Hizbollah factor

March 13 2005

The Hizbollah factor
pv vivekanand


In a show of strength Hizbollah organised a massive demonstration in Beirut on Tuesday. Its leader, Sheikh Hussein Nasrallah, is reportedly planning repeat rallies on Friday in Sidon in the south and in Tripoli in the north and on Monday in the Christian town of Dakhla on March 18. Obviously, the group is putting up a show of strength in a signal that although Syria is withdrawing its military forces from Beirut and its environs to the eastern Bekaa Valley -- and eventually across the border -- there is no scaling down of the Syrian influence in Lebanese politics. And that is worrying the Lebanese and people in the rest of the region.

No doubt, Hizbollah, which has proved itself to be pragmatic, does not want to rekindle the civil war by violently challenging the opposition grouping of a certain segment of the Sunni community led by Hariri's heirs, the Druze led by Walid Junblatt and the Maronite Christians led by Archbishop Nasrallah Sfeir.

Obviously, Hizbollah knows that it would have to take on the combined strength of the US, Israel and the Lebanese opposition if it were to start off a violent confrontation. At the same time, it cannot afford to let the opposition project an image that the Sunni-Druze-Maronite alliance represents the majority of Lebanese population.

No doubt, Iran, a close ally of Syria, played a key role in influencing the Hizbollah leadership to adopt a clear pro-Syrian political position in the crisis triggered by the Hariri assassination, where the opposition, backed by the US and France, is accusing Damascus of orchestrating the killing.

At the same time, Hizbollah cannot but be aware that if it allows the pro-American camp to assume the upper hand in Lebanese affairs, then it is inevitable that it would be one of the first targets for crackdown. Hizbollah would be asked to disarm its fighters and also face immense pressure to dilute its influence in the daily life of the Shiites in the country. That could come through state intervention in the affairs of the schools, hospitals and other organisations it runs for the Shiite community. If Hizbollah allows that to happen, its leaders believe, then it is the end of the group as a strong political force in Lebanon. Therefore, it has to stick with Syria.

Stepping up pressure

For good measure in their effort to keep the pressure mounting, the US and Israel have also accused Syria of harbouring the Palestinian group Islamic Jihad, which has claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv.

Damascus has rejected the allegations as unfounded, but it could not resist the American and UN pressure on it to withdraw from Lebanon, and hence the redeployment to the Bekaa Valley.

Syrian President Bashar Al Assad is trying to find a face-saving formula by showing that he is not succumbing to pressure. Hence there is only the redeployment and not a clear announcement of withdrawal of the forces to Syrian territory across the border. He is also trying to remove any justification for a possible isolation of his country through UN sanctions that could lead to external military intervention. Such action would not stop at nothing but "regime change" in Damascus -- an avowed objective of the pro-Israeli neo-conservative camp in Washington.

Obviously, Assad knows that his immediate move in Lebanon would be adjudged as "half measure" and would be rejected by the US and the Lebanese opposition. That is the reason for his comment during the announcement in parliament this week that "I know that the minute I finish this speech, they will say it is not enough. So I say it now: It is not enough."

Indeed, these are polemics. The reality on the ground is fraught with dangers.

It is very difficult for the Syrians to accept that they have to end their domination of Lebanon or face serious consequences. At the same time, Damascus has realised that the Bush administration would not let it off the hook. Even a complete Syrian departure from Lebanon would not lead to any easing of the American pressure. Assad is fully aware that Washington would not give him peace unless of course he sacrifices whatever Syria holds dear and near to itself as a staunch Arab nationalist and leader of the Arab struggle against Israel. Once that happens, then Syria would be forced into a corner and asked to sign on the dotted line of a peace accord with Israel where it would have to make major compromises over the Golan Heights.

Assad was hoping for Arab support in his stand-off with the US, but he found that Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the two Arab giants, urging him to withdraw his forces from Syria as the best option. Syria's neighbour Jordan also joined the call; so did his staunchest ally, Russia.

Dignified withdrawal

The Arab summit, scheduled to be held in Algiers on March 22 and 23, could come up with a formula that allows Syria to withdraw with some semblance of dignity. After all, it was under an Arab League mandate that Syria sent soldiers to Lebanon which was then in the throes of a civil war.

Again, the US might not want to allow Syria to retain any dignity if only because the American-Israeli gameplan is to strip Damascus of whatever "strategic assets" it might think it has. This includes the country's status as the last hold-out against Israel's expansionist ambitions in the region.

Indeed, Syria could, to a large extent, count on Iran as an ally, but the Iranians themselves are under immense US-led international pressure over their alleged plans to develop nuclear weapons.

Israeli intelligence reports -- "leaked" to the public domain -- allege that Syria has created joint units with Iranians and they are deployed in key points of Lebanon. The reports also allege that Iran has set up several radar stations in Lebanese territory in order to give the Syrians advance warning of any external military incursion.

According to a website (debka.com), which claims to carry Israeli "intelligence" findings, Iranian forces were airlifted to Syria on Feb.20, the same day that US President George W. Bush flew to meetings with European leaders.

"They were the tail end of the biggest military airlift Iran has launched in the Middle East to date. Its objective was to set up shared Iranian-Syrian safeguards against attacks on the Islamic Republic's nuclear installations and/or Syrian strategic targets," says the website.

"The fleet of Iranian military transports secretly off loaded complete elite units for operating, maintaining and guarding a sophisticated system of Iranian electronic warning stations, radar networks and anti-aircraft missiles to be deployed in Syria and Lebanon," it says. "More than 1,000 Iranian soldiers and technicians and 600 Revolutionary Guards commandos took up positions on the South Lebanese border with Israel, along the Syrian-Israeli Golan frontier to the south and up Syria's Mediterranean coastline to the west. They also spread out along Syria's northeastern frontier with Iraqi Kurdistan and its southern border with Iraq's Al Qaim and Al Anbar provinces."

Syria is purportedly hoping that the pressure would shift to Tehran and Hizbollah when the US seeks to evict the Iranian forces allegedly present in Lebanon and this would allow Damascus some breathing space.

However, Washington is moving fast ahead with efforts for Syria's total international isolation. Reports say that US National Security Council head Stephen Hadley has notified European Washington-based envoys of moves to cut off Damascus' international banking ties and the flow of international funds to and from Syria through Lebanese banks. The volume of these transfers is such that it could bankrupt Syria, according to the reports.

UN Middle East envoy Terje Roed-Larsen is visiting Europe, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Arab countries to finalise the US-Arab-European consensus on international sanctions against Syria, say reports.

Larsen will also visit Damascus next week to give the Syrian government a "last chance" to implement Security Council Resolution 1559 of September 2004 in full, or else face up to UN sanctions. French President Jacques Chirac has already ordered French ties with Damascus severed at all government levels.

Fears among opposition

The Lebanese opposition is also aware of the emerging dangers. All it might need is a carefully executed bomb attack to trigger off violent confrontation between Hizbollah and the opposition and it is not a secret that Israel has often resorted to such actions while arranging pointing fingers at the Lebanese themselves.

Junblatt, the Druze leader, is seeking to strengthen the international pressure on Syria by inviting more involvement by the European Union as well as Moscow.

At the same time, clearly keeping the risk factors in mind, he is also seeking a dialogue with Hizbollah.

"We are a democratic country. They have demonstrated their stand, they are part of the Lebanese. Hizbollah is part of the Lebanon," he said after talks with EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana.

"I do thank them because they have raised the Lebanese flag. So we have something in common. And this is why we should engage in dialogue."

Junblatt is hoping to get rid of the Syrians before general elections in May where he hopes that the opposition will put up a showing strong enough to form a government.

How far Hizbollah is willing to go in making a compromise in its position will be crucial to determining the course of events in Lebanon. If the Iranians and Syrians are determined to prevent, directly or indirectly, a dilution of their influences in Lebanese affairs, then Hizbollah would reflect that, but then it would become obvious that Damascus is not willing to let go of Lebanon. What happens next is anyone's guess, but the people of Lebanon, perfectly aware of the pitfalls of a violent confrontation, are smarter now than they were during the years of the civil war.

A compromise has to be found among the Lebanese themselves, but will the US and Israel step back from the kill that they have been waiting for long?

Showdown in Lebanon

Lebanese crisis: Time for showdown


Washington has seized the Feb.14 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al Hariri to apply pressure on Syrian President Bashar Al Assad. On Wednesday, Bush demanded in blunt terms that Syria get out of Lebanon.

The scene for the ultimatum was set in a joint American-French statement issued in London by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier.

"Both of them stood up and said loud and clear to Syria, You get your troops and your secret services out of Lebanon so that good democracy has a chance to flourish," Bush said.

The president's forceful words clearly indicated a determination to see the affair through to the point that Syria would be left in a vulnerable position where it would not be able to influence the course of events in the Middle East or to insist on its terms for peace with Israel. In the bargain, Syria would also be pushed into a corner where it would not be able to take advantage of its alliance with Iran, according to the emerging scenario.

It would be naive to assume that Washington is overtly interested in ensuring that democracy prevails in Lebanon without external influence. The objective, as it would appear, is to remove Lebanon from the binding with Syria and make Lebanese-Israeli peace with no say from Damascus and then deal with Syria on its own.

French President Jacques Chirac might have had a personal consideration following the Hariri assassination since the slain billionaire was a personal friend.

Bush might have seen in Hariri a key Lebanese politician with enough influence to push through the agenda of severing the Syrian artery with Lebanon. And his assassination offered the perfect backdrop for stepping in with pressure for a final showdown.

Mounting pressure

That is what is happening today, with pressure mounting on Damascus through various avenues.

Washington and Israel hold Syria responsible for last Friday's bombing in Tel Aviv which killed four people and threatened the delicate Palestinian-Israeli truce that is essential for advancing prospects for negotiated peace in Palestine.

Rice has said that the US has proof that the Damascus-based Palestinian Islamic Jihad group was behind the bombing. Earlier, Israel alleged but reversed it quickly that Syrian-allied Lebanese Hizbollah was behind the attack. Islamic Jihad or Hizbollah, the target of the American-Israeli pressure was and continues to be Syria.

The resignation of the pro-Syrian government in Lebanon this week has set off the chain of events towards an end to the Syrian dominance of its neighour since mid-70s. It sets the course for a total reshaping of the geopolitical realities of the area.

Definitely, the resignation by the government headed by Rashid Karami was co-ordinated with the Syrian leadership which seems to have realised that Damascus has no choice but to succumb to

US and Israeli pressure and quit Lebanon.

Obviously, Assad is seeking a face-saving formula. It is speculated that he might be planning to endorse a government of technocrats and complete a military withdrawal from Lebanon before the end of the year. However, it would not be acceptable to the US and of course the Lebanese opposition because they want to end all Syrian influence in domestic affairs. The opposition wants a neutral government to prepare fair election, find Hariri's assassins and rid country of Syrian occupation.

Isolating Syria

Assad has denied Syrian involvement in the Hariri killing or the Tel Aviv suicide bombing, but those denials are ineffective against the determined American-Israeli drive to isolate Syria.

Washington has of course support from Paris, London and other European capitals as well as from the UN in the form of a firm warning issued by Secretary-General Kofi Annan that Syria complete its withdrawal from Lebanon by April or face international sanctions.

Damascus has responded by announcing a pullback of its forces to the Bekaa Valley and promising to co-operate with the UN team which began investigations into the bombing that killed Hariri and 16 others in Beirut.

It is unrealistic at this point to expect that Damascus could somehow hang on to its dominance in Lebanon. The US-Israeli drive is all too powerful this time around.

If anything, the possibility is real that Syria would face US-engineered international punitive action even it meets the UN demand for withdrawal and dismantling of the intelligence nexus between Syrian and Lebanese intelligence agencies.

Syria could escape the American hook if it were to agree to Israel's terms for peace without seeking the return of the Golan Heights. However, it is an unlikely prospect in the short term.

The US and Israel are not going to let Syria off until they are

satisfied that Damascus has ceased to be a challenge to Israeli domination of the region. The US and Israel are ready for American and allied military intervention in Syria and Assad does not have too many options except a face-saving exit from Lebanon as the starting point.

Assad has indicated in an interview with Time magazine that he would withdraw Syria's 15,000 troops from Lebanon "maybe in the next few months."

It was immediately rejected by US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Satterfield.

"Neither this government nor the people of Lebanon will believe anything other than what we see with our eyes," he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Lebanese opposition

In the meantime, the Lebanese opposition, riding high on the victory of having forced the resignation of the Karami government, is seeking to enlist the powerful Hizbollah in the opposition camp.

If Iran-backed Hizbollah moves to the opposition, then the demise of Syrian influence in Lebanon will be faster than expected.

"This week is going to be a very critical week," says Nizar Hamzeh, professor of politics at the American University of Beirut. "Either the country will emerge united in terms of forming a transitional government or ... if there are no concessions between the two sides,(pro-Syrian President Emile) Lahoud will have the choice of resigning or forming a military government," Hamzeh told the Christian Science Monitor.

Hamzeh said he believes that if Lahoud is cornered by the opposition, he may seek to form a military government rather than step down. "If the opposition accepts the resignation of the government as a major victory and is willing to compromise on a neutral government, the country might be saved by the skin of its teeth," he says.

The opposition groups are not backing down either. They are demanding that Lahoud must accept the demands before they would join any discussions on forming a new government.

The opposition position is clear: "The ... step that the opposition considers essential in its demands on the road to salvation and independence is the total withdrawal of the Syrian army and intelligence service from Lebanon," said an opposition statement issued this week.

"This step requires an official announcement from the Syrian president on the withdrawal of the Syrian forces and its intelligence from Lebanon," it said.

Druze leader Walid Junblatt explained that "these are the principles that the opposition defined ... Only if the authorities agree on these conditions we might take part (in talks on government) formation."

Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, a Syrian ally who heads the Shiite Amal militia, has warned against anyone "stepping into (a power) vacuum. Now everyone has to rise to the level of their national duty."

The opposition is insisting that a neutral government should be formed of people not standing in the May general elections and acceptable to most Lebanese.

Anti-Syrian alliance

Washington has offered to help conduct fair and free elections in Lebanon after Syria withdraws. The timing is also crucial here, with questions asked whether Syria could or would complete its withdrawal before the May elections.

It is widely held that fair and free elections, if held, will produce an anti-Syrian alliance that would create new facts on the ground that would not allow Damascus to even hope for a pre-Hariri assassination state of affairs.

However, given the depth of Syrian-Lebanese relations, Damascus does not necessarily have to be hostile to any government in Beirut.

"The crucial time will be from now until the elections," according to Ibrahim Hamidi, a Syrian political analyst and correspondent for the Arabic Al Hayat daily. "If the Syrians play the game cleverly, they can have good relations with any government in Beirut."

Junblatt has agreed with that.

"The Syrian-Lebanese security agencies should be dismantled next ... and Syrian forces must be withdrawn from Lebanon," he said last month." All this should be done without hostility to Syria. Hostility toward Syria will not be tolerated."

No matter how Damascus tried to play its hand, it is clear that the US remains ready to counter it if the game excludes a clean break in Damascus's authority to call the shots in Lebanon.

Clearly, Syria does not have many options. Under the geopolitical realities of the Middle East today, the only way out of the predicament for Damascus is to comply with the US demands while trying to save face. Otherwise, anything and everything is possible, including an American-French military intervention supported by Israel that would only add to the woes of the Arab World.

Political tsunami in Lebanon

February 21 2005
Hariri assassination a political tsunami

pv vivekanand

There could be a dozen varying political scenarios in the Lebanese-Syrian equation, but no matter how Damascus plays its hand, the American-led pressure being applied against Syria to withdraw its 13-15,000-strong military force in Lebanon will not be eased. The Bush administration has clearly signalled it and it has French support. There is very little the Syrian government of President Bashar Al Assad could do to withstand the pressure and play the brinkmanship of his late father Hafez Al Assad.
Damascus retains enough clout in the Lebanese parliament to resist a change in government through the legislative process, but it might not be enough. The Hariri assassination has brought together many non-political Lebanese with political parties and communities such as the Sunni camp led by the slain prime minister, the Maronite Christian community and the Druze from Shouf mountains in an alliance that would not have been thought possible.
Despite the mounting accusations that Syria had ordered the killing of Hariri since he had fallen out with Damascus and posed a challenge to Syrian interests in Lebanon, the prevailing belief in the region is that the Syrians are not that naive to believe that they could get away with it. Many are convinced that an external force, most likely Israel, was behind the assassination since the Jewish state stood to benefit most from the resulting crisis.
French President Jacques Chirac, a close friend of Hariri, has bluntly accused Syria and its allies in Lebanon of orchestrating his assassination and demanded an immediate international investigation. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said his country had reasons for strong suspicion that Syria was behind the killing.
Israel's drive
The effort to terminate the Syrian influence in Lebanese affairs could be interpreted as part of Israel's drive -- successful so far indeed -- to separate the "Arab confrontation states or parties" -- Egypt, the Palestinians, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria -- from each other and pre-empt a united Arab negotiating position in the Middle East conflict.
That was established in 1978 when Israel managed to negotiate with Egypt on its own and sign the Camp David agreements. Egypt's Anwar Sadat might have initiated the move, but he was nudged into that corner by the US.
The Camp David agreements removed Egypt as a "confrontation state" with Israel, which followed up with invading Lebanon in 1982 and tried in vain to install an Israeli-friendly regime in Beirut. Israel had no choice but to withdraw from Lebanon after a disastrous 17-year occupation of southern Lebanon in 1999.

One down, four to go.

Israel dismantled a joint Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating position launched at the international conference in Madrid in late 1991 by engaging the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in secret talks that led to the signing of the Israel-PLO Oslo agreements in September 1993 under American auspices.
As soon as reports of the secret talks came out, Jordan said it was dismantling the joint negotiating team, leaving the PLO to pursue its own track with Israel with no reflections on the Jordanian track.
Subsequently, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in October 1994 while the Jewish state kept the PLO engaged in "interim arrangements" pending "final status" negotiations in 1998.
Two down, two to go.
Now it is Lebanon's turn to be pried away. The first concrete step in this direction came when the UN Security Council adopted a US-backed resolution in September 2004. Resolution 1559 called on Syria to stop interfering in Lebanese affairs and withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Equally importantly, it said the Israeli-occupied Sheba Farms was seized from Syria in 1967 and not from Lebanon. It meant that no Lebanese territory was under Israeli occupation and therefore the Lebanese had no bilateral dispute with the Jewish state.
In order to fully assert for itself three down and one more to go, Israel needs to cut the Syrian-Lebanese artery as reflected in the strong Syrian influence in Lebanese politics, and this would be achieved when Damascus would find itself so much under international pressure that it would have no choice but to withdraw its forces from Lebanon and dismantle its intelligence network there. This was emphasised by US President George W Bush during his tour of Europe this week.
In a joint statement, Chirac and Bush said: "The United States and France join with the European Union and the international community in condemning the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, and in their support for a free, independent, and democratic Lebanon."
It added: "We urge full and immediate implementation of UN resolution 1559 in all its aspects."
Washington has recalled its ambassador to Syria following the assassination and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has stressed the distinction between holding Syria morally responsible for developments in Lebanon and directly accusing Damascus of Hariri's murder.
However, Chirac, whose country has close links with the Lebanese Christian community, made no such distinction and railed against Syria's intelligence services in Lebanon.
"It is not only the military occupation that is being questioned," Chirac told a news conference on Tuesday night in Brussels. "The special service operatives controlling Lebanon are in fact more questionable than the military occupation."
No doubt, the pressure against Syria would be intensified in the days ahead. That was noted by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who sent his intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, to Damascus with a message to Assad on Wednesday.
"Something has to happen because the situation is difficult now and (Syria) won't be able to stand against the pressures of the international community," said Mubarak. "But we must find solutions."
Mubarak, a veteran Arab leader, knows that the US and Israel have smelt blood and would tighten the screws against Assad to unbearable levels and would not let go until their goals are achieved even if it means destabilising Syria and Lebanon.
It would be an intelligent guess that Mubarak's message advises Assad not to engage in brinkmanship and accept the inevitability of having to relinquish his country's dominant role in Lebanon, particularly given the growing Lebanese opposition campaign against the Syrian presence in their midst.
Syria has already said that it remains committed to start withdrawing some troops from Lebanon soon in line with the Taif accord that ended Lebanon's 1975-90 civil war. Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq Sharaa said this month that he expected the troops to stay on in Lebanon for another two years.
The Taif agreement required the then 35,000-strong Syrian forces to withdraw to the eastern Bekaa region, close to the Syrian border, within two years. Syria periodically redeployed its troops, which now number 13-15,000. Syria did withdraw 3,000 troops from Beirut last year.
The Lebanese opposition has also called for implementation of the Taif agreement, but insists on a total Syrian pullout.
UN investigation
For purposes of legitimacy for the US-Israeli drive against Syria, a UN-appointed commission will investigate the Hariri killing and determine who was behind it.
The investigators, headed by Peter Fitzgerald, is due in Beirut on Friday and Lebanese Justice Minister Adnan Addoum has affirmed that the government is "ready to fully co-operate with the UN team, as long as Lebanese sovereignty is preserved."
However, few attach any hopes to the commission's effort since it seems to be a foregone conclusion that no investigation would ever reveal the real hands behind the Feb.14 explosion. Many see the UN investigation as a different version of the UN search in Iraq for (non-existent) weapons-of-mass -destruction -- the justification that the US offered before invading Iraq in March last year.
Analyst and commentator Samir Khalaf wrote: "Brutal and cold-blooded assassinations are an indelible feature of Lebanese political culture. Abominable as they are, usually such acts remain unexplained. The perpetrators and criminals are never recognised or brought to justice. Barely four months ago, former economy minister Marwan Hamade miraculously survived a bomb attack. If the same malicious forces were also behind Hariri's murder, and the incriminating traces are strewn all over, they made certain that providence would not this time foil their crime."
The prima facie evidence in the Hariri killing is so overwhelming that there is no doubt whatsoever that only a powerful government intelligence agency with extensive contacts and network in Lebanon could have carried out the assassination. The first candidate who fits the description is Syria, but that is the obvious conclusion. Equally strong in its intelligence network in Lebanon is Israel, whose notorious Mossad spy agency has a record of carrying out bombings and shootings in Lebanon although its role was never explicitly proved.
Given the benefits that Israel is reaping and hopes to reap from the scenario resulting from the assassination of Hariri, it would not be off the mark at all to line up Israel as the culprit. It is known for such deceptive tactics and it would not be the first or last time it would undertake such actions.

Heavily anti-Syrian

Where do the people of Lebanon -- the most important player in the equation -- fit into the scheme of things?
Politics apart, the message that is coming out of Lebanon is that the Hariri killing is heavily anti-Syrian.
One thing is clear: Many Lebanese want Syria to leave them alone. The assertion that the Lebanese are capable of looking after themselves without Syrian help has been heard for long.
Effectively, the Hariri killing brought those voices together as well as others who did not speak out earlier.
As Gibran Tueni, an opposition leader who publishes the Beirut Daily observes, "this is the beginning of something important. It's the first time in Lebanon you have Muslims, Christians and Druze asking for the same thing."
Tens of thousands of people have marched through the streets of Beirut in the largest anti-Syrian protests since the Hariri killing.
Lebanese opposition figures have seized on public anger to demand that Syria pull out and that the Beirut government it supports resigns.
Prime Minister Omar Karami, who succeeded Hariri as prime minister in October when the latter resigned in protest against Syrian moves to retain Emile Lahoud as president for another three years, has said he is ready to resign.
Lahoud himself spoke in a tougher tone. He was quoted as saying in a newspaper interview on Wednesday that the government cannot succumb to opposition demands.
Lahoud argued that the withdrawal of the Syrian army, which went to Lebanon as part of an Arab peacekeeping force under an Arab League mandate in 1976, can only be decided in line with the Taif agreement.
Confidence vote
If it comes to a vote of confidence in the 128-member parliament, the government would be unlikely to lose since it has a majority in the assembly, which will meet on Feb. 28 to question the government on who was behind the Hariri assassination.
Orchestrating the opposition are Druze leader Walid Junblatt, Maronite Catholic Archbishop Nasrallah Sfeir, and Sunni Muslims led by Bahaa Hariri, son of the slain president, with the blessing of the Sunni Muslim mufti of Lebanon.
Fears are indeed high that the country could slide back into civil war -- a prospect no one in the region wants.
Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has already issued a warning that the popular agitation against Syria's role on the country following the Hariri killing could plunge Lebanon into civil war again.
It all depends on how Damascus and the government in Beirut opt to deal with the mounting calls for a Syrian departure from Lebanon leading to a restructuring of the geopolitical balance that would work against Syria's strategic interests.
The opposition leaders determined to force the Syrian hand. They are said to be planning a series of "spectacular" shows of strength in Beirut aimed at paralysing government activity.
Parallel to that, they will also step up external pressure by organising rallies by Lebanese living outside the country, including the US, Europe, Middle East and Far East.
If the Syrians and government forces decide to use muscles to put down the growing agitation within Lebanon, then it is inevitable that violence would follow, but then it would invariably invite foreign military intervention, including a possible American-French alliance entering the country.
Mounting French pressure
If, on the other hand, Syria succumbs to the US-French pressure and quits Lebanon -- which is a likely scenario -- then the question that comes up is: How would the country's majority Shiites respond to the newfound strength of the Maronite Christians backed by the Hariri and Junblatt camps?
Experts familiar with the Iranian-backed Hizbollah, arguably the most organised group in Lebanon, say that the organisation is pragmatic and realistic to grasp that a return to arms is not an option and that it has to adjust its positions to the new realities emerging on the ground in the country.
Abdo Saad, a Lebanese analyst, says: "The good thing about Hizbollah is that their political discourse has been very moderate and they have won the respect and admiration of the opposition,
"Hizbollah has taken the initiative, which will be translated into dialogue with the opposition in the coming days. They want to find common ground."
In the meantime, the opposition is said to be seeking to split the Shiite ranks by enlisting the support of the parliament speaker, Nabih Berri, who heads the Shiite Amal movement, against Hizbollah. It is not yet clear how far vulnerable is Berri and his supporters to such pressure in the changing scenario where it is abundantly clear that the crisis is turning out to be a make-or-break situation for the country.

Lebanese intelligence

An immediate result of Berri joining the anti-Syrian group would be a green signal for an open debate in parliament about the Hariri killing where one of the opposition demands would be for questioning the Lebanese intelligence chief General Jamil Al Sayad as well as General Rostum Ghazallah of Syrian military intelligence.
Kuwait's Al Siyassah has named the two as behind the assassination.
"Those standing behind Hariri's death are Brigadier General Assef Shawkat, who recently became Syria's military-intelligence chief, Syrian Brigadier Bahjat Suleiman and Lebanese Brigadier Jamil Sayyed, who is known for his blind loyalty to the Syrian regime," according to the paper.
Junblatt has also openly declared that the Syrian-Lebanese intelligence services were behind Hariri's assassination, which came ahead of parliamentary elections in May where the Hariri-Sfeir-Junblatt alliance was expected to do well and gain a challenging position against Syria.
Former army commander General Michel Aoun, a bitter foe of the Syrians who lives in exile in France, says he expects the government to be toppled in a vote on Monday.
According to Aoun, although parliament was still made up of the same members who agreed to the extension of President Lahoud's mandate and approved the appointment of the Karami cabinet, the killing of Hariri has opened their eyes to the need for change.
If Karami steps down as prime minister before a vote, Damascus might try to use it as a tool to defuse the tensions, but it would be a fruitless exercise since the US and France would not settle for anything less than complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.
In Aoun's view, which he gave to Beirut's Daily Star newspaper in an interview, there is a strong international political will to pressure Syria into leaving Lebanon.
"The Syrians will be out before the parliamentary elections in Lebanon take place," he told the paper. "In case that does not happen, I am sure the international community will move. The issue is not a matter of bilateral relations between Syria and Lebanon anymore."

Syrian options

Syria might not have much of options at all except to bow to the American pressure unless it wishes to risk a military confrontation that would not stop anywhere short of a regime change in Damascus.
For more than a decade, Syria has seen steady pressure which it sees as aimed at stripping itself of what it considers as its strategic assets which it intends use in possible negotiations with Israel to secure the return of its Golan Heights.
Damascus also has economic interests in Lebanon. More than a quarter o million Syrians are employed in Lebanon, and they also control many businesses based in Lebanon. There is no definite figure on what percentage of Syria's gross domestic product comes from Lebanon, but it is indeed believed to be significant to the Syrian economy.
However, economic considerations might have to play second fiddle to political survival.
The US and Israel have always used every opportunity to apply pressure on Damascus, whether in the name of its alleged support for international terrorism, the presence of hard-line Palestinian groups in Syrian territory, the alleged flow of Iranian-supplied arms for Hizbollah for use against Israel, its alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (it is widely believed that it has chemical weapons), human rights and democracy, and charges that it is sheltering wanted Nazis.
Damascus has challenged the US on every count. It has been demanding an internationally accepted definition of terrorism and distinction between freedom fighters and resistance fighters. Over the last 15 years, it has toned down the activities of Palestinian groups after getting rid of groups like those led by Abu Nidal and Carlos the Jackal, a former ally of the PLO who was once described as the world's most wanted man.
Syria has asked the US to prove that Iranian arms are flowing through its territory to Lebanon. It has pointed out that it is not a signatory to the international convention on chemical weapons and therefore it is not violating any international law even if it -- hypothetically -- did have such arms.
It has also demanded that Israel prove with substantiation that Nazis are being sheltered in Syria.
However, all these challenges and affirmations did little to alleviate the pressure on Damascus if only because of the Israeli-backed American determination to "clip the Syrian wings" that challenge the American-Israeli designs in the region.
And, from the looks of things today, a head-on clash appears to be inevitable

Right partners in Iraq

February 16, 2005

Seeking right partner


SHIITES, the long-oppressed majority in Iraq, have done well in the Jan.30 elections, but they may have to make compromises with other groups since they failed to win an absolute two-third majority of the seats in the 275-member National Assembly.

The 47.6 per cent vote won by the Shiite list -- the United Iraqi Alliance -- endorsed by the country's senior-most Shiite religious leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani is far short of the two-third majority that would allow the group to form a government of its own.

Therefore it has to depend on other groups in a coalition arrangement. Indeed, some Shiites in the list are saying their showing in the elections qualifies them to reject the post-Saddam Hussein, US-drafted interim constitution that insists on a two-third parliamentary majority for a government. However, that would mean alienating the Kurds and another step towards disintegration of the country since the Kurds could break away from Baghdad and set up their own entity in the north if their emergence as kingmakers in the country is not recognised and respected.

Jaafari favourite

As of Wednesday, Ibrahim Al Jaafari, head of the Dawa Party, one of the two dominant groups in the Shiite list, who is a vice-president in the interim government, emerged as the favourite for the powerful post of prime minister in a Shiite-Kurdish alliance where the Kurds would be given the ceremonial post of president. They want Jalal Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, to be president.

The Kurds also want some key ministries in exchange for their supporting a Shiite prime minister and government.

The Kurds have won 25.4 per cent of the votes and it makes an ideal coalition partner, but then a Shiite-Kurdish coalition would technically" need another four per cent for a two-third majority.

However, in the final count, the Shiite list is expected to have about 140 seats -- two seats more than needed for a simple majority -- in the assembly once those votes that went to candidates who did not get enough to secure a seat are redistributed. The Kurds will have about 70 and interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's Iraqi National Accord (INA) will have 40. That meant a Shiite-Kurdish coalition having 210 seats, five seats more than a two-thirds majority.

A key factor here is the natural alliance between the Kurdish parties and the INA. Both sides are backed by the US and that had been the tie-up between them so far.

The INA got 13.6 per cent of the votes, and a hypothetical Kurdish-INA coalition -- which will have a combined strength of 110 seats in the assembly in the final count -- could prevent the Shiite list from forming a government without their support.

Definitely, the Kurds would not want to throw a spanner in the works since they are seeking the presidency and they need the Shiite list's backing in order to capitalise on their newfound legislative clout.

No doubt, the Americans, who have lost their bet on Allawi, could try to call the shots with the Kurds and force them into demanding that Allawi be named prime minister as a consensus candidate in return for the Kurd-INA alliance join the Shiite list in a coalition.

However, that would mean the Kurds demanding the posts of both president and prime minister, a demand that will surely be shot down by the Shiites.

Sunni political groups that shunned the election will be invited to participate in the new government and in drafting the constitution.

If whatever coalition that is formed wants to bring in the Sunnis, then the Sunnis have to be given at least one prominent position in the government. Again, that intensifies the battle for top posts.

The Shiite list had several aspirants for premiership. They included Adel Abdel Mahdi, the interim finance minister who belongs to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the other dominant group in the Shiite list, Ahmed Chalabi, once the candidate favoured by the US, and Hussein Shahristani, a physicist.

The SCIRI was reported to have withdrawn Mahdi's candidacy in favour of Jaafari on Wednesday and thus clearing the way for a Shiite-Kurdish alliance.

Allawi's importance

However, some analysts say it is too early to write off Allawi, a US-backed Shiite who describes himself as secular, as a compromise to unite religious and ethnic groups.

The other groups which fielded candidates in the elections did badly. The Sunni group of interim President Ghazi Al Yawar got one per cent of the votes; elder statesman Adnan Pachachi failed to win a single seat. In all, the Sunnis, most of whom stayed away or were prevented from voting, got five seats.

After the results of the elections are confirmed on Wednesday, if they are unchallenged, the National Assembly will approve a prime minister by early March.

There is a tacit agreement that the prime minister will be a Shiite, the president a Kurd and one of two vice presidents a Sunni.

However, the Kurds and Sunnis will not accept a clerical Shiite because they want to pre-empt Sharia, or Islamic law, being enshrined in the constitution as the primary source of law as suggested by some leaders of the Shiite alliance.

Sadr factor

In another blow to the US, Jaafari, who is emerging as the favourite to become the prime minister, wants to bring in Moqtada Sadr, a firebrand cleric who has challenged the US dominance of the country, into his cabinet.

At one point Sadr was among America's top enemies in Iraq, with the US military declaring him wanted dead or alive.

One of the first things that Sadr, who is known to have ties with figures in Iran, an archfoe of the US, did after the Jan.30 elections was to call for the US to set a deadline to leave Iraq.

No doubt, the neocon plotters of the invasion and occupation of Iraq are scratching their heads in Washington trying to figure a way out of the quagmire they created for the US by failing to take seriously the complexities of the Iraqi society and the forces that would emerge to the centre-stage once Saddam Hussein was toppled.

Indeed, they might manage to come up with a compromise. But then that would only be a stopgap measure since the going would get much tougher once the National Assembly gets down to drafting a permanent constitution that would be acceptable to the country's three major constituncies -- Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds -- given the deep divisions among them in perceptions of the future of Iraq.

Allawi deatl a big blow

BY PV VIVEKANAND

THE future of interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and through him the American plans in have been dealt a severe blow by the wide margin that the Shiite list endorsed by Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani has gained in the Jan.30 elections.
Indeed, there is an off-chance that Allawi could still emerge as a compromise candidate and seek to hang onto the job as prime-ministership based on the votes that the country's northern Kurdish groups gained in the elections. However, the Shiite list is unlikely to accept Allawi as prime minister. One of it leaders, Ibrahim Al Jafaari, has already staked a claim to that job.
On its own, the group led by Allawi and President Ghazi Al Yawar is seen as securing around 15 per cent of the votes cast, but they could team up with the Kurds, who are expected to gain around 20 per cent of the votes. Thus the strength of the Allawi-Kurd alliance would be around 35 per cent of the total votes cast for the 275-member assembly. That is enough to give Allawi the bargaining power to prevent the United Iraqi Alliance of the Sistani camp from going ahead on its own and form a government since it would denied the required two-thirds majority in the assembly.
The Allawi-Yawar group also benefited from the support of Ayatollah Hussein Sadr of Baghdad, who does not agree with the way Sistani leads the Shiite community.
How Yawar, head of a powerful Sunni-Shiite tribe, would fit into the scheme of things is unclear yet.
In the final count, the United Iraqi Alliance list of 228 candidates representing 16 political groups headed by Abdul Aziz Al Hakim’s Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Jafaari’s Al Daawa is expected to gain up to 140 to150 seats on its own and thus emerge as the largest party but it would have to depend on potential coalition partners to form a two-third majority government.
The main Shite list contender against Jaafari to the post of prime minister is said to be Adel Abdel Mahdi, who is now finance minister.
Aziz Hakim, the cleric who headed the list, has indicated he is not interested in prime ministership.
The Kurds — represented by the United Kurdish list set up jointly by Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani — could turn out to be the kingmakers here. They account for about two million of the eight million votes cast, and this is seen to give them around 60 seats, or around 20 to 22 per cent of the votes compared with their 16 to 18 per cent content in the Iraqi population (the Kurds are accused artificially inflating their support in Kirkuk by importing tens of thousands of armed voters from across Kurdistan. Turkey, alarmed by the growing strength of the Kurds, has demanded an American explanation and has hinted at the use of Turkish military force to rectify the distortion). The Kurds also garnered some 400,000 overseas voters in the United States and Europe.
Again, the Kurds on their own could not prevent the formation of a Sistani camp government. They have to team up with the Allawi group, but the two are natural allies, given that both of them enjoy American backing and have been in the forfront of implementing American-designed programmes in the country since the ouster of Saddam Hussein.
In yet another slap to the US, Jaafari, who is emerging as the favourite to become the next prime minister of Iraq, wants to bring in Moqtada Sadr, a firebrand cleric who has challenged the US dominance of the country, into his cabinet.
In a series of interviews over the weekend, Jafaari described Sadr as a responsible person who is capable of contributing to the reconstruction of Iraq.
Jafaari noted that Moqtadr Sadr's father was killed by Saddam Hussein, and the young cleric has a large number of followers.
At one point Sadr was among America's top enemies in Iraq, with the US military declaring him wanted dead or alive.
Sadr called on Friday for the US to set a deadline to leave Iraq, something Washington is not prepared to do. Sadr is also known to have ties with figures in Iran, an archfoe of the US.
Allawi is trying to jockey himself into a position as a consensus candidate for premiership. However, unless his group and the rest of other parties, including the powerful Kurds, come up with an absolute one-third of the votes, the United Iraqi List will have an open ground and a free hand — with two-thirds of the vote — to form a government on its own without any challenge.
That would be clear in about a week's time.

Squeezing Syria

February 10 2005

Squeezing Syria

pv vivekanand

THE US and Israel are engaged in an effort to strip Syria of what it considers as its strategic assets and bargaining chips in regaining its Golan Heights from Israeli occupation and affirming its role as a key regional player. Obviously, Damascus is resisting the pressure because it is aware that meeting the American/Israeli demands would leave it vulnerable and force it to accept Israeli terms for "peace" that would not involve the return of the Golan Heights to Syrian sovereignty. At the same time, Syria is willing to meet the demands half-way at this point, with the other half being met only in the context of a firm and irreversible peace deal that ensures the return of the Golan Heights and preserves Arab national dignity. That Syrian position clashes head on with the American/Israeli determination to deprive Damascus of negotiating strengths before trying to force down its throat the Israeli version of a deal for peace. As such, it is unlikely that any moves would materialise soon to bring Israel and Syria to the negotiating table.

Hopes were raised that moves would be made towards reviving Syrian-Israeli peace talks along with the effort to relaunch Israeli-Palestinian peace talks at the Sharm Al Sheikh summit on Tuesday. However, instead of responding positively to Syrian calls for resumption of talks, the US has opted to tighten pressure on Damascus by insisting that it is supporting "terrorism" and "destabilising" the region. The Middle East does not need to be told whose actions have destabilised and continue to destabilise the region; all it needs is a look at Iraq, but then that is only part of the scenario. People in this region know that Syria is serious in its efforts to engage Israel in genuine negotiations and secure the return of the Golan Heights, which the Jewish state occupied in the 1967 war. The US also knows Damascus is serious, but Washington is playing to the tunes of Israel, which is not interested in talks with Syria until it becomes clear that the return of the Golan is not central to making peace. In simple terms, Israel wants Syria to come to the negotiating table without demanding the return of the Golan and then the mighty Jewish state might consider making peace on its own terms. This is the equation today.

Meeting requirements

The pattern of Syrian moves and public statements clearly establishes that Damascus is trying to meet the basic American-dictated requirements for resumption of talks, but it finds some of those demands as part of the American/Israeli agenda to weaken it. These include:

-- Suspending alleged support for groups and individuals waging the guerrilla war in Iraq across the border. The problem here is that the US has not been specific in pinpointing the groups and alleged groups and individuals it says are based in Syria. Media reports in the US have named some, but it has not been established that those people are indeed present in Syria. Indeed, some of them have been proved to be based in Europe. But the same media organisations which carried the initial allegation are not willing to acknowledge it. Furthermore, it goes against the Arab nationalist grain of Syria to launch a crackdown on Iraqis present in the country and hand over suspects to the US as Washington demands. Obviously Damascus believes that doing so would deprive it of the image it has built for itself as a staunch defender of Arab rights, which Arab nationalists see as at stake in Iraq under American occupation. Complying with the American demand would mean, in Syria's eyes as well as those of a majority in the Arab World, that Damascus is co-operating with plots that aim at establishing American/Israeli superiority in the region.

Backing talks

-- Supporting the ongoing moves to revive Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Syria has already affirmed its backing for the moves and implicitly expressed hope that they would lead to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Leaders of Palestinian groups waging armed resistance in the occupied territories and opposing the US-sponsored peace talks are indeed present in Syrian territory, but there is little substance to American and Israeli contentions that they are behind the actual resistance operations, which Washington and Tel Aviv describe as terrorism (Incidentally, Syria has for long been calling for an international definition of "terrorism" and set a clear line between acts of legitimate resistance and terrorist actions and the US has always stonewalled the Syrian call).

-- Withdrawing Syrian soldiers from Lebanon and stop "meddling" in Lebanese affairs. Syria has already pulled back part of its 15,000-strong unit deployed in Lebanon and is expected to complete the pullback by the end of this year. However, the second part of the American demand is difficult to be met, given the traditionally strong links between Syria and Lebanon. Damascus considers its influence in Lebanon as natural and its right as a regional player, but it would be ready to scale it down in the context of a peace agreement with Israel. Again, the problem here is that the US wants it the other way around.

-- Withdrawing support for groups such as Lebanon's Hizbollah. Again, contrary of the blanket American and Israeli assertion that Damascus pulls the Hizbollah strings, people in this region know that the Syrian-Hizbollah link is very delicate. Hizbollah leaders would listen to Syria only as far as it suits their thinking and what they consider as their interests, and the equation would be scrambled if Damascus tried to twist their arms.

In that hypothesis, Hizbollah could threaten Syrian interests in Lebanon and, obviously, Damascus fails to see why it should initiate moves in that direction at this point in time.

Similarly, Syria would not stand in the way of Iranian-Hizbollah relations because of the alliance between Damascus and Tehran, the two capitals which are being targeted by the US after ousting Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

The impression that one gets is clear: Syria is ready to do what it takes for peace and stability in the region, but the US and Israel want to strip Damascus of what it considers as its strategic assets that strengthen its position in negotiations with Israel. Syria might indeed be amenable to adjusting its positions but these could come only after a peace agreement is worked out with Israel based on Syria's legitimate political and territorial rights.

That brings up the key question whether Israel would ever respect the Syrian rights?

Source of water

One thing is clear: Israel has no intention of returning the Golan Heights to Syria, not because of the "strategic military value" of the plateau that overlooks northern Israel but because it is the main source of water for the Jewish state.

Given the scarcity of water in the region and its paranoia of being hemmed in by upstream neighbour Syria, Israel would never give up the Golan. At best, it might be willing to make a face-saving compromise for Syria by returning part of the Golan and would never agree to return the whole of the strategic Heights, which overlook the See of Galilee in northern Israel.

Israeli paranoia

Israel argues that since the Golan overlooks northern Israeli towns a withdrawal from the Heights would leave northern Israeli towns vulnerable to Syrian missile and infantry attacks. Given that Syria possesses missiles capable of hitting almost everywhere in Israel, the "security" claim has always sounded hollow.

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has consistently opposed a withdrawal from the Syrian plateau. Sharon's predecessor, Ehud Barak, offered to withdraw from parts of the Heights in 2000, but insisted on retaining some of the territory. Syria insisted on the entire area be returned to it.

Notwithstanding the Israeli posture in the negotiations, it was clear that it was only seeking to put up insurmountable hurdles in the Syrian quest for the return of the Golan.

An Israeli army general said in August last year that his country does not need to keep the Golan Heights under occupation in what was seen as boasting by the Israeli military that it is capable of "defending" Israel without having military forces present on the Heights.

The general's statement was only an affirmation that retaining the Golan Heights is not central to Israeli security and was not seen as an indication that Israel might consider returning to Syria.

That water plays the central role in the Israeli posture is clear.

Sharon, a military general who has also served as Israel's minister of defence as well as of water, could not but be acutely aware of the importance of the Golan Heights for his country's paranoia and preoccupation with securing water sources.

The Golan is the source for more than 55 per cent of Israel's fresh water needs.

Given the scarcity of water in the region, Israel would never give up the Golan. At best, it might be willing to make a face-saving compromise by returning part of the Golan but would never agree to return the whole of the Heights.

Securing water sources has been an Israeli priority since its founding in 1948 and it remains a preoccupation today; the per capita consumption of water in Israel is eight times that of the Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank, which accounts for 18 per cent of Israel's needs of drinking water.

In 1950, the then Israeli prime minister, Ben Gurion, declared that Jews were fighting a "battle for water" and that the Jewish existence in Palestine was contingent on the outcome of such a battle.

Some 20,000 Jewish settlers live on the Golan Heights and Israel has launched expansion projects on the Heights.

Seen in light of these realities, it is not surprising that the US-Israeli camp is stepping up pressure on Syria. It is highly unlikely that there would be any positive response to the Syrian overtures for peace talks until the US and Israel are convinced that they would be able to twist the Syrian arm into accepting a deal that excludes the return of the Golan Heights in a manner that satisfies the Syrians.

Shape of things in Iraq

THE SHAPE of things to come in Iraq remains blurred as the counting of the ballots cast in Sunday's elections has ended and the numbers and details are being fed into computers before the results are formally announced, perhaps next week. Political bargaining seems to have already started among groups on forming a coalition government based on an asusmption that no group would win a two-third majority in the polls. The insurgents are active, but the new reality of an elected assembly in the country could act as a counterforce against them, particularly given that the elections themselves seems to have given a new spirit to most Iraqis, writes 'Inad Khairallah
The Jan.30 elections in Iraq were generally hailed across the world as a success, mostly because millions of Iraqis turned out to vote despite the very real danger to their life posed by insurgents who had threatened to hit anyone and everyone who participated in the process.
Was it a success of the tight security arrangement organised by the US-led coalition forces?
Or was it a success because the Iraqis voted for the first time in 50 years in an environment free from coercion?
Or was it a success because relatively few people died in insurgent attacks on election day?
Or was it a success because the US showed the world that it could organise elections in a chaotic country like Iraq after messing it up?
Or was it a success because the election was the harbinger of American-style democracy in an Arab country that has known only autocracy in its recent history?
Above all, whose success was it?
Was it American? Was it Shiite? Was it Iraqi?
The answers to all these question might probably be: "A combination of all these and more."
US President George W Bush was to outline his plans for Iraq a few after print time, but no surprises were expected from him. His campaign to convince other world leaders that the new government emerging from the elections should be supported clearly indicated that he is staying the course without committing himself to any deadline for an American withdrawal from Iraq.
Simply put, there is no "exit strategy"; at least not yet.
In the meantime, questions are also many over the options of the various parties involved in Iraq, and all eyes are on the majority Shiite community led by Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani.
In an interview with Democracy Now! one day after the Jan.30 elections, respected British journalist Robert Fisk gave his assessment. Here are some major excerpts:
"As a person who is regularly cynical about the Middle East, and I think with good reason, it was a very moving experience to see so many hundreds and thousands of Shiite Muslims in Baghdad walking against the sound of bombs and mortar fire.
.".... The Shiites decided to vote. They abided by the instructions of the supreme Shiite leader, the marja, Ali Al Sistani who said it was more important to vote than fasting at Ramadan or prayer.
"The catch, of course, is that the Shiites were not voting for democracy, although they'd very much like to have it and believe in it. Many of them expressed their views forthrightly inside the polling station. They were coming to vote because Sistani told them to. 'We're coming to vote because we weren't allowed to do so before. We're coming to vote because we want the Americans to leave.'
"Now it is all very well for the American media that they came to vote for democracy. They probably did. But they also came because they think and believe and are convinced of the fact that by voting that they'll have a free country without an occupation force. If they are denied this, if they feel they are betrayed that their vote is worth nothing, of course a different question arises.
"What will they think of democracy and will they join the insurgency? "The Kurds, of course, voted for their own autonomy and they are the most pro-American of all Iraqis and in a sense, you see, although they voted in the Iraqi election, they were in a sense trying to continue to vote themselves out of Iraq. The more autonomy they had, and the flags you saw in the streets were Kurdistan not Iraqi, the nearer they are to the independents which Kurdish people have been demanding for so many decades. Indeed at least 200 years.
"So, what you've got was an election which showed immense courage on behalf of the Shiites. Perhaps less courage on the Kurds who anyways live in the most stable area of Iraq. Nonetheless, they went to vote and have been threatened in the past and a total abstention by Sunni Muslims and the latter, of course, is — this is the problem.
"If there is to be a national assembly, which is generally representative of the Iraqi people and this election was for a government, not for an assembly to choose a constitution, upon which there must be a referendum, another election for a new government, and then what is the legitimacy of a new parliament? It's 20 per cent of the population. The only section of the population which is actively and violently resisting the Americans is not represented. This is the real problem, you see. Either the Shiites are going to find themselves betrayed because what they want is not going to be forthcoming; of course they want to run the next government. They want to be -- they would like this to be a Shia country. They don't want an Islamic republic, but they want power because they are 60 per cent of the population and for 100 years, they haven't been able to be represented in that way.
"What this election has done is not actually a demonstration of people who demand democracy, but they want freedom of a different kind, freedom to vote, but also freedom from foreign occupation. And if they are betrayed in this, then we are going to look back and regret the broken promises. But certainly even the Iraqi soldiers guarding one of the polling stations and the fact that they were all wearing black hoods so they couldn't be identified tells you the dismal sense of security here with the same thing -- we want the Americans to go. But, of course, we're not seeing any promises to do that.
ghdad where the elections have just concluded.
"The issue is what is going to be the American involvement in providing Iraq with its next interim government. Again, I repeat this election was for a national assembly to write a constitution, which will have to be approved by a referendum, which in December there would then have to be another election for a real quote-unquote government.
The issue here you see is this: In the aftermath of these elections and we don't know the results and won't know them for days to come, it is quite possible that the administration here, which, of course, is effectively in the hands of the United States and here Ambassador (John) Negroponte will be involved, will try to form a government coalition. This would include certain leading Shiite politicians who won seats in yesterday's election. It would include some Sunnis who were running, in some cases, on Shiite tickets. This was a list system, proportional representation election, and of course, it would undoubtedly include some Kurds. Now, it would look very nice and democratic and free if a coalition government could include Shiites and Sunnis and Kurds. And that I'm sure is what the Americans would like to see. But then the largest Shiite alliance, which scored seats in the election, could turn out to be the official opposition and Shiites would then say, well, it is very nice to have this lovely coalition of all our ethnic groups. But we won the election. We are 60 per cent of the people and now we're in a coalition where we don't have the majority of power and our largest party is confined to being the opposition in parliament. And that, at the moment, is the biggest danger, that we're going to see such administrative refining of the results that we will produce and Westernise infinitely fair coalition government comprising Sunnis and Shiites and Kurds, but which will not represent the overall election results, which must show a Shiite majority.
"I mean there are actually members of the largest alliance of Shiite groups saying now that they are certain they've got more than 50 per cent of the vote.... . Now if that's the case, the Shiites will say, well hold on a second, we're the majority, we got the most votes, we got the greatest number of seats and you are making us part of a coalition and the biggest party of the opposition in parliament and that, of course, would then be betrayal just as it would be if they suddenly signed that the American and British and other foreign forces, they are not going to leave.
"So, we eventually – I mean we set up an enormous amount of expectations for this election. And I have got to admit, I have to admit having seen it and been there and walked with people to the polling stations in Baghdad, that the Shiites who wanted to vote did so unanimously and with great courage.
"Are they now going to be portrayed by the slippery process of coalitioning a government, which will suit the West, which will, of course, include Kurds and then of course must include some Sunnis as well or are they going to be effectively told, ok, the Shiites now have what you people in America like to call empowerment. This is now effectively a Shiite republic, not an Islamic republic, but this country is a Shiite country, which it is, of course, in real life. Will the election result, will the parliament, will the next government actually reflect the reality on the ground? If it does, then we are moving if it doesn't, then it would be better that the elections would not be held."
Fisk has been following the developments in Iraq firsthand and he should know. And there would not be many people who would disagree with his assessment.
For one thing, barring wholesale twisting, it is clear that the Sistani camp would emerge as the majority winner in the elections, and it will be Sistani who would be calling the shots on the shape of the next government.
Although it might take a few days more before the winners are announced, leaders of political parties have already started hard bargaining to form a new Iraqi government.
The United Iraqi Alliance, which has Sistani's backing, is likely to be pitted against a group led by the interim prime minister, Ayad Allawi, the race to form the government.
Both groups have pledge that they are committed to a secular Iraq and want all sects of the country to have a share in government.
There are Sunni candidates who are in the lists of both groups and their presence would lend legitimacy to the coalition government's set-up. However, Wednesday's declaration by the major Sunni alliance which called for a boycott of the polls that the Sunnis would not recognise the post-election government has thrown a major dampner on hopes of a smooth creation and functioning of an executive authority in the country.
The interim constitution says that the elected 275-member National Assembly must first choose a president and two deputies by a two-thirds majority. The president and deputies then pick a party or coalition, along with its choice of a prime minister, to form a government. Simply put, a two-third majority of the assembly is an absolute must for anyone hoping to gain power.
It is deemed unlikely that the Sistani camp would secure an absolute two-third majorty of the seats that it needs to form a government on its own. Leaders of the United Iraqi Alliance say the do have a formula to form a government, but Allawi's Iraqi List could foil their plans if it on its own or with coalition partners manage to secure more one third of the seats. It could then block emergence of the Shiite coalition to power.
Then there could only be a compromise:, Allawi offers himself to the coalition as a candidate for prime minister, or he could try to pick off members of the Shiite coalition and make a coalition for himself.
How would that go down with people like Ahmed Chalabi, who has a running conflict with Allawi?
In the meantime, it remains to be seen whether the success of the election is the beginning of the end of the insurgency since it seems to have given a newfound uplift to the mindset of the people of Iraq.
It all depends on how soon a government will be set up in Iraq and how the insurgents would deal with the new reality that, despite flaws, the country now has an assembly of elected representatives and would soon have a government.

Russian bear missiling its way?

February 2 2005
Russian bear on a comeback trail
pvvivekanand


RUSSIA is staging a political and military comeback to the Middle East. President Vladimir Putin is keen on it and so are several Arab players, including the Syrians and Palestinians, as well as Iran, which would like to use Moscow as an ally in its running feud with the US.

Predictably, Israel is worried and the US has mounted a campaign to ensure that Russia does not pose a direct or indirect threat to the combined American-Israeli interests to contain any regional challenge to the Jewish state's military supremacy and quest for regional domination.

Putin does not have to work too hard to regain the foothold that the former Soviet Union had in the Middle East. The channels and tracks are there for him to return. Moscow has always championed the Palestinian cause, maintained a strong and steady relationship with Syria and refused to back down from its nuclear deals with Iran despite intense American pressure.

However, it kept a low profile in the region's political affairs in the last decade, and now, it seems, Putin has realised the time is opportune to strengthen the profile. No doubt, he is aware that American-Arab relations are under a strain following the Sept.11, 2001 attacks in the US, the American invasion and occupation of Iraq and Washington's firming up of its alliance with Israel; and hence a Russian alignment with the Arab position would be welcomed with enthusiasm.

He is also aware that the US involvement in Iraq has turned problematic for Washington and things could turn worse for the Bush administration there. The Russian president would like his country to be on the spot to take advantage of the situation. It suits him well to use the Syrian, Palestinian and Iranian cards to stake a fresh claim for a prominent Russian role in the Middle East. And that is what he is trying to accomplish.

At the same time, it is subject to debate how influential a political role Putin could play in the Middle East amid the US efforts to reshape the region to suit American-Israeli interests, starting with Iraq and continuing with Syria, Iran, Lebanon and other countries.

That Russia is returning to the scene was made clear with the visit to Moscow last month of two key Mideastern players -- the Syrian and Palestinian presidents.

Syrian President Bashar Al Assad's visit resulted in Putin deciding to write off nearly $10 billion of Syria's military debts and advancing a deal under which Russia will supply anti-aircraft missiles to Syria.

Israel's worry

Israel has been pressuring Russia against the missile deal and Putin was reported to have assured Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that the sale was not imminent, but that does not seem to have soothed Israeli fears.

Reports in the Israeli press indicate that Syria and Russia are close to finalising the $70 million deal for the sale of 20 SA-18 Igla-S batteries mounted on armoured personnel carriers.

The SA-18 Igla-S is one of the most effective missiles against low-flying aircraft on the market. The Syrians were supposed to have received the shoulder-held version of the missiles, but American pressure forced Russia to amend the deal. Now they would be mounted on APCs and Russia says they would not be operative if detached from the APC moorings.

Syria has also acquired Kornet AT-14 anti-tank missiles from Eastern Europe.

Washington's warning

In both cases, Washington has warned that if those weapons turn up in Iraq or Lebanon, America will be free to take military action against Syria.

Assad has defended his country's right to acquire surface-to-air missiles from Russia saying "these are weapons for air defence, meant to prevent aircraft from intruding in our airspace."

Israeli analyst Gerald Steinberg has said that Syrian possession of the Russian missiles "is very problematic and will pose a challenge to Israeli military planners."

In talks with Putin, Bashar gave an explicit invitation to Russia to come back to the political scene in the Middle East by reviving its Soviet-era influence in the region.

"Russia has an enormous role, and has a lot of respect from Third World countries ... which really hope that Russia will try to revive the positions it used to hold," Assad said in Moscow. He also used the opportunity to slam American policy, saying the US approach to Iraq was "disastrous."

Moscow has several times condemned the American threat to Syria of sanctions if Damascus did not withdraw its alleged support for guerrillas fighting the US-led coalition forces in Iraq and "terrorists" -- meaning Palestinian groups based in Syrian territory.

Russia abstained on a vote in the UN Security Council in September on a joint US-French resolution demanding the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and non-interference in the Lebanese presidential elections.

Russia has described Syria as one of its "most important partners" in the Middle East.

During Assad's visit, Russia and Syria signed a number of oil, gas and transport-related deals aimed at reviving business ties.

Putin and Assad also used the visit to declare that Russia and Syria were fully supportive of efforts by the new Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, to resume peace talks with Israel.

Abbas himself was in Moscow late last month. At the end of the visit, he and Putin signed a joint statement pledging commitment to the Quartet-backed road map plan and calling for Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a step towards peace.

It was Abbas's first official visit abroad after being elected successor to Yasser Arafat and he described it as a show of "the respect the Palestinian people feel towards the Russian people and it shows the important role that Russia plays on the world arena, above all in the Middle East, namely in the Quartet, in which Russia is a most notable representative."

The joint statement said that within the framework of the road-map plan, Russia and Palestine believe Israel must withdraw troops from Gaza and the West Bank, a move that would serve as the "first step in ending the Israeli occupation of Palestine."

"There is no doubt Russia's presence on our side, our co-operation on a bilateral basis, its role in the mediating Quartet will be decisive in establishing peace in the Middle East," said Abbas.

Role in Iran

On the Iranian front, the Russians are said to be building a strong air defence system around Iran's key nuclear installations to ward off possible American or Israeli attacks against them after Moscow undertook to secure Iran's nuclear industry. A secret Moscow-Tehran agreement includes the supply and installation of sophisticated air defence equipment to military planning and operational co-operation, according to reports.

The first phase of the work was over in mid-January when Russian experts from the Raduga OKB engineering group in Dubna near Moscow completed the installation of two advanced radar systems around the Bushehr nuclear reactor on the Gulf. Work is under way on the second phase, with the Russians installing the same system at Iran's uranium enrichment plants -- which the US says could be used for military purposes -- in Isfahan in central Iran.

These improved mobile 36D6 systems, code named Tin Shield, upgraded the air defence radar protecting Iran's key nuclear facilities from missile attack, according to military experts and intelligence reports.

The Tin Shield 36D6 is a mobile radar system designed to detect air targets and perform friend-or-foe identification. It is highly effective in detecting low, medium and high altitude targets moving at almost any speed, including winged missiles and American or Israeli cruise missiles. It is capable of providing the target and bearing of active jamming, as well as integrated computer-aided systems of control and guidance of anti-aircraft missile complexes.

Tin Shield can operate independently as an observation and air detection post, as part of computer-aided control systems or as an element in an anti-air guided missile complex, where it carries out reconnaissance and targeting.

By providing the system to the Iranians, Moscow has placed a serious hurdle in the way of any American and Israel military action to curb Iran's nuclear armament.

Couple that with the missile deal with Syria, and no wonder Israel and the US are upset.

However, it remains to be seen how Putin opts to play his cards.

American-Russian relations, with Putin at the helm in Moscow, have at best been ambiguous. While Putin needs American-supported Western assistance, he has often rebelled against Washington on issues that are of deep concern to Russia. It could not be judged whether he is a friend or foe of the US because of his mercurial behaviour.

Indeed, Washington strategists have their general assessment of what to expect from Putin, but it is unlikely that they could predict with any accuracy how he would turn at any given point. Their best understanding of the man seems to be based on intelligent guesswork at times of crises.

Some might argue Moscow never left the Middle Eastern scene, but a close observation would clearly indicate that it was too preoccupied with internal issues since the collapse of the Soviet Union to adopt an effective stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is not that Putin has now settled his domestic problems to rest and is turning to the Middle East. Regardless of the issues at home, he needs to re-establish a Russian role as the US pursues its effort to reshape the Middle East.

Russia could not afford to miss the opportunity to place itself as a counterforce -- regardless of its actual impact on the ground -- to the US if only to build its political and economic relations with the Arab World and that is the driving force behind Putin.

The unknown in the equation is how far he would push it and whether he would step back when the going gets tough with the US.

Seizure in absentia

January 21 2005


Israel-Palestine conflict: Seizure 'in absentia'

pv vivekanand

THIS WEEK'S Israeli seizure of large tracts of Palestinian-owned land near occupied Jerusalem is a clear indicator of the shape of things to come under Ariel Sharon's unilateral plans regardless of whatever else is going on in terms of efforts to revive Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

Consolidating Israel's illegal presence in the West Bank while withdrawing from the troublesome Gaza Strip is one of Sharon's objectives. It is served partly by the "separation wall" that he is building along the West Bank by fencing in the illegal Jewish settlements and huge chunks of adjoining Palestinian land.

The seizure of the land pulls the rug from under the feet of Israel's explanation to the international community that it needs the wall to check Palestinian infiltrators into Israel. For all technical and practical purposes, the seizure of the land is part and parcel of Sharon's strategy, and that was indeed true of all his predecessors.

(According to Palestinian historian and scholar Edward Atiyah, the exodus from Palestine in 1948 "was due partly to the belief of the Arabs, encouraged by the boastings of an unrealistic Arabic press and the irresponsible utterances of some of the Arab leaders that it could be only a matter of weeks before the Jews were defeated by the armies of the Arab states and the Palestinian Arabs enabled to re-enter and retake possession of their country."

"But it was also, and in many parts of the country, largely due to a policy of deliberate terrorism and eviction followed by the Jewish commanders in the areas they occupied, and reaching its peak of brutality in the massacre of Deir Yassin," he notes.

"There were two good reasons why the Jews should follow such a policy,'" according to Atiyah. "First, the problem of harbouring within the Jewish state a large and disaffected Arab population had always troubled them. They wanted an exclusively Jewish state, and the presence of such a population that could never be assimilated, that would always resent its inferior position under Jewish rule and stretch a hand across so many frontiers to its Arab cousins in the surrounding countries, would not only detract from the Jewishness of Israel, but also constitute a danger to its existence.

"Secondly, the Israelis wanted to open the doors of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration. Obviously, the fewer Arabs there were in the country the more room there would be for Jewish immigrants. If the Arabs could be driven out of the land in the course of the fighting, the Jews would have their homes, their lands, whole villages and towns, without even having to purchase them. And this is exactly what happened.")

Walled out

The plots that the Israeli army seized this week were separated from their owners by the wall in the Bethlehem and Beit Jalla areas south of Jerusalem. The portion of the wall in these areas was completed in August last year, and since then their owners have not had access to the land.

Effectively, the lands belong to those who live in adjoining areas that do not fall inside Israel's definition of "greater Jerusalem." Most of them do not have Israeli "permission" to enter "greater Jerusalem."

Sharon has sprung a five-decade-old "law" that "permits" Israel to seize lands that belong to "absentees" -- technically meaning that the landowner is not present in Palestine to claim and utilise the land. Israel applied the so-called law primarily to Palestinians who fled or were driven out during the 1948-49 war that followed Israel's creation in Palestine. Under that law, at least 20,000 Palestinian homes in the largely Jewish West Jerusalem were seized by Israel in the 1950s.

Refusing entry

Since then, the "law" was applied to individual cases wherever possible. One of the tenets of the "law" says the owner has to be away for a period longer than seven years before the land or property could be seized. But even that was never followed, with the occupation authorities moving in against whatever they could lay their hands on. Another move to support this policy was to refuse entry back to the West Bank to Palestinians who have stayed more than two years outside their land. That denial ensured that they would be barred from Palestine for life and thus the door was open for seizure of their property under the "absentee law."

Sharon has defended the latest move by insisting that the "Custodian of Absentee Property" has the authority to "transfer, sell or lease" land in Arab East Jerusalem belonging to "absentee owners."

Never mind that the owners of the lands seized this week were not absent from the West Bank. Never mind that the lands were cultivated by their Palestinian owners until August when the wall deprived them of access to their property. They could see their land through gaps in the wall, but are unable to get there.

There are many legal arguments against Israel's seizure of the lands, but none is likely to stand up in an Israeli court. The Palestinians have no recourse to approach an international court since Israel, backed by the US, has refused to accept that the Geneva Conventions are applicable to the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories.

Of course, an international court uninfluenced by the US could handle the case and issue a ruling, but then the question that comes up is: Who will or can pressure Israel into respecting that ruling?

Sharon and his predecessors refrained from applying the "absentee law" to lands in the outskirts of their self-styled "greater Jerusalem" if only because it would have triggered a massive protest.

That Sharon has found it fit now to exercise the "absentee law" shows that he is ready for a "showdown" with the Palestinians. Obviously, he believes the situation in Palestine is opportune for Israel to move swiftly towards its strategic and territorial goals.

No doubt, Sharon would find some way to apply the essence of the "absentee law" to the rest of the West Bank and seek to "legitimise" his plans for annexing the grabbed land into Israel.

In the bargain, he is creating insurmountable obstacles in the way to a peace agreement. Obviously, a peace accord with the Palestinians is not in Sharon's cards since he should be perfectly aware that every centimetre of land taken from the Palestinians would place prospects for peace farther and farther since those who lose the land would not accept that loss as part of the price for peace; and this would make the mission of the new Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), all the more difficult and complex.

Perhaps that is what Sharon wants. After all, by own admission (through his adviser), Sharon's goal is to freeze any peace negotiations with the Palestinians deep in formaldehyde. What better way to do that by creating ground realities that negate all prospects for a just and dignified peace accord based on the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people?

What next in Palestine..

January 8 2005


Palestine: Not a question of who, but what next

pv vivekanand

IT IS not as much as who will win the Palestinian presidential election as whether the new elected leader would be able to achieve peace based on the people's legitimate rights and put an end to their more than half a century of sufferings. It is the question that is haunting the Palestinian people.

Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), who assumed the mantle of chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) following the death of Yasser Arafat in November, is seen to have been assured of poll victory.

He played the role of a perfect politician in the run-up to the election by assuring those who advocate armed struggle that he would protect them from Israeli attacks and pledging that he would not budge on the rights of the Palestinians while negotiating peace with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

Sharon has not commented on Abu Mazen's declarations, perhaps because he thought it was only expected of a presidential candidate. The Sharon camp seems to believe that they could successfully negotiate with Abu Mazen without budging from their hard-line rejection of some of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people.

At the same time, they did not stop their military crackdown on Palestinian resistance. Israeli incursions into the Gaza Strip have exacted a heavy death toll and massive destruction in the final days before the election as if to underline its scorched earth policy against Palestinian resistance.

On New Year Day, Ibtihal Abu Thaher, 10, was killed in the Jabalyia Refugee Camp and her 11-year-old brother injured when an Israeli tank shell hit them as they played outside their home. At least 30 homes and shops were demolished by Israeli forces on Jan.2

On Jan.4, eight people were killed by tank shells. They included six children from the same family. The Israeli military claimed that soldiers were firing at armed men, but witnesses and doctors said the casualties were mostly children playing in an open field.

The Israeli justified the attacks saying Palestinians fired rockets at Jewish settlements. Al Quds Brigades, the military wing of the Islamic Jihad, and Hamas' Izzeddin Al Qassam Brigades claimed the attacks, some of which caused no casualties. Some 12 Israeli soldiers were injured on Jan.5.

Hero's welcome

Some attacks came even as Abu Mazen was campaigning in the Gaza Strip, where he was given a hero's welcome despite the decision by Hamas and Islamic Jihad to boycott the election.

Hamas has said the decision was "irreversible" and that it would not enter a candidate in the race. It asserted it would not endorse any other candidate; nor would its supporters vote on election day.

Abu Mazen has said he would use persuasion with the group to work out a ceasefire with Israel.

"We will not use force with Hamas but we will use the way of persuasion and negotiation," he said.

"We consider that fighting among Palestinians is a red line that must not be crossed."

In public, Israeli leaders say that they had no "preferred candidate" but the way they have gone ahead in "helping" arrange the election indicates that they favour Abu Mazen.

However, during the campaigning, Abu Mazen made clear he would make no compromises over his people's rights.

Abu Mazen made several firm points:

* On Jan.1, in a speech marking the occasion of Fateh's 40th anniversary, he said he was committed to following Yasser Arafat's path. "Occupation would eventually end," he said. "We will not forget our brothers behind Israeli bars and we will not forget the wanted Palestinians who are heroes fighting for freedom. We will not forget the refugees..." he said.

* The right of Palestinian refugees to return home or exercise the option of receiving compensation for their properties lost in 1948 is supreme to any agreement with Israel.

* The release of the more than 7,000 Palestinian prisoners is key to any peace agreement. Without their freedom, there would be no deal.

* The prisoners should be allowed to vote. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has filed an application with Israel for the purposes (It is unlikely to be granted, reports indicated).

* The state of Palestine that would be created after negotiations with Israel will include the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and its capital will be Arab East Jerusalem.

* The PNA will protect those waging armed resistance from Israeli attacks.

"When we see them, when we meet them, and when they welcome us, we owe them," he said. "This debt always is to protect them from assassination, to protect them from killing, and all these things they are subject to by the Israelis."

* However, the firing of rockets towards Israeli settlements and towns are counter-productive since they lead to heavy Israeli retaliation resulting in the death of Palestinian children.

"Firing these rockets is of no use. These rockets only hurt our people and lead to (Israeli) aggressions and I am making no apologies for what I said," he said in reference to his condemnation of the attacks.

"When we speak of the rule of law, we mean that we refuse security chaos and we should not allow conditions to be exploited and give Israelis any excuse to continue their aggressions," he said

The main hardline factions described his remarks "as a stab in the back of the resistance."

However, in general terms, Abu Mazen seems to have pleased many prospective voters.

Israeli views

Again, how the Israelis viewed his statements is subject to debate.

However, they should have been worried by the welcome Abu Mazen received at a gathering attended by hundreds of people and dozens of Aqsa Martyrs Brigades activists. He was treated as a hero by the Brigades, who hoisted him on their shoulders,

in a show of support that sparked criticism from the US, which called the incident "worrying."

During a Jan.4 speech in Al Bireh in the West Bank, Abu Mazen called Israel the "Zionist enemy." Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert lashed back saying such comments were "unacceptable and unforgivable."

Israel has allowed Abu Mazen to campaign in Arab East Jerusalem where residents would be allowed to vote in five post offices as they did in 1996. The Israeli permission to allow him to visit the occupied city is deemed to be a concession, given that the occupation force never allowed Arafat to enter the city.

Mustafa Barghouti, who is second in line behind Abu Mazen in the race, was arrested and interrogated for three hours by Israeli police in occupied Jerusalem because they said he did not have permission to be campaigning in the city.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has announced that it would support his candidacy because the group agreed with him on a national democratic programme.

Despite the frenzy of elections, most Palestinians are sceptical whether Sharon, the hawkish Israeli prime minister, would budge from his denial of their legitimate rights.

They seem to think -- along with many in the Arab World -- that Sharon's "enthusiasm" would disappear when confronted with the reality that neither Abu Mazen nor any other Palestinian leader would make a compromise over the rights of the Palestinian people.

In the meantime, Sharon has rearranged his coalition government ahead of his plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip later this year.

Sharon, who has called 2005 a "year of opportunity" for resolving the Palestinian problem, has made a deal with Shimon Peres, leader of the opposition Labour party. The Labour is to join Sharon's Likud-led government, replacing other coalition partners.

Peres, who is in favour of accepting some of the rights of the Palestinian people, supports the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and proposed resumption of negotiations with the Palestinians.

As veteran journalist Ian Black observes: "By joining Ariel Sharon's Likud-led coalition as deputy prime minister, Peres is showing that the majority of Israelis back the plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, remove its settlers and restart negotiations with the Palestinians.

"Peres's move illustrates the fact that four bloody years of armed intifada have destroyed the Israeli left but underlined the need to end the conflict. Arafat's death and replacement by the pragmatic Mahmoud Abbas is one reason things could improve -- not because Abbas will bend on the tough issues of borders, settlements and Jerusalem, but because he is likely to curb violence, embrace reform and win international backing to force Israel to accept a fair deal. Another reason is Sharon's conversion to the idea that Palestinians need their own state -- though exactly what it should consist of remains, crucially, to be agreed."

Stone wall

However, Sharon's Gaza plan is suspect. He is seen aiming at consolidating Israel's grip on the West Bank while abandoning Gaza, which has proved to be the most ungovernable occupied territory. By expanding Israeli presence in the West Bank, Sharon is seen as seeking to cut down the size of a future Palestinian state.

Confronted with that agenda, which includes a no-compromise stand over the vital issues of the right of the refugees and return of Arab East Jerusalem to the Palestinians, Abu Mazen or any other Palestinian leader elected on Jan.9 would be running into a stone wall.

At the same time, the election itself would add international legitimacy to the elected president's status as the leader of his people, something that Sharon would find hard to reject or brush aside.

Add to the equation, US President George Bush's declaration that he would spend his "political capital" that he seems to have gained by the re-election to find an end to the Palestinian problem.

If Bush were to use a way out of the inevitable Israeli-engineered pressure on him against endorsing the Palestinian rights in their truest form, then he does have the option of involving the European Union, the UN and Russia and pushing ahead the Quartet-backed roadmap for peace.

Sharon has said he endorses the roadmap for peace, but subject to 14 amendments disguised as "reservations."

These include:

* Calm will be a condition for the start and continuation of the process. The Palestinians must end "violence," dismantle security organisations and form new organisations to combat "violence." In the first phase, and as a condition for progress to the second phase, the Palestinians will dismantle resistance groups and their infrastructure and collect all illegal weapons.

* Full compliance will be a condition for progress between phases of the plan and for progress within the phases. The first condition for progress will be the full cessation of "violence."

* A new, different PNA leadership must emerge through reform before the second phase. This demand would be met on June 9. New elections must be held to the Palestinian Legislative Council.

* The monitoring mechanism will be under US management.

* The nature of the provisional Palestinian state will be determined at Israeli-Palestinian talks. The provisional state will be fully demilitarised with no military forces. Israel will control all entry and exit, as well as air space.

* The state must make declarations on Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state and on the waiver of any right of return for Palestinian refugees to what is now the state of Israel.

* The end of the process will lead to the end of all claims as well as the end of the conflict.

* A settlement will be reached through agreement and direct negotiations in accordance with the vision outlined by Bush in a speech on June 24, 2003. (In that speech, Bush said: "I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. I call upon them to build a practising democracy, based on tolerance and liberty. If the Palestinian people actively pursue these goals, America and the world will actively support their efforts. If the Palestinian people meet these goals, they will be able to reach agreement with Israel and Egypt and Jordan on security and other arrangements for independence. And when the Palestinian people have new leaders, new institutions and new security arrangements with their neighbours, the United States of America will support the creation of a Palestinian state whose borders and certain aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional until resolved as part of a final settlement in the Middle East).

* Issues that will not be discussed include Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except a freeze on settlement expansion and illegal outposts, the status of the PNA and its institutions in occupied Jerusalem, and issues that will be part of a final peace agreement.

* The removal of references to a Saudi peace plan and an Arab initiative adopted in Beirut in 2003.

* The reform process will be promoted in the PNA -- a transitional Palestinian constitution will be drafted, a Palestinian legal infrastructure will be built, international efforts to rehabilitate the Palestinian economy will continue, and transfer of tax revenues will continue.

* The redeployment of Israeli forces to positions they held in September 2000 before the Palestinian uprising began will depend on absolute quiet and future circumstances.

* Subject to "security" conditions, Israel will work to restore Palestinian life to normal, promote the economy, cultivate commercial ties and assist humanitarian agencies.

* Arab countries will assist the process by condemning "violence." No link will be established between the Palestinian track and other peace tracks.

As is obvious, these "reservations" are "loaded" since most of them are vaguely outlined, obviously with a view to allowing interpretations in Israel's own way.

And that is where the catch is.