the assassination would have been themselves.
There is a sizeable school of thought which believes that the Israelis were behind the killing since they stood to benefit most from its repercussions. However, if indeed Israel had a direct or indirect role in the murder, then it is also a safe bet that all tracks were carefully covered and smoothened over.
Despite a few blunders in recent years, Israel's notorious Mossad is very much capable of carrying out such deceptive operations and leaving red herrings pointing to Israel's adversaries as the culprits.
Therefore, it is widely perceived that any investigation into the killing is unlikely to come up with a definite conclusion as to who was behind that massive bomb blast on Feb.14.
However, an inconclusive investigation would still leave Syria as the prime suspect and this would definitely be used by the US and Israel to tighten the screws of pressure on Damascus on their own.
The deceptive "weapons of mass destruction" justification that the Bush administration used to implement its plans to invade Iraq, topple Saddam Hussein and occupy the country is the best example of the extent to which Washington would go to achieve its strategic goals.
-- Fears of a new civil war in Lebanon pitting anti-Syrian and pro-Syrian forces.
It is a highly unlikely course of events. The Lebanese have learnt their lessons from the 17-year civil strife they lived through. They are perfectly aware that a renewed civil war would benefit no one. Indeed, a civil war in Lebanon is the last thing that the Syrians want, given the reform plans that Damascus is implementing. Nor does Israel want a civil war in Lebanon. Strife across the border in Lebanon would pose serious threats to Israel, which would be a logical target for disgruntled Lebanese and Palestinian forces in Lebanon. That is to say the least.
Some people suggest that Hizbollah would refuse to take orders from an "American-friendly" government in Beirut and this could lead to an armed conflict. However, Hizbollah's track record proves that it is a pragmatic and realistic organisation and it would never be a party to igniting a civil war where its survival as the dominant group in Lebanon would be threatened.
Again, it is improbable that any government in Beirut would seek to disarm Hizbollah under American pressure based on UN Security Council Resolution 1559. Trying to disarm Hizbollah will be nothing but playing with fire, as its leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah recently warned with an open challenge to the US to send in its military to Lebanon to take away the group's weapons.
A Beirut government using own security forces in a bid to disarm Hizbollah could indeed be problematic with untold dangers because of the sectarian divide. The government should and would know it better than most that deploying Lebanese security forces to challenge Hizbollah would lead to in nothing less than the end of the government itself.
Hizbollah knows well that if it is deprived of its armed power then it is not only its own end as an armed force but also the end of the Islamist resurgence that it believes it represents and of any hope to assert Islamist power in the Middle East. Everyone knows it, and even the US would think thrice before even entertaining any thought of using force to disarm Hizbollah.
Today, Hizbollah is looking forward to the May 29 elections. It is confident that it would be able to significantly strengthen its parliamentary presence through the ballot box. An armed conflict is the last thing it wants, but, if challenged with a life-and-death situation, then the group is capable of wreaking havoc throughout the region.
On the Syrian front, the reforms planned by the regime is seen crucial to warding off the American quest for "regime change" in Damascus. Bashar Al Assad would not flinch from it and thus deprive the US of credibility in its calls for action against Syria. However, that would not necessarily dissuade Washington from pursuing its plans, since "regime change" in Syria is crucial not only to American strategies in the region but also to Israel's quest for regional domination without making any territorial compromise with the Syrians over the occupied Golan Heights.
In any event, no matter how the cookie crumbles, the political equations in the Middle East are poised for a massive reshaping. It is only a matter of time before something gives.
Monday, May 02, 2005
An unlikely page
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Monday, April 25, 2005
Hamas — political revolution
April 25, 2005
Hamas and elections: A sweeping political revolution in the making
pv vivekanand
Hamas, which boycotted the last elections to the Palestinian legislative council, has announced it will field candidates in the next polls and will stake a claim to power based on the results. The group, which describes itself as a wing of the powerful Muslim Brotherhood -- "a universal organisation which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times" -- is confident of winning between one-third and half of the seats in the council.
Mahmoud Abbas, who heads Fatah, once the strongest and most influential among the Palestinian factions that make up the PLO, won presidential elections in February without serious challenge only because Hamas stayed away from the elections. Fatah could not hope for a repetition on the victory in the council elections.
Apart from being the best organised group in Palestinian politics with a strong foundation of committed activists, Hamas could also count on the votes of Palestinians frustrated over the chaos and in-fighting in Fatah and administrative and financial corruption in the Fatah-dominated Palestinian National Authority (PNA).
Most Palestinians want Abbas to lead the political process, but they also want clean governance, an end to corruption, and personal security, and they see that only Hamas could offer them these.
Recent opinion polls have put popular support for Fatah at 36 per cent, down from 40 per cent in December, and backing for Hamas has increased from 18 per cent to 25 per cent, with 33 per cent in its Gaza stronghold.
Elections to city and local councils in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in recent months have produced impressive success for Hamas and other Islamist groups.
The rising popularity for Hamas is coupled with doubts about the PNA's ability to make good on its promises to improve conditions and produce achievements in the talks with Israel.
One of the key difference between Fatah and Hamas is simple: Fatah represents Palestinian nationalism and is secular, whereas Hamas draws its strength from Islam and wants to set up a state based on Islamic teachings and laws. Fatah is willing to negotiate peace with Israel on the basis of the 1967 lines held by the Jewish state, whereas Hamas wants the 1948 lines -- meaning an end to the existence of Israel -- although that stance is seen more tactical than substantial.
The Palestinians elected their first legislative assembly in 1996; the late Yasser Arafat postponed elections that had been set for 2000.
Hamas boycotted the earlier elections, saying they were part of the process launched by the 1993 Oslo accords, which it vehemently opposed because they recognise Israel.
At present the council has 88 seats. Fatah accounts for 49 of them, with affiliated groups having 15; the others include 20 independents and four Islamist affiliates.
Under Abbas-proposed amendments to the election law, the number of seats will be raised to 132, but it is not clear whether the dominant Fatah members would approve it since many of them see Abbas as easily succumbing to Hamas demands. They are also aware that approval of the law means the starting of the electoral clock for chiming in three months from that date.
They see Abbas' insistence that the polls be held as scheduled on July 17 as playing into the hands of Hamas because of the expectation that the Islamists will emerge as a dominant power in the elections if held in July. The Fatah dissidents want the polls to be postponed until September and they hope to use the intervening period to rally its forces and strengthen their prospects in the polls.
In public statements, Hamas leaders maintain hard-line rhetoric that they would never recognise the state of Israel and are committed to regaining pre-1948 Palestine. Some of them say that all Jews who migrated to Israel should return to where they came from and the Jewish state should cease to exist in historic Palestine.
The group says: "The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic waqf consecrated for future Muslim generations until Judgment Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: It, or any part of it, should not be given up.
"Neither a single Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither any king or president, nor all the kings and presidents, neither any organisation nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess the right to do that. Palestine is an Islamic waqf land consecrated for Muslim generations until Judgment Day. This being so, who can presume to speak for all Islamic generations to the Day of Resurrection?"
However, Hamas is a realistic and pragmatic group and its leaders are aware that they would have to make compromises and they would do so if and when they feel the time is right, but they would not give up the struggle for the whole of Palestine. After all that is the group's raison d'être.
Hamas's senior leader in Gaza, Mahmoud Al Zahar, has called Israel's planned withdrawal from Gaza as a victory for his group's armed resistance.
"Very simply, nobody can deny that if Israel is going to leave the Gaza Strip and part of the West Bank, that was because of the intifada, because of the armed struggle, because of the big sacrifices of Hamas for this goal," he said in a recent interview.
"It was not because of negotiations, or the goodwill of Israel, or the Americans or Europeans."
Zahar refused to commit Hamas to peace in Gaza once Israel withdraws its 9,000 settlers.
"It depends on what Israel does," he said. "Now Israel is talking about reorganisation. We do not accept reorganisation. We are looking for withdrawal, real withdrawal, and not to violate our sovereignty."
Indeed, Hamas leaders are also tactical politicians who are projecting the group both as an active armed resistance movement and as a party that seeks to influence the Palestinian political agenda. They remind everyone that Hamas could call off the current unofficial truce if Israel does not keep up its obligations but that they are maintaining the ceasefire anyway because they know that the people want that for now.
Hamas' pragmatism is also evident in Zahar's pronouncement that the group wants to join the PLO in order "to consolidate the resistance option in its capacity as the strategic option towards the liberation of Palestine."
According to the Central Elections Commission, a minimum of three months are needed between the time the election law is approved and elections. The three-month leeway expired on Sunday with no movement and Palestinian MPs are meeting this week on the issue.
Throwing a spanner in the works is an uncertainty whether Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon would delay the planned Israeli evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip from July 20 to mid-August.
While the officially cited reason is a sensitivity to the date falling during a traditional three-week mourning period for what Israelis consider the destruction of ancient Jewish temples.
However, the actual reason, according to some accounts, is the shortcomings and delays in the logistics of the evacuation of 21 settlements in Gaza and four in the West Bank.
On Wednesday, the Israeli army started moving out equipment of Gaza, signalling preparations for the pullout.
The July 20 date for the beginning of the evacuation was cited by Palestinian Information Minister Nabil Shaath for the possible delay in the elections.
"The question really has to do with the Israeli pullout of Gaza during that time, and our fear that the Israelis might make it difficult for people to do real election campaigns and have real freedom of movement," he said early this week.
"This is really the only consideration," he said. "And this consideration will be discussed with Hamas and with everybody."
Caught in the crossfire between Fatah and Hamas is Abbas himself, who is being sarcastically described as a Hamas ally because of his insistence that the polls be held on time.
Abbas has drawn criticism for bowing to Hamas demands on many fronts since he took over as president following the death of Yasser Arafat. His strategy is delicately balanced between the need to keep armed resistance in check while remaining firm on his reform programme in the PNA.
His insistence on the July 17 date for elections and on amending the election law is seen as yet another concession to Hamas. For, it is taken for granted by many that Hamas would emerge as the winners if elections are held next month, and the suggested change to the election law is also deemed as benefiting Hamas.
Abbas is suggesting that the law, which was given preliminary approval on Wednesday by Palestinians legislators, should be amended to the effect that all members of the 132-seat assembly should be from national lists rather than the present arrangement of 88 from constituency lists -- meaning districtwise individuals -- and 44 from national lists.
Hamas, which is stronger in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, are more likely to benefit from fielding national list candidates than Fatah, and this only adds to the fears of the Fatah leaders.
If Abbas insists on changes in the election law at this stage, it would go to the parliamentary legal committee for debate and only then to the floor of the parliament for final approval. Election officials have said that any further delays would force them to put off the voting, because they need three months to prepare.
Fatah fears of a major election defeat at Hamas' hands were heightened when student elections last week at Bir Zeit and Bethlehem universities showed the Islamists were gaining strength in both universities. Both institutions are secular and attended by the sons and daughters of rich Palestinians, some of them Christian. Fatah had a majority of votes in both before the latest student elections.
The elections showed that Hamas is a powerful group that is continuing to gather strength at the expense of Fatah.
Abbas is under tremendous pressure from many sides. US President George W. Bush, who argues that a wave of democracy is going to take over the Middle East as a result of his invasion and occupation of Iraq, has ruled out any delay in Palestinian elections.
Bush insisted on the Jan.30 date for elections in Iraq. He is insisting on elections in Lebanon in May. He is insisting on election reforms in Egypt, and he is insisting that the Palestinians should vote on July 17.
Sharon, who obviously discussed the issue with Bush at the White House this month, could not actually care who wins the Palestinian elections. If Abbas's group wins, then he would seek to negotiate and force down his version of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement on the Palestinians. If hard-liners like Hamas win the elections, then Sharon would simply clam up on the negotiations front and impose his unilateral military-based solution to the problem.
In his meeting with Bush at the US president's ranch in Texas this month, Sharon is said to have presented intelligence reports indicating that there is complete breakdown of Abu Mazen's grip on authority and that hard-liners within Fatah plan to start armed attacks against Israelis in June and trigger Israeli retaliation leading to a situation that would not be conducive to elections.
Abbas is also apprehensive that Hamas would make good its threat to call off the de fact truce it has maintained since February if the elections were delayed.
Hamas is unlikely to move from its stand since it knows well that it stands to gain in July elections and it finds no reason to agree to a delay, particularly when it is clear that Fatah will use the intervening period not only to strengthen itself but also to weaken all rivals.
At this week's meeting of Palestinian legislators, Fatah is likely to seek to stall the endorsement of the amended election law.
Abbas's options are limited. His weekend visit to Egypt and Jordan was seen by his critics as a ploy to make himself absent from the Palestinian territories and thus abort a vote by Palestinian legislators on his proposals. The vote was supposed to take place on Sunday, but his absence pre-empted it.
Abbas has won a few more days before the crucial vote, but he cannot run from it. His choice is between postponing the elections and incur Hamas wrath and holding the polls on time and risking the loss of his power base.
Hamas sweeping the Palestinian elections and coming to power in the West Bank and Gaza is indeed a source of concern not only to the Palestinian leadership under Abbas but also to Arab countries wherever Islamists have strong influence among the people.
The very fact that the Muslim Brotherhood is banned as a political party in Egypt, where Hassan Al Banna set up the organisation in 1928, is the clearest indication of the group's influence among the people.
An example is Jordan, where the strongest and most organised and committed political grouping is the Islamic Action Front, which is the political arm of the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The kingdom will be the first to be affected if Hamas sweeps the Palestinian elections.
Concerns over developments in Palestine have been heightened by intelligence reports indicating that the Abbas government is getting deeper day by day into disorder and revolt, and Hamas is taking advantage of the situation to strengthen itself at Fatah's expense.
The US and Israel, which hopes it could work out an agreement with Abbas that would protect Israeli interests, are considering means to support the Fatah leader. Two US officials, deputy head of the national security council Elliott Abrams and head of the State Department's Middle East desk David Walsh, will be visiting Ramallah this week to explore whether and how the US and Israel could help shore up Abbas.
However, there are contradictions in the approach.
If the American and Israeli support comes in the form of supporting a postponement of the elections -- from July 17 to Sept.25 as some reports suggest -- then Hamas would challenge it.
Sharon's move to expand Jewish settlements is not helping Abbas either.
An Israeli a government agency is inviting bids for the purchase of 50 plots for the construction of single-family housing units in the settlement of Elkana, some five kilometres inside the West Bank.
Bush says he opposes expansion of Israeli settlements on the West Bank but has endorsed the existing ones by saying it was unrealistic of the Palestinians to return to the 1949 armistice lines. But Sharon has given little heed to the American position and is continuing with his plans, and the impression that the Middle East gets is that the position adopted in public by Washington is only for public consumption.
In any event, Israel's one-track mind and refusal to recognise and respect the legitimate territorial and political rights of the Palestinians while also professing commitment to peaceful negotiations plays into the hands of Hamas against Fatah.
Again, notwithstanding the status of negotiations with the Palestinians -- or of the efforts to revive negotiations -- Sharon is also planning further "unilateral withdrawals" that clearly aim at setting Israel's "final borders" -- no doubt helped largely by the "separation wall" he is building along the occupied West Bank.
No doubt, Hamas leaders are closely watching Sharon's moves, but they seem to believe that the time for an all-out showdown is not here yet. They want to secure the political leadership of the Palestinian movement, and the elections to the legislative council is the first step towards that goal. Most importantly, they are determined to make the best of it, and the outcome of the elections would be a landmark in Middle Eastern history.
Hamas and elections: A sweeping political revolution in the making
pv vivekanand
Hamas, which boycotted the last elections to the Palestinian legislative council, has announced it will field candidates in the next polls and will stake a claim to power based on the results. The group, which describes itself as a wing of the powerful Muslim Brotherhood -- "a universal organisation which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times" -- is confident of winning between one-third and half of the seats in the council.
Mahmoud Abbas, who heads Fatah, once the strongest and most influential among the Palestinian factions that make up the PLO, won presidential elections in February without serious challenge only because Hamas stayed away from the elections. Fatah could not hope for a repetition on the victory in the council elections.
Apart from being the best organised group in Palestinian politics with a strong foundation of committed activists, Hamas could also count on the votes of Palestinians frustrated over the chaos and in-fighting in Fatah and administrative and financial corruption in the Fatah-dominated Palestinian National Authority (PNA).
Most Palestinians want Abbas to lead the political process, but they also want clean governance, an end to corruption, and personal security, and they see that only Hamas could offer them these.
Recent opinion polls have put popular support for Fatah at 36 per cent, down from 40 per cent in December, and backing for Hamas has increased from 18 per cent to 25 per cent, with 33 per cent in its Gaza stronghold.
Elections to city and local councils in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in recent months have produced impressive success for Hamas and other Islamist groups.
The rising popularity for Hamas is coupled with doubts about the PNA's ability to make good on its promises to improve conditions and produce achievements in the talks with Israel.
One of the key difference between Fatah and Hamas is simple: Fatah represents Palestinian nationalism and is secular, whereas Hamas draws its strength from Islam and wants to set up a state based on Islamic teachings and laws. Fatah is willing to negotiate peace with Israel on the basis of the 1967 lines held by the Jewish state, whereas Hamas wants the 1948 lines -- meaning an end to the existence of Israel -- although that stance is seen more tactical than substantial.
The Palestinians elected their first legislative assembly in 1996; the late Yasser Arafat postponed elections that had been set for 2000.
Hamas boycotted the earlier elections, saying they were part of the process launched by the 1993 Oslo accords, which it vehemently opposed because they recognise Israel.
At present the council has 88 seats. Fatah accounts for 49 of them, with affiliated groups having 15; the others include 20 independents and four Islamist affiliates.
Under Abbas-proposed amendments to the election law, the number of seats will be raised to 132, but it is not clear whether the dominant Fatah members would approve it since many of them see Abbas as easily succumbing to Hamas demands. They are also aware that approval of the law means the starting of the electoral clock for chiming in three months from that date.
They see Abbas' insistence that the polls be held as scheduled on July 17 as playing into the hands of Hamas because of the expectation that the Islamists will emerge as a dominant power in the elections if held in July. The Fatah dissidents want the polls to be postponed until September and they hope to use the intervening period to rally its forces and strengthen their prospects in the polls.
In public statements, Hamas leaders maintain hard-line rhetoric that they would never recognise the state of Israel and are committed to regaining pre-1948 Palestine. Some of them say that all Jews who migrated to Israel should return to where they came from and the Jewish state should cease to exist in historic Palestine.
The group says: "The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic waqf consecrated for future Muslim generations until Judgment Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: It, or any part of it, should not be given up.
"Neither a single Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither any king or president, nor all the kings and presidents, neither any organisation nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess the right to do that. Palestine is an Islamic waqf land consecrated for Muslim generations until Judgment Day. This being so, who can presume to speak for all Islamic generations to the Day of Resurrection?"
However, Hamas is a realistic and pragmatic group and its leaders are aware that they would have to make compromises and they would do so if and when they feel the time is right, but they would not give up the struggle for the whole of Palestine. After all that is the group's raison d'être.
Hamas's senior leader in Gaza, Mahmoud Al Zahar, has called Israel's planned withdrawal from Gaza as a victory for his group's armed resistance.
"Very simply, nobody can deny that if Israel is going to leave the Gaza Strip and part of the West Bank, that was because of the intifada, because of the armed struggle, because of the big sacrifices of Hamas for this goal," he said in a recent interview.
"It was not because of negotiations, or the goodwill of Israel, or the Americans or Europeans."
Zahar refused to commit Hamas to peace in Gaza once Israel withdraws its 9,000 settlers.
"It depends on what Israel does," he said. "Now Israel is talking about reorganisation. We do not accept reorganisation. We are looking for withdrawal, real withdrawal, and not to violate our sovereignty."
Indeed, Hamas leaders are also tactical politicians who are projecting the group both as an active armed resistance movement and as a party that seeks to influence the Palestinian political agenda. They remind everyone that Hamas could call off the current unofficial truce if Israel does not keep up its obligations but that they are maintaining the ceasefire anyway because they know that the people want that for now.
Hamas' pragmatism is also evident in Zahar's pronouncement that the group wants to join the PLO in order "to consolidate the resistance option in its capacity as the strategic option towards the liberation of Palestine."
According to the Central Elections Commission, a minimum of three months are needed between the time the election law is approved and elections. The three-month leeway expired on Sunday with no movement and Palestinian MPs are meeting this week on the issue.
Throwing a spanner in the works is an uncertainty whether Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon would delay the planned Israeli evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip from July 20 to mid-August.
While the officially cited reason is a sensitivity to the date falling during a traditional three-week mourning period for what Israelis consider the destruction of ancient Jewish temples.
However, the actual reason, according to some accounts, is the shortcomings and delays in the logistics of the evacuation of 21 settlements in Gaza and four in the West Bank.
On Wednesday, the Israeli army started moving out equipment of Gaza, signalling preparations for the pullout.
The July 20 date for the beginning of the evacuation was cited by Palestinian Information Minister Nabil Shaath for the possible delay in the elections.
"The question really has to do with the Israeli pullout of Gaza during that time, and our fear that the Israelis might make it difficult for people to do real election campaigns and have real freedom of movement," he said early this week.
"This is really the only consideration," he said. "And this consideration will be discussed with Hamas and with everybody."
Caught in the crossfire between Fatah and Hamas is Abbas himself, who is being sarcastically described as a Hamas ally because of his insistence that the polls be held on time.
Abbas has drawn criticism for bowing to Hamas demands on many fronts since he took over as president following the death of Yasser Arafat. His strategy is delicately balanced between the need to keep armed resistance in check while remaining firm on his reform programme in the PNA.
His insistence on the July 17 date for elections and on amending the election law is seen as yet another concession to Hamas. For, it is taken for granted by many that Hamas would emerge as the winners if elections are held next month, and the suggested change to the election law is also deemed as benefiting Hamas.
Abbas is suggesting that the law, which was given preliminary approval on Wednesday by Palestinians legislators, should be amended to the effect that all members of the 132-seat assembly should be from national lists rather than the present arrangement of 88 from constituency lists -- meaning districtwise individuals -- and 44 from national lists.
Hamas, which is stronger in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, are more likely to benefit from fielding national list candidates than Fatah, and this only adds to the fears of the Fatah leaders.
If Abbas insists on changes in the election law at this stage, it would go to the parliamentary legal committee for debate and only then to the floor of the parliament for final approval. Election officials have said that any further delays would force them to put off the voting, because they need three months to prepare.
Fatah fears of a major election defeat at Hamas' hands were heightened when student elections last week at Bir Zeit and Bethlehem universities showed the Islamists were gaining strength in both universities. Both institutions are secular and attended by the sons and daughters of rich Palestinians, some of them Christian. Fatah had a majority of votes in both before the latest student elections.
The elections showed that Hamas is a powerful group that is continuing to gather strength at the expense of Fatah.
Abbas is under tremendous pressure from many sides. US President George W. Bush, who argues that a wave of democracy is going to take over the Middle East as a result of his invasion and occupation of Iraq, has ruled out any delay in Palestinian elections.
Bush insisted on the Jan.30 date for elections in Iraq. He is insisting on elections in Lebanon in May. He is insisting on election reforms in Egypt, and he is insisting that the Palestinians should vote on July 17.
Sharon, who obviously discussed the issue with Bush at the White House this month, could not actually care who wins the Palestinian elections. If Abbas's group wins, then he would seek to negotiate and force down his version of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement on the Palestinians. If hard-liners like Hamas win the elections, then Sharon would simply clam up on the negotiations front and impose his unilateral military-based solution to the problem.
In his meeting with Bush at the US president's ranch in Texas this month, Sharon is said to have presented intelligence reports indicating that there is complete breakdown of Abu Mazen's grip on authority and that hard-liners within Fatah plan to start armed attacks against Israelis in June and trigger Israeli retaliation leading to a situation that would not be conducive to elections.
Abbas is also apprehensive that Hamas would make good its threat to call off the de fact truce it has maintained since February if the elections were delayed.
Hamas is unlikely to move from its stand since it knows well that it stands to gain in July elections and it finds no reason to agree to a delay, particularly when it is clear that Fatah will use the intervening period not only to strengthen itself but also to weaken all rivals.
At this week's meeting of Palestinian legislators, Fatah is likely to seek to stall the endorsement of the amended election law.
Abbas's options are limited. His weekend visit to Egypt and Jordan was seen by his critics as a ploy to make himself absent from the Palestinian territories and thus abort a vote by Palestinian legislators on his proposals. The vote was supposed to take place on Sunday, but his absence pre-empted it.
Abbas has won a few more days before the crucial vote, but he cannot run from it. His choice is between postponing the elections and incur Hamas wrath and holding the polls on time and risking the loss of his power base.
Hamas sweeping the Palestinian elections and coming to power in the West Bank and Gaza is indeed a source of concern not only to the Palestinian leadership under Abbas but also to Arab countries wherever Islamists have strong influence among the people.
The very fact that the Muslim Brotherhood is banned as a political party in Egypt, where Hassan Al Banna set up the organisation in 1928, is the clearest indication of the group's influence among the people.
An example is Jordan, where the strongest and most organised and committed political grouping is the Islamic Action Front, which is the political arm of the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The kingdom will be the first to be affected if Hamas sweeps the Palestinian elections.
Concerns over developments in Palestine have been heightened by intelligence reports indicating that the Abbas government is getting deeper day by day into disorder and revolt, and Hamas is taking advantage of the situation to strengthen itself at Fatah's expense.
The US and Israel, which hopes it could work out an agreement with Abbas that would protect Israeli interests, are considering means to support the Fatah leader. Two US officials, deputy head of the national security council Elliott Abrams and head of the State Department's Middle East desk David Walsh, will be visiting Ramallah this week to explore whether and how the US and Israel could help shore up Abbas.
However, there are contradictions in the approach.
If the American and Israeli support comes in the form of supporting a postponement of the elections -- from July 17 to Sept.25 as some reports suggest -- then Hamas would challenge it.
Sharon's move to expand Jewish settlements is not helping Abbas either.
An Israeli a government agency is inviting bids for the purchase of 50 plots for the construction of single-family housing units in the settlement of Elkana, some five kilometres inside the West Bank.
Bush says he opposes expansion of Israeli settlements on the West Bank but has endorsed the existing ones by saying it was unrealistic of the Palestinians to return to the 1949 armistice lines. But Sharon has given little heed to the American position and is continuing with his plans, and the impression that the Middle East gets is that the position adopted in public by Washington is only for public consumption.
In any event, Israel's one-track mind and refusal to recognise and respect the legitimate territorial and political rights of the Palestinians while also professing commitment to peaceful negotiations plays into the hands of Hamas against Fatah.
Again, notwithstanding the status of negotiations with the Palestinians -- or of the efforts to revive negotiations -- Sharon is also planning further "unilateral withdrawals" that clearly aim at setting Israel's "final borders" -- no doubt helped largely by the "separation wall" he is building along the occupied West Bank.
No doubt, Hamas leaders are closely watching Sharon's moves, but they seem to believe that the time for an all-out showdown is not here yet. They want to secure the political leadership of the Palestinian movement, and the elections to the legislative council is the first step towards that goal. Most importantly, they are determined to make the best of it, and the outcome of the elections would be a landmark in Middle Eastern history.
Wednesday, April 20, 2005
Abbas - between a rock and hard place
Abu Mazen - between a rock and a hard place
pv vivekanand
MAHMOUD Abbas is with Fatah or Hamas? Ironically, this is the question that many Fatah supporters seem to be asking in the ongoing debate over whether the Palestinian legislative elections scheduled for July 17 should be postponed.
Abbas (Abu Mazen), president of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and thus president of Palestine, insists that the elections should be held on July 17. However, Fatah leaders are apprehensive that the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) would steal the thunder from them and walk away with a majority of the seats if elections were held in July. They prefer to have some more time to organise themselves and streamline the party, which is ridden with internal divisions and whose leaders are accused of corruption.
Abbas, who is also the leader of Fatah, has drawn criticism for bowing to Hamas demands on many fronts since he took over as president following the death of Yasser Arafat.
His insistence on the July 17 date for elections and on amending the election law is seen as yet another concession to Hamas. For, it is taken for granted by many that Hamas would emerge as the winners if elections are held next month, and the suggested change to the election law is also deemed as benefiting Hamas.
Abbas is suggesting that the law be amended to the effect that all members of the 132-seat assembly should be from national lists rather than the present arrangement of 88 from constituency lists -- meaning districtwise individuals -- and 44 from national lists (parties).
Hamas, which is deemed to be relatively stronger in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, is more likely to benefit from fielding national list candidates than Fatah, and this only adds to the fears of the Fatah leaders.
Fatah won a majority in the Palestinian legislative council in last elections, but it is unlikely to do well in next polls. Its fears of a major election defeat at Hamas' hands were heightened when student elections last week at Bir Zeit and Bethlehem universities showed the Islamists were gaining strength in both universities. Both institutions are secular and attended by the sons and daughters of rich Palestinians, some of them Christian. Fatah had a majority of votes in both before the latest student elections.
The elections showed that Hamas is a powerful group that is continuing to gather strength at the expense of Fatah.
Against that reality, Abbas' inclination to go along with the Hamas demands for elections on July 17 pits him against the will of his own party, which has reportedly suggested a 70-day postponement i.e. elections on Sept.25.
Serious setback
Fatah, once the strongest and largest of the factions that make up the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), has suffered a serious setback as a result of internal divisions. The death of Arafat saw Marwan Barghuthi, who is imprisoned in Israel, posing a challenge to Abbas's prospects of being elected president before he quit the race. Today, a large number of young Fatah members see Barghuthi as their leader rather than Abbas. Resentment over financial administration corruption in the PNA is yet another factor that has weakened Fatah.
And the net picture today is that Hamas, whose members are deemed to be more committed to its cause than its rivals, would do much better than Fatah in elections to the Palestinian legislative council. The group has announced it would field candidates and would also assume cabinet positions based on its performance in the elections.
Little choice
No doubt, Abbas is aware of this reality, but he has no choice but to press ahead with present plans.
He is under tremendous pressure from many sides. US President George W Bush, who argues that a wave of democracy is going to take over the Middle East as a result of his invasion and occupation of Iraq, has ruled out any delay in Palestinian elections.
Bush insisted on the Jan.30 date for elections in Iraq. He is insisting on elections in Lebanon in May. He is insisting on election reforms in Egypt, and he is insisting that the Palestinians should vote on July 17.
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who obviously discussed the issue with Bush at the White House this month, could not actually care who wins the Palestinian elections. If Abbas's group wins, then he would seek to negotiate and force down his version of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement on the Palestinians. If hardliners like Hamas win the elections, then Sharon would simply clam up on the negotiations front and impose his unilateral military-based solution to the problem.
In his meeting with Bush at the US president's ranch in Texas this month, Sharon is said to have presented intelligence reports indicating that there is complete breakdown of Abu Mazen's grip on authority and that hardliners within Fatah plan to start armed attacks against Israelis in June and trigger Israeli retaliation leading to a situation that would not be conducive to elections.
Abbas is also apprehensive that Hamas would make good its threat to call off the de fact truce it has maintained since February if the elections were delayed.
Hamas is unlikely to move from its stand since it knows well that it stands to gain in July elections and it finds no reason to agree to a delay, particularly when it is clear that Fatah will use the intervening period not only to strengthen itself but also to weaken all rivals.
At this week's meeting of Palestinian legislators, Fatah is likely to seek to stall the endorsement of the amended election law that is crucial if elections were to be held on July 17. Palestinian officials say they need at least three months to prepare for elections.
Several young leaders of Fatah have reportedly warned Abbas that the change he is proposing would be voted down by all Fatah institutions.
Abbas's options are limited. His weekend visit to Egypt and Jordan was seen by his critics as a ploy to make himself absent from the Palestinian territories and thus abort a vote by Palestinian legislators on his proposals. The vote was supposed to take place on Sunday, but his absence pre-empted it.
Abbas has won a few more days before the crucial vote, but he cannot run from it. His choice is between postponing the elections and incur Hamas wrath and holding the polls on time and risking the loss of his power base. Beyond that, however, is the real question: Can he come up with a formula that keeps Fatah ranks intact?
pv vivekanand
MAHMOUD Abbas is with Fatah or Hamas? Ironically, this is the question that many Fatah supporters seem to be asking in the ongoing debate over whether the Palestinian legislative elections scheduled for July 17 should be postponed.
Abbas (Abu Mazen), president of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and thus president of Palestine, insists that the elections should be held on July 17. However, Fatah leaders are apprehensive that the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) would steal the thunder from them and walk away with a majority of the seats if elections were held in July. They prefer to have some more time to organise themselves and streamline the party, which is ridden with internal divisions and whose leaders are accused of corruption.
Abbas, who is also the leader of Fatah, has drawn criticism for bowing to Hamas demands on many fronts since he took over as president following the death of Yasser Arafat.
His insistence on the July 17 date for elections and on amending the election law is seen as yet another concession to Hamas. For, it is taken for granted by many that Hamas would emerge as the winners if elections are held next month, and the suggested change to the election law is also deemed as benefiting Hamas.
Abbas is suggesting that the law be amended to the effect that all members of the 132-seat assembly should be from national lists rather than the present arrangement of 88 from constituency lists -- meaning districtwise individuals -- and 44 from national lists (parties).
Hamas, which is deemed to be relatively stronger in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, is more likely to benefit from fielding national list candidates than Fatah, and this only adds to the fears of the Fatah leaders.
Fatah won a majority in the Palestinian legislative council in last elections, but it is unlikely to do well in next polls. Its fears of a major election defeat at Hamas' hands were heightened when student elections last week at Bir Zeit and Bethlehem universities showed the Islamists were gaining strength in both universities. Both institutions are secular and attended by the sons and daughters of rich Palestinians, some of them Christian. Fatah had a majority of votes in both before the latest student elections.
The elections showed that Hamas is a powerful group that is continuing to gather strength at the expense of Fatah.
Against that reality, Abbas' inclination to go along with the Hamas demands for elections on July 17 pits him against the will of his own party, which has reportedly suggested a 70-day postponement i.e. elections on Sept.25.
Serious setback
Fatah, once the strongest and largest of the factions that make up the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), has suffered a serious setback as a result of internal divisions. The death of Arafat saw Marwan Barghuthi, who is imprisoned in Israel, posing a challenge to Abbas's prospects of being elected president before he quit the race. Today, a large number of young Fatah members see Barghuthi as their leader rather than Abbas. Resentment over financial administration corruption in the PNA is yet another factor that has weakened Fatah.
And the net picture today is that Hamas, whose members are deemed to be more committed to its cause than its rivals, would do much better than Fatah in elections to the Palestinian legislative council. The group has announced it would field candidates and would also assume cabinet positions based on its performance in the elections.
Little choice
No doubt, Abbas is aware of this reality, but he has no choice but to press ahead with present plans.
He is under tremendous pressure from many sides. US President George W Bush, who argues that a wave of democracy is going to take over the Middle East as a result of his invasion and occupation of Iraq, has ruled out any delay in Palestinian elections.
Bush insisted on the Jan.30 date for elections in Iraq. He is insisting on elections in Lebanon in May. He is insisting on election reforms in Egypt, and he is insisting that the Palestinians should vote on July 17.
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who obviously discussed the issue with Bush at the White House this month, could not actually care who wins the Palestinian elections. If Abbas's group wins, then he would seek to negotiate and force down his version of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement on the Palestinians. If hardliners like Hamas win the elections, then Sharon would simply clam up on the negotiations front and impose his unilateral military-based solution to the problem.
In his meeting with Bush at the US president's ranch in Texas this month, Sharon is said to have presented intelligence reports indicating that there is complete breakdown of Abu Mazen's grip on authority and that hardliners within Fatah plan to start armed attacks against Israelis in June and trigger Israeli retaliation leading to a situation that would not be conducive to elections.
Abbas is also apprehensive that Hamas would make good its threat to call off the de fact truce it has maintained since February if the elections were delayed.
Hamas is unlikely to move from its stand since it knows well that it stands to gain in July elections and it finds no reason to agree to a delay, particularly when it is clear that Fatah will use the intervening period not only to strengthen itself but also to weaken all rivals.
At this week's meeting of Palestinian legislators, Fatah is likely to seek to stall the endorsement of the amended election law that is crucial if elections were to be held on July 17. Palestinian officials say they need at least three months to prepare for elections.
Several young leaders of Fatah have reportedly warned Abbas that the change he is proposing would be voted down by all Fatah institutions.
Abbas's options are limited. His weekend visit to Egypt and Jordan was seen by his critics as a ploy to make himself absent from the Palestinian territories and thus abort a vote by Palestinian legislators on his proposals. The vote was supposed to take place on Sunday, but his absence pre-empted it.
Abbas has won a few more days before the crucial vote, but he cannot run from it. His choice is between postponing the elections and incur Hamas wrath and holding the polls on time and risking the loss of his power base. Beyond that, however, is the real question: Can he come up with a formula that keeps Fatah ranks intact?
Monday, April 11, 2005
US-Vatican hotline
pv vivekanand
IT is known from developments on the ground that in the 1980s, the US used Christians in Eastern Europe to fight communism and it is widely accepted that the late Pope John Paul II played a major role in encouraging the revolt that eventually led to the near-total collapse of communist countries around the world. But the truth is that the US and the Vatican had a secret alliance from the time John Paul became pope and Washington and the Vatican worked closely together to plan the strategy that actually led to the collapse of communism by the mid-90s.
According to confidential documents that have been leaked after the death of Pope John Paul this month and appearing on various internet sites, a secret "hot line" of communication was set up between Washington and the Holy See after the Polish-born pope took over the helm of the Roman Catholic Church on Oct. 22, 1978. This channel was established by Polish-born Zbigniew Brzezinski who served as President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, who found in John Paul, a fellow Pole, a perfect ally in the battle against communism.
Brzezinski is known for having devised the Cold War strategy to fight the Soviet Union and other communist countries by using Christians in Eastern Europe and Latin America and Muslims in Asia and the Middle East (He was the one who brought in Arab countries to support and finance the mujahedeen war against the Red Army in Afghanistan during the 1980s).
The documents reveal that Brzezinski first met the pope in 1976 when the latter was Polish Archbishop Karol Wojtyla and visited to the US to deliver a series of lectures at Harvard University.
Brzezinski, who was then a professor at Harvard, was very impressed by Wojtyla and invited him for tea. That was the most important event in the US-orchestrated campaign against communism since it was during the meeting over tea that the first step was taken towards establishing an American-Vatican alliance against communism.
Brzezinski and Archbishop Wojtyla remained in continued contact through correspondence, and then in 1977 Brzezinski took over as Carter's national security adviser and Wojtyla became Pope John Paul II in 1978, setting the ground for the secret alliance to take off.
The announcement that Wojtyla was to be the next pope was the moment that Brzezinsky was waiting for. He got Carter excited about how the US could use the Roman Catholic Church and convinced the president that the new pope was the perfect man for the job.
For the first time in history, a 30-member delegation representing the US attended the ceremony where Wojtyla underwent the investiture as Pope John Paul II on Oct.22, 1978; the delegation included the speaker of the House of Representatives, Thomas P. (Tip) O’Neil and Brzezinski himself – both Roman Catholics — Senator Edward Muskie and Representatives Clement Zablocki and Barbara Mikulski, all Carter loyalists and all of Polish origin.
“’It’s the beginning of the end for communism," exulted Ms Mikulski said at a lunch at the US embassy in Rome after the investiture, clearly indicating how the the newfound US-Vatican alliance was to be used.
A glimpse into the alliance and how it worked was offered by James M. Rentschler, a former US ambassador and staff member of Carter's National Security Council under Brzenzski.
The key man from the Roman Catholic Church in the alliance was none other than Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, whose power and influence at the Vatican was second only to the pope himself. Casaroli was Pope John Paul II's first secretary of state (foreign minister).
Brzezinski and Casarole established the private channel between the White House and the Holy See — the so-called Vatican hot line.
That channel was used by Carter and John Paul II for what Rentschler described in 1998 (twenty years later) as "a personal correspondence of extraordinary breadth …an unprecedented exchange between an American Baptist president and a Polish-born Roman Catholic pontiff. “
The Carter-Pope correspondence, some 40 letters, remain classified and confidential under the official secrets act of the US. But, according to Rentschler, the letters covered almost everything on the international scene and highly sensitive issues such as arms control, human rights, famine relief, popular unrest behind in communist countries, Soviet activities in Afghanistan, the fate of Catholic missionaries in China, Cuban links with Africa, the Middle East peace process, hostage-taking and terrorism.
While it is difficult to perceive how John Paul saw himself being used o fight communism, one thing is clear: He wanted to fight communism himself and the alliance with the US was perfect for him too.
What followed was the increased number of visits that the Pope launched into communist countries — those behind the Iron Curtain — and speeches to the faithful Christians there. His speeches prompted the faithful to defy party orders and rise up against their regimes — that was the most signficant and indeed the strongest contribution that the late pope made to the collapse of communism.
Carter left office in January 1980 after losing re-election to Ronald Reagan. However, the "hot line" set up by Brzeniski and Casaroli had already done its job, since the Pope had already made up his mind to work against communism for the rest of his life. And he did so, and we the results today.
According to the documents, the US intelligence agencies worked in parallel to the pope's efforts by engaging secret agitators to rouse the people and encourage them to rise up against their atheistic oppressors and also inflamed Muslims in communist countries.
Brzezinski remained in contact with the late pope throughout. But, it is unlikely that he had to do any "follow -up" work and/or suggest new "ideas" in the anti-communism battle. The Pope was already an effective planner and fighter himself by the time the Carter administration left office, and the collapse of communism was already signalled although it took more than 12 years for the Soviet Union to break up.
IT is known from developments on the ground that in the 1980s, the US used Christians in Eastern Europe to fight communism and it is widely accepted that the late Pope John Paul II played a major role in encouraging the revolt that eventually led to the near-total collapse of communist countries around the world. But the truth is that the US and the Vatican had a secret alliance from the time John Paul became pope and Washington and the Vatican worked closely together to plan the strategy that actually led to the collapse of communism by the mid-90s.
According to confidential documents that have been leaked after the death of Pope John Paul this month and appearing on various internet sites, a secret "hot line" of communication was set up between Washington and the Holy See after the Polish-born pope took over the helm of the Roman Catholic Church on Oct. 22, 1978. This channel was established by Polish-born Zbigniew Brzezinski who served as President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, who found in John Paul, a fellow Pole, a perfect ally in the battle against communism.
Brzezinski is known for having devised the Cold War strategy to fight the Soviet Union and other communist countries by using Christians in Eastern Europe and Latin America and Muslims in Asia and the Middle East (He was the one who brought in Arab countries to support and finance the mujahedeen war against the Red Army in Afghanistan during the 1980s).
The documents reveal that Brzezinski first met the pope in 1976 when the latter was Polish Archbishop Karol Wojtyla and visited to the US to deliver a series of lectures at Harvard University.
Brzezinski, who was then a professor at Harvard, was very impressed by Wojtyla and invited him for tea. That was the most important event in the US-orchestrated campaign against communism since it was during the meeting over tea that the first step was taken towards establishing an American-Vatican alliance against communism.
Brzezinski and Archbishop Wojtyla remained in continued contact through correspondence, and then in 1977 Brzezinski took over as Carter's national security adviser and Wojtyla became Pope John Paul II in 1978, setting the ground for the secret alliance to take off.
The announcement that Wojtyla was to be the next pope was the moment that Brzezinsky was waiting for. He got Carter excited about how the US could use the Roman Catholic Church and convinced the president that the new pope was the perfect man for the job.
For the first time in history, a 30-member delegation representing the US attended the ceremony where Wojtyla underwent the investiture as Pope John Paul II on Oct.22, 1978; the delegation included the speaker of the House of Representatives, Thomas P. (Tip) O’Neil and Brzezinski himself – both Roman Catholics — Senator Edward Muskie and Representatives Clement Zablocki and Barbara Mikulski, all Carter loyalists and all of Polish origin.
“’It’s the beginning of the end for communism," exulted Ms Mikulski said at a lunch at the US embassy in Rome after the investiture, clearly indicating how the the newfound US-Vatican alliance was to be used.
A glimpse into the alliance and how it worked was offered by James M. Rentschler, a former US ambassador and staff member of Carter's National Security Council under Brzenzski.
The key man from the Roman Catholic Church in the alliance was none other than Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, whose power and influence at the Vatican was second only to the pope himself. Casaroli was Pope John Paul II's first secretary of state (foreign minister).
Brzezinski and Casarole established the private channel between the White House and the Holy See — the so-called Vatican hot line.
That channel was used by Carter and John Paul II for what Rentschler described in 1998 (twenty years later) as "a personal correspondence of extraordinary breadth …an unprecedented exchange between an American Baptist president and a Polish-born Roman Catholic pontiff. “
The Carter-Pope correspondence, some 40 letters, remain classified and confidential under the official secrets act of the US. But, according to Rentschler, the letters covered almost everything on the international scene and highly sensitive issues such as arms control, human rights, famine relief, popular unrest behind in communist countries, Soviet activities in Afghanistan, the fate of Catholic missionaries in China, Cuban links with Africa, the Middle East peace process, hostage-taking and terrorism.
While it is difficult to perceive how John Paul saw himself being used o fight communism, one thing is clear: He wanted to fight communism himself and the alliance with the US was perfect for him too.
What followed was the increased number of visits that the Pope launched into communist countries — those behind the Iron Curtain — and speeches to the faithful Christians there. His speeches prompted the faithful to defy party orders and rise up against their regimes — that was the most signficant and indeed the strongest contribution that the late pope made to the collapse of communism.
Carter left office in January 1980 after losing re-election to Ronald Reagan. However, the "hot line" set up by Brzeniski and Casaroli had already done its job, since the Pope had already made up his mind to work against communism for the rest of his life. And he did so, and we the results today.
According to the documents, the US intelligence agencies worked in parallel to the pope's efforts by engaging secret agitators to rouse the people and encourage them to rise up against their atheistic oppressors and also inflamed Muslims in communist countries.
Brzezinski remained in contact with the late pope throughout. But, it is unlikely that he had to do any "follow -up" work and/or suggest new "ideas" in the anti-communism battle. The Pope was already an effective planner and fighter himself by the time the Carter administration left office, and the collapse of communism was already signalled although it took more than 12 years for the Soviet Union to break up.
Monday, March 14, 2005
Hizbollah factor
March 13 2005
The Hizbollah factor
pv vivekanand
In a show of strength Hizbollah organised a massive demonstration in Beirut on Tuesday. Its leader, Sheikh Hussein Nasrallah, is reportedly planning repeat rallies on Friday in Sidon in the south and in Tripoli in the north and on Monday in the Christian town of Dakhla on March 18. Obviously, the group is putting up a show of strength in a signal that although Syria is withdrawing its military forces from Beirut and its environs to the eastern Bekaa Valley -- and eventually across the border -- there is no scaling down of the Syrian influence in Lebanese politics. And that is worrying the Lebanese and people in the rest of the region.
No doubt, Hizbollah, which has proved itself to be pragmatic, does not want to rekindle the civil war by violently challenging the opposition grouping of a certain segment of the Sunni community led by Hariri's heirs, the Druze led by Walid Junblatt and the Maronite Christians led by Archbishop Nasrallah Sfeir.
Obviously, Hizbollah knows that it would have to take on the combined strength of the US, Israel and the Lebanese opposition if it were to start off a violent confrontation. At the same time, it cannot afford to let the opposition project an image that the Sunni-Druze-Maronite alliance represents the majority of Lebanese population.
No doubt, Iran, a close ally of Syria, played a key role in influencing the Hizbollah leadership to adopt a clear pro-Syrian political position in the crisis triggered by the Hariri assassination, where the opposition, backed by the US and France, is accusing Damascus of orchestrating the killing.
At the same time, Hizbollah cannot but be aware that if it allows the pro-American camp to assume the upper hand in Lebanese affairs, then it is inevitable that it would be one of the first targets for crackdown. Hizbollah would be asked to disarm its fighters and also face immense pressure to dilute its influence in the daily life of the Shiites in the country. That could come through state intervention in the affairs of the schools, hospitals and other organisations it runs for the Shiite community. If Hizbollah allows that to happen, its leaders believe, then it is the end of the group as a strong political force in Lebanon. Therefore, it has to stick with Syria.
Stepping up pressure
For good measure in their effort to keep the pressure mounting, the US and Israel have also accused Syria of harbouring the Palestinian group Islamic Jihad, which has claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv.
Damascus has rejected the allegations as unfounded, but it could not resist the American and UN pressure on it to withdraw from Lebanon, and hence the redeployment to the Bekaa Valley.
Syrian President Bashar Al Assad is trying to find a face-saving formula by showing that he is not succumbing to pressure. Hence there is only the redeployment and not a clear announcement of withdrawal of the forces to Syrian territory across the border. He is also trying to remove any justification for a possible isolation of his country through UN sanctions that could lead to external military intervention. Such action would not stop at nothing but "regime change" in Damascus -- an avowed objective of the pro-Israeli neo-conservative camp in Washington.
Obviously, Assad knows that his immediate move in Lebanon would be adjudged as "half measure" and would be rejected by the US and the Lebanese opposition. That is the reason for his comment during the announcement in parliament this week that "I know that the minute I finish this speech, they will say it is not enough. So I say it now: It is not enough."
Indeed, these are polemics. The reality on the ground is fraught with dangers.
It is very difficult for the Syrians to accept that they have to end their domination of Lebanon or face serious consequences. At the same time, Damascus has realised that the Bush administration would not let it off the hook. Even a complete Syrian departure from Lebanon would not lead to any easing of the American pressure. Assad is fully aware that Washington would not give him peace unless of course he sacrifices whatever Syria holds dear and near to itself as a staunch Arab nationalist and leader of the Arab struggle against Israel. Once that happens, then Syria would be forced into a corner and asked to sign on the dotted line of a peace accord with Israel where it would have to make major compromises over the Golan Heights.
Assad was hoping for Arab support in his stand-off with the US, but he found that Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the two Arab giants, urging him to withdraw his forces from Syria as the best option. Syria's neighbour Jordan also joined the call; so did his staunchest ally, Russia.
Dignified withdrawal
The Arab summit, scheduled to be held in Algiers on March 22 and 23, could come up with a formula that allows Syria to withdraw with some semblance of dignity. After all, it was under an Arab League mandate that Syria sent soldiers to Lebanon which was then in the throes of a civil war.
Again, the US might not want to allow Syria to retain any dignity if only because the American-Israeli gameplan is to strip Damascus of whatever "strategic assets" it might think it has. This includes the country's status as the last hold-out against Israel's expansionist ambitions in the region.
Indeed, Syria could, to a large extent, count on Iran as an ally, but the Iranians themselves are under immense US-led international pressure over their alleged plans to develop nuclear weapons.
Israeli intelligence reports -- "leaked" to the public domain -- allege that Syria has created joint units with Iranians and they are deployed in key points of Lebanon. The reports also allege that Iran has set up several radar stations in Lebanese territory in order to give the Syrians advance warning of any external military incursion.
According to a website (debka.com), which claims to carry Israeli "intelligence" findings, Iranian forces were airlifted to Syria on Feb.20, the same day that US President George W. Bush flew to meetings with European leaders.
"They were the tail end of the biggest military airlift Iran has launched in the Middle East to date. Its objective was to set up shared Iranian-Syrian safeguards against attacks on the Islamic Republic's nuclear installations and/or Syrian strategic targets," says the website.
"The fleet of Iranian military transports secretly off loaded complete elite units for operating, maintaining and guarding a sophisticated system of Iranian electronic warning stations, radar networks and anti-aircraft missiles to be deployed in Syria and Lebanon," it says. "More than 1,000 Iranian soldiers and technicians and 600 Revolutionary Guards commandos took up positions on the South Lebanese border with Israel, along the Syrian-Israeli Golan frontier to the south and up Syria's Mediterranean coastline to the west. They also spread out along Syria's northeastern frontier with Iraqi Kurdistan and its southern border with Iraq's Al Qaim and Al Anbar provinces."
Syria is purportedly hoping that the pressure would shift to Tehran and Hizbollah when the US seeks to evict the Iranian forces allegedly present in Lebanon and this would allow Damascus some breathing space.
However, Washington is moving fast ahead with efforts for Syria's total international isolation. Reports say that US National Security Council head Stephen Hadley has notified European Washington-based envoys of moves to cut off Damascus' international banking ties and the flow of international funds to and from Syria through Lebanese banks. The volume of these transfers is such that it could bankrupt Syria, according to the reports.
UN Middle East envoy Terje Roed-Larsen is visiting Europe, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Arab countries to finalise the US-Arab-European consensus on international sanctions against Syria, say reports.
Larsen will also visit Damascus next week to give the Syrian government a "last chance" to implement Security Council Resolution 1559 of September 2004 in full, or else face up to UN sanctions. French President Jacques Chirac has already ordered French ties with Damascus severed at all government levels.
Fears among opposition
The Lebanese opposition is also aware of the emerging dangers. All it might need is a carefully executed bomb attack to trigger off violent confrontation between Hizbollah and the opposition and it is not a secret that Israel has often resorted to such actions while arranging pointing fingers at the Lebanese themselves.
Junblatt, the Druze leader, is seeking to strengthen the international pressure on Syria by inviting more involvement by the European Union as well as Moscow.
At the same time, clearly keeping the risk factors in mind, he is also seeking a dialogue with Hizbollah.
"We are a democratic country. They have demonstrated their stand, they are part of the Lebanese. Hizbollah is part of the Lebanon," he said after talks with EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana.
"I do thank them because they have raised the Lebanese flag. So we have something in common. And this is why we should engage in dialogue."
Junblatt is hoping to get rid of the Syrians before general elections in May where he hopes that the opposition will put up a showing strong enough to form a government.
How far Hizbollah is willing to go in making a compromise in its position will be crucial to determining the course of events in Lebanon. If the Iranians and Syrians are determined to prevent, directly or indirectly, a dilution of their influences in Lebanese affairs, then Hizbollah would reflect that, but then it would become obvious that Damascus is not willing to let go of Lebanon. What happens next is anyone's guess, but the people of Lebanon, perfectly aware of the pitfalls of a violent confrontation, are smarter now than they were during the years of the civil war.
A compromise has to be found among the Lebanese themselves, but will the US and Israel step back from the kill that they have been waiting for long?
The Hizbollah factor
pv vivekanand
In a show of strength Hizbollah organised a massive demonstration in Beirut on Tuesday. Its leader, Sheikh Hussein Nasrallah, is reportedly planning repeat rallies on Friday in Sidon in the south and in Tripoli in the north and on Monday in the Christian town of Dakhla on March 18. Obviously, the group is putting up a show of strength in a signal that although Syria is withdrawing its military forces from Beirut and its environs to the eastern Bekaa Valley -- and eventually across the border -- there is no scaling down of the Syrian influence in Lebanese politics. And that is worrying the Lebanese and people in the rest of the region.
No doubt, Hizbollah, which has proved itself to be pragmatic, does not want to rekindle the civil war by violently challenging the opposition grouping of a certain segment of the Sunni community led by Hariri's heirs, the Druze led by Walid Junblatt and the Maronite Christians led by Archbishop Nasrallah Sfeir.
Obviously, Hizbollah knows that it would have to take on the combined strength of the US, Israel and the Lebanese opposition if it were to start off a violent confrontation. At the same time, it cannot afford to let the opposition project an image that the Sunni-Druze-Maronite alliance represents the majority of Lebanese population.
No doubt, Iran, a close ally of Syria, played a key role in influencing the Hizbollah leadership to adopt a clear pro-Syrian political position in the crisis triggered by the Hariri assassination, where the opposition, backed by the US and France, is accusing Damascus of orchestrating the killing.
At the same time, Hizbollah cannot but be aware that if it allows the pro-American camp to assume the upper hand in Lebanese affairs, then it is inevitable that it would be one of the first targets for crackdown. Hizbollah would be asked to disarm its fighters and also face immense pressure to dilute its influence in the daily life of the Shiites in the country. That could come through state intervention in the affairs of the schools, hospitals and other organisations it runs for the Shiite community. If Hizbollah allows that to happen, its leaders believe, then it is the end of the group as a strong political force in Lebanon. Therefore, it has to stick with Syria.
Stepping up pressure
For good measure in their effort to keep the pressure mounting, the US and Israel have also accused Syria of harbouring the Palestinian group Islamic Jihad, which has claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv.
Damascus has rejected the allegations as unfounded, but it could not resist the American and UN pressure on it to withdraw from Lebanon, and hence the redeployment to the Bekaa Valley.
Syrian President Bashar Al Assad is trying to find a face-saving formula by showing that he is not succumbing to pressure. Hence there is only the redeployment and not a clear announcement of withdrawal of the forces to Syrian territory across the border. He is also trying to remove any justification for a possible isolation of his country through UN sanctions that could lead to external military intervention. Such action would not stop at nothing but "regime change" in Damascus -- an avowed objective of the pro-Israeli neo-conservative camp in Washington.
Obviously, Assad knows that his immediate move in Lebanon would be adjudged as "half measure" and would be rejected by the US and the Lebanese opposition. That is the reason for his comment during the announcement in parliament this week that "I know that the minute I finish this speech, they will say it is not enough. So I say it now: It is not enough."
Indeed, these are polemics. The reality on the ground is fraught with dangers.
It is very difficult for the Syrians to accept that they have to end their domination of Lebanon or face serious consequences. At the same time, Damascus has realised that the Bush administration would not let it off the hook. Even a complete Syrian departure from Lebanon would not lead to any easing of the American pressure. Assad is fully aware that Washington would not give him peace unless of course he sacrifices whatever Syria holds dear and near to itself as a staunch Arab nationalist and leader of the Arab struggle against Israel. Once that happens, then Syria would be forced into a corner and asked to sign on the dotted line of a peace accord with Israel where it would have to make major compromises over the Golan Heights.
Assad was hoping for Arab support in his stand-off with the US, but he found that Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the two Arab giants, urging him to withdraw his forces from Syria as the best option. Syria's neighbour Jordan also joined the call; so did his staunchest ally, Russia.
Dignified withdrawal
The Arab summit, scheduled to be held in Algiers on March 22 and 23, could come up with a formula that allows Syria to withdraw with some semblance of dignity. After all, it was under an Arab League mandate that Syria sent soldiers to Lebanon which was then in the throes of a civil war.
Again, the US might not want to allow Syria to retain any dignity if only because the American-Israeli gameplan is to strip Damascus of whatever "strategic assets" it might think it has. This includes the country's status as the last hold-out against Israel's expansionist ambitions in the region.
Indeed, Syria could, to a large extent, count on Iran as an ally, but the Iranians themselves are under immense US-led international pressure over their alleged plans to develop nuclear weapons.
Israeli intelligence reports -- "leaked" to the public domain -- allege that Syria has created joint units with Iranians and they are deployed in key points of Lebanon. The reports also allege that Iran has set up several radar stations in Lebanese territory in order to give the Syrians advance warning of any external military incursion.
According to a website (debka.com), which claims to carry Israeli "intelligence" findings, Iranian forces were airlifted to Syria on Feb.20, the same day that US President George W. Bush flew to meetings with European leaders.
"They were the tail end of the biggest military airlift Iran has launched in the Middle East to date. Its objective was to set up shared Iranian-Syrian safeguards against attacks on the Islamic Republic's nuclear installations and/or Syrian strategic targets," says the website.
"The fleet of Iranian military transports secretly off loaded complete elite units for operating, maintaining and guarding a sophisticated system of Iranian electronic warning stations, radar networks and anti-aircraft missiles to be deployed in Syria and Lebanon," it says. "More than 1,000 Iranian soldiers and technicians and 600 Revolutionary Guards commandos took up positions on the South Lebanese border with Israel, along the Syrian-Israeli Golan frontier to the south and up Syria's Mediterranean coastline to the west. They also spread out along Syria's northeastern frontier with Iraqi Kurdistan and its southern border with Iraq's Al Qaim and Al Anbar provinces."
Syria is purportedly hoping that the pressure would shift to Tehran and Hizbollah when the US seeks to evict the Iranian forces allegedly present in Lebanon and this would allow Damascus some breathing space.
However, Washington is moving fast ahead with efforts for Syria's total international isolation. Reports say that US National Security Council head Stephen Hadley has notified European Washington-based envoys of moves to cut off Damascus' international banking ties and the flow of international funds to and from Syria through Lebanese banks. The volume of these transfers is such that it could bankrupt Syria, according to the reports.
UN Middle East envoy Terje Roed-Larsen is visiting Europe, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Arab countries to finalise the US-Arab-European consensus on international sanctions against Syria, say reports.
Larsen will also visit Damascus next week to give the Syrian government a "last chance" to implement Security Council Resolution 1559 of September 2004 in full, or else face up to UN sanctions. French President Jacques Chirac has already ordered French ties with Damascus severed at all government levels.
Fears among opposition
The Lebanese opposition is also aware of the emerging dangers. All it might need is a carefully executed bomb attack to trigger off violent confrontation between Hizbollah and the opposition and it is not a secret that Israel has often resorted to such actions while arranging pointing fingers at the Lebanese themselves.
Junblatt, the Druze leader, is seeking to strengthen the international pressure on Syria by inviting more involvement by the European Union as well as Moscow.
At the same time, clearly keeping the risk factors in mind, he is also seeking a dialogue with Hizbollah.
"We are a democratic country. They have demonstrated their stand, they are part of the Lebanese. Hizbollah is part of the Lebanon," he said after talks with EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana.
"I do thank them because they have raised the Lebanese flag. So we have something in common. And this is why we should engage in dialogue."
Junblatt is hoping to get rid of the Syrians before general elections in May where he hopes that the opposition will put up a showing strong enough to form a government.
How far Hizbollah is willing to go in making a compromise in its position will be crucial to determining the course of events in Lebanon. If the Iranians and Syrians are determined to prevent, directly or indirectly, a dilution of their influences in Lebanese affairs, then Hizbollah would reflect that, but then it would become obvious that Damascus is not willing to let go of Lebanon. What happens next is anyone's guess, but the people of Lebanon, perfectly aware of the pitfalls of a violent confrontation, are smarter now than they were during the years of the civil war.
A compromise has to be found among the Lebanese themselves, but will the US and Israel step back from the kill that they have been waiting for long?
Saturday, March 05, 2005
Showdown in Lebanon
Lebanese crisis: Time for showdown
Washington has seized the Feb.14 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al Hariri to apply pressure on Syrian President Bashar Al Assad. On Wednesday, Bush demanded in blunt terms that Syria get out of Lebanon.
The scene for the ultimatum was set in a joint American-French statement issued in London by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier.
"Both of them stood up and said loud and clear to Syria, You get your troops and your secret services out of Lebanon so that good democracy has a chance to flourish," Bush said.
The president's forceful words clearly indicated a determination to see the affair through to the point that Syria would be left in a vulnerable position where it would not be able to influence the course of events in the Middle East or to insist on its terms for peace with Israel. In the bargain, Syria would also be pushed into a corner where it would not be able to take advantage of its alliance with Iran, according to the emerging scenario.
It would be naive to assume that Washington is overtly interested in ensuring that democracy prevails in Lebanon without external influence. The objective, as it would appear, is to remove Lebanon from the binding with Syria and make Lebanese-Israeli peace with no say from Damascus and then deal with Syria on its own.
French President Jacques Chirac might have had a personal consideration following the Hariri assassination since the slain billionaire was a personal friend.
Bush might have seen in Hariri a key Lebanese politician with enough influence to push through the agenda of severing the Syrian artery with Lebanon. And his assassination offered the perfect backdrop for stepping in with pressure for a final showdown.
Mounting pressure
That is what is happening today, with pressure mounting on Damascus through various avenues.
Washington and Israel hold Syria responsible for last Friday's bombing in Tel Aviv which killed four people and threatened the delicate Palestinian-Israeli truce that is essential for advancing prospects for negotiated peace in Palestine.
Rice has said that the US has proof that the Damascus-based Palestinian Islamic Jihad group was behind the bombing. Earlier, Israel alleged but reversed it quickly that Syrian-allied Lebanese Hizbollah was behind the attack. Islamic Jihad or Hizbollah, the target of the American-Israeli pressure was and continues to be Syria.
The resignation of the pro-Syrian government in Lebanon this week has set off the chain of events towards an end to the Syrian dominance of its neighour since mid-70s. It sets the course for a total reshaping of the geopolitical realities of the area.
Definitely, the resignation by the government headed by Rashid Karami was co-ordinated with the Syrian leadership which seems to have realised that Damascus has no choice but to succumb to
US and Israeli pressure and quit Lebanon.
Obviously, Assad is seeking a face-saving formula. It is speculated that he might be planning to endorse a government of technocrats and complete a military withdrawal from Lebanon before the end of the year. However, it would not be acceptable to the US and of course the Lebanese opposition because they want to end all Syrian influence in domestic affairs. The opposition wants a neutral government to prepare fair election, find Hariri's assassins and rid country of Syrian occupation.
Isolating Syria
Assad has denied Syrian involvement in the Hariri killing or the Tel Aviv suicide bombing, but those denials are ineffective against the determined American-Israeli drive to isolate Syria.
Washington has of course support from Paris, London and other European capitals as well as from the UN in the form of a firm warning issued by Secretary-General Kofi Annan that Syria complete its withdrawal from Lebanon by April or face international sanctions.
Damascus has responded by announcing a pullback of its forces to the Bekaa Valley and promising to co-operate with the UN team which began investigations into the bombing that killed Hariri and 16 others in Beirut.
It is unrealistic at this point to expect that Damascus could somehow hang on to its dominance in Lebanon. The US-Israeli drive is all too powerful this time around.
If anything, the possibility is real that Syria would face US-engineered international punitive action even it meets the UN demand for withdrawal and dismantling of the intelligence nexus between Syrian and Lebanese intelligence agencies.
Syria could escape the American hook if it were to agree to Israel's terms for peace without seeking the return of the Golan Heights. However, it is an unlikely prospect in the short term.
The US and Israel are not going to let Syria off until they are
satisfied that Damascus has ceased to be a challenge to Israeli domination of the region. The US and Israel are ready for American and allied military intervention in Syria and Assad does not have too many options except a face-saving exit from Lebanon as the starting point.
Assad has indicated in an interview with Time magazine that he would withdraw Syria's 15,000 troops from Lebanon "maybe in the next few months."
It was immediately rejected by US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Satterfield.
"Neither this government nor the people of Lebanon will believe anything other than what we see with our eyes," he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Lebanese opposition
In the meantime, the Lebanese opposition, riding high on the victory of having forced the resignation of the Karami government, is seeking to enlist the powerful Hizbollah in the opposition camp.
If Iran-backed Hizbollah moves to the opposition, then the demise of Syrian influence in Lebanon will be faster than expected.
"This week is going to be a very critical week," says Nizar Hamzeh, professor of politics at the American University of Beirut. "Either the country will emerge united in terms of forming a transitional government or ... if there are no concessions between the two sides,(pro-Syrian President Emile) Lahoud will have the choice of resigning or forming a military government," Hamzeh told the Christian Science Monitor.
Hamzeh said he believes that if Lahoud is cornered by the opposition, he may seek to form a military government rather than step down. "If the opposition accepts the resignation of the government as a major victory and is willing to compromise on a neutral government, the country might be saved by the skin of its teeth," he says.
The opposition groups are not backing down either. They are demanding that Lahoud must accept the demands before they would join any discussions on forming a new government.
The opposition position is clear: "The ... step that the opposition considers essential in its demands on the road to salvation and independence is the total withdrawal of the Syrian army and intelligence service from Lebanon," said an opposition statement issued this week.
"This step requires an official announcement from the Syrian president on the withdrawal of the Syrian forces and its intelligence from Lebanon," it said.
Druze leader Walid Junblatt explained that "these are the principles that the opposition defined ... Only if the authorities agree on these conditions we might take part (in talks on government) formation."
Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, a Syrian ally who heads the Shiite Amal militia, has warned against anyone "stepping into (a power) vacuum. Now everyone has to rise to the level of their national duty."
The opposition is insisting that a neutral government should be formed of people not standing in the May general elections and acceptable to most Lebanese.
Anti-Syrian alliance
Washington has offered to help conduct fair and free elections in Lebanon after Syria withdraws. The timing is also crucial here, with questions asked whether Syria could or would complete its withdrawal before the May elections.
It is widely held that fair and free elections, if held, will produce an anti-Syrian alliance that would create new facts on the ground that would not allow Damascus to even hope for a pre-Hariri assassination state of affairs.
However, given the depth of Syrian-Lebanese relations, Damascus does not necessarily have to be hostile to any government in Beirut.
"The crucial time will be from now until the elections," according to Ibrahim Hamidi, a Syrian political analyst and correspondent for the Arabic Al Hayat daily. "If the Syrians play the game cleverly, they can have good relations with any government in Beirut."
Junblatt has agreed with that.
"The Syrian-Lebanese security agencies should be dismantled next ... and Syrian forces must be withdrawn from Lebanon," he said last month." All this should be done without hostility to Syria. Hostility toward Syria will not be tolerated."
No matter how Damascus tried to play its hand, it is clear that the US remains ready to counter it if the game excludes a clean break in Damascus's authority to call the shots in Lebanon.
Clearly, Syria does not have many options. Under the geopolitical realities of the Middle East today, the only way out of the predicament for Damascus is to comply with the US demands while trying to save face. Otherwise, anything and everything is possible, including an American-French military intervention supported by Israel that would only add to the woes of the Arab World.
Washington has seized the Feb.14 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al Hariri to apply pressure on Syrian President Bashar Al Assad. On Wednesday, Bush demanded in blunt terms that Syria get out of Lebanon.
The scene for the ultimatum was set in a joint American-French statement issued in London by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier.
"Both of them stood up and said loud and clear to Syria, You get your troops and your secret services out of Lebanon so that good democracy has a chance to flourish," Bush said.
The president's forceful words clearly indicated a determination to see the affair through to the point that Syria would be left in a vulnerable position where it would not be able to influence the course of events in the Middle East or to insist on its terms for peace with Israel. In the bargain, Syria would also be pushed into a corner where it would not be able to take advantage of its alliance with Iran, according to the emerging scenario.
It would be naive to assume that Washington is overtly interested in ensuring that democracy prevails in Lebanon without external influence. The objective, as it would appear, is to remove Lebanon from the binding with Syria and make Lebanese-Israeli peace with no say from Damascus and then deal with Syria on its own.
French President Jacques Chirac might have had a personal consideration following the Hariri assassination since the slain billionaire was a personal friend.
Bush might have seen in Hariri a key Lebanese politician with enough influence to push through the agenda of severing the Syrian artery with Lebanon. And his assassination offered the perfect backdrop for stepping in with pressure for a final showdown.
Mounting pressure
That is what is happening today, with pressure mounting on Damascus through various avenues.
Washington and Israel hold Syria responsible for last Friday's bombing in Tel Aviv which killed four people and threatened the delicate Palestinian-Israeli truce that is essential for advancing prospects for negotiated peace in Palestine.
Rice has said that the US has proof that the Damascus-based Palestinian Islamic Jihad group was behind the bombing. Earlier, Israel alleged but reversed it quickly that Syrian-allied Lebanese Hizbollah was behind the attack. Islamic Jihad or Hizbollah, the target of the American-Israeli pressure was and continues to be Syria.
The resignation of the pro-Syrian government in Lebanon this week has set off the chain of events towards an end to the Syrian dominance of its neighour since mid-70s. It sets the course for a total reshaping of the geopolitical realities of the area.
Definitely, the resignation by the government headed by Rashid Karami was co-ordinated with the Syrian leadership which seems to have realised that Damascus has no choice but to succumb to
US and Israeli pressure and quit Lebanon.
Obviously, Assad is seeking a face-saving formula. It is speculated that he might be planning to endorse a government of technocrats and complete a military withdrawal from Lebanon before the end of the year. However, it would not be acceptable to the US and of course the Lebanese opposition because they want to end all Syrian influence in domestic affairs. The opposition wants a neutral government to prepare fair election, find Hariri's assassins and rid country of Syrian occupation.
Isolating Syria
Assad has denied Syrian involvement in the Hariri killing or the Tel Aviv suicide bombing, but those denials are ineffective against the determined American-Israeli drive to isolate Syria.
Washington has of course support from Paris, London and other European capitals as well as from the UN in the form of a firm warning issued by Secretary-General Kofi Annan that Syria complete its withdrawal from Lebanon by April or face international sanctions.
Damascus has responded by announcing a pullback of its forces to the Bekaa Valley and promising to co-operate with the UN team which began investigations into the bombing that killed Hariri and 16 others in Beirut.
It is unrealistic at this point to expect that Damascus could somehow hang on to its dominance in Lebanon. The US-Israeli drive is all too powerful this time around.
If anything, the possibility is real that Syria would face US-engineered international punitive action even it meets the UN demand for withdrawal and dismantling of the intelligence nexus between Syrian and Lebanese intelligence agencies.
Syria could escape the American hook if it were to agree to Israel's terms for peace without seeking the return of the Golan Heights. However, it is an unlikely prospect in the short term.
The US and Israel are not going to let Syria off until they are
satisfied that Damascus has ceased to be a challenge to Israeli domination of the region. The US and Israel are ready for American and allied military intervention in Syria and Assad does not have too many options except a face-saving exit from Lebanon as the starting point.
Assad has indicated in an interview with Time magazine that he would withdraw Syria's 15,000 troops from Lebanon "maybe in the next few months."
It was immediately rejected by US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Satterfield.
"Neither this government nor the people of Lebanon will believe anything other than what we see with our eyes," he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Lebanese opposition
In the meantime, the Lebanese opposition, riding high on the victory of having forced the resignation of the Karami government, is seeking to enlist the powerful Hizbollah in the opposition camp.
If Iran-backed Hizbollah moves to the opposition, then the demise of Syrian influence in Lebanon will be faster than expected.
"This week is going to be a very critical week," says Nizar Hamzeh, professor of politics at the American University of Beirut. "Either the country will emerge united in terms of forming a transitional government or ... if there are no concessions between the two sides,(pro-Syrian President Emile) Lahoud will have the choice of resigning or forming a military government," Hamzeh told the Christian Science Monitor.
Hamzeh said he believes that if Lahoud is cornered by the opposition, he may seek to form a military government rather than step down. "If the opposition accepts the resignation of the government as a major victory and is willing to compromise on a neutral government, the country might be saved by the skin of its teeth," he says.
The opposition groups are not backing down either. They are demanding that Lahoud must accept the demands before they would join any discussions on forming a new government.
The opposition position is clear: "The ... step that the opposition considers essential in its demands on the road to salvation and independence is the total withdrawal of the Syrian army and intelligence service from Lebanon," said an opposition statement issued this week.
"This step requires an official announcement from the Syrian president on the withdrawal of the Syrian forces and its intelligence from Lebanon," it said.
Druze leader Walid Junblatt explained that "these are the principles that the opposition defined ... Only if the authorities agree on these conditions we might take part (in talks on government) formation."
Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, a Syrian ally who heads the Shiite Amal militia, has warned against anyone "stepping into (a power) vacuum. Now everyone has to rise to the level of their national duty."
The opposition is insisting that a neutral government should be formed of people not standing in the May general elections and acceptable to most Lebanese.
Anti-Syrian alliance
Washington has offered to help conduct fair and free elections in Lebanon after Syria withdraws. The timing is also crucial here, with questions asked whether Syria could or would complete its withdrawal before the May elections.
It is widely held that fair and free elections, if held, will produce an anti-Syrian alliance that would create new facts on the ground that would not allow Damascus to even hope for a pre-Hariri assassination state of affairs.
However, given the depth of Syrian-Lebanese relations, Damascus does not necessarily have to be hostile to any government in Beirut.
"The crucial time will be from now until the elections," according to Ibrahim Hamidi, a Syrian political analyst and correspondent for the Arabic Al Hayat daily. "If the Syrians play the game cleverly, they can have good relations with any government in Beirut."
Junblatt has agreed with that.
"The Syrian-Lebanese security agencies should be dismantled next ... and Syrian forces must be withdrawn from Lebanon," he said last month." All this should be done without hostility to Syria. Hostility toward Syria will not be tolerated."
No matter how Damascus tried to play its hand, it is clear that the US remains ready to counter it if the game excludes a clean break in Damascus's authority to call the shots in Lebanon.
Clearly, Syria does not have many options. Under the geopolitical realities of the Middle East today, the only way out of the predicament for Damascus is to comply with the US demands while trying to save face. Otherwise, anything and everything is possible, including an American-French military intervention supported by Israel that would only add to the woes of the Arab World.
Tuesday, February 22, 2005
Political tsunami in Lebanon
February 21 2005
Hariri assassination a political tsunami
pv vivekanand
There could be a dozen varying political scenarios in the Lebanese-Syrian equation, but no matter how Damascus plays its hand, the American-led pressure being applied against Syria to withdraw its 13-15,000-strong military force in Lebanon will not be eased. The Bush administration has clearly signalled it and it has French support. There is very little the Syrian government of President Bashar Al Assad could do to withstand the pressure and play the brinkmanship of his late father Hafez Al Assad.
Damascus retains enough clout in the Lebanese parliament to resist a change in government through the legislative process, but it might not be enough. The Hariri assassination has brought together many non-political Lebanese with political parties and communities such as the Sunni camp led by the slain prime minister, the Maronite Christian community and the Druze from Shouf mountains in an alliance that would not have been thought possible.
Despite the mounting accusations that Syria had ordered the killing of Hariri since he had fallen out with Damascus and posed a challenge to Syrian interests in Lebanon, the prevailing belief in the region is that the Syrians are not that naive to believe that they could get away with it. Many are convinced that an external force, most likely Israel, was behind the assassination since the Jewish state stood to benefit most from the resulting crisis.
French President Jacques Chirac, a close friend of Hariri, has bluntly accused Syria and its allies in Lebanon of orchestrating his assassination and demanded an immediate international investigation. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said his country had reasons for strong suspicion that Syria was behind the killing.
Israel's drive
The effort to terminate the Syrian influence in Lebanese affairs could be interpreted as part of Israel's drive -- successful so far indeed -- to separate the "Arab confrontation states or parties" -- Egypt, the Palestinians, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria -- from each other and pre-empt a united Arab negotiating position in the Middle East conflict.
That was established in 1978 when Israel managed to negotiate with Egypt on its own and sign the Camp David agreements. Egypt's Anwar Sadat might have initiated the move, but he was nudged into that corner by the US.
The Camp David agreements removed Egypt as a "confrontation state" with Israel, which followed up with invading Lebanon in 1982 and tried in vain to install an Israeli-friendly regime in Beirut. Israel had no choice but to withdraw from Lebanon after a disastrous 17-year occupation of southern Lebanon in 1999.
One down, four to go.
Israel dismantled a joint Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating position launched at the international conference in Madrid in late 1991 by engaging the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in secret talks that led to the signing of the Israel-PLO Oslo agreements in September 1993 under American auspices.
As soon as reports of the secret talks came out, Jordan said it was dismantling the joint negotiating team, leaving the PLO to pursue its own track with Israel with no reflections on the Jordanian track.
Subsequently, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in October 1994 while the Jewish state kept the PLO engaged in "interim arrangements" pending "final status" negotiations in 1998.
Two down, two to go.
Now it is Lebanon's turn to be pried away. The first concrete step in this direction came when the UN Security Council adopted a US-backed resolution in September 2004. Resolution 1559 called on Syria to stop interfering in Lebanese affairs and withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Equally importantly, it said the Israeli-occupied Sheba Farms was seized from Syria in 1967 and not from Lebanon. It meant that no Lebanese territory was under Israeli occupation and therefore the Lebanese had no bilateral dispute with the Jewish state.
In order to fully assert for itself three down and one more to go, Israel needs to cut the Syrian-Lebanese artery as reflected in the strong Syrian influence in Lebanese politics, and this would be achieved when Damascus would find itself so much under international pressure that it would have no choice but to withdraw its forces from Lebanon and dismantle its intelligence network there. This was emphasised by US President George W Bush during his tour of Europe this week.
In a joint statement, Chirac and Bush said: "The United States and France join with the European Union and the international community in condemning the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, and in their support for a free, independent, and democratic Lebanon."
It added: "We urge full and immediate implementation of UN resolution 1559 in all its aspects."
Washington has recalled its ambassador to Syria following the assassination and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has stressed the distinction between holding Syria morally responsible for developments in Lebanon and directly accusing Damascus of Hariri's murder.
However, Chirac, whose country has close links with the Lebanese Christian community, made no such distinction and railed against Syria's intelligence services in Lebanon.
"It is not only the military occupation that is being questioned," Chirac told a news conference on Tuesday night in Brussels. "The special service operatives controlling Lebanon are in fact more questionable than the military occupation."
No doubt, the pressure against Syria would be intensified in the days ahead. That was noted by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who sent his intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, to Damascus with a message to Assad on Wednesday.
"Something has to happen because the situation is difficult now and (Syria) won't be able to stand against the pressures of the international community," said Mubarak. "But we must find solutions."
Mubarak, a veteran Arab leader, knows that the US and Israel have smelt blood and would tighten the screws against Assad to unbearable levels and would not let go until their goals are achieved even if it means destabilising Syria and Lebanon.
It would be an intelligent guess that Mubarak's message advises Assad not to engage in brinkmanship and accept the inevitability of having to relinquish his country's dominant role in Lebanon, particularly given the growing Lebanese opposition campaign against the Syrian presence in their midst.
Syria has already said that it remains committed to start withdrawing some troops from Lebanon soon in line with the Taif accord that ended Lebanon's 1975-90 civil war. Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq Sharaa said this month that he expected the troops to stay on in Lebanon for another two years.
The Taif agreement required the then 35,000-strong Syrian forces to withdraw to the eastern Bekaa region, close to the Syrian border, within two years. Syria periodically redeployed its troops, which now number 13-15,000. Syria did withdraw 3,000 troops from Beirut last year.
The Lebanese opposition has also called for implementation of the Taif agreement, but insists on a total Syrian pullout.
UN investigation
For purposes of legitimacy for the US-Israeli drive against Syria, a UN-appointed commission will investigate the Hariri killing and determine who was behind it.
The investigators, headed by Peter Fitzgerald, is due in Beirut on Friday and Lebanese Justice Minister Adnan Addoum has affirmed that the government is "ready to fully co-operate with the UN team, as long as Lebanese sovereignty is preserved."
However, few attach any hopes to the commission's effort since it seems to be a foregone conclusion that no investigation would ever reveal the real hands behind the Feb.14 explosion. Many see the UN investigation as a different version of the UN search in Iraq for (non-existent) weapons-of-mass -destruction -- the justification that the US offered before invading Iraq in March last year.
Analyst and commentator Samir Khalaf wrote: "Brutal and cold-blooded assassinations are an indelible feature of Lebanese political culture. Abominable as they are, usually such acts remain unexplained. The perpetrators and criminals are never recognised or brought to justice. Barely four months ago, former economy minister Marwan Hamade miraculously survived a bomb attack. If the same malicious forces were also behind Hariri's murder, and the incriminating traces are strewn all over, they made certain that providence would not this time foil their crime."
The prima facie evidence in the Hariri killing is so overwhelming that there is no doubt whatsoever that only a powerful government intelligence agency with extensive contacts and network in Lebanon could have carried out the assassination. The first candidate who fits the description is Syria, but that is the obvious conclusion. Equally strong in its intelligence network in Lebanon is Israel, whose notorious Mossad spy agency has a record of carrying out bombings and shootings in Lebanon although its role was never explicitly proved.
Given the benefits that Israel is reaping and hopes to reap from the scenario resulting from the assassination of Hariri, it would not be off the mark at all to line up Israel as the culprit. It is known for such deceptive tactics and it would not be the first or last time it would undertake such actions.
Heavily anti-Syrian
Where do the people of Lebanon -- the most important player in the equation -- fit into the scheme of things?
Politics apart, the message that is coming out of Lebanon is that the Hariri killing is heavily anti-Syrian.
One thing is clear: Many Lebanese want Syria to leave them alone. The assertion that the Lebanese are capable of looking after themselves without Syrian help has been heard for long.
Effectively, the Hariri killing brought those voices together as well as others who did not speak out earlier.
As Gibran Tueni, an opposition leader who publishes the Beirut Daily observes, "this is the beginning of something important. It's the first time in Lebanon you have Muslims, Christians and Druze asking for the same thing."
Tens of thousands of people have marched through the streets of Beirut in the largest anti-Syrian protests since the Hariri killing.
Lebanese opposition figures have seized on public anger to demand that Syria pull out and that the Beirut government it supports resigns.
Prime Minister Omar Karami, who succeeded Hariri as prime minister in October when the latter resigned in protest against Syrian moves to retain Emile Lahoud as president for another three years, has said he is ready to resign.
Lahoud himself spoke in a tougher tone. He was quoted as saying in a newspaper interview on Wednesday that the government cannot succumb to opposition demands.
Lahoud argued that the withdrawal of the Syrian army, which went to Lebanon as part of an Arab peacekeeping force under an Arab League mandate in 1976, can only be decided in line with the Taif agreement.
Confidence vote
If it comes to a vote of confidence in the 128-member parliament, the government would be unlikely to lose since it has a majority in the assembly, which will meet on Feb. 28 to question the government on who was behind the Hariri assassination.
Orchestrating the opposition are Druze leader Walid Junblatt, Maronite Catholic Archbishop Nasrallah Sfeir, and Sunni Muslims led by Bahaa Hariri, son of the slain president, with the blessing of the Sunni Muslim mufti of Lebanon.
Fears are indeed high that the country could slide back into civil war -- a prospect no one in the region wants.
Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has already issued a warning that the popular agitation against Syria's role on the country following the Hariri killing could plunge Lebanon into civil war again.
It all depends on how Damascus and the government in Beirut opt to deal with the mounting calls for a Syrian departure from Lebanon leading to a restructuring of the geopolitical balance that would work against Syria's strategic interests.
The opposition leaders determined to force the Syrian hand. They are said to be planning a series of "spectacular" shows of strength in Beirut aimed at paralysing government activity.
Parallel to that, they will also step up external pressure by organising rallies by Lebanese living outside the country, including the US, Europe, Middle East and Far East.
If the Syrians and government forces decide to use muscles to put down the growing agitation within Lebanon, then it is inevitable that violence would follow, but then it would invariably invite foreign military intervention, including a possible American-French alliance entering the country.
Mounting French pressure
If, on the other hand, Syria succumbs to the US-French pressure and quits Lebanon -- which is a likely scenario -- then the question that comes up is: How would the country's majority Shiites respond to the newfound strength of the Maronite Christians backed by the Hariri and Junblatt camps?
Experts familiar with the Iranian-backed Hizbollah, arguably the most organised group in Lebanon, say that the organisation is pragmatic and realistic to grasp that a return to arms is not an option and that it has to adjust its positions to the new realities emerging on the ground in the country.
Abdo Saad, a Lebanese analyst, says: "The good thing about Hizbollah is that their political discourse has been very moderate and they have won the respect and admiration of the opposition,
"Hizbollah has taken the initiative, which will be translated into dialogue with the opposition in the coming days. They want to find common ground."
In the meantime, the opposition is said to be seeking to split the Shiite ranks by enlisting the support of the parliament speaker, Nabih Berri, who heads the Shiite Amal movement, against Hizbollah. It is not yet clear how far vulnerable is Berri and his supporters to such pressure in the changing scenario where it is abundantly clear that the crisis is turning out to be a make-or-break situation for the country.
Lebanese intelligence
An immediate result of Berri joining the anti-Syrian group would be a green signal for an open debate in parliament about the Hariri killing where one of the opposition demands would be for questioning the Lebanese intelligence chief General Jamil Al Sayad as well as General Rostum Ghazallah of Syrian military intelligence.
Kuwait's Al Siyassah has named the two as behind the assassination.
"Those standing behind Hariri's death are Brigadier General Assef Shawkat, who recently became Syria's military-intelligence chief, Syrian Brigadier Bahjat Suleiman and Lebanese Brigadier Jamil Sayyed, who is known for his blind loyalty to the Syrian regime," according to the paper.
Junblatt has also openly declared that the Syrian-Lebanese intelligence services were behind Hariri's assassination, which came ahead of parliamentary elections in May where the Hariri-Sfeir-Junblatt alliance was expected to do well and gain a challenging position against Syria.
Former army commander General Michel Aoun, a bitter foe of the Syrians who lives in exile in France, says he expects the government to be toppled in a vote on Monday.
According to Aoun, although parliament was still made up of the same members who agreed to the extension of President Lahoud's mandate and approved the appointment of the Karami cabinet, the killing of Hariri has opened their eyes to the need for change.
If Karami steps down as prime minister before a vote, Damascus might try to use it as a tool to defuse the tensions, but it would be a fruitless exercise since the US and France would not settle for anything less than complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.
In Aoun's view, which he gave to Beirut's Daily Star newspaper in an interview, there is a strong international political will to pressure Syria into leaving Lebanon.
"The Syrians will be out before the parliamentary elections in Lebanon take place," he told the paper. "In case that does not happen, I am sure the international community will move. The issue is not a matter of bilateral relations between Syria and Lebanon anymore."
Syrian options
Syria might not have much of options at all except to bow to the American pressure unless it wishes to risk a military confrontation that would not stop anywhere short of a regime change in Damascus.
For more than a decade, Syria has seen steady pressure which it sees as aimed at stripping itself of what it considers as its strategic assets which it intends use in possible negotiations with Israel to secure the return of its Golan Heights.
Damascus also has economic interests in Lebanon. More than a quarter o million Syrians are employed in Lebanon, and they also control many businesses based in Lebanon. There is no definite figure on what percentage of Syria's gross domestic product comes from Lebanon, but it is indeed believed to be significant to the Syrian economy.
However, economic considerations might have to play second fiddle to political survival.
The US and Israel have always used every opportunity to apply pressure on Damascus, whether in the name of its alleged support for international terrorism, the presence of hard-line Palestinian groups in Syrian territory, the alleged flow of Iranian-supplied arms for Hizbollah for use against Israel, its alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (it is widely believed that it has chemical weapons), human rights and democracy, and charges that it is sheltering wanted Nazis.
Damascus has challenged the US on every count. It has been demanding an internationally accepted definition of terrorism and distinction between freedom fighters and resistance fighters. Over the last 15 years, it has toned down the activities of Palestinian groups after getting rid of groups like those led by Abu Nidal and Carlos the Jackal, a former ally of the PLO who was once described as the world's most wanted man.
Syria has asked the US to prove that Iranian arms are flowing through its territory to Lebanon. It has pointed out that it is not a signatory to the international convention on chemical weapons and therefore it is not violating any international law even if it -- hypothetically -- did have such arms.
It has also demanded that Israel prove with substantiation that Nazis are being sheltered in Syria.
However, all these challenges and affirmations did little to alleviate the pressure on Damascus if only because of the Israeli-backed American determination to "clip the Syrian wings" that challenge the American-Israeli designs in the region.
And, from the looks of things today, a head-on clash appears to be inevitable
Wednesday, February 16, 2005
Right partners in Iraq
February 16, 2005
Seeking right partner
SHIITES, the long-oppressed majority in Iraq, have done well in the Jan.30 elections, but they may have to make compromises with other groups since they failed to win an absolute two-third majority of the seats in the 275-member National Assembly.
The 47.6 per cent vote won by the Shiite list -- the United Iraqi Alliance -- endorsed by the country's senior-most Shiite religious leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani is far short of the two-third majority that would allow the group to form a government of its own.
Therefore it has to depend on other groups in a coalition arrangement. Indeed, some Shiites in the list are saying their showing in the elections qualifies them to reject the post-Saddam Hussein, US-drafted interim constitution that insists on a two-third parliamentary majority for a government. However, that would mean alienating the Kurds and another step towards disintegration of the country since the Kurds could break away from Baghdad and set up their own entity in the north if their emergence as kingmakers in the country is not recognised and respected.
Jaafari favourite
As of Wednesday, Ibrahim Al Jaafari, head of the Dawa Party, one of the two dominant groups in the Shiite list, who is a vice-president in the interim government, emerged as the favourite for the powerful post of prime minister in a Shiite-Kurdish alliance where the Kurds would be given the ceremonial post of president. They want Jalal Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, to be president.
The Kurds also want some key ministries in exchange for their supporting a Shiite prime minister and government.
The Kurds have won 25.4 per cent of the votes and it makes an ideal coalition partner, but then a Shiite-Kurdish coalition would technically" need another four per cent for a two-third majority.
However, in the final count, the Shiite list is expected to have about 140 seats -- two seats more than needed for a simple majority -- in the assembly once those votes that went to candidates who did not get enough to secure a seat are redistributed. The Kurds will have about 70 and interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's Iraqi National Accord (INA) will have 40. That meant a Shiite-Kurdish coalition having 210 seats, five seats more than a two-thirds majority.
A key factor here is the natural alliance between the Kurdish parties and the INA. Both sides are backed by the US and that had been the tie-up between them so far.
The INA got 13.6 per cent of the votes, and a hypothetical Kurdish-INA coalition -- which will have a combined strength of 110 seats in the assembly in the final count -- could prevent the Shiite list from forming a government without their support.
Definitely, the Kurds would not want to throw a spanner in the works since they are seeking the presidency and they need the Shiite list's backing in order to capitalise on their newfound legislative clout.
No doubt, the Americans, who have lost their bet on Allawi, could try to call the shots with the Kurds and force them into demanding that Allawi be named prime minister as a consensus candidate in return for the Kurd-INA alliance join the Shiite list in a coalition.
However, that would mean the Kurds demanding the posts of both president and prime minister, a demand that will surely be shot down by the Shiites.
Sunni political groups that shunned the election will be invited to participate in the new government and in drafting the constitution.
If whatever coalition that is formed wants to bring in the Sunnis, then the Sunnis have to be given at least one prominent position in the government. Again, that intensifies the battle for top posts.
The Shiite list had several aspirants for premiership. They included Adel Abdel Mahdi, the interim finance minister who belongs to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the other dominant group in the Shiite list, Ahmed Chalabi, once the candidate favoured by the US, and Hussein Shahristani, a physicist.
The SCIRI was reported to have withdrawn Mahdi's candidacy in favour of Jaafari on Wednesday and thus clearing the way for a Shiite-Kurdish alliance.
Allawi's importance
However, some analysts say it is too early to write off Allawi, a US-backed Shiite who describes himself as secular, as a compromise to unite religious and ethnic groups.
The other groups which fielded candidates in the elections did badly. The Sunni group of interim President Ghazi Al Yawar got one per cent of the votes; elder statesman Adnan Pachachi failed to win a single seat. In all, the Sunnis, most of whom stayed away or were prevented from voting, got five seats.
After the results of the elections are confirmed on Wednesday, if they are unchallenged, the National Assembly will approve a prime minister by early March.
There is a tacit agreement that the prime minister will be a Shiite, the president a Kurd and one of two vice presidents a Sunni.
However, the Kurds and Sunnis will not accept a clerical Shiite because they want to pre-empt Sharia, or Islamic law, being enshrined in the constitution as the primary source of law as suggested by some leaders of the Shiite alliance.
Sadr factor
In another blow to the US, Jaafari, who is emerging as the favourite to become the prime minister, wants to bring in Moqtada Sadr, a firebrand cleric who has challenged the US dominance of the country, into his cabinet.
At one point Sadr was among America's top enemies in Iraq, with the US military declaring him wanted dead or alive.
One of the first things that Sadr, who is known to have ties with figures in Iran, an archfoe of the US, did after the Jan.30 elections was to call for the US to set a deadline to leave Iraq.
No doubt, the neocon plotters of the invasion and occupation of Iraq are scratching their heads in Washington trying to figure a way out of the quagmire they created for the US by failing to take seriously the complexities of the Iraqi society and the forces that would emerge to the centre-stage once Saddam Hussein was toppled.
Indeed, they might manage to come up with a compromise. But then that would only be a stopgap measure since the going would get much tougher once the National Assembly gets down to drafting a permanent constitution that would be acceptable to the country's three major constituncies -- Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds -- given the deep divisions among them in perceptions of the future of Iraq.
Seeking right partner
SHIITES, the long-oppressed majority in Iraq, have done well in the Jan.30 elections, but they may have to make compromises with other groups since they failed to win an absolute two-third majority of the seats in the 275-member National Assembly.
The 47.6 per cent vote won by the Shiite list -- the United Iraqi Alliance -- endorsed by the country's senior-most Shiite religious leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani is far short of the two-third majority that would allow the group to form a government of its own.
Therefore it has to depend on other groups in a coalition arrangement. Indeed, some Shiites in the list are saying their showing in the elections qualifies them to reject the post-Saddam Hussein, US-drafted interim constitution that insists on a two-third parliamentary majority for a government. However, that would mean alienating the Kurds and another step towards disintegration of the country since the Kurds could break away from Baghdad and set up their own entity in the north if their emergence as kingmakers in the country is not recognised and respected.
Jaafari favourite
As of Wednesday, Ibrahim Al Jaafari, head of the Dawa Party, one of the two dominant groups in the Shiite list, who is a vice-president in the interim government, emerged as the favourite for the powerful post of prime minister in a Shiite-Kurdish alliance where the Kurds would be given the ceremonial post of president. They want Jalal Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, to be president.
The Kurds also want some key ministries in exchange for their supporting a Shiite prime minister and government.
The Kurds have won 25.4 per cent of the votes and it makes an ideal coalition partner, but then a Shiite-Kurdish coalition would technically" need another four per cent for a two-third majority.
However, in the final count, the Shiite list is expected to have about 140 seats -- two seats more than needed for a simple majority -- in the assembly once those votes that went to candidates who did not get enough to secure a seat are redistributed. The Kurds will have about 70 and interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's Iraqi National Accord (INA) will have 40. That meant a Shiite-Kurdish coalition having 210 seats, five seats more than a two-thirds majority.
A key factor here is the natural alliance between the Kurdish parties and the INA. Both sides are backed by the US and that had been the tie-up between them so far.
The INA got 13.6 per cent of the votes, and a hypothetical Kurdish-INA coalition -- which will have a combined strength of 110 seats in the assembly in the final count -- could prevent the Shiite list from forming a government without their support.
Definitely, the Kurds would not want to throw a spanner in the works since they are seeking the presidency and they need the Shiite list's backing in order to capitalise on their newfound legislative clout.
No doubt, the Americans, who have lost their bet on Allawi, could try to call the shots with the Kurds and force them into demanding that Allawi be named prime minister as a consensus candidate in return for the Kurd-INA alliance join the Shiite list in a coalition.
However, that would mean the Kurds demanding the posts of both president and prime minister, a demand that will surely be shot down by the Shiites.
Sunni political groups that shunned the election will be invited to participate in the new government and in drafting the constitution.
If whatever coalition that is formed wants to bring in the Sunnis, then the Sunnis have to be given at least one prominent position in the government. Again, that intensifies the battle for top posts.
The Shiite list had several aspirants for premiership. They included Adel Abdel Mahdi, the interim finance minister who belongs to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the other dominant group in the Shiite list, Ahmed Chalabi, once the candidate favoured by the US, and Hussein Shahristani, a physicist.
The SCIRI was reported to have withdrawn Mahdi's candidacy in favour of Jaafari on Wednesday and thus clearing the way for a Shiite-Kurdish alliance.
Allawi's importance
However, some analysts say it is too early to write off Allawi, a US-backed Shiite who describes himself as secular, as a compromise to unite religious and ethnic groups.
The other groups which fielded candidates in the elections did badly. The Sunni group of interim President Ghazi Al Yawar got one per cent of the votes; elder statesman Adnan Pachachi failed to win a single seat. In all, the Sunnis, most of whom stayed away or were prevented from voting, got five seats.
After the results of the elections are confirmed on Wednesday, if they are unchallenged, the National Assembly will approve a prime minister by early March.
There is a tacit agreement that the prime minister will be a Shiite, the president a Kurd and one of two vice presidents a Sunni.
However, the Kurds and Sunnis will not accept a clerical Shiite because they want to pre-empt Sharia, or Islamic law, being enshrined in the constitution as the primary source of law as suggested by some leaders of the Shiite alliance.
Sadr factor
In another blow to the US, Jaafari, who is emerging as the favourite to become the prime minister, wants to bring in Moqtada Sadr, a firebrand cleric who has challenged the US dominance of the country, into his cabinet.
At one point Sadr was among America's top enemies in Iraq, with the US military declaring him wanted dead or alive.
One of the first things that Sadr, who is known to have ties with figures in Iran, an archfoe of the US, did after the Jan.30 elections was to call for the US to set a deadline to leave Iraq.
No doubt, the neocon plotters of the invasion and occupation of Iraq are scratching their heads in Washington trying to figure a way out of the quagmire they created for the US by failing to take seriously the complexities of the Iraqi society and the forces that would emerge to the centre-stage once Saddam Hussein was toppled.
Indeed, they might manage to come up with a compromise. But then that would only be a stopgap measure since the going would get much tougher once the National Assembly gets down to drafting a permanent constitution that would be acceptable to the country's three major constituncies -- Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds -- given the deep divisions among them in perceptions of the future of Iraq.
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