THE FACADE of the US-British allegations to justify a
war against Iraq has disintergrated in the homestetch
to a new UN resolution. Fresh revelations have
highlighted that Washington has been resorting to
blatant deception in its effort to secure domestic and
international support for its plans for military
action aimed at "regime change" in Baghdad.
Almost every contention made by Washington and London
while building their case for war against Iraq have
been found to be deceptive, whether linked to Saddam's
alleged weapons of mass destruction or his alleged
alliance with Osama Bin Laden and support for
"international terrorism."
The latest weapon to pierce through the US armour of
contentions and arguments for war against Iraq came
from a hitherto secret transcript of an interview that
senior UN weapons inspectors held with an Iraqi
defector, Hussein Kamel Hassan Al Majed, a son-in-law
of Saddam Hussein, in August 1995.
That transcript shows that Kamel, who had defected
from Iraq, told the then chief of UN weapon
inspectors, Sweden's Rolf Ekeus, that he, in his
capacity as head of Iraq's Military Industrialisation
Commission, had ordered the destruction of the
country's entire stockpile of chemical and biological
weapons and banned missiles.
He also told Ekeus, who headed the UN Special
Commission (Unscom), that all that remained ere
"hidden blueprints, computer disks, microfiches" and
production dies. The weapons were destroyed secretly,
in order to hide their existence from inspectors, in
the hope of someday resuming production after
inspections had finished, he told Ekeus, who was
accompanied by Maurizio Zifferero. deputy director of
the IAEA and head of the inspections team in Iraq, and
Nikita Smidovich, a Russian diplomat who led Unscom's
ballistic missile team.
Kamel, who returned to Iraq in February 1996 and was
killed (see separate story), repeated the same
assertions to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and Britain's MI6 while he was in Amman, said
Newsweek, which added that these statements were
"hushed up by the UN inspectors" in order to "bluff
Saddam into disclosing still more."
Predictably, the CIA rejected the report. "It is
incorrect, bogus, wrong, untrue," said CIA spokesman
Bill Harlow in a statement to Reuters commenting on
the Newsweek revelations.
However, Glen Rangwala, a Cambridge University
analyst who in early February exposed that a British
"intelligence report" on Iraq was plagiarised from an
academic thesis, got hold the actual Ekeus-Kamel
transcript and has released it (see
http://www.fair.org/press-releases/kamel.pdf).
Washington now finds itself caught further in its own
web.
It has to either stand by assertions made by President
George W. Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney and
Secretary of State Colin Powell that Kamel, the Iraqi
defector, was a treasure trove of information and that
had it not been for him the world would not have known
of Iraq's weapons programme; or it has to reject
Kamel's statement in its entirety including his
revelations of Iraq's weapons programme and that all
the weapons stockpiles were destroyed. The Bush
administration cannot be selective and accept as
truth Kamel's disclosures about the weapons programme
and reject as lie the assertion that the stockpile of
weapons was destroyed.
Without any trace of doubt, Washington had access to
the Ekeus-Kamel transcript, the contents of which were
backed by Kamel's statements to the CIA during his
nearly seven-month exile in Jordan. As such, the
presumption goes that the Bush aides who had gone
through the document deliberately held back parts of
it from the presidential eyes or Bush himself chose to
ignore those comments which undermined his case
against Iraq.
Almost all the US claims against Iraq have been
rejected by UN weapons inspectors as well as
international experts.
While the contradictions do not make Saddam an angel
or do away with the stigma of dictatorial appression
attached to him, they do highlight the US and British
desparation to deceive the world into accepting that
he poses a major threat to the region and indeed the
international community.
In his analysis of the US approach to Kamel's
statement, Rangwala notes that Bush and others in his
administration have repeatedly cited the Iraqi
defector's statements as evidence that Iraq has not
disarmed, that inspections cannot disarm it, and that
defectors such as Kamel are the most reliable source
of information on Iraq's weapons.
The Cambridge analyst also notes that Bush said in an
Oct.7, 2002 speech: "In 1995, after several years of
deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq's
military industries defected. It was then that the
regime was forced to admit that it had produced more
than 30,000 litres of anthrax and other deadly
biological agents. The inspectors, however, concluded
that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that
amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological
weapons that has never been accounted for, and capable
of killing millions."
Powell's said in a Feb. 5 presentation to the UN
Security Council: "It took years for Iraq to finally
admit that it had produced four tonnes of the deadly
nerve agent, VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will
kill in minutes. Four tonnes. The admission only came
out after inspectors collected documentation as a
result of the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam
Hussein's late son-in-law."
In an Aug.27, 2002 speeach, Cheney asserted that
Kamel's story "should serve as a reminder to all that
we often learned more as the result of defections than
we learned from the inspection regime itself."
Bush and Powell were actually referring to anthrax
and VX produced by Iraq before the 1991 Gulf War as
were all the weapons cited by Kamel, who, according
to the Ekeus transcript, also said that Iraq
destroyed all these weapons in 1991.
Kamel told Ekeus during the August 1995 meeting in
Amman: "I ordered destruction of all chemical
weapons. All weapons - biological, chemical, missile,
nuclear were destroyed."
"Not a single missile left but they had blueprints and
molds for production," he said. "All missiles were
destroyed."
On anthrax, he said it was the "main focus" of the
biological programme , but that "nothing remained"
after he ordered the stocks destroyed following visits
by UN inspection teams.
"I made the decision to disclose everything so that
Iraq could return to normal" so that the sanctions
could be lifted, he told Ekeus.
Kamel admitted that Iraq had loaded chemical weapons t
in bombs during last days of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq
war. "They were not used and the programme was
terminated," he told Ekeus..
Interestingly, Richard Butler, the Australian diplomat
who succeeded Ekeus in 1997, has never referred to
Kamel's statements during his meetings with the press
and declined to answer any questions in this context.
Among the many other statements, claims and
contentions made by Bush and others in their push for
UN and international backing for their plans for war
against Iraq are those about nuclear weapons.
Among these contradictions are:
The admistration has asserted that the International
Atomic Energy Agency confirmed in the 1990s that Iraq
had an advanced nuclear weapons development programme
, had a design for a nuclear weapon and was enriching
uranium for a bomb.
However, the IAEA has reported to the UN Security
Council that it had found that Iraq’s nuclear capacity
had been completely dismantled by 1998.
In a 1998 report, the agency said that there were "no
indications that there remains in Iraq any physical
capability for the production of weapon-usable nuclear
material of any practical significance."
In its latest report to the Security Council, IAEA
chief Mohammed Al Baradei stated that the agency
"found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear
weapons program since the elimination of the programme
in the 1990’s.” That statement is supported by a
former Iraqi nuclear scientist who now lives in Canada
who says that Iraq does not have the expertise and
hardware to produce a nuclear bomb.
Compare the IAEA report and the scientist's assertion
with Bush's claim in September 2002 that the IAEA
had stated in a report that Iraq was “six months away
from developing a [nuclear] weapon." Someone should
ask Bush and his aides for a copy of that specific
report.
No such report actually exists.
Washington has charged that Iraq “had attempted to
purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for
nuclear weapons production.” But the IAEA contradicts
that charge saying the aluminum tubes were not
suitable for nuclear use.
The Institute for Science and International Security
also says that it found the Bush contention to be
“very misleading."
The Bush administration is “selectively picking
information to bolster a case that the Iraqi nuclear
threat was more imminent than it is, and, in essence,
scare people,” says the institute.
Powell claimed that UN weapons inspectors had found
that Iraqi officials were hiding and moving illicit
materials within and outside of Iraq to prevent their
discovery and that Iraq had developed mobile
biological weapons laborataries.
However, chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix
contradicted the assertion by saying that “inspectors
had reported no such incidents” of hiding or moving
illicit materials and that they have seen “no
evidence” of mobile biological weapons labs.
Independent experts have ridiculed a claim by Bush
that Iraq had a growing fleet of unmanned aircraft
that could be used “for missions targeting the United
States.” Iraq does not have that kind of advance
technology and there is no evidence whatsoever that it
acquired such unmanned aircraft with the range to
reach the US.
Countering the Bush administration's claims that Iraq
"aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al
Qaeda," is the reality that the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
British intelligence agencies have found no link
between Al Qaeda and Iraq.
If anything, a British intelligence report -- that has
never been made public by the Blair government -- says
that there could have no link between Saddam and Bin
Laden if only because of their "ideological"
differences.
While the US claims that Iraq had the materials to
produce as much as 500 tonnes of sarin, mustard and VX
nerve agent and has given no evidence that it has
destroyed them, the UN inspectors say that by 1998 at
least 95 per cent of Iraq’s chemical weapons had been
accounted for and destroyed.
Agaisnt the US assertion that the UN had found that
Iraq had materials sufficient to produce more than
38,000 litres of botulinum toxic, a 1999 UN report
said that Iraq had to account only for an amount of
the growth media for the toxin that could produce
1,200 litres of botulinum toxin.
Blix has also shot down an American contention that
Iraqi intelligence officers were posing as the
scientists inspectors are supposed to interview.
The littany of the US deception also includes a claim
by Defenee Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that he had
“nothing to do” with helping Iraq in its war against
Iran and that he cautioned Saddam about the use of
chemical weapons in a 90-minute meeting in 1983. In
reality, Rumsfeld led a delegation to Iraq to resume
diplomatic relations in order to prevent an Iranian
victory in the war, according to State Department
notes of the Rumsfeld-Saddam meeting as reported by
The Washington Post in late December 2002.
What is the net impact of these revelations of deceit?
Definitely not a rethink of the US and British plans
for war against Iraq. However, that is not all. If
anything, in the days ahead the world would be privvy
to further revelations of the hidden motives and
ulterior objectives of the American-British plans for
Iraq. And that would further erode chances of any
legitimacy for any war against Iraq. Obviously,
neither Washington nor London could afford any delay
that would leave room for further undermining of their
plans; and hence their haste to set a March 17
deadline for war.
Monday, March 10, 2003
A defector who never was!!!
NEWSWEEK sparked a controversy by its report last
month that Hussein Kamel Hassan Al Majed, Saddam
Hussein’s son-in-law who was in charge of Iraq's
military production for about 10 years, had told
Western intelligence agents and UN weapons inspectors
in 1995 that Iraq had destroyed all its chemical and
biological weapons stocks and the missiles to deliver
them after the 1991 war.
As such, the Newsweek article implies, there could not
be much truth in the American and British allegations
that Iraq continues to hide a massive stockpile of
such weapons in violation of UN Security Council
resolutions. The argument here is that if Kamel is to
be taken as seriously as the British and US
administrations have previously held him to be, then
his claim that "all weapons — biological, chemical,
missile, nuclear — were destroyed" should be taken
equally seriously. That pulls the rug further from
under the feet of the American and British charges
that Iraq has a stockpile of weapons of mass
destruction.
That might indeed be the case. But the point I'd like
to raise here is how far Kamel's "defection" itself
was authentic. For all we know, the possibility could
not ruled out outright that it was a stage-managed
affair although a conventional analysis would rule
that out. But then, there is nothing conventional
about Iraq and Saddam Hussein.
Kamel, who "defected" to Jordan in 1995 and went back
home seven months later only to be (allegedly) lynched
by his clan, had declared that he fled Iraq because he
wanted to reveal all information regarding his
country's military industry and weapons programmes.
While in "exile," he met Central Intelligence Agency
and British intelligence agents in the Jordanian
capital and revealed to them what the latter
considered as closely guarded secrets of the Saddam
regime's arsenal.
Kamel's prime revelations were made to Rolf Ekeus, the
then head of the UN Special Commission (Unscom)
entrusted with ensuring that Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction were scuttled and the country stripped of
the ability to produce them.
Ekeus found himself almost overburdened with the
"details" provided by Kamel. It took him and his
experts several months to match the information
provided by Kamel with that was "voluntarily" to given
to them by the Iraqi government. By the time Ekeus
drew up more pointed questions to be put to Kamel,
the Iraqi was no longer alive to answer them. Since
then, it has remained a closely guarded secret what
exactly Ekeus learnt from the files and what questions
he had for Kamel.
Kamel was director of Iraq's Military
Industrialisation Corporation and in charge of Iraq's
weapons programme and he superised Iraq’s nuclear,
chemical, biological and missile programmes. His
bother Colonel Saddam Kamel was the head of
presidential security.
Kamel, who arrived in Jordan in the second week of
August 1995 with his wife and children as well as his
brother and his family and cousin Izzeddine plus a
dozen or so bodyguards, was the most senior official
from Saddam's inner circle to defect.
As such, he was a prize catch for Western
intelligence.
His made his first public appearance at a press
conference on the lawns of the Royal Palace on Aug.12,
and his interpreter was the head of Jordan Television
and Radio Corporation and a son-in-law of the then
crown prince of Jordan. That reflected the importance
the Jordanian leadership gave to Kamel, who was also
given accommodation at one of the palaces in the
Jordanian capital before being moved to a smaller
palace in the suburbs.
"We will work inside Iraq and in the whole Arab World
to topple the Iraqi regime," Kamel declared at the
press conference. But his words were not convincing
since Kamel was considered as ruthless as Saddam
Hussein by many Iraqi exiles.
I was almost a minority of one among Amman-based
journalists who did not fully buy Kamel's story. I
subsequently pulled a few strings and managed to get
an exclusive interview with him (for your info Rosh,
it was a world exclusive!!!!). His comments during
that 65-minute encounter -- and in other interviews
thereafter -- only strengthened my suspicion that his
so-called defection could have been stage managed and
that Saddam was as much a part of the drama as much as
Kamel himself.
The best argument against that theory was that it was
not Saddam's style to resort to such a deception. It
is simply beyond him, many argued. The very fact that
his defection was a "body blow" to Saddam was a
central pillar of argument for those who inisted that
it was no drama. "After all, in a society like Iraq,
Saddam lost much face among his people because the
defection proved that he could not control his own
family," was the comment of a veteran journalist with
extensive Middle Eastern experience. "If you cannot
control your own family, how could you maintain
control over the whole country?"
The argument was strengthened in February 1996 when
Kamel and his brother as well as their father were
murdered when the two brothers returned home. However,
even their murder does not really rule out the
possiiblity that the defection was a drama.
The arguments in favour of the theory that the
defection was stage managed hinged on several
contentions and assumptions as opposed to the "facts"
as they appeared to the world at large.
These contentions and assumptions are:
In 1995, it was four years after the UN weapons
inspectors launched their mission in Iraq and were
engaged in on-again off-again standoffs with Iraqi
officials. No real progress was made in their work,
and it seemed every day that passed by was only
furthering the realisation of the UN objectives and
chances of Iraq returning to the international fold
were receding.
By mid-1995, Saddam should have realised that he
could not hope to continue to conceal his weapons
programmes from the UN inspectors, who were backed by
satellite spying information provided by the US. He
should have summarised that the UN inspectors would
gradually unearth whatever military programmes he had.
But it would have taken years if not decades and in
the meantime he could not hope for a lifting of the
crippling UN sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990.
However, he could not very well order his people on a
fine morning to reveal everything to the UN inspectors
because that would be an indignified affair for him.
That realisation prompted him to seek a face-saving
formula under which he would not be held personally
responsible for concealing the weapons and programmes
but the details would nonetheless be made available to
the UN inspectors.
Kamel's "defection" was that compromise.
Having reached that "foundation," it is relatively
easy to figure out the rest if one suspects that
there was no real defection at all.
Kamel was not supposed to have lived in "exile" in
Jordan for more than three to four months during which
he was supposed to "tell all" to the UN inspectors.
Another mission was added to his "defection" at some
point: Penetrate the Iraqi exile movements and be
Saddam's Trojan horse among them.
Let us look at what happened after Kamel arrived in
Amman in August.
In less than 24 hours, he was denounced as a traitor.
In a week's time the Iraqi government declared that
Kamel had unilaterally, without informing Saddam,
concealed a lot of information from the UN inspectors.
Baghdad requested Ekeus to visit Iraq to collect all
information that Kamel had purportedly held back from
him.
The contention was clear: Saddam had ordered every
Iraqi official to reveal all information on the
country's military industry to the UN inspectors, but
his own son-in-law disobeyed him for reasons of his
own.
Ekeus flew to Baghdad in the third week of August.
Sure enough, masses of files on Iraq's military
industry were handed over to him along with
explanations that had Saddam been aware of Kamel's
deception, the information would not have been held
back from the UN inspectors.
The clinch came when a senior Iraqi minister drove
Ekeus to Kamel's chicken farm outside Baghdad and
showed the UN inspector several locked cupboards
there. These were found to contain more "confidential
and vital" information on Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction. Kamel had secreted these files at his
farmhouse without informing anyone, Ekeus was told.
The UN official carted off all the files to Baghdad
from where they were shipped to Vienna and the UN
headquarters in New York. Some were also sent to
Bahrain where the Unscom had set up base for its Iraq
mission.
Ekeus's next stop was Amman, where he, Maurizio
Zifferero, deputy director of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and head of the inspections team
in Iraq, and Nikita Smidovich, a Russian diplomat who
led UNSCOM's ballistic missile team and former deputy
director for operations of Unscom, interviewed Kamel.
Major Izzeddin Al Majid, a cousin of Kamel, who had
also defected, acted as an interpreter (Izzeddin Al
Majid did not return with them to Iraq in 1996. He is
now believed to be living somewhere in Europe).
Obviously, whatever information the UN inspectors had
gleaned from the newfound files in Baghdad were
confirmed point to point by Kamel during that Amman
encounter. However, he did not provide an iota of
information more than what Ekeus had gathered from the
files except that he had ordered all weapons of mass
destruction be destroyed.
The transcript of the Ekeus-Kamel meeting was
classified as sensitive and was not made public.
However, a copy was "leaked" to Glen Rangwala, the
same person who exposed that the recent British
intelligence report on Iraq was a partial reprint of
an academic study conducted by a California student in
1991. The "leak" came after the Newsweek article was
published.
What the transcript does not contain is that at the
beginning of the meeting, Kamel told Ekeus to get rid
of his main translator, a Syrian or a Tunisian, saying
he was on Iraqi payroll.
"That was perhaps the only new revelation that Kamel
made during his meetings with Ekeus," according to a
source close to the Ekeus-Kamel encounter. "Everything
else Kamel told Ekeus was only confirmation of what
was contained in the files given to the inspectors by
the Iraqi government."
Ekeus left Amman, apparently happier than ever since
he began his mission in Iraq in 1991.
The data contained in the Iraqi files took several
months to be deciphered into practical information and
Ekeus either overlooked that the Iraqi defector did
not give him any information not available in the
files or was too overwhelmed by the details given to
him.
By the time he was ready for another meeting with
Kamel, the defector had returned to Iraq and was
killed along with his brother by "vengeful" members of
their Majed clan despite a pardon offered to them by
Saddam. Some of those who killed him were "executed."
It was reported that Saddam's eldest son Uday
supervised the killing of his brother-in-laws. The
sisters and children were reportedly sent off to the
family home on Tikrit. Kamel's wife was reported since
then to have lost her mind.
There are many who believe that the entire script of
the "defection, revelations, pardon and return home"
drama was written by none other than Saddam himself
and agreed with Kamel. But what Kamel did not account
for was that his father-in-law had rewritten the happy
ending without his knowledge.
Why was the script rewritten?
Again, it is conjecture. Saddam had not anticipated
the kind of approach that the Western media would take
to Kamel, who was described, immediately after his
"defection," as Saddam's replacement as Iraq's
president after a Western-engineered coup in Baghdad.
The Clinton administration sought to portray Kamel as
an alternative to Saddam and gave public assurances of
support to Jordan's King Hussein for granting asylum
to the Iraqi defectors. That was an unexpected
development for Saddam, who was, at best, expecting
the outside world see his son-in-law as an "important"
Iraqi defector but not of presidential material.
Furthermore, Saddam had allowed for a three-to-four
month stay for Kamel in Jordan (Kamel actually never
left Jordanian territory during his seven-month
"exile," except, according to unconfirmed reports,
when the late King Hussein took him along to perform
Umra in Saudi Arabia). The stay had to be extended
because Kamel's second mission -- of penetrating the
camp of Iraqi dissidents-- was faltering because no
Iraqi exile leader was ready to accept him as the
future president of Iraq; if anything, they did not
trust him as far as they could throw him.
Prominent Iraqi exile leaders were unanimous in their
opinion of Kamel: He could have been helpful in
securing the support of senior Iraqi military generals
from the Sunni community and could at best be rewarded
with a ministerial post in a post-Saddam government.
Saddam was more disturbed, according to those who who
advocate the theory that the defection was a drama,
that Kamel in Amman was in almost daily contact with
senior CIA officials and other Western intelligence
agencies, which used their good offices with the
Jordanians to remain in touch with him.
Obviously, Saddam put himself in Kamel's shoes and
applied his own philosophy and approach. He reached
the conclusion that Kamel could have been "turned" by
the CIA and the possibility could not be ruled out
that his son-in-law might shoot him in the back at the
first given opportunity in a carefully orchestrated
plot and take over the helm in Iraq with CIA backing.
That was not something that he had not provided for in
the original script for the defection drama.
After all, goes the theory, Saddam would have thought
that had he been Kamel he would not waste an
opportunity to grab power, father-in-law or no
father-in-law, and as such, he posed a major risk if
readmitted to the ruling circles as written in the
original defection script.
Kamel belonged to the same clan as Saddam's father. He
was a member of the presidential security guard and
steadily rose in prominence. He was known for his
efficiency in arranging Saddam's security details and
this brought him into close quarters with the
president. Saddam was obviously taken to the man since
he found common streaks, including a ruthlessness that
is so vital to survival in the labrynth of power in
Baghdad (Kamel was known for his brutality while
handling the Kurdish rebellion in the north and Shiite
unrest in the south, and he also showed that trait
while handling Kuwaiti resistance during the Iraqi
occupation of the emirate).
Apparently, Saddam decided that it was ideal to seal
Kamel into his camp by marrying off his daughter,
Raghad, to him. That was done. And Kamel manipulated
the pawns and arranged his brother Saddam Kamel to
marry the president's younger daughter Rana and
elevate him as head of presidential security. At some
point, reports have said, Saddam Hussein considered
Kamel closer to him than his own sons Uday and Qusai
and that was one of the reasons that Uday was hostile
to Kamel and his brother.
Is there any hard evidence that Kamel's "defection"
was faked?
Consider this: In mid-October 1995 -- two months after
Kamel defected -- I was told aan interesting story
about a Jordanian woman who was giving private tution
to the children of the Iraqi defectors. At one point,
she was being a bit harsh with the children for
truancy, but was told by Kamel's wife to "take it
easy."
"Don't take these tutions too seriously," she was
told. "We should be going back in a few weeks anyway,
so don't bother too much and don't be too tough on the
children."
Consider this: During my interviews with Kamel -- and
others have said the same thing -- I found him
largely naive to the ways of life outside Iraq. He
came across like a villager who was suddenly
catapulted into a position of power and influence and
did not know what to do with his newfound strength. He
spoke little English and even his Arabic was deemed by
experts to be too sub-standard for someone who served
as a minister of Iraq.
Consider this: Kamel blamed Saddam's eldest son Uday
for all the troubles of Iraq. He contented that Saddam
was surrounded by people who told him only what he
wanted to hear and who manipulated him. Thes included
Tareq Aziz and Taha Yassin Ramadan. He said he himself
was finding it difficult to get access to the
president despite his position as a member of the
cabinet as well as his family relationship. He said he
chose to leave Iraq because he feared for his life
since Uday was plotting against him.
Consider this: Kamel never gave a straight answer to
the question whether he envisaged himself to be
Saddam's successor as president of Iraq. In fact, he
seemed to be taken aback when the question was put to
him for the first time as if the thought had never
occurred to him earlier.
Consider this: Kamel said while in Jordan that he knew
of an impending Iraqi plan to reinvade and reoccupy
Kuwait and that a massive force was being assembled
near the border. The US was alarmed, particularly
after satellite spying spotted some movements near the
border. However, what were supposed to have been a
concentration of battle tanks disappeared overnight in
what many experts then theorised as a replay of the
feigned allied invasion of France during World War II.
But for sceptics, it was the enactment of a
pre-arranged Saddam ploy aimed at giving credence to
Kamel's "revelations."
The theory that the defection was faked does not make
much sense when seen from a conventional vantage
point. That apporoach would see Hussein Kamel as a
man who was fed up of his father-in-law's machinations
and wanted to put an end to the cat-and-mouse game
with the UN inspectors. "I made the decision to
disclose everything so that Iraq could return to
normal," he had told Ekeus. "They (Saddam and others
in the regime) are only interested in themselves and
not worried about economics or political state of the
country. I can state publicly I will work against the
regime."
He fled his country with his family, hoping that his
revelations would help hasten the demise of Saddam
from power and he stood a chance to succeed his
father-in-law as president of Iraq. He was
disillusioned when Iraqi exile groups turned down his
overtures and labelled him as untrustworthy as Saddam
himself.
Kamel also realised that the Americans were not
taking him seriously. His wife and sister-in-law
pleaded to be allowed to return to their homeland. His
will was weakened by the arrival of his weeping
mother-in-law, Sajida, who told him Saddam had
promised her that he would forgive him and his brother
if they would return to Baghdad.
He established contacts with the Iraqi diplomatic
mission in Amman and informed Saddam he regreted his
decision to defect and wanted to return home. Soon
word came through the mission that he was given a
presidential pardon and he could return. On Feb.20,
1996, he, his brother and their families crossed the
border back into Iraq. The moment they were in Iraqi
territory, they were separated from their wives and
taken to their home in Baghdad where they were kept
under house arrest.
Their divorces from Saddam's daughters were announced
immediately thereafter.
Their repeated appeals for a meeting with their
father-in-law were rejected. On the night of Feb.23, a
group led by elders of their Majed clan attacked them.
Both brothers as well as their father and a few
supporters were said to have put up a brave battle
before all of them were shot down by the clansmen who
claimed they were cleansing the honour of the clan by
killing the "traitors."
The bodies of the Kamels were never seen. That leaves
open speculation that even their "death" was faked and
that the Kamel brothers are living in secret with
their families somewhere in Iraq. That is a theory
that is equally fascinating but impossible.
month that Hussein Kamel Hassan Al Majed, Saddam
Hussein’s son-in-law who was in charge of Iraq's
military production for about 10 years, had told
Western intelligence agents and UN weapons inspectors
in 1995 that Iraq had destroyed all its chemical and
biological weapons stocks and the missiles to deliver
them after the 1991 war.
As such, the Newsweek article implies, there could not
be much truth in the American and British allegations
that Iraq continues to hide a massive stockpile of
such weapons in violation of UN Security Council
resolutions. The argument here is that if Kamel is to
be taken as seriously as the British and US
administrations have previously held him to be, then
his claim that "all weapons — biological, chemical,
missile, nuclear — were destroyed" should be taken
equally seriously. That pulls the rug further from
under the feet of the American and British charges
that Iraq has a stockpile of weapons of mass
destruction.
That might indeed be the case. But the point I'd like
to raise here is how far Kamel's "defection" itself
was authentic. For all we know, the possibility could
not ruled out outright that it was a stage-managed
affair although a conventional analysis would rule
that out. But then, there is nothing conventional
about Iraq and Saddam Hussein.
Kamel, who "defected" to Jordan in 1995 and went back
home seven months later only to be (allegedly) lynched
by his clan, had declared that he fled Iraq because he
wanted to reveal all information regarding his
country's military industry and weapons programmes.
While in "exile," he met Central Intelligence Agency
and British intelligence agents in the Jordanian
capital and revealed to them what the latter
considered as closely guarded secrets of the Saddam
regime's arsenal.
Kamel's prime revelations were made to Rolf Ekeus, the
then head of the UN Special Commission (Unscom)
entrusted with ensuring that Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction were scuttled and the country stripped of
the ability to produce them.
Ekeus found himself almost overburdened with the
"details" provided by Kamel. It took him and his
experts several months to match the information
provided by Kamel with that was "voluntarily" to given
to them by the Iraqi government. By the time Ekeus
drew up more pointed questions to be put to Kamel,
the Iraqi was no longer alive to answer them. Since
then, it has remained a closely guarded secret what
exactly Ekeus learnt from the files and what questions
he had for Kamel.
Kamel was director of Iraq's Military
Industrialisation Corporation and in charge of Iraq's
weapons programme and he superised Iraq’s nuclear,
chemical, biological and missile programmes. His
bother Colonel Saddam Kamel was the head of
presidential security.
Kamel, who arrived in Jordan in the second week of
August 1995 with his wife and children as well as his
brother and his family and cousin Izzeddine plus a
dozen or so bodyguards, was the most senior official
from Saddam's inner circle to defect.
As such, he was a prize catch for Western
intelligence.
His made his first public appearance at a press
conference on the lawns of the Royal Palace on Aug.12,
and his interpreter was the head of Jordan Television
and Radio Corporation and a son-in-law of the then
crown prince of Jordan. That reflected the importance
the Jordanian leadership gave to Kamel, who was also
given accommodation at one of the palaces in the
Jordanian capital before being moved to a smaller
palace in the suburbs.
"We will work inside Iraq and in the whole Arab World
to topple the Iraqi regime," Kamel declared at the
press conference. But his words were not convincing
since Kamel was considered as ruthless as Saddam
Hussein by many Iraqi exiles.
I was almost a minority of one among Amman-based
journalists who did not fully buy Kamel's story. I
subsequently pulled a few strings and managed to get
an exclusive interview with him (for your info Rosh,
it was a world exclusive!!!!). His comments during
that 65-minute encounter -- and in other interviews
thereafter -- only strengthened my suspicion that his
so-called defection could have been stage managed and
that Saddam was as much a part of the drama as much as
Kamel himself.
The best argument against that theory was that it was
not Saddam's style to resort to such a deception. It
is simply beyond him, many argued. The very fact that
his defection was a "body blow" to Saddam was a
central pillar of argument for those who inisted that
it was no drama. "After all, in a society like Iraq,
Saddam lost much face among his people because the
defection proved that he could not control his own
family," was the comment of a veteran journalist with
extensive Middle Eastern experience. "If you cannot
control your own family, how could you maintain
control over the whole country?"
The argument was strengthened in February 1996 when
Kamel and his brother as well as their father were
murdered when the two brothers returned home. However,
even their murder does not really rule out the
possiiblity that the defection was a drama.
The arguments in favour of the theory that the
defection was stage managed hinged on several
contentions and assumptions as opposed to the "facts"
as they appeared to the world at large.
These contentions and assumptions are:
In 1995, it was four years after the UN weapons
inspectors launched their mission in Iraq and were
engaged in on-again off-again standoffs with Iraqi
officials. No real progress was made in their work,
and it seemed every day that passed by was only
furthering the realisation of the UN objectives and
chances of Iraq returning to the international fold
were receding.
By mid-1995, Saddam should have realised that he
could not hope to continue to conceal his weapons
programmes from the UN inspectors, who were backed by
satellite spying information provided by the US. He
should have summarised that the UN inspectors would
gradually unearth whatever military programmes he had.
But it would have taken years if not decades and in
the meantime he could not hope for a lifting of the
crippling UN sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990.
However, he could not very well order his people on a
fine morning to reveal everything to the UN inspectors
because that would be an indignified affair for him.
That realisation prompted him to seek a face-saving
formula under which he would not be held personally
responsible for concealing the weapons and programmes
but the details would nonetheless be made available to
the UN inspectors.
Kamel's "defection" was that compromise.
Having reached that "foundation," it is relatively
easy to figure out the rest if one suspects that
there was no real defection at all.
Kamel was not supposed to have lived in "exile" in
Jordan for more than three to four months during which
he was supposed to "tell all" to the UN inspectors.
Another mission was added to his "defection" at some
point: Penetrate the Iraqi exile movements and be
Saddam's Trojan horse among them.
Let us look at what happened after Kamel arrived in
Amman in August.
In less than 24 hours, he was denounced as a traitor.
In a week's time the Iraqi government declared that
Kamel had unilaterally, without informing Saddam,
concealed a lot of information from the UN inspectors.
Baghdad requested Ekeus to visit Iraq to collect all
information that Kamel had purportedly held back from
him.
The contention was clear: Saddam had ordered every
Iraqi official to reveal all information on the
country's military industry to the UN inspectors, but
his own son-in-law disobeyed him for reasons of his
own.
Ekeus flew to Baghdad in the third week of August.
Sure enough, masses of files on Iraq's military
industry were handed over to him along with
explanations that had Saddam been aware of Kamel's
deception, the information would not have been held
back from the UN inspectors.
The clinch came when a senior Iraqi minister drove
Ekeus to Kamel's chicken farm outside Baghdad and
showed the UN inspector several locked cupboards
there. These were found to contain more "confidential
and vital" information on Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction. Kamel had secreted these files at his
farmhouse without informing anyone, Ekeus was told.
The UN official carted off all the files to Baghdad
from where they were shipped to Vienna and the UN
headquarters in New York. Some were also sent to
Bahrain where the Unscom had set up base for its Iraq
mission.
Ekeus's next stop was Amman, where he, Maurizio
Zifferero, deputy director of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and head of the inspections team
in Iraq, and Nikita Smidovich, a Russian diplomat who
led UNSCOM's ballistic missile team and former deputy
director for operations of Unscom, interviewed Kamel.
Major Izzeddin Al Majid, a cousin of Kamel, who had
also defected, acted as an interpreter (Izzeddin Al
Majid did not return with them to Iraq in 1996. He is
now believed to be living somewhere in Europe).
Obviously, whatever information the UN inspectors had
gleaned from the newfound files in Baghdad were
confirmed point to point by Kamel during that Amman
encounter. However, he did not provide an iota of
information more than what Ekeus had gathered from the
files except that he had ordered all weapons of mass
destruction be destroyed.
The transcript of the Ekeus-Kamel meeting was
classified as sensitive and was not made public.
However, a copy was "leaked" to Glen Rangwala, the
same person who exposed that the recent British
intelligence report on Iraq was a partial reprint of
an academic study conducted by a California student in
1991. The "leak" came after the Newsweek article was
published.
What the transcript does not contain is that at the
beginning of the meeting, Kamel told Ekeus to get rid
of his main translator, a Syrian or a Tunisian, saying
he was on Iraqi payroll.
"That was perhaps the only new revelation that Kamel
made during his meetings with Ekeus," according to a
source close to the Ekeus-Kamel encounter. "Everything
else Kamel told Ekeus was only confirmation of what
was contained in the files given to the inspectors by
the Iraqi government."
Ekeus left Amman, apparently happier than ever since
he began his mission in Iraq in 1991.
The data contained in the Iraqi files took several
months to be deciphered into practical information and
Ekeus either overlooked that the Iraqi defector did
not give him any information not available in the
files or was too overwhelmed by the details given to
him.
By the time he was ready for another meeting with
Kamel, the defector had returned to Iraq and was
killed along with his brother by "vengeful" members of
their Majed clan despite a pardon offered to them by
Saddam. Some of those who killed him were "executed."
It was reported that Saddam's eldest son Uday
supervised the killing of his brother-in-laws. The
sisters and children were reportedly sent off to the
family home on Tikrit. Kamel's wife was reported since
then to have lost her mind.
There are many who believe that the entire script of
the "defection, revelations, pardon and return home"
drama was written by none other than Saddam himself
and agreed with Kamel. But what Kamel did not account
for was that his father-in-law had rewritten the happy
ending without his knowledge.
Why was the script rewritten?
Again, it is conjecture. Saddam had not anticipated
the kind of approach that the Western media would take
to Kamel, who was described, immediately after his
"defection," as Saddam's replacement as Iraq's
president after a Western-engineered coup in Baghdad.
The Clinton administration sought to portray Kamel as
an alternative to Saddam and gave public assurances of
support to Jordan's King Hussein for granting asylum
to the Iraqi defectors. That was an unexpected
development for Saddam, who was, at best, expecting
the outside world see his son-in-law as an "important"
Iraqi defector but not of presidential material.
Furthermore, Saddam had allowed for a three-to-four
month stay for Kamel in Jordan (Kamel actually never
left Jordanian territory during his seven-month
"exile," except, according to unconfirmed reports,
when the late King Hussein took him along to perform
Umra in Saudi Arabia). The stay had to be extended
because Kamel's second mission -- of penetrating the
camp of Iraqi dissidents-- was faltering because no
Iraqi exile leader was ready to accept him as the
future president of Iraq; if anything, they did not
trust him as far as they could throw him.
Prominent Iraqi exile leaders were unanimous in their
opinion of Kamel: He could have been helpful in
securing the support of senior Iraqi military generals
from the Sunni community and could at best be rewarded
with a ministerial post in a post-Saddam government.
Saddam was more disturbed, according to those who who
advocate the theory that the defection was a drama,
that Kamel in Amman was in almost daily contact with
senior CIA officials and other Western intelligence
agencies, which used their good offices with the
Jordanians to remain in touch with him.
Obviously, Saddam put himself in Kamel's shoes and
applied his own philosophy and approach. He reached
the conclusion that Kamel could have been "turned" by
the CIA and the possibility could not be ruled out
that his son-in-law might shoot him in the back at the
first given opportunity in a carefully orchestrated
plot and take over the helm in Iraq with CIA backing.
That was not something that he had not provided for in
the original script for the defection drama.
After all, goes the theory, Saddam would have thought
that had he been Kamel he would not waste an
opportunity to grab power, father-in-law or no
father-in-law, and as such, he posed a major risk if
readmitted to the ruling circles as written in the
original defection script.
Kamel belonged to the same clan as Saddam's father. He
was a member of the presidential security guard and
steadily rose in prominence. He was known for his
efficiency in arranging Saddam's security details and
this brought him into close quarters with the
president. Saddam was obviously taken to the man since
he found common streaks, including a ruthlessness that
is so vital to survival in the labrynth of power in
Baghdad (Kamel was known for his brutality while
handling the Kurdish rebellion in the north and Shiite
unrest in the south, and he also showed that trait
while handling Kuwaiti resistance during the Iraqi
occupation of the emirate).
Apparently, Saddam decided that it was ideal to seal
Kamel into his camp by marrying off his daughter,
Raghad, to him. That was done. And Kamel manipulated
the pawns and arranged his brother Saddam Kamel to
marry the president's younger daughter Rana and
elevate him as head of presidential security. At some
point, reports have said, Saddam Hussein considered
Kamel closer to him than his own sons Uday and Qusai
and that was one of the reasons that Uday was hostile
to Kamel and his brother.
Is there any hard evidence that Kamel's "defection"
was faked?
Consider this: In mid-October 1995 -- two months after
Kamel defected -- I was told aan interesting story
about a Jordanian woman who was giving private tution
to the children of the Iraqi defectors. At one point,
she was being a bit harsh with the children for
truancy, but was told by Kamel's wife to "take it
easy."
"Don't take these tutions too seriously," she was
told. "We should be going back in a few weeks anyway,
so don't bother too much and don't be too tough on the
children."
Consider this: During my interviews with Kamel -- and
others have said the same thing -- I found him
largely naive to the ways of life outside Iraq. He
came across like a villager who was suddenly
catapulted into a position of power and influence and
did not know what to do with his newfound strength. He
spoke little English and even his Arabic was deemed by
experts to be too sub-standard for someone who served
as a minister of Iraq.
Consider this: Kamel blamed Saddam's eldest son Uday
for all the troubles of Iraq. He contented that Saddam
was surrounded by people who told him only what he
wanted to hear and who manipulated him. Thes included
Tareq Aziz and Taha Yassin Ramadan. He said he himself
was finding it difficult to get access to the
president despite his position as a member of the
cabinet as well as his family relationship. He said he
chose to leave Iraq because he feared for his life
since Uday was plotting against him.
Consider this: Kamel never gave a straight answer to
the question whether he envisaged himself to be
Saddam's successor as president of Iraq. In fact, he
seemed to be taken aback when the question was put to
him for the first time as if the thought had never
occurred to him earlier.
Consider this: Kamel said while in Jordan that he knew
of an impending Iraqi plan to reinvade and reoccupy
Kuwait and that a massive force was being assembled
near the border. The US was alarmed, particularly
after satellite spying spotted some movements near the
border. However, what were supposed to have been a
concentration of battle tanks disappeared overnight in
what many experts then theorised as a replay of the
feigned allied invasion of France during World War II.
But for sceptics, it was the enactment of a
pre-arranged Saddam ploy aimed at giving credence to
Kamel's "revelations."
The theory that the defection was faked does not make
much sense when seen from a conventional vantage
point. That apporoach would see Hussein Kamel as a
man who was fed up of his father-in-law's machinations
and wanted to put an end to the cat-and-mouse game
with the UN inspectors. "I made the decision to
disclose everything so that Iraq could return to
normal," he had told Ekeus. "They (Saddam and others
in the regime) are only interested in themselves and
not worried about economics or political state of the
country. I can state publicly I will work against the
regime."
He fled his country with his family, hoping that his
revelations would help hasten the demise of Saddam
from power and he stood a chance to succeed his
father-in-law as president of Iraq. He was
disillusioned when Iraqi exile groups turned down his
overtures and labelled him as untrustworthy as Saddam
himself.
Kamel also realised that the Americans were not
taking him seriously. His wife and sister-in-law
pleaded to be allowed to return to their homeland. His
will was weakened by the arrival of his weeping
mother-in-law, Sajida, who told him Saddam had
promised her that he would forgive him and his brother
if they would return to Baghdad.
He established contacts with the Iraqi diplomatic
mission in Amman and informed Saddam he regreted his
decision to defect and wanted to return home. Soon
word came through the mission that he was given a
presidential pardon and he could return. On Feb.20,
1996, he, his brother and their families crossed the
border back into Iraq. The moment they were in Iraqi
territory, they were separated from their wives and
taken to their home in Baghdad where they were kept
under house arrest.
Their divorces from Saddam's daughters were announced
immediately thereafter.
Their repeated appeals for a meeting with their
father-in-law were rejected. On the night of Feb.23, a
group led by elders of their Majed clan attacked them.
Both brothers as well as their father and a few
supporters were said to have put up a brave battle
before all of them were shot down by the clansmen who
claimed they were cleansing the honour of the clan by
killing the "traitors."
The bodies of the Kamels were never seen. That leaves
open speculation that even their "death" was faked and
that the Kamel brothers are living in secret with
their families somewhere in Iraq. That is a theory
that is equally fascinating but impossible.
Monday, March 03, 2003
Turkish Islamists and Iraq
by pv vivekanand
THE dominant Islamists of Turkey have taken a big political risk by voting in parliament against allowing American troops to deploy in Turkish territory to wage a war against Iraq. Obviously, the strategists in Washington might even be contemplating manipulating the US "connections" with the Turkish military into staging events that might see the demise of the Islamist domination of the Turkish parliament and create new realities in the country that would serve the pressing American need to have access to Turkish territory for military action against Iraq. US-engineered upheavals have been known to happen before and there is no reason not to rule it out this time around either.
The motion for approval for the Ankara-Washington deal was voted down in parliament by three votes after several members abstained and others conveniently stayed away from the session and spared themselves from answering their voters why they opted to support a war against a fellow Muslim country.
There is considerable opposition among Turks to a US-led war against Iraq since many see it was a campaign against Islam itself. Those sentiments have to seen against the decades of "discrimination" that Turks feel they were subjected to in the West coupled with post-Sept.11 events.
It is not simply the parliamentary rejection of an American military deployment in Turkey that should be irking Washington. It is the realisation that the politics of Turkey has changed dramatically after the election victory last year of the Justice and Development (AKP) party led by firebrand Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has made no secret of his distaste of his country's alliance with the West rather than its natural partners in the Arab and Muslim world.
At the same time, other AKP leaders, including the current prime minister Adullah Gul -- who is actually standing in for Erdogan until the latter wins a bye-election and qualifies to be prime minister -- are seen as a moderating factor.
The prospect of a war against Iraq has come to Turkey at a most inappropriate time for the Islamists, who, for the first time in the modern history of the country, have an absolute majority in parliament and need to consolidate their political grip through meeting the expectations of the electorate. Their agenda did not have any room for an external crisis interfering with their plans. Their pressing priority is to stabilise the internal front and consolidate their newfound status as the dominant political power in the coutnry.
They need a stable environment in order to achieve social and economic objectives that would endear them more to the voters. The crisis over Iraq was something they could have done very well without.
The Turkish military establishment, which has a record of intervening whenever serious political crises erupted, is watching from the wings, and many would not rule out that the generals could go into action if they felt that Ankara was going too far from its traditional relationship with Washington.
Analysts believe that many senior Turkish military generals have close affiliation with the US; many of them have undergone training in the US and feel close to the US military establishment; most of their weapons and equipment are supplied by the US; and some might even be outraged that the Islamist politicians are placing the relationship with the US on the firing line by denying Washington the much-needed military facility to wage a successful war against Iraq.
The first thought that occurred to many observers when the AKP won the elections last year was how the generals would take it. It was indeed a relief that the military relented and said the party had its backing to rule Turkey with the first wholly Islamist government. Since then it was generally been smooth sailing for the AKP, which went on to introduce legislative amendsments that allowed Erdogan to stand in elections. A by-poll is scheduled to be held on Sunday which is expected to see Erdogan entering parliament and take over premiership from Gul.
The election should be another irritating factor for the Americans since it has frozen any move by the government to put in a new request for parliament to take a new vote on the deployment of US troops in the country. A vote would not come before another two or three weeks in view of the government reshuffle that is expected to follow Erdogan's election.
There should have been many considerations behind the Gul goverment's failed move last week to secure parliamentary approval for US military deployment, and those considerations remain unchanged.
These include:
Turkey would definitely like to have a military say in northern Iraq because of fears that Iraqi Kurds could take control the oil-producing areas there and move towards declaring an independent state that would stir the Turkish Kurdish community.
Turkish politicians have been demanding that Ankara pre-empt such a move by seizing control of the oil regions of northern Iraq citing Ottoman territorial claims and the presence there of two million Turcomen -- Iraqis of Turkish origin.
Turkey's economy needs urgent infusion of funds. A deal made between Ankara and Washington would allow Ankara to get $6 billion immediately and up to $26 billion in credit facilities iin return for allowing Turkish territory to be used by the Americans to open a northern front against Saddam Hussein.
Under the Islamists, Turkey, which has come under criticism in the Arab World for the last 30 years for its ties with Israel, is hoping to signal a slow-down in its interaction with Israel and seek to strengthen its relationship with the Arab World. It has already sought an observer status in the Arab League.
Given the Arab and Muslim rejection of a regime change in Iraq through military means, Turkey has to be careful in its steps in the crisis.
Obviously, the Islamist government's decision to close the deal with the US was prompted by a calculation that business would be back as usual once the Iraqi crisis tides over with the ouster of the Saddam regime since it knows well that there is not much love lost for Saddam among Arab leaders. At the same time, Erdogan also faces the task of justifying his decision to the wider Islamic World.
Reminding Ankara of the pitfalls it faces in Iraq is the growing internal rejection of war against Iraq as well as the Iraqi Kurdish approach to the issue. Tousands of Iraqi Kurds who staged a protest against any deployment of Turkish troops in northern Iraq on Monday and burnt Turkish flags in front of the UN headquarters in Arbil.
Iraqi Kurds fear that the Turkish-US deal is at their expense although the political and military details of the accord have yet to be disclosed.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), one of the two dominant Iraqi Kurdish groups, has voiced fears that the deal gives Turkey the green light to pour in thousands of Turkish troops into northern Iraq. The KDP sees it as a betral of the Kurds and has vowed to fight the Turks if they enter the Kurdish enclave that is shared between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurdish distrust of Turkey was highlighted when Kurdish border guards prevented Turks from accompanying journalists and delegates who attended an Iraqi opposition conference in northern Iraq last week.
The uncertainty over Turkish approval of the deal has put American miltiary plans in disarray since use of Turkish territory is vital to success in the planned US war against Iraq. Senior US commanders have admitted as much and are seeking alternative plans to using Turkey.
However, denial of access to Turkish territory will cripple US plans to execute a "short war" to achieve its objectives in Iraq. Any prolonged conflict would only work against the carefully planned US scenario for a post-war Iraq.
As such, the angry response the Turkish parliament vote drew from Washington was understandable. It reflected the frustration of the American strategists who worked for more than three months to close the deal with Ankara.
However, those protests and words of condemnation would have little effect unless Erdogan streamlines his members of parliament and forces through an approval of the deal with the US before the delay throws a spanner in the US works. But then, Erdogan's priorities are too complex for a smooth process of a parliamentary approval of the deal in a new vote.
And that is why all eyes are on the options of the Turkish military generals.
THE dominant Islamists of Turkey have taken a big political risk by voting in parliament against allowing American troops to deploy in Turkish territory to wage a war against Iraq. Obviously, the strategists in Washington might even be contemplating manipulating the US "connections" with the Turkish military into staging events that might see the demise of the Islamist domination of the Turkish parliament and create new realities in the country that would serve the pressing American need to have access to Turkish territory for military action against Iraq. US-engineered upheavals have been known to happen before and there is no reason not to rule it out this time around either.
The motion for approval for the Ankara-Washington deal was voted down in parliament by three votes after several members abstained and others conveniently stayed away from the session and spared themselves from answering their voters why they opted to support a war against a fellow Muslim country.
There is considerable opposition among Turks to a US-led war against Iraq since many see it was a campaign against Islam itself. Those sentiments have to seen against the decades of "discrimination" that Turks feel they were subjected to in the West coupled with post-Sept.11 events.
It is not simply the parliamentary rejection of an American military deployment in Turkey that should be irking Washington. It is the realisation that the politics of Turkey has changed dramatically after the election victory last year of the Justice and Development (AKP) party led by firebrand Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has made no secret of his distaste of his country's alliance with the West rather than its natural partners in the Arab and Muslim world.
At the same time, other AKP leaders, including the current prime minister Adullah Gul -- who is actually standing in for Erdogan until the latter wins a bye-election and qualifies to be prime minister -- are seen as a moderating factor.
The prospect of a war against Iraq has come to Turkey at a most inappropriate time for the Islamists, who, for the first time in the modern history of the country, have an absolute majority in parliament and need to consolidate their political grip through meeting the expectations of the electorate. Their agenda did not have any room for an external crisis interfering with their plans. Their pressing priority is to stabilise the internal front and consolidate their newfound status as the dominant political power in the coutnry.
They need a stable environment in order to achieve social and economic objectives that would endear them more to the voters. The crisis over Iraq was something they could have done very well without.
The Turkish military establishment, which has a record of intervening whenever serious political crises erupted, is watching from the wings, and many would not rule out that the generals could go into action if they felt that Ankara was going too far from its traditional relationship with Washington.
Analysts believe that many senior Turkish military generals have close affiliation with the US; many of them have undergone training in the US and feel close to the US military establishment; most of their weapons and equipment are supplied by the US; and some might even be outraged that the Islamist politicians are placing the relationship with the US on the firing line by denying Washington the much-needed military facility to wage a successful war against Iraq.
The first thought that occurred to many observers when the AKP won the elections last year was how the generals would take it. It was indeed a relief that the military relented and said the party had its backing to rule Turkey with the first wholly Islamist government. Since then it was generally been smooth sailing for the AKP, which went on to introduce legislative amendsments that allowed Erdogan to stand in elections. A by-poll is scheduled to be held on Sunday which is expected to see Erdogan entering parliament and take over premiership from Gul.
The election should be another irritating factor for the Americans since it has frozen any move by the government to put in a new request for parliament to take a new vote on the deployment of US troops in the country. A vote would not come before another two or three weeks in view of the government reshuffle that is expected to follow Erdogan's election.
There should have been many considerations behind the Gul goverment's failed move last week to secure parliamentary approval for US military deployment, and those considerations remain unchanged.
These include:
Turkey would definitely like to have a military say in northern Iraq because of fears that Iraqi Kurds could take control the oil-producing areas there and move towards declaring an independent state that would stir the Turkish Kurdish community.
Turkish politicians have been demanding that Ankara pre-empt such a move by seizing control of the oil regions of northern Iraq citing Ottoman territorial claims and the presence there of two million Turcomen -- Iraqis of Turkish origin.
Turkey's economy needs urgent infusion of funds. A deal made between Ankara and Washington would allow Ankara to get $6 billion immediately and up to $26 billion in credit facilities iin return for allowing Turkish territory to be used by the Americans to open a northern front against Saddam Hussein.
Under the Islamists, Turkey, which has come under criticism in the Arab World for the last 30 years for its ties with Israel, is hoping to signal a slow-down in its interaction with Israel and seek to strengthen its relationship with the Arab World. It has already sought an observer status in the Arab League.
Given the Arab and Muslim rejection of a regime change in Iraq through military means, Turkey has to be careful in its steps in the crisis.
Obviously, the Islamist government's decision to close the deal with the US was prompted by a calculation that business would be back as usual once the Iraqi crisis tides over with the ouster of the Saddam regime since it knows well that there is not much love lost for Saddam among Arab leaders. At the same time, Erdogan also faces the task of justifying his decision to the wider Islamic World.
Reminding Ankara of the pitfalls it faces in Iraq is the growing internal rejection of war against Iraq as well as the Iraqi Kurdish approach to the issue. Tousands of Iraqi Kurds who staged a protest against any deployment of Turkish troops in northern Iraq on Monday and burnt Turkish flags in front of the UN headquarters in Arbil.
Iraqi Kurds fear that the Turkish-US deal is at their expense although the political and military details of the accord have yet to be disclosed.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), one of the two dominant Iraqi Kurdish groups, has voiced fears that the deal gives Turkey the green light to pour in thousands of Turkish troops into northern Iraq. The KDP sees it as a betral of the Kurds and has vowed to fight the Turks if they enter the Kurdish enclave that is shared between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurdish distrust of Turkey was highlighted when Kurdish border guards prevented Turks from accompanying journalists and delegates who attended an Iraqi opposition conference in northern Iraq last week.
The uncertainty over Turkish approval of the deal has put American miltiary plans in disarray since use of Turkish territory is vital to success in the planned US war against Iraq. Senior US commanders have admitted as much and are seeking alternative plans to using Turkey.
However, denial of access to Turkish territory will cripple US plans to execute a "short war" to achieve its objectives in Iraq. Any prolonged conflict would only work against the carefully planned US scenario for a post-war Iraq.
As such, the angry response the Turkish parliament vote drew from Washington was understandable. It reflected the frustration of the American strategists who worked for more than three months to close the deal with Ankara.
However, those protests and words of condemnation would have little effect unless Erdogan streamlines his members of parliament and forces through an approval of the deal with the US before the delay throws a spanner in the US works. But then, Erdogan's priorities are too complex for a smooth process of a parliamentary approval of the deal in a new vote.
And that is why all eyes are on the options of the Turkish military generals.
Sunday, March 02, 2003
It is all about water
Parallel to the argument that the US is seeking control of Iraq's oil wealth through its campaign to topple Saddam Hussein, a new contention has emerged that Washington might also be eyeing to reshape the region's water system.
The assertion has come from Stephen C. Pelletiere, who served as Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) senior political analyst on Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, and as a professor at the Army War College from 1988 to 2000. In that capacity, says Pelletriere, "I was privy to much of the classified material that flowed through Washington having to do with the (Arabian) Gulf..."
In an opinion/editorial piece written in the New York Times under the title "A war crime or an act of war," Petteriere primarily sought to establish that it was not Iraq but Iran which had used chemical weapons on the people of Halabja on the border between the two countries at the end of the 1980-88 war.
"...The truth is, all we know for certain is that Kurds were bombarded with poison gas that day at Halabja," he wrote. "We cannot say with any certainty that Iraqi chemical weapons killed the Kurds. This is not the only distortion in the Halabja story."
According to the former CIA officer, it was during an Iraqi-Iranian battle that ensued when Iran soought take over of the Darbandikhan lake and dam the border in an area including Halabja that chemical weapons were used. The gas that was used was known to have been used by Iran and not Iraq, he says in contradiction to President George W,Bush's implicit accusation in is recent State of the Union address that Saddam had used chemical weapons against his own people.
Beyond the debate about the use of chemical weapons in Halabja, Pelletriere's article refers to plans about the region's water resources.
"Iraq has the most extensive river system in the Middle East," he says.
"Before the Gulf war, Iraq had built an impressive system of dams and river control projects, the largest being the Darbandikhan dam in the Kurdish area," says the article. "And it was this dam the Iranians were aiming to take control of when they seized Halabja.
"In the 1990s there was much discussion over the construction of a so-called Peace Pipeline that would bring the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates south to the Gulf states, and, by extension, Israel," Pelletriere writes.
The Peace Pipeline project was the brainchild of the late Turkish president Turgut Ozal in the late 80s and early 90s. He proposed that Turkey dam up the Euphrates and sell the water to the region's countries, including Israel.
Turkey on the one hand and downstream Syria and Iraq had been for long locked in disputes over the Euphrates since Turkey slowed down the flow of the river through dams build upstream. In the 90s, it built the Ataturk Dam, which has considerably reduced the flow.
Eighty per cent of Iraq’s water originates outside its borders. Turkey controls most of the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates, the twin rivers upon which both Syria and Iraq depend.
While the Peace Pipeline project was welcomed by Israel, which has the highest per capita water consumption in the Middle East, Iraq and Syria objected to it since damming up the Euphrates would have serious consequences on their sections of the river.
--
The Peace Pipeline project involved conveying Turkey's waters through Syrian territory or along the Mediterranean to Israel. The Gulf-bound water would pass through Iraq, according to the Turkish plan.
Russia was the main non-Arab opponent of the project since Moscow felt that that the project will have dangerous outcomes and will lead to new fights and Arab-Israeli wars over the water.
Indeed, that assumption is held valid in view of the growing water crisis in the region and a lack of agreement on how the region’s scarce resources should be divided.
In any event, it is elementary that a Turkish water pipeline running through Syrian territory to Israel could be contemplated only in a situation of Arab-Israeli peace -- which seems far too distant at this jucture in history.
But, does the US have any plans to use Iraqi territory for a pipeline to Israel running through Jordan?
While Pelletriere, the former CIA expert, is not clear on this point, he suggests all options could be open.
"We are constantly reminded that Iraq has perhaps the world's largest reserves of oil," says Pelletriere. "But in a regional and perhaps even geopolitical sense, it may be more important that Iraq has the most extensive river system in the Middle East."
"Iraq was covered with irrigation works by the sixth century AD., and was a granary for the region," says Pelletriere.
According to the former espionage official, no progress was made on the Peace Pipeline project because of what he calls Iraqi intransigence.
"With Iraq in American hands, of course, all that could change," he says.
"Thus America could alter the destiny of the Middle East in a way that probably could not be challenged for decades — not solely by controlling Iraq's oil, but by controlling its water....."
Indeed, experts have often predicted that the next Middle East war would be over water.
“Many of the wars of this [20th] century were about oil,” World Bank Vice-President Ismail Serageldin observed in the late 90s, “but the wars of the next century will be about water.”
Seen against the obivous "invisible" US objective of removing Iraq as a potential military threat against Israel, it would also seem conceivable that its plan includes opening the door to address its ally's water concerns. With the US in absolute control of Iraq, it would be free to use Iraqi territory to convey water Israel through Jordan, which has signed a peace treaty with the Jewish state and has strong economic and trade links with the US,
Israel has proved it would not hesitate to go to war over water. Its seizure of Syria's Golan Heights in the 1967 war had more to do with its anxiety to take control of the strategic area which is the main source of its water than military strategy; and its persistent refusal to negotiate the return of the Golan to Syria evidences its determination not to give up control of the water source.
The Israeli invasion and 23-year occupation of southern Lebanon was also partly motivated by designs to gain control over Lebanon's water sources and divert them into Israeli territory.
Israel's continued occupation of parts of the West Bank is aimed at retaining control of aquifers in the occupied territory that accounts for nearly one fourth of its water consumption. It has imposed severe controls over Palestinian exploitation of their own water sources.
As such, Pelletriere's assertion that the US would seek to revamp the region's water-sharing arrangements could not be dismissed out of hand.
However, it need not be the case that Iraq would be a conduit to Turkey's water to Israel.
A US control of Iraq would definitely change the region's shape and political perceptions and Washington might eventually be able to "persuade" Syria to make peace with Israel under the new reality of a strong American military presence in neighbouring Iraq.
A Syrian-Israeli peace agreement, by definition if, as and when it is signed, would definitely involve firm accords of water sharing and the world could bet it would be more oriented towards addressing Israel's "water concerns" than those of the Arabs.
Droughts are frequent in the northern parts of Iraq, indicating that the water sources in that part of the country are not dependable.
The Tigris and Euphrates rivers rise in the eastern mountains of Turkey and enter Iraq along its northwestern borders.
After flowing for some 1,200 kilometres tranversing through Iraq, the two rivers converge at Karmat Al, just north of Basra, to form the Shatt Al Arab waterway, which flows some 110 kilometres to enter the Gulf. The middle of the waterway is supposed to be the Iran-Iraq international border.
The Euphrates does not receive any tributaries within Iraq, while the Tigris receives four main tributaries, the Khabour, Great Zab, Little Zab and Diyala, which rise in the mountains of eastern Turkey and northwestern Iran and flow in a southwesterly direction until they meet the Tigris River, according to data provided by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation. A seasonal river, Al Authaim, rising in the highlands of northern Iraq, also flows into the Tigris, and is the only significant tributary arising entirely within Iraq.
The assertion has come from Stephen C. Pelletiere, who served as Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) senior political analyst on Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, and as a professor at the Army War College from 1988 to 2000. In that capacity, says Pelletriere, "I was privy to much of the classified material that flowed through Washington having to do with the (Arabian) Gulf..."
In an opinion/editorial piece written in the New York Times under the title "A war crime or an act of war," Petteriere primarily sought to establish that it was not Iraq but Iran which had used chemical weapons on the people of Halabja on the border between the two countries at the end of the 1980-88 war.
"...The truth is, all we know for certain is that Kurds were bombarded with poison gas that day at Halabja," he wrote. "We cannot say with any certainty that Iraqi chemical weapons killed the Kurds. This is not the only distortion in the Halabja story."
According to the former CIA officer, it was during an Iraqi-Iranian battle that ensued when Iran soought take over of the Darbandikhan lake and dam the border in an area including Halabja that chemical weapons were used. The gas that was used was known to have been used by Iran and not Iraq, he says in contradiction to President George W,Bush's implicit accusation in is recent State of the Union address that Saddam had used chemical weapons against his own people.
Beyond the debate about the use of chemical weapons in Halabja, Pelletriere's article refers to plans about the region's water resources.
"Iraq has the most extensive river system in the Middle East," he says.
"Before the Gulf war, Iraq had built an impressive system of dams and river control projects, the largest being the Darbandikhan dam in the Kurdish area," says the article. "And it was this dam the Iranians were aiming to take control of when they seized Halabja.
"In the 1990s there was much discussion over the construction of a so-called Peace Pipeline that would bring the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates south to the Gulf states, and, by extension, Israel," Pelletriere writes.
The Peace Pipeline project was the brainchild of the late Turkish president Turgut Ozal in the late 80s and early 90s. He proposed that Turkey dam up the Euphrates and sell the water to the region's countries, including Israel.
Turkey on the one hand and downstream Syria and Iraq had been for long locked in disputes over the Euphrates since Turkey slowed down the flow of the river through dams build upstream. In the 90s, it built the Ataturk Dam, which has considerably reduced the flow.
Eighty per cent of Iraq’s water originates outside its borders. Turkey controls most of the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates, the twin rivers upon which both Syria and Iraq depend.
While the Peace Pipeline project was welcomed by Israel, which has the highest per capita water consumption in the Middle East, Iraq and Syria objected to it since damming up the Euphrates would have serious consequences on their sections of the river.
--
The Peace Pipeline project involved conveying Turkey's waters through Syrian territory or along the Mediterranean to Israel. The Gulf-bound water would pass through Iraq, according to the Turkish plan.
Russia was the main non-Arab opponent of the project since Moscow felt that that the project will have dangerous outcomes and will lead to new fights and Arab-Israeli wars over the water.
Indeed, that assumption is held valid in view of the growing water crisis in the region and a lack of agreement on how the region’s scarce resources should be divided.
In any event, it is elementary that a Turkish water pipeline running through Syrian territory to Israel could be contemplated only in a situation of Arab-Israeli peace -- which seems far too distant at this jucture in history.
But, does the US have any plans to use Iraqi territory for a pipeline to Israel running through Jordan?
While Pelletriere, the former CIA expert, is not clear on this point, he suggests all options could be open.
"We are constantly reminded that Iraq has perhaps the world's largest reserves of oil," says Pelletriere. "But in a regional and perhaps even geopolitical sense, it may be more important that Iraq has the most extensive river system in the Middle East."
"Iraq was covered with irrigation works by the sixth century AD., and was a granary for the region," says Pelletriere.
According to the former espionage official, no progress was made on the Peace Pipeline project because of what he calls Iraqi intransigence.
"With Iraq in American hands, of course, all that could change," he says.
"Thus America could alter the destiny of the Middle East in a way that probably could not be challenged for decades — not solely by controlling Iraq's oil, but by controlling its water....."
Indeed, experts have often predicted that the next Middle East war would be over water.
“Many of the wars of this [20th] century were about oil,” World Bank Vice-President Ismail Serageldin observed in the late 90s, “but the wars of the next century will be about water.”
Seen against the obivous "invisible" US objective of removing Iraq as a potential military threat against Israel, it would also seem conceivable that its plan includes opening the door to address its ally's water concerns. With the US in absolute control of Iraq, it would be free to use Iraqi territory to convey water Israel through Jordan, which has signed a peace treaty with the Jewish state and has strong economic and trade links with the US,
Israel has proved it would not hesitate to go to war over water. Its seizure of Syria's Golan Heights in the 1967 war had more to do with its anxiety to take control of the strategic area which is the main source of its water than military strategy; and its persistent refusal to negotiate the return of the Golan to Syria evidences its determination not to give up control of the water source.
The Israeli invasion and 23-year occupation of southern Lebanon was also partly motivated by designs to gain control over Lebanon's water sources and divert them into Israeli territory.
Israel's continued occupation of parts of the West Bank is aimed at retaining control of aquifers in the occupied territory that accounts for nearly one fourth of its water consumption. It has imposed severe controls over Palestinian exploitation of their own water sources.
As such, Pelletriere's assertion that the US would seek to revamp the region's water-sharing arrangements could not be dismissed out of hand.
However, it need not be the case that Iraq would be a conduit to Turkey's water to Israel.
A US control of Iraq would definitely change the region's shape and political perceptions and Washington might eventually be able to "persuade" Syria to make peace with Israel under the new reality of a strong American military presence in neighbouring Iraq.
A Syrian-Israeli peace agreement, by definition if, as and when it is signed, would definitely involve firm accords of water sharing and the world could bet it would be more oriented towards addressing Israel's "water concerns" than those of the Arabs.
Droughts are frequent in the northern parts of Iraq, indicating that the water sources in that part of the country are not dependable.
The Tigris and Euphrates rivers rise in the eastern mountains of Turkey and enter Iraq along its northwestern borders.
After flowing for some 1,200 kilometres tranversing through Iraq, the two rivers converge at Karmat Al, just north of Basra, to form the Shatt Al Arab waterway, which flows some 110 kilometres to enter the Gulf. The middle of the waterway is supposed to be the Iran-Iraq international border.
The Euphrates does not receive any tributaries within Iraq, while the Tigris receives four main tributaries, the Khabour, Great Zab, Little Zab and Diyala, which rise in the mountains of eastern Turkey and northwestern Iran and flow in a southwesterly direction until they meet the Tigris River, according to data provided by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation. A seasonal river, Al Authaim, rising in the highlands of northern Iraq, also flows into the Tigris, and is the only significant tributary arising entirely within Iraq.
Wednesday, February 26, 2003
Iraqi monarchy to be revived?
pv vivekanand
"What a preprosterous idea!" that is how a source
close to Prince Hassan of Jordan responded when asked
whether the prince was gearing up to be the king of
Iraq after Saddam Hussein is toppled.
"Do you think Prince Hassan is the type of person who
would ride on an American tank into baghdad to rule
Iraq?" asked the source.
the very idea of restoring the hashemite monarchy in
post-war iraq came up in july when prince hassan, the
brother of the king hussein of jordan, turned up at a
meeting of Iraqi dissidents in London.
Although he insisted that he was attending the meeting
in his personal capacity, his very presence sparked
suggestions that he had made a deal with the americans
under which he would be installed as king of iraq
after saddam is ousted.
The deal, it was alleged, involved jordan joining the
american war camp against Iraq and offering military
facilities to the US military to launch strikes
against the kingdom's eastern neighbour in a course of
events leading to prince hassan taking over Iraq with
american backing.
hassan was expected to become the king of jordan but
his brother king hussein turned around a few days
before his death in February 1999 and named his son
Abdullah as his heir.
Hassan was of course disappointed. Howevdr, the pragmatic
scholar and intellectual he is, he pubicly declared
that he backed abdullah as the new king of jordan.
since then, Hassan came to be known as a king without
a throne, and the purported idea of him being named
king of iraq suited the minds of many.
american sources have confirmed that restoration of
the monarchy in iraq was one of the "many" scenarios
being considered.
however, there are many questions that are not
answered.
these include:
-- will the iraqis themselves accept a monarchy?
the hashemite monarchy was in power in iraq from 1920
until 1958 when it was overthrown. today's iraqi
generation has been for long used to the baathist
leadership and presidency, which came to power in
1968, with saddam hussein assuming power in 1979.
as such, restoration of a ruling family that today's
generation is not familiar with faces major hurdles.
The direct descendant of the Iraqi branch of the
Hashmite family is Sharif Ali Bin Hussein, who
attended the London meeting with prince hassan in
july. sharif ali heads the Constitutional Monarchy
Movement, which, as the name implies, would give the
restored hashemite family a titular power, with the
actual executive powers lying with an elected
government.
The most favoured american plan for immediate post-war
iraq is a military administration headed by a
civilian.
However, that plan seems to have run into trouble
facing rejection by the iraqi dissident groups, which
are insisting that they should be given power in
post-war iraq.
Two Iraqi groups, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)
based in northern Iraq and the Shiite Supreme Council
for islamic revolution in Iraq (Scriri) said this week
that Washington had agreed to give the anti-Saddam
groups power in Iraq after the war.
The reported American change of mind to accepting to
allow the Iraqi opposition to rule a post-war Iraq
stems from a realization that Washington would never
be able to secure international legitimacy for a US
occupation of that country.
Earlier US plans called for a military administration
of post-war Iraq.
The country was to be administratively divided into
three sectors - the Kurdish north, the Shiite north
and the mixed central region, including Baghdad, the
capital.
The Bush administration had also firmed up the people
who were supposed to be in charge of the three
sectors: A woman ambassador and a serving general and
a former lieutenant-general, with each assigned to
three sectors of a post-war Iraq - the northern
Kurdish region, the central region including Baghdad
and the Shiite
The woman, career foreign service diplomat Barbara
Brodine, last served as the US ambassador to Yemen and
handled a difficult phase in Washington-Sanaa
relationship after the bombing of the USS Cole off
Aden in 2000 attributed to Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda
group.
The other two are: Lieutenant-General John Abizaid,
who is of Lebanese origin, and former
lieutenant-general Jay Garner, who served as the US
Army's specialist in missile defence and space-related
affairs.
The Iraqi opposition groups vehemently opposed the
plans, but Washington did not seem to be taking them
seriously. Obviously, the assumption was that these
groups would fall in line once the US military takes
firm control of Iraq.
On the international front, the US obviously hoped to
secure a UN Security Council resolution endorsing its
occupation of Iraq disguised as "administrative
control."
However, France and Russia have vowed that they would
deny
the US such legitimacy since it would also mean that
they were endorsing the legality of the US war against
Iraq that does not have Security Council
authorisation.
It was the French and Russian threats of veto that
dissuaded US President George W.Bush from seeking
approval of a new Security Council resolution and
insist that Resolution 1441 of November was enough to
launch military action against Iraq.
On Friday, one day after the war was launched, French
President Jacque Chirac threatened to veto any UN
resolution to let the US run Iraq after the war.
He said that allowing Washington and London to oversee
the creation of a new government in Iraq would reward
them for starting a war that flouted the supremacy of
the UN Security Council.
France would veto any attempt in the United Nations to
"legitimise the military intervention (and) ... give
the belligerents the powers to administer Iraq,"
Chirac said. "That would justify the war after the
event."
Chirac made his position known after British Prime
Minister Tony Blair called on the other European Union
countries to support future moves at the UN to forge a
post-Saddam "civil authority in Iraq."
On Saturday, Russian joined France in opposing the US
move.
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said he expected
Washington to seek retroactive approval for their
action from the United Nations after Iraqi resistance
had been crushed but that Russia would oppose it.
"Attempts will undoubtedly be made in the UN Security
Council to find ways which would help legitimise the
military operations and the post-war (political)
set-up in Iraq," he said.
"We will follow this very carefully and we will not,
of course, give legitimacy to this action in the
Security Council," Ivanov said.
"I don't think Iraq needs a democracy brought on the
wings of Tomahawk (missiles)," he said.
In northern Iraq on Saturday, the KDP annoucned
Washington had a change of heart and had abandoned
plans to install a temporary US military
administration in post-war Iraq.
"There will be an interim Iraqi administration
immediately after the liberation," a senior KDP
official said, adding that the decision was taken
during tripartite talks in Ankara between American,
Turkish and Iraqi opposition representatives
Hoshyar Zebari of the KDP affirmed that initially, the
Americans had hoped to impose a military
administration which would not involve Iraqis.
But the US "abandoned that idea during the talks," he
said. "It will not exactly be a government, more an
authority which will be responsible for public
services," he explained.
"Power will gradually be transferred to this
authority, which will be able to negotiate with the
United Nations and with countries donating aid,"
Zebari said. "It will prepare the ground for a court
of justice and help establish a constitutional
assembly to draw up a constitution."
Abdul Aziz Hakim, deputy head of the Tehran-based
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI), said US representative Zalmay Khalilzad had
announced the change of plan.
Hakim said Khalilzad told them the opposition would
now take control "from the outset."
The reported American change of mind reflects
Washington's thinking that it might not be a good idea
to take its confrontation with other world powers any
further and further undermine the credibility of the
UN Security Council. "Defying the Security Council and
going ahead with its unilateral war against Iraq was
the biggest blow that the UN has ever received,"
commented a European diplomat.
"To continue along the same line and impose its own
rule in Iraq would only worsen the international
crisis, particularly at a time when the US is hoping
for world support in rebuilding Iraq and in mending
fences with European powers like France, Germany and
others."
"Unilateralism could be taken only to a point without
actually triggering a world crisis of massive
proportions worse than those prevailing today," added
the diplomat. At the same time, the "new" American
position to allow the Iraqi opposition to rule
post-war Iraq might be a smoke screen that would veil
the actual power that Washington would wield there in
post-Saddam era.
"What is stopping the US to pull its strings and have
some puppets who would obey orders?" said an Arab
diplomat.
That might not be that easy, given the
behind-the-scene struggle among Iraqi exiles to gain
power in a post-Saddam Iraq.
Leading the pack is Ahmed Chalabi, a former banker in
Jordan with a dubious reputation. Chalabi, a Shiite
who enjoys the backing of several leading figures in
the Bush administration, has made no secret of his
ambition to succeed Saddam. But he faces stiff
opposition from other exile groups such as the
Iran-backed Shiite Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, the Iraqi National Accord backed
by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the two main
Kurdish groups, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and
the Kurdish Democratic Party as well as the
Constitutional Monarchy Movement.
Meanwhile, the US plan for post-war Iraq would involve
someone who would have mission similar to that of
General Douglas MacArthur, who oversaw the
rebuilding of Japan after World War II.
US officials have affirmed that American officials,
both civilian and military, would be in charge of
post-war Iraq's affairs "as long as it takes" to
create a situation where Washington could hand over
power to an Iraqi civilian government.
What stands out in the proposed nominations is the
reported inclusion of Brodine, a woman, as
administrator of Baghdad.
Washington is being totally insensitive to the
feelings of Iraqis and the Arabs at large and it is a
perfect recipe for continued instability in Iraq since
the Iraqis would not accept a woman at the helm of
their affairs.
The decision might indeed be rooted in considerations
of Bodine's efficiency and experience in the Middle
East, but it could not but be seen as a total
disregard of the sensitivities of the people of Iraq
as well as the male-dominated Arab World at large. If
anything, it would be seen as adding insult to injury
among the Arabs, who have vehemently rejected the US
war against Iraq.
Definitely, the purported plan does not seem to have
taken into consideration Iraqi cultural, historical,
and religious sensitivities.
Iraq is indeed a secular state and Iraqi women
afforded full rights of participation in all levels of
society. However, the installing of a government run
by a non-Arab, non-Muslim woman will definitely wound
the pride of the people of Iraq.
Although modernised, tribal customs still run deep in
Iraq and tribal leaders and sheikhs would not accept
to deal with a woman who would be telling Iraqis how
to run their lives .
Iraqis agree.
"Iraqis will react to it aggressively," said an Iraqi
trader in the UAE, noting that life in Iraq, as in
most other Arab countries, is dominated by males and
Iraqis have never dealt with a woman occupying any
high political office. "The Iraqis would be the last
among the Arabs to accept that a woman running their
country," said the trader.
Another Iraqi, a business executive, laughed at the
idea. "How do you think a woman would be able to deal
with the tribal leaders and sheikhs? They would never
take orders from a woman. They would simply boycott
her."
If anything, Iraqis have an added reason to be hostile
to American female diplomats. Many Iraqis have not
forgotten that it was another American woman
ambassador, April Glaspie, who, they believe, nudged
Saddam into believing that Washington would remain
neutral if he were to invade Kuwait and was thus
implicitly encouraged to order his military across the
border to the emirate in August 1990.
"We already had an American woman leading us into
disaster," said another IraqI, a banking executive.
"If it had not been for (Glaspie's) misleading
comments, Saddam would have thought twice or thrice
before invading Kuwait and brought the catastrophe
upon the entire country."
"Why should the Iraqi need another American ambassador
who could be doing the same things all over again
although in a different context, time and place?"
asked the executive.
That might indeed be true. But do the Iraqis have any
choice?
"What a preprosterous idea!" that is how a source
close to Prince Hassan of Jordan responded when asked
whether the prince was gearing up to be the king of
Iraq after Saddam Hussein is toppled.
"Do you think Prince Hassan is the type of person who
would ride on an American tank into baghdad to rule
Iraq?" asked the source.
the very idea of restoring the hashemite monarchy in
post-war iraq came up in july when prince hassan, the
brother of the king hussein of jordan, turned up at a
meeting of Iraqi dissidents in London.
Although he insisted that he was attending the meeting
in his personal capacity, his very presence sparked
suggestions that he had made a deal with the americans
under which he would be installed as king of iraq
after saddam is ousted.
The deal, it was alleged, involved jordan joining the
american war camp against Iraq and offering military
facilities to the US military to launch strikes
against the kingdom's eastern neighbour in a course of
events leading to prince hassan taking over Iraq with
american backing.
hassan was expected to become the king of jordan but
his brother king hussein turned around a few days
before his death in February 1999 and named his son
Abdullah as his heir.
Hassan was of course disappointed. Howevdr, the pragmatic
scholar and intellectual he is, he pubicly declared
that he backed abdullah as the new king of jordan.
since then, Hassan came to be known as a king without
a throne, and the purported idea of him being named
king of iraq suited the minds of many.
american sources have confirmed that restoration of
the monarchy in iraq was one of the "many" scenarios
being considered.
however, there are many questions that are not
answered.
these include:
-- will the iraqis themselves accept a monarchy?
the hashemite monarchy was in power in iraq from 1920
until 1958 when it was overthrown. today's iraqi
generation has been for long used to the baathist
leadership and presidency, which came to power in
1968, with saddam hussein assuming power in 1979.
as such, restoration of a ruling family that today's
generation is not familiar with faces major hurdles.
The direct descendant of the Iraqi branch of the
Hashmite family is Sharif Ali Bin Hussein, who
attended the London meeting with prince hassan in
july. sharif ali heads the Constitutional Monarchy
Movement, which, as the name implies, would give the
restored hashemite family a titular power, with the
actual executive powers lying with an elected
government.
The most favoured american plan for immediate post-war
iraq is a military administration headed by a
civilian.
However, that plan seems to have run into trouble
facing rejection by the iraqi dissident groups, which
are insisting that they should be given power in
post-war iraq.
Two Iraqi groups, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)
based in northern Iraq and the Shiite Supreme Council
for islamic revolution in Iraq (Scriri) said this week
that Washington had agreed to give the anti-Saddam
groups power in Iraq after the war.
The reported American change of mind to accepting to
allow the Iraqi opposition to rule a post-war Iraq
stems from a realization that Washington would never
be able to secure international legitimacy for a US
occupation of that country.
Earlier US plans called for a military administration
of post-war Iraq.
The country was to be administratively divided into
three sectors - the Kurdish north, the Shiite north
and the mixed central region, including Baghdad, the
capital.
The Bush administration had also firmed up the people
who were supposed to be in charge of the three
sectors: A woman ambassador and a serving general and
a former lieutenant-general, with each assigned to
three sectors of a post-war Iraq - the northern
Kurdish region, the central region including Baghdad
and the Shiite
The woman, career foreign service diplomat Barbara
Brodine, last served as the US ambassador to Yemen and
handled a difficult phase in Washington-Sanaa
relationship after the bombing of the USS Cole off
Aden in 2000 attributed to Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda
group.
The other two are: Lieutenant-General John Abizaid,
who is of Lebanese origin, and former
lieutenant-general Jay Garner, who served as the US
Army's specialist in missile defence and space-related
affairs.
The Iraqi opposition groups vehemently opposed the
plans, but Washington did not seem to be taking them
seriously. Obviously, the assumption was that these
groups would fall in line once the US military takes
firm control of Iraq.
On the international front, the US obviously hoped to
secure a UN Security Council resolution endorsing its
occupation of Iraq disguised as "administrative
control."
However, France and Russia have vowed that they would
deny
the US such legitimacy since it would also mean that
they were endorsing the legality of the US war against
Iraq that does not have Security Council
authorisation.
It was the French and Russian threats of veto that
dissuaded US President George W.Bush from seeking
approval of a new Security Council resolution and
insist that Resolution 1441 of November was enough to
launch military action against Iraq.
On Friday, one day after the war was launched, French
President Jacque Chirac threatened to veto any UN
resolution to let the US run Iraq after the war.
He said that allowing Washington and London to oversee
the creation of a new government in Iraq would reward
them for starting a war that flouted the supremacy of
the UN Security Council.
France would veto any attempt in the United Nations to
"legitimise the military intervention (and) ... give
the belligerents the powers to administer Iraq,"
Chirac said. "That would justify the war after the
event."
Chirac made his position known after British Prime
Minister Tony Blair called on the other European Union
countries to support future moves at the UN to forge a
post-Saddam "civil authority in Iraq."
On Saturday, Russian joined France in opposing the US
move.
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said he expected
Washington to seek retroactive approval for their
action from the United Nations after Iraqi resistance
had been crushed but that Russia would oppose it.
"Attempts will undoubtedly be made in the UN Security
Council to find ways which would help legitimise the
military operations and the post-war (political)
set-up in Iraq," he said.
"We will follow this very carefully and we will not,
of course, give legitimacy to this action in the
Security Council," Ivanov said.
"I don't think Iraq needs a democracy brought on the
wings of Tomahawk (missiles)," he said.
In northern Iraq on Saturday, the KDP annoucned
Washington had a change of heart and had abandoned
plans to install a temporary US military
administration in post-war Iraq.
"There will be an interim Iraqi administration
immediately after the liberation," a senior KDP
official said, adding that the decision was taken
during tripartite talks in Ankara between American,
Turkish and Iraqi opposition representatives
Hoshyar Zebari of the KDP affirmed that initially, the
Americans had hoped to impose a military
administration which would not involve Iraqis.
But the US "abandoned that idea during the talks," he
said. "It will not exactly be a government, more an
authority which will be responsible for public
services," he explained.
"Power will gradually be transferred to this
authority, which will be able to negotiate with the
United Nations and with countries donating aid,"
Zebari said. "It will prepare the ground for a court
of justice and help establish a constitutional
assembly to draw up a constitution."
Abdul Aziz Hakim, deputy head of the Tehran-based
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI), said US representative Zalmay Khalilzad had
announced the change of plan.
Hakim said Khalilzad told them the opposition would
now take control "from the outset."
The reported American change of mind reflects
Washington's thinking that it might not be a good idea
to take its confrontation with other world powers any
further and further undermine the credibility of the
UN Security Council. "Defying the Security Council and
going ahead with its unilateral war against Iraq was
the biggest blow that the UN has ever received,"
commented a European diplomat.
"To continue along the same line and impose its own
rule in Iraq would only worsen the international
crisis, particularly at a time when the US is hoping
for world support in rebuilding Iraq and in mending
fences with European powers like France, Germany and
others."
"Unilateralism could be taken only to a point without
actually triggering a world crisis of massive
proportions worse than those prevailing today," added
the diplomat. At the same time, the "new" American
position to allow the Iraqi opposition to rule
post-war Iraq might be a smoke screen that would veil
the actual power that Washington would wield there in
post-Saddam era.
"What is stopping the US to pull its strings and have
some puppets who would obey orders?" said an Arab
diplomat.
That might not be that easy, given the
behind-the-scene struggle among Iraqi exiles to gain
power in a post-Saddam Iraq.
Leading the pack is Ahmed Chalabi, a former banker in
Jordan with a dubious reputation. Chalabi, a Shiite
who enjoys the backing of several leading figures in
the Bush administration, has made no secret of his
ambition to succeed Saddam. But he faces stiff
opposition from other exile groups such as the
Iran-backed Shiite Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, the Iraqi National Accord backed
by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the two main
Kurdish groups, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and
the Kurdish Democratic Party as well as the
Constitutional Monarchy Movement.
Meanwhile, the US plan for post-war Iraq would involve
someone who would have mission similar to that of
General Douglas MacArthur, who oversaw the
rebuilding of Japan after World War II.
US officials have affirmed that American officials,
both civilian and military, would be in charge of
post-war Iraq's affairs "as long as it takes" to
create a situation where Washington could hand over
power to an Iraqi civilian government.
What stands out in the proposed nominations is the
reported inclusion of Brodine, a woman, as
administrator of Baghdad.
Washington is being totally insensitive to the
feelings of Iraqis and the Arabs at large and it is a
perfect recipe for continued instability in Iraq since
the Iraqis would not accept a woman at the helm of
their affairs.
The decision might indeed be rooted in considerations
of Bodine's efficiency and experience in the Middle
East, but it could not but be seen as a total
disregard of the sensitivities of the people of Iraq
as well as the male-dominated Arab World at large. If
anything, it would be seen as adding insult to injury
among the Arabs, who have vehemently rejected the US
war against Iraq.
Definitely, the purported plan does not seem to have
taken into consideration Iraqi cultural, historical,
and religious sensitivities.
Iraq is indeed a secular state and Iraqi women
afforded full rights of participation in all levels of
society. However, the installing of a government run
by a non-Arab, non-Muslim woman will definitely wound
the pride of the people of Iraq.
Although modernised, tribal customs still run deep in
Iraq and tribal leaders and sheikhs would not accept
to deal with a woman who would be telling Iraqis how
to run their lives .
Iraqis agree.
"Iraqis will react to it aggressively," said an Iraqi
trader in the UAE, noting that life in Iraq, as in
most other Arab countries, is dominated by males and
Iraqis have never dealt with a woman occupying any
high political office. "The Iraqis would be the last
among the Arabs to accept that a woman running their
country," said the trader.
Another Iraqi, a business executive, laughed at the
idea. "How do you think a woman would be able to deal
with the tribal leaders and sheikhs? They would never
take orders from a woman. They would simply boycott
her."
If anything, Iraqis have an added reason to be hostile
to American female diplomats. Many Iraqis have not
forgotten that it was another American woman
ambassador, April Glaspie, who, they believe, nudged
Saddam into believing that Washington would remain
neutral if he were to invade Kuwait and was thus
implicitly encouraged to order his military across the
border to the emirate in August 1990.
"We already had an American woman leading us into
disaster," said another IraqI, a banking executive.
"If it had not been for (Glaspie's) misleading
comments, Saddam would have thought twice or thrice
before invading Kuwait and brought the catastrophe
upon the entire country."
"Why should the Iraqi need another American ambassador
who could be doing the same things all over again
although in a different context, time and place?"
asked the executive.
That might indeed be true. But do the Iraqis have any
choice?
Chalabi and his ambitions
PV Vivekanand
For a while it seemed that Ahmed Chalabi, a
London-based Shiite and former banker who leads an
umbrella body of Iraqi exile groups, was most favoured
to take over power in a hypothetical post-Saddam Iraq.
However, American priorities and strategies have
shifted since then, and Chalabi might not find himself
in the presidential palace unless his powerful friends
in Washington turns things around. However, that might
not be easy either, writes PV Vivekanand, who also
traces Chalabi's background as a banker in Jordan and
his experience in dealing with the Iraqi exiles.
AHMED CHALABI, leader of the Iraqi National Congress
(INC) and self-styled candidate to succeed Saddam
Hussein, has been dealt a severe blow to his
aspirations to occupy the presidential palace in
Baghdad.
Obviously, Washington has its own plans and designs
for a post-Saddam Iraq and Chalabi, a Shiite with a
chequered past as a banker in Jordan, appeared to
have found little room to accommodate himself in the
American scheme of things that envisages a military
occupation of the country after toppling Saddam.
Chalabi, who maintains offices in London and
Washington as well as northern Iraq beyond Saddam'
reach, has been building a case for himself as a
potential successor to the Iraqi president since 1991.
He had been a frequent visitor to Washington in order
to promote himself and secure American political and
financial support against Saddam.
The administration seems to have played an off-again,
on-again game with him, with the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) raising questions about his use of
American funds given to him to build a viable Iraqi
opposition front to challenge Saddam. Others say
Chalabi had spent his own money on trying to build an
anti-Saddam coalition in northern Iraq. He had even
set up a radio station to beam anti-Saddam rhetoric to
the people of Iraq. His efforts came to nought in 1996
when two Kurdish groups fought each other for
prominence in the region, and Saddam's agents managed
to penetrate into the area. That posed a direct threat
of military action and Chalabi, like others who had
set up presence there, had no choice but to order his
set-up dismantled and his people evacuated. He has
re-established an INC presence there now.
However, the most prominent American reason to
sideline him now seems to be the realisation that
other Iraqi exile groups had never really accepted the
INC leader as a possible successor to Saddam and that
he might not be the right candidate capable of dealing
with the ground realities in Iraq; and that seems to
have shut out -- at this jucture -- Chalabi's dreams
of riding atop an American military tank into the
presidential palace of Baghdad.
He has publicly rejected US plans to install an
American military administration based on the
remnants of the current Iraqi regime once Saddam is
toppled.
Speaking from an undisclosed location in northern
Iraq, Chalabi told ABC Television on Tuesday: "Iraqis
must choose their own government."
Describing as "unacceptable" the reported US plan to
have a reformed ruling Baath Party "work de facto
under the protection of US military administration,"
Chalabi told ABC: "An extended US administration...in
Iraq is unworkable....a US administration will have
very little knowledge of Arab society."
Chalabi's misfortune of falling out with the American
plans is not unique. It is simply that a liberal like
him with modern views and more attuned to dealing with
Western democratic setups than the peculiarities of
the Iraqi society is no match for the heavy
undercurrents and tribalism that dominate the Iraqi
scene today. The exigencies posed by post-war chaos in
Iraq could be too strong for him to survive.
Over the decades, the Iraqi exile groups -- at one
point there were over 60 of them -- which espouse
differing ideologies, self-interests and political
priorities have never been able to come together on a
practical platform, Their only common interest was a
desire to see Saddam departing from power. They never
trusted each other and suspected that every
group/leader was playing puppet to strings pulled by
external forces with vested interests.
It is not even likely that more than a few hundred
people might even know Chalabi in Baghdad, a fact
admitted by his spin doctor in Washington, Entifadh
Qanbar, who says that people in Baghdad "may not know
the man, but he represents their views."
That is a tall claim indeed.
Banker in Jordan
I have met Chalabi several times at public meetings
while he was a banker in Jordan during the 80s, but
never had an opportunity to get wind of his political
plans. His prominence as a Jordanian banker did not
matter much to me as a journalist since I had access
to the Shomans, who owned the Arab Bank -- the largest
commercial bank in Jordan. But then, it had never
occurred to me that Chalabi, a seemingly streetwise
banker and financier, had political ambitions; and it
is more likely that he did not have any and that he
turned himself to an active anti-Saddam activist after
leaving Jordan in a cloud of controversy and settling
down in London along with some of his close aides from
the banking era.
He established the INC in 1992 and since then his
efforts have been focused on pushing the US to finish
the uncompleted task of the 1991 war -- ouster of
Saddam.
I have spoken to him several times in London in the
late 80s and early 90s, but those conversations had to
do with the banking scandal he left behind in Amman
when he fled in July 1989, purportedly hiding in the
trunk of a car.
Those conversations formed part of the basis for my
numerous reports on the banking scam to the extent
that I was once told that my telephone was tapped
since Jordanian intelligence wanted direct access to
the information that Chalabi was "feeding" me.
However, I was never questioned by Jordanian
intelligence over Chalabi (perhaps because there was
always a trace of animosity in our conversations and I
was not always buying his versions of the scandal and
often challenged him to substantiate his contentions).
I had the first confirmation of Chalabi's political
ambitions after the Gulf war of 1991.
I received a telephone call in Jordan from a close
Chalabi associate, Ali Sarraf, in March 1991. I had
just returned from post-war Baghdad and I told him how
bad the situation was for the people of Iraq after the
war over Kuwait.
Sarraf had earlier given me clues how to locate some
of his relatives in Baghdad (I had opted aginst the
idea since establishing connections with them would
be construed as me acting as a link between Iraqi
exiles and their supporters in Baghdad; this would
have seen me rotting in one of the notorious prisons
of Iraq with my jailers having thrown away the key).
During that March 1991 conversation, the shape of
post-war Iraq came up.
"Give us one year and imagine who you'd see in power
in Baghdad," Sarraf quipped. "The doctor (Chalabi)
will be the president of Iraq and guess who would be
his finance minister," he added with an unmistakeable
echo of glee over the electronic waves, obviously
imagining himself to be in control of the finances of
a country which holds 12 per cent of the world's oil
reserves.
"Best of luck Ali," I told him, "and please tell the
doctor to grant me the first interview from the
presidential palace in Baghdad. I am sure the
Jordanians and others would be anxious to hear what he
has to say."
"Well, you wait and see what we are going to do to
Jordan and the Mickey Mouses there," was Sarraf's
rejoinder in a reference to Jordanian ministers and
officials who were at that time building a case
against Chalabi and others, including Sarraf himself.
"We'd kick butts so bad that Jordan might not exist by
the time we are finished with it."
Here it needs a little background.
Chalabi belonged to an influential Shiite family in
Iraq. He studied at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and earned a doctorate in mathematics from
the University of Chicago in 1969.
He left Iraq when the Hashemite monarchy was
overthrown in 1958. He was given refuge in Jordan,
where, using his connections with the Hashemite royal
family there, he set up Petra Bank in 1977.
By mid-80s, Petra Bank had grown to be the second
largest commercial bank in Jordan after the Arab Bank.
It even had a affiliate bank -- Petra International --
in New York. Petra also had a branch in Beirut called
MEBCO that was liquidated by the Central Bank of
Lebanon and Chalabi'ated MEBCO Geneva.
He was also generous to socio-economic projects and
educational development in Jordan. Petra Bank was
among the first to introduce computerised operations
in Jordan.
However, in the second half of the 80s, Jordan's
economy stumbled because of heavy foreign debts and
foreign exchange reserves dried up. The late King
Hussein appointed veteran Mohammed Saed Nabulsi as
governor of the Central Bank with the mandate of
shoring up the country's monetary situation.
Nabulsi took stock of the situation and asked all
commercial banks to deposit 30 per of their foreign
currency holdings in the Central Bank. All banks
obliged, but Petra Bank and another small bank did not
and this prompted a closer look at the banks'
activities. The books showed that Petra Bank held $200
million in foreign currency, but the money was
missing.
Soon, according to Nabulsi, it emerged that Petra Bank
-- and, by extension, the smaller bank -- were
involved in a complex network of illegal operations.
He ordered a Central Bank take-over of Petra Bank and
an investigation June 1989 and this opened a Pandora's
Box that led to the collapse of the bank and Chalabi's
flight from Jordan.
Nabulsi accused Chalabi of spiriting away depositors'
money and Central Bank funds. The collapse of Petra
Bank is said to have caused Jordan $500 million. The
actual amount the treasury lost was eventually put at
$300 million after the liquidation of the bank.
Investigations followed the collapse of the bank and a
government committee submitted its findings that led
to a trial in 1992.
Chalabi and 16 others -- most of them tried in
absentia -- were found guilty on several counts in a
trial after an investigating commitee reported its
findings to the government. He was sentenced in April
1992 to 22 years hard labour by the State Security
Court on 31 charges of embezzlement, theft, misuse of
depositor funds and speculation with the Jordanian
dinar. The court also handed down harsh sentences and
fines to the others, including several brothers and
close relatives who were members of the board of
Petra Bank, or owners of affiliated companies.
Jordan tried to secure Chalabi's deportation from the
UK to the kingdom, but it did not work out.
Ali Sarraf --the man who wanted to become Iraq's
finance minister under a Chalabi reign in Baghdad --
was Chalabi's chief foreign exchange dealer at Petra
Bank.
When the banking scam came to light, the Jordanian
authorities had seized the passports of Chalabi as
well as several others but almost all of them managed
to flee the country in mysterious circumstances.
Chalabi was believed to have been driven to the Syrian
border by "someone high up" who used his influence to
see the Iraqi across the frontier from where he took
off for London and applied for asylum in the UK.
Sarraf was caught at Amman international airport a few
days later as he was about to board a London-bound
flight with a suitcase full of documents and over
$25,000 in cash. His passport was also seized and he
was detained for a few days and then released.
My instincts told me there was much more than met the
eye in the Petra Bank scam. I got in touch with
Sarraf after his release and invited him to a Chinese
lunch along with one of the my colleagues at the
Jordan Times. I wanted to hear his story first hand.
However, while Sarraf talked at length about how the
Jordanian government had "mistreated" Chalabi and
himself at the behest of Saddam, he gave away little
in substance about how Petra Bank collapsed. He was
evasive to pointed questions and in fact I was more
perplexed about the affair that I started off before
the lunch.
Anyway, we parted with a promise that we'd remain in
touch. He gave me Chalabi's telephone number in
London, but before I could get around to calling the
"doctor," I started receiving calls from the banker
himself, telling me his version of the Petra Bank
episode. His stories made little sense to me, perhaps
because I did not understand high finance banking
practices and the extent of Chalabi's "connections" in
Jordan. However, he used to issue regular threats
against prominent Jordanians, saying "all I need is to
open my mouth and name some names...that would make
the Central Bank governor lose his pants....."
He insisted that he left Jordan because Saddam's
agents were after him and he feared for his life. He
also accused Saddam of pressuring Jordan into forcing
the collapse of Petra Bank.
Chalabi's persistent contention was that there was
nothing wrong with Petra Bank, he had not stolen any
money and that all Jordanian charges against him were
fabricated. However, the facts of the case, as it
unfolded in a Jordanian court much later, spoke
otherwise.
After his every call to me, I tried to match what he
told me with information gleaned from Jordanian
officials, including some from the Central Bank, and
write reports in the Jordan Times. One day a friend of
mine-- with connections in Jordanian intelligence --
advised me to stop covering the Petra Bank issue. "It
is not worth to get too deep into it because it could
harm you....and your reputation" for whatever that was
worth, I was told.
A few days later, Sarraf's Amman telephone stopped
answering, and I found out he had mysteriously fled
the country.
Shortly thereafter, I estabished an excellent rapport
with the head of the committee investigating the Petra
Bank scandal, and I became privvy to an unfolding
tale of Chalabi's banking tentacles spread not only
in Jordan but also in several Arab and African
countries as well as Switzerland and the US. Some of
the details revealed to me went into reports while I
maintained the confidentially of others.
I also developed a close relationship with the finance
minister as well as the governor of the Central Bank.
I could call them on their direct line or at home
whenever I had questions for them. Obvioiusly I was
"safe" because by then they had realised that I knew
what the sensitivities were. Earlier,
the officialdom was upset because they thought Chalabi
was using me to air his version of the bank collapse
(as I came to know much later, some had even suspected
that Chalabi was paying me).
In expert opinion, Petra Bank would not have collapsed
had it not been for Chalabi's one-track mind to build
a business empire with his finger of every pie in the
industrial and trade sectors. He financed businesses,
took them over when they hit troubles and sought to
revive them after appointing "experts" loyal to him --
including a veteran Indian economist then in his 70s
-- to run them. All the "experts" were supposed to
report directly to him, and none of them knew each
other.
His business "interests" included industrial units,
computer firms, travel agencies, export companies,
hotels, real estate, construction, insurance.. you
name it and he had interests in the sector. It took
the investigating committee years to unravel them.
Jordan's banking system tottered for some time after
the Petra Bank collapse because, as officials charged,
Chalabi had drained the last of the country's scarce
foreign exchange reserves, thus adding the kingdom's
burdens.
When the whole picture was unveiled to me, I wrote a
lengthy piece in the Jordan Times saying Chalabi was
either one of the best banking brains in the Arab
World or the worst crook depending on how one viewed
him and his activities.
The very day the report appeared, I got a call from
Chalabi, who was obviously getting Jordanian newspaper
clippings faxed to him in London every day.
"I have half a mind to sue the hell out of you and
your paper for calling me a crook," he told me in a
stern voice. Go ahead and do that, I told him
(knowing well that he stood no chance against me in a
Jordanian court at that point in time). "Don't worry,
I won't do that," he said. "But I am flattered by the
picture you painted of me... that of a banking
superman sitting behind a computer console in the
top-floor office my bank manipulating the economy,
banking and finances of Jordan..."
Well, that was exactly what he was doing and he had
left Jordan in a serious mess.
Jordanian sources who were close to Chalabi affirm
that anti-Saddam politics was never his priority while
in the kingdom. The picture that emerges is of a man
who portrayed himself to be Saddam's victim and
started believing in his own tales and transformed
himself to be a leading opponent of the Iraqi
strongman.
Chalabi now says he was targeted for assassination by
Iraqi agents in at least nine attempts since his
flight from Jordan. Probably it is true.
Senior Iraqi officials whom I met after the 1991 war
dismissed Chalabi as irrelevant and non-consequential.
That was indeed a short-sighted assumption since
Chalabi went on to make himself dear to the US
administration, secured the support of leading
congressmen and built a strong lobby for himself. He
managed to project himself as a possible successor to
Saddam, but fell afoul of US intelligence agencies
when they detected what they saw as discrepancies in
the way he used to spend American funds.
Ironically, a story that went around in Jordan in the
mid-90s was how a group of Iraqi army generals plotted
a coup against Saddam over several months and managed
to keep it top secret. The coup, according to the
sources who had the story, would have been
successfully staged had it not been for the "mistake"
that the generals made by informing Chalabi of their
plans. The next thing the plotters knew was their own
arrest by Saddam's secret police. Almost all of them
and their supporters were executed, went the story.
How did that happen? Well, the story says that when
Chalabi was informed of the plot, he tipped off the
CIA and Saddam got wind of the plans through a CIA
"leak."
Or did Chalabi himself use his channels to tip off
Saddam because he feared that a coup would only lead
to generals assuming power in Baghdad and that would
have dealt the death blow to his own ambitions?
Despite his split with the US over plans for post-war
Iraq, Chalabi might yet stage a comeback. He has
powerful friends in Washington. Apart from influential
members in the US Congress, those who favoured
Chalabi as a democratic alternative to Saddam include
Vice President Richard Cheney, Defence Secretary
Donald Rumsfled, Defence Policy Board head Richard
Perle, Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz and
the Pentagon's Middle-East policy executors such as
Peter Rodman, Douglas Feith, David Wurmser and Michael
Rubin, says American writer Robert Dreyfuss.
With such a heavyweight lobby behind him, Chalabi
seemed to have all but clinched his role as Saddam's
successor a few months ago. At that point, the shrewd
banker even promised that American oil companies would
have the run of Iraq's oil wealth as and when he
assumed power in Baghdad.
However, his detractors are in the CIA and the State
Department who describe him as better suited to the
cut and thrust of exile politics and diplomacy in the
West than the cut-throat politics of post-Saddam Iraq
where tribalism is expected to play the dominant role.
Chalabi's hope of salvation hinges on his success to
set up a "leadership" council made up of Iraqi exile
leaders and appoint himself as its head. That would
give him a position of prominence if and when he
enters a Saddamless Iraq or he would find himself as
one of the thousands of exiles returning to their
homeland. Obviously, the way to the top from the
"leadership" council would be easy if his friends in
Washington turns the thinking around in the CIA and
the military establishment.
But then, keeping him popped up in power could come at
the cost of American lives since it would pit the
Chalabi camp against what is emerging as a powerful
alliance grouping the two main Kurdish parties, the
Kurdistan Democratic Party and thePatriotic Union of
Kurdistan, the Iraqi National Accord, a CIA-backed
faction, and the Iranian-supported Supreme Council for
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,
For a while it seemed that Ahmed Chalabi, a
London-based Shiite and former banker who leads an
umbrella body of Iraqi exile groups, was most favoured
to take over power in a hypothetical post-Saddam Iraq.
However, American priorities and strategies have
shifted since then, and Chalabi might not find himself
in the presidential palace unless his powerful friends
in Washington turns things around. However, that might
not be easy either, writes PV Vivekanand, who also
traces Chalabi's background as a banker in Jordan and
his experience in dealing with the Iraqi exiles.
AHMED CHALABI, leader of the Iraqi National Congress
(INC) and self-styled candidate to succeed Saddam
Hussein, has been dealt a severe blow to his
aspirations to occupy the presidential palace in
Baghdad.
Obviously, Washington has its own plans and designs
for a post-Saddam Iraq and Chalabi, a Shiite with a
chequered past as a banker in Jordan, appeared to
have found little room to accommodate himself in the
American scheme of things that envisages a military
occupation of the country after toppling Saddam.
Chalabi, who maintains offices in London and
Washington as well as northern Iraq beyond Saddam'
reach, has been building a case for himself as a
potential successor to the Iraqi president since 1991.
He had been a frequent visitor to Washington in order
to promote himself and secure American political and
financial support against Saddam.
The administration seems to have played an off-again,
on-again game with him, with the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) raising questions about his use of
American funds given to him to build a viable Iraqi
opposition front to challenge Saddam. Others say
Chalabi had spent his own money on trying to build an
anti-Saddam coalition in northern Iraq. He had even
set up a radio station to beam anti-Saddam rhetoric to
the people of Iraq. His efforts came to nought in 1996
when two Kurdish groups fought each other for
prominence in the region, and Saddam's agents managed
to penetrate into the area. That posed a direct threat
of military action and Chalabi, like others who had
set up presence there, had no choice but to order his
set-up dismantled and his people evacuated. He has
re-established an INC presence there now.
However, the most prominent American reason to
sideline him now seems to be the realisation that
other Iraqi exile groups had never really accepted the
INC leader as a possible successor to Saddam and that
he might not be the right candidate capable of dealing
with the ground realities in Iraq; and that seems to
have shut out -- at this jucture -- Chalabi's dreams
of riding atop an American military tank into the
presidential palace of Baghdad.
He has publicly rejected US plans to install an
American military administration based on the
remnants of the current Iraqi regime once Saddam is
toppled.
Speaking from an undisclosed location in northern
Iraq, Chalabi told ABC Television on Tuesday: "Iraqis
must choose their own government."
Describing as "unacceptable" the reported US plan to
have a reformed ruling Baath Party "work de facto
under the protection of US military administration,"
Chalabi told ABC: "An extended US administration...in
Iraq is unworkable....a US administration will have
very little knowledge of Arab society."
Chalabi's misfortune of falling out with the American
plans is not unique. It is simply that a liberal like
him with modern views and more attuned to dealing with
Western democratic setups than the peculiarities of
the Iraqi society is no match for the heavy
undercurrents and tribalism that dominate the Iraqi
scene today. The exigencies posed by post-war chaos in
Iraq could be too strong for him to survive.
Over the decades, the Iraqi exile groups -- at one
point there were over 60 of them -- which espouse
differing ideologies, self-interests and political
priorities have never been able to come together on a
practical platform, Their only common interest was a
desire to see Saddam departing from power. They never
trusted each other and suspected that every
group/leader was playing puppet to strings pulled by
external forces with vested interests.
It is not even likely that more than a few hundred
people might even know Chalabi in Baghdad, a fact
admitted by his spin doctor in Washington, Entifadh
Qanbar, who says that people in Baghdad "may not know
the man, but he represents their views."
That is a tall claim indeed.
Banker in Jordan
I have met Chalabi several times at public meetings
while he was a banker in Jordan during the 80s, but
never had an opportunity to get wind of his political
plans. His prominence as a Jordanian banker did not
matter much to me as a journalist since I had access
to the Shomans, who owned the Arab Bank -- the largest
commercial bank in Jordan. But then, it had never
occurred to me that Chalabi, a seemingly streetwise
banker and financier, had political ambitions; and it
is more likely that he did not have any and that he
turned himself to an active anti-Saddam activist after
leaving Jordan in a cloud of controversy and settling
down in London along with some of his close aides from
the banking era.
He established the INC in 1992 and since then his
efforts have been focused on pushing the US to finish
the uncompleted task of the 1991 war -- ouster of
Saddam.
I have spoken to him several times in London in the
late 80s and early 90s, but those conversations had to
do with the banking scandal he left behind in Amman
when he fled in July 1989, purportedly hiding in the
trunk of a car.
Those conversations formed part of the basis for my
numerous reports on the banking scam to the extent
that I was once told that my telephone was tapped
since Jordanian intelligence wanted direct access to
the information that Chalabi was "feeding" me.
However, I was never questioned by Jordanian
intelligence over Chalabi (perhaps because there was
always a trace of animosity in our conversations and I
was not always buying his versions of the scandal and
often challenged him to substantiate his contentions).
I had the first confirmation of Chalabi's political
ambitions after the Gulf war of 1991.
I received a telephone call in Jordan from a close
Chalabi associate, Ali Sarraf, in March 1991. I had
just returned from post-war Baghdad and I told him how
bad the situation was for the people of Iraq after the
war over Kuwait.
Sarraf had earlier given me clues how to locate some
of his relatives in Baghdad (I had opted aginst the
idea since establishing connections with them would
be construed as me acting as a link between Iraqi
exiles and their supporters in Baghdad; this would
have seen me rotting in one of the notorious prisons
of Iraq with my jailers having thrown away the key).
During that March 1991 conversation, the shape of
post-war Iraq came up.
"Give us one year and imagine who you'd see in power
in Baghdad," Sarraf quipped. "The doctor (Chalabi)
will be the president of Iraq and guess who would be
his finance minister," he added with an unmistakeable
echo of glee over the electronic waves, obviously
imagining himself to be in control of the finances of
a country which holds 12 per cent of the world's oil
reserves.
"Best of luck Ali," I told him, "and please tell the
doctor to grant me the first interview from the
presidential palace in Baghdad. I am sure the
Jordanians and others would be anxious to hear what he
has to say."
"Well, you wait and see what we are going to do to
Jordan and the Mickey Mouses there," was Sarraf's
rejoinder in a reference to Jordanian ministers and
officials who were at that time building a case
against Chalabi and others, including Sarraf himself.
"We'd kick butts so bad that Jordan might not exist by
the time we are finished with it."
Here it needs a little background.
Chalabi belonged to an influential Shiite family in
Iraq. He studied at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and earned a doctorate in mathematics from
the University of Chicago in 1969.
He left Iraq when the Hashemite monarchy was
overthrown in 1958. He was given refuge in Jordan,
where, using his connections with the Hashemite royal
family there, he set up Petra Bank in 1977.
By mid-80s, Petra Bank had grown to be the second
largest commercial bank in Jordan after the Arab Bank.
It even had a affiliate bank -- Petra International --
in New York. Petra also had a branch in Beirut called
MEBCO that was liquidated by the Central Bank of
Lebanon and Chalabi'ated MEBCO Geneva.
He was also generous to socio-economic projects and
educational development in Jordan. Petra Bank was
among the first to introduce computerised operations
in Jordan.
However, in the second half of the 80s, Jordan's
economy stumbled because of heavy foreign debts and
foreign exchange reserves dried up. The late King
Hussein appointed veteran Mohammed Saed Nabulsi as
governor of the Central Bank with the mandate of
shoring up the country's monetary situation.
Nabulsi took stock of the situation and asked all
commercial banks to deposit 30 per of their foreign
currency holdings in the Central Bank. All banks
obliged, but Petra Bank and another small bank did not
and this prompted a closer look at the banks'
activities. The books showed that Petra Bank held $200
million in foreign currency, but the money was
missing.
Soon, according to Nabulsi, it emerged that Petra Bank
-- and, by extension, the smaller bank -- were
involved in a complex network of illegal operations.
He ordered a Central Bank take-over of Petra Bank and
an investigation June 1989 and this opened a Pandora's
Box that led to the collapse of the bank and Chalabi's
flight from Jordan.
Nabulsi accused Chalabi of spiriting away depositors'
money and Central Bank funds. The collapse of Petra
Bank is said to have caused Jordan $500 million. The
actual amount the treasury lost was eventually put at
$300 million after the liquidation of the bank.
Investigations followed the collapse of the bank and a
government committee submitted its findings that led
to a trial in 1992.
Chalabi and 16 others -- most of them tried in
absentia -- were found guilty on several counts in a
trial after an investigating commitee reported its
findings to the government. He was sentenced in April
1992 to 22 years hard labour by the State Security
Court on 31 charges of embezzlement, theft, misuse of
depositor funds and speculation with the Jordanian
dinar. The court also handed down harsh sentences and
fines to the others, including several brothers and
close relatives who were members of the board of
Petra Bank, or owners of affiliated companies.
Jordan tried to secure Chalabi's deportation from the
UK to the kingdom, but it did not work out.
Ali Sarraf --the man who wanted to become Iraq's
finance minister under a Chalabi reign in Baghdad --
was Chalabi's chief foreign exchange dealer at Petra
Bank.
When the banking scam came to light, the Jordanian
authorities had seized the passports of Chalabi as
well as several others but almost all of them managed
to flee the country in mysterious circumstances.
Chalabi was believed to have been driven to the Syrian
border by "someone high up" who used his influence to
see the Iraqi across the frontier from where he took
off for London and applied for asylum in the UK.
Sarraf was caught at Amman international airport a few
days later as he was about to board a London-bound
flight with a suitcase full of documents and over
$25,000 in cash. His passport was also seized and he
was detained for a few days and then released.
My instincts told me there was much more than met the
eye in the Petra Bank scam. I got in touch with
Sarraf after his release and invited him to a Chinese
lunch along with one of the my colleagues at the
Jordan Times. I wanted to hear his story first hand.
However, while Sarraf talked at length about how the
Jordanian government had "mistreated" Chalabi and
himself at the behest of Saddam, he gave away little
in substance about how Petra Bank collapsed. He was
evasive to pointed questions and in fact I was more
perplexed about the affair that I started off before
the lunch.
Anyway, we parted with a promise that we'd remain in
touch. He gave me Chalabi's telephone number in
London, but before I could get around to calling the
"doctor," I started receiving calls from the banker
himself, telling me his version of the Petra Bank
episode. His stories made little sense to me, perhaps
because I did not understand high finance banking
practices and the extent of Chalabi's "connections" in
Jordan. However, he used to issue regular threats
against prominent Jordanians, saying "all I need is to
open my mouth and name some names...that would make
the Central Bank governor lose his pants....."
He insisted that he left Jordan because Saddam's
agents were after him and he feared for his life. He
also accused Saddam of pressuring Jordan into forcing
the collapse of Petra Bank.
Chalabi's persistent contention was that there was
nothing wrong with Petra Bank, he had not stolen any
money and that all Jordanian charges against him were
fabricated. However, the facts of the case, as it
unfolded in a Jordanian court much later, spoke
otherwise.
After his every call to me, I tried to match what he
told me with information gleaned from Jordanian
officials, including some from the Central Bank, and
write reports in the Jordan Times. One day a friend of
mine-- with connections in Jordanian intelligence --
advised me to stop covering the Petra Bank issue. "It
is not worth to get too deep into it because it could
harm you....and your reputation" for whatever that was
worth, I was told.
A few days later, Sarraf's Amman telephone stopped
answering, and I found out he had mysteriously fled
the country.
Shortly thereafter, I estabished an excellent rapport
with the head of the committee investigating the Petra
Bank scandal, and I became privvy to an unfolding
tale of Chalabi's banking tentacles spread not only
in Jordan but also in several Arab and African
countries as well as Switzerland and the US. Some of
the details revealed to me went into reports while I
maintained the confidentially of others.
I also developed a close relationship with the finance
minister as well as the governor of the Central Bank.
I could call them on their direct line or at home
whenever I had questions for them. Obvioiusly I was
"safe" because by then they had realised that I knew
what the sensitivities were. Earlier,
the officialdom was upset because they thought Chalabi
was using me to air his version of the bank collapse
(as I came to know much later, some had even suspected
that Chalabi was paying me).
In expert opinion, Petra Bank would not have collapsed
had it not been for Chalabi's one-track mind to build
a business empire with his finger of every pie in the
industrial and trade sectors. He financed businesses,
took them over when they hit troubles and sought to
revive them after appointing "experts" loyal to him --
including a veteran Indian economist then in his 70s
-- to run them. All the "experts" were supposed to
report directly to him, and none of them knew each
other.
His business "interests" included industrial units,
computer firms, travel agencies, export companies,
hotels, real estate, construction, insurance.. you
name it and he had interests in the sector. It took
the investigating committee years to unravel them.
Jordan's banking system tottered for some time after
the Petra Bank collapse because, as officials charged,
Chalabi had drained the last of the country's scarce
foreign exchange reserves, thus adding the kingdom's
burdens.
When the whole picture was unveiled to me, I wrote a
lengthy piece in the Jordan Times saying Chalabi was
either one of the best banking brains in the Arab
World or the worst crook depending on how one viewed
him and his activities.
The very day the report appeared, I got a call from
Chalabi, who was obviously getting Jordanian newspaper
clippings faxed to him in London every day.
"I have half a mind to sue the hell out of you and
your paper for calling me a crook," he told me in a
stern voice. Go ahead and do that, I told him
(knowing well that he stood no chance against me in a
Jordanian court at that point in time). "Don't worry,
I won't do that," he said. "But I am flattered by the
picture you painted of me... that of a banking
superman sitting behind a computer console in the
top-floor office my bank manipulating the economy,
banking and finances of Jordan..."
Well, that was exactly what he was doing and he had
left Jordan in a serious mess.
Jordanian sources who were close to Chalabi affirm
that anti-Saddam politics was never his priority while
in the kingdom. The picture that emerges is of a man
who portrayed himself to be Saddam's victim and
started believing in his own tales and transformed
himself to be a leading opponent of the Iraqi
strongman.
Chalabi now says he was targeted for assassination by
Iraqi agents in at least nine attempts since his
flight from Jordan. Probably it is true.
Senior Iraqi officials whom I met after the 1991 war
dismissed Chalabi as irrelevant and non-consequential.
That was indeed a short-sighted assumption since
Chalabi went on to make himself dear to the US
administration, secured the support of leading
congressmen and built a strong lobby for himself. He
managed to project himself as a possible successor to
Saddam, but fell afoul of US intelligence agencies
when they detected what they saw as discrepancies in
the way he used to spend American funds.
Ironically, a story that went around in Jordan in the
mid-90s was how a group of Iraqi army generals plotted
a coup against Saddam over several months and managed
to keep it top secret. The coup, according to the
sources who had the story, would have been
successfully staged had it not been for the "mistake"
that the generals made by informing Chalabi of their
plans. The next thing the plotters knew was their own
arrest by Saddam's secret police. Almost all of them
and their supporters were executed, went the story.
How did that happen? Well, the story says that when
Chalabi was informed of the plot, he tipped off the
CIA and Saddam got wind of the plans through a CIA
"leak."
Or did Chalabi himself use his channels to tip off
Saddam because he feared that a coup would only lead
to generals assuming power in Baghdad and that would
have dealt the death blow to his own ambitions?
Despite his split with the US over plans for post-war
Iraq, Chalabi might yet stage a comeback. He has
powerful friends in Washington. Apart from influential
members in the US Congress, those who favoured
Chalabi as a democratic alternative to Saddam include
Vice President Richard Cheney, Defence Secretary
Donald Rumsfled, Defence Policy Board head Richard
Perle, Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz and
the Pentagon's Middle-East policy executors such as
Peter Rodman, Douglas Feith, David Wurmser and Michael
Rubin, says American writer Robert Dreyfuss.
With such a heavyweight lobby behind him, Chalabi
seemed to have all but clinched his role as Saddam's
successor a few months ago. At that point, the shrewd
banker even promised that American oil companies would
have the run of Iraq's oil wealth as and when he
assumed power in Baghdad.
However, his detractors are in the CIA and the State
Department who describe him as better suited to the
cut and thrust of exile politics and diplomacy in the
West than the cut-throat politics of post-Saddam Iraq
where tribalism is expected to play the dominant role.
Chalabi's hope of salvation hinges on his success to
set up a "leadership" council made up of Iraqi exile
leaders and appoint himself as its head. That would
give him a position of prominence if and when he
enters a Saddamless Iraq or he would find himself as
one of the thousands of exiles returning to their
homeland. Obviously, the way to the top from the
"leadership" council would be easy if his friends in
Washington turns the thinking around in the CIA and
the military establishment.
But then, keeping him popped up in power could come at
the cost of American lives since it would pit the
Chalabi camp against what is emerging as a powerful
alliance grouping the two main Kurdish parties, the
Kurdistan Democratic Party and thePatriotic Union of
Kurdistan, the Iraqi National Accord, a CIA-backed
faction, and the Iranian-supported Supreme Council for
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,
Questions that the US must answer
PV Vivekanand
AT THIS JUNCTURE where the United States is ardently pushing the international community to war against Iraq in the name of the United Nations and citing Baghdad's non-compliance with Security Council resolutions, Washington has to answer a few questions that it has been ducking,
Foremost of those questions are:
Why is it that Washington cites Iraq's violations of UN Security Council resolutions to justify an all-out war while overlooking that US allies like Turkey and Israel continue to violate dozens of Security Council resolutions?
Isn't it a blatant addition of insult to injury when the US not only endorses Israel's aggressive policies but also prevents the international community from pressuring Israel into seeing logic, justice, fairness and reason?
Why does Washington block other countries from taking military action to force truants to comply with Security Council resolutions? Or is it that it is a right it has reserved for itself as the sole superpower?
Isn't it true that the US warning that the Security Council could lose its "relevance" is based on how far the world body agrees to abide by American commands?
Why does Washington insist that Iraq poses a threat to American national security while there is no evidence whatsover of Baghdad had or has any link with any group that has carried out anti-American attacks or has issued any such threat?
Isn't it clear that a war against Iraq would play into the hands of militants and increase the same "security threats" that Washington cites as a reason for a war?
Why does Washington see an Iraqi threat to other Middle Eastern countries while none of them - except Israel - sees such threat?
Why does Washington refrain from acknowledging that it had given an implicit go ahead to Iraq to invade Kuwait in 1990 by saying it would have no role in an "Arab-Arab" dispute?
Why does Washington cite Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and conveniently sidestep the truth that it was the US which provided such weapons to Iraq and also offered satellite intelligence that helped the Iraqi military to pinpoint Iranian positions to be targeted?
Why does Washington speak in general terms and avoid being specific on its allegations that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction?
Why is that the superb satellite intelligence of the US unable to tell the UN inspectors where to look for such weapons in Iraq?
Why does the US waste no opportunity to hit at Iraqi targets in the "no-fly" zones at the slightest "provacation" while not employing the same warplanes to bomb out any Iraqi weapons site? Isn't it because it has failed to find any such site?
Why does the US cite human rights concerns and the "oppression" of the people of Iraq as a reason for war whereas its record speaks of decade-old alliances with much worse regimes than that of Saddam Hussein? Why is the US not applying the same standards and why the sudden concern for the people of Iraq?
Why does the US refrain from any concern for the oppressed people of Palestine who live under perpetual terror posed by the mighty military machinery of the occupying Israeli forces?
Why does the US allow Israel to use US-supplied weapons and military gear against the Palestinians while it insists on such bans attached to military sales to other countries?
How long would it take the US to recognise that the real threat to peace in the Middle East is posed by Israel's expansionist ambitions and oppressive policies against the Palestinians?
Why does the US fail to acknowledge that a war against Iraq would have serious repercussions on the Middle East?
Isn't the American plan for an open-ended military occupation of Iraq a reincarnation of colonialism?
Isn't it true that the planned war against is aimed at securing control of Iraq's oil to serve American economy and oil companies and shutting out Europeans and others in Washington's quest for absolute global dominance?
Isn't it true that the scenario of war was prepared years ago and the ongoing effort at the Security Council for a new resolution is simply a charade?
Isn't it true that the failure of the council to adopt the new resolution would have no impact on the American determination to go to war against Iraq?
Isn't it true that the administration is trying to muzzle the media citing national security in order to ensure that the American people hear only what Washington wants them to hear?
Isn't it true that the US is ignoring Arab concerns for regional security and stability because it has ceased to care for such issues and is arrogantly confident that it would be able to deal with any eventuality -- even it means total chaos in the region?
Finally, isn't true that the entire war scenario where the US would spend tens of billions of dollars and engage upto 250,000 American soldiers is scripted to suit the interests of Israel?
AT THIS JUNCTURE where the United States is ardently pushing the international community to war against Iraq in the name of the United Nations and citing Baghdad's non-compliance with Security Council resolutions, Washington has to answer a few questions that it has been ducking,
Foremost of those questions are:
Why is it that Washington cites Iraq's violations of UN Security Council resolutions to justify an all-out war while overlooking that US allies like Turkey and Israel continue to violate dozens of Security Council resolutions?
Isn't it a blatant addition of insult to injury when the US not only endorses Israel's aggressive policies but also prevents the international community from pressuring Israel into seeing logic, justice, fairness and reason?
Why does Washington block other countries from taking military action to force truants to comply with Security Council resolutions? Or is it that it is a right it has reserved for itself as the sole superpower?
Isn't it true that the US warning that the Security Council could lose its "relevance" is based on how far the world body agrees to abide by American commands?
Why does Washington insist that Iraq poses a threat to American national security while there is no evidence whatsover of Baghdad had or has any link with any group that has carried out anti-American attacks or has issued any such threat?
Isn't it clear that a war against Iraq would play into the hands of militants and increase the same "security threats" that Washington cites as a reason for a war?
Why does Washington see an Iraqi threat to other Middle Eastern countries while none of them - except Israel - sees such threat?
Why does Washington refrain from acknowledging that it had given an implicit go ahead to Iraq to invade Kuwait in 1990 by saying it would have no role in an "Arab-Arab" dispute?
Why does Washington cite Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and conveniently sidestep the truth that it was the US which provided such weapons to Iraq and also offered satellite intelligence that helped the Iraqi military to pinpoint Iranian positions to be targeted?
Why does Washington speak in general terms and avoid being specific on its allegations that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction?
Why is that the superb satellite intelligence of the US unable to tell the UN inspectors where to look for such weapons in Iraq?
Why does the US waste no opportunity to hit at Iraqi targets in the "no-fly" zones at the slightest "provacation" while not employing the same warplanes to bomb out any Iraqi weapons site? Isn't it because it has failed to find any such site?
Why does the US cite human rights concerns and the "oppression" of the people of Iraq as a reason for war whereas its record speaks of decade-old alliances with much worse regimes than that of Saddam Hussein? Why is the US not applying the same standards and why the sudden concern for the people of Iraq?
Why does the US refrain from any concern for the oppressed people of Palestine who live under perpetual terror posed by the mighty military machinery of the occupying Israeli forces?
Why does the US allow Israel to use US-supplied weapons and military gear against the Palestinians while it insists on such bans attached to military sales to other countries?
How long would it take the US to recognise that the real threat to peace in the Middle East is posed by Israel's expansionist ambitions and oppressive policies against the Palestinians?
Why does the US fail to acknowledge that a war against Iraq would have serious repercussions on the Middle East?
Isn't the American plan for an open-ended military occupation of Iraq a reincarnation of colonialism?
Isn't it true that the planned war against is aimed at securing control of Iraq's oil to serve American economy and oil companies and shutting out Europeans and others in Washington's quest for absolute global dominance?
Isn't it true that the scenario of war was prepared years ago and the ongoing effort at the Security Council for a new resolution is simply a charade?
Isn't it true that the failure of the council to adopt the new resolution would have no impact on the American determination to go to war against Iraq?
Isn't it true that the administration is trying to muzzle the media citing national security in order to ensure that the American people hear only what Washington wants them to hear?
Isn't it true that the US is ignoring Arab concerns for regional security and stability because it has ceased to care for such issues and is arrogantly confident that it would be able to deal with any eventuality -- even it means total chaos in the region?
Finally, isn't true that the entire war scenario where the US would spend tens of billions of dollars and engage upto 250,000 American soldiers is scripted to suit the interests of Israel?
Monday, February 24, 2003
Garner to "govern" Iraq
by pv vivekanand
Jay Garner, a retired lieutenant-general of the US Army, whose name has started figuring in reports about American plans for post-war Iraq, is tipped to be Washingtons' choice as the man to head a military occupation of Iraq after Saddam Hussein is toppled in war.
Not much is known about Garner except that he served in the Gulf during the 1991 war and headed American military-led relief operations for the Kurds in northern Iraq after the war when they came under Iraqi army attack following an ill-fated revolt against Saddam.
Garner's specialisation is missile defence, having served as the US Army's programme executive officer for missile defence and overseen the development of both theater and national missile defence systems for the army.
He submitted a comprehensive report to the US Congress in 1992 on how the Patriot missiles successfully performed during the Gulf war as a defensive shield against incoming missles. Patriot missiles were deployed in Saudi Arabia as well as Israel during the war.
Garner headed the US Army Space and Strategic Defence Command before retirment. In that capacity, he directed the activities of the US Army Space Command, Colorado Springs, the Missile Defence and Space Technology Centre, Huntsville, the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands -- test range for ballistic missile defence systems -- and a high energy laser test facility at White Sands, New Mexico where the US is conducting laser research, development, test, and evaluation.
Garner figures in a scandal involving a $48 million contract given by the Space and Missile Defence Command (SMDC) to SY Technology. Garner, who was the president of SV Technology at that time, accuses congressional candidate Biff Baker of making false allegations against his company that have cost it millions of dollars in lost revenue.
Baker, a Libertarian candidate for the House of Representatives from Colorado, continued his public statements against the company and asserted that in addition to the $48 million site activation command (SAC) contract, there were three other contracts worth a total of nearly $100 million in illegal "sweetheart deals" between the active duty generals in Space and Missile Defence Command (SMDC) and Garner. Federal law requires most contracts to be awarded on a competitive bidding basis. Baker is now under a gag order.
SY Tehnology has filed a lawsuit in El Paso county saying Baker falsely accused Garner and SY Technology of fraud, and is asking for millions of dollars in compensation.
Garner now heads a special office consisting of 100 officials from the departments of State, Treasury and Agriculture, the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence arms of the govenment, and the White House's Office of Management and Budget.
Garner, according to reports, has steafastly declined to be interviewed after taking over the new office.
While he heads the special office, he is giving particular focus on preparations for organising, integrating and co-ordinating civilian aid, reconstruction, and civil administration or governance in post-war Iraq.
The New York Times reported on Saturday that the office for post-war Iraq held a secret session over the weekend to assess plans for securing and rebuilding Iraq if Saddam Hussein is toppled.
Washington is said to be bracing for an 18-month-to-two-year military occupation of Iraq after Saddam is ousted in war. However, that timeframe is seen as a deliberate misrepresentation since the US is planning to stay as long as it takes to "slap and shape" the country into a shape suitable to serve US interests, others say.
The secret "classified" meeting was held at the Eisenhower Hall of the National Defence University in Washington and was also attended by representatives of allied countries that have supported Washington on Iraq. , officials told the New York Times.
The Times quoted Douglas J. Feith, the under-secretary of defence for policy, as saying that the meeting reviewed "work that has been done in a number of areas, such as civil administration and reconstruction" in post-war Iraq.
He insisted that the planning office's mission would not be to run Iraq, but other reports said Garner was indeed tipped to take over the military occupation of the country after the war.
The weekend meeting also appears to have been a strategy meeting ahead of a gathering of Iraqi exiles where the US plan for military occupation of post-war Iraq is expected to draw stiff rejection.
The reported plan has unnerved Iraqi exiles like Ahmed Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) who has made no secret of his plans to occupy the presidential palace in Baghdad, as well as heads of other Iraqi dissident groups opposed to Saddam.
Chalabi's plans call for setting up "a leadership council of the transitional government of Iraq" drawn from the 65 members of a steering committee appointed at an opposition conference in London in December. The leadership council will draft a temporary constitution and assign an executive committee head to create the first post-Saddam government.
There was concern among American officials that Chalabi might use a meeting of anti-Saddam groups in northern Iraq to annouce the council and US President George W.Bush's special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad agreed to attend the conference only s after its Kurdish hosts guaranteed there would be no declaration of a provisional government.
However, as of Monday, reports said Chalabi himself was not invited to the Irbil meeting but the gathering is expected include independents like former ministers and diplomats.
Khalilzad and a small group of American officials arrived in Turkey on Sunday to attend the meeting inside northern Iraq.
The Bush administration has given up hope of unifying the bickering Iraqi exiles and hence the significance of the plan for bringing the country under military occupation. The American who heads it will be given the title "military governor" backed by an "advisory council" of independent Iraqis. The day-to-day government would be left in the hands of low-level Ba'ath party members who are now in the bureaucracy under the current regime.
Jay Garner, a retired lieutenant-general of the US Army, whose name has started figuring in reports about American plans for post-war Iraq, is tipped to be Washingtons' choice as the man to head a military occupation of Iraq after Saddam Hussein is toppled in war.
Not much is known about Garner except that he served in the Gulf during the 1991 war and headed American military-led relief operations for the Kurds in northern Iraq after the war when they came under Iraqi army attack following an ill-fated revolt against Saddam.
Garner's specialisation is missile defence, having served as the US Army's programme executive officer for missile defence and overseen the development of both theater and national missile defence systems for the army.
He submitted a comprehensive report to the US Congress in 1992 on how the Patriot missiles successfully performed during the Gulf war as a defensive shield against incoming missles. Patriot missiles were deployed in Saudi Arabia as well as Israel during the war.
Garner headed the US Army Space and Strategic Defence Command before retirment. In that capacity, he directed the activities of the US Army Space Command, Colorado Springs, the Missile Defence and Space Technology Centre, Huntsville, the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands -- test range for ballistic missile defence systems -- and a high energy laser test facility at White Sands, New Mexico where the US is conducting laser research, development, test, and evaluation.
Garner figures in a scandal involving a $48 million contract given by the Space and Missile Defence Command (SMDC) to SY Technology. Garner, who was the president of SV Technology at that time, accuses congressional candidate Biff Baker of making false allegations against his company that have cost it millions of dollars in lost revenue.
Baker, a Libertarian candidate for the House of Representatives from Colorado, continued his public statements against the company and asserted that in addition to the $48 million site activation command (SAC) contract, there were three other contracts worth a total of nearly $100 million in illegal "sweetheart deals" between the active duty generals in Space and Missile Defence Command (SMDC) and Garner. Federal law requires most contracts to be awarded on a competitive bidding basis. Baker is now under a gag order.
SY Tehnology has filed a lawsuit in El Paso county saying Baker falsely accused Garner and SY Technology of fraud, and is asking for millions of dollars in compensation.
Garner now heads a special office consisting of 100 officials from the departments of State, Treasury and Agriculture, the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence arms of the govenment, and the White House's Office of Management and Budget.
Garner, according to reports, has steafastly declined to be interviewed after taking over the new office.
While he heads the special office, he is giving particular focus on preparations for organising, integrating and co-ordinating civilian aid, reconstruction, and civil administration or governance in post-war Iraq.
The New York Times reported on Saturday that the office for post-war Iraq held a secret session over the weekend to assess plans for securing and rebuilding Iraq if Saddam Hussein is toppled.
Washington is said to be bracing for an 18-month-to-two-year military occupation of Iraq after Saddam is ousted in war. However, that timeframe is seen as a deliberate misrepresentation since the US is planning to stay as long as it takes to "slap and shape" the country into a shape suitable to serve US interests, others say.
The secret "classified" meeting was held at the Eisenhower Hall of the National Defence University in Washington and was also attended by representatives of allied countries that have supported Washington on Iraq. , officials told the New York Times.
The Times quoted Douglas J. Feith, the under-secretary of defence for policy, as saying that the meeting reviewed "work that has been done in a number of areas, such as civil administration and reconstruction" in post-war Iraq.
He insisted that the planning office's mission would not be to run Iraq, but other reports said Garner was indeed tipped to take over the military occupation of the country after the war.
The weekend meeting also appears to have been a strategy meeting ahead of a gathering of Iraqi exiles where the US plan for military occupation of post-war Iraq is expected to draw stiff rejection.
The reported plan has unnerved Iraqi exiles like Ahmed Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) who has made no secret of his plans to occupy the presidential palace in Baghdad, as well as heads of other Iraqi dissident groups opposed to Saddam.
Chalabi's plans call for setting up "a leadership council of the transitional government of Iraq" drawn from the 65 members of a steering committee appointed at an opposition conference in London in December. The leadership council will draft a temporary constitution and assign an executive committee head to create the first post-Saddam government.
There was concern among American officials that Chalabi might use a meeting of anti-Saddam groups in northern Iraq to annouce the council and US President George W.Bush's special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad agreed to attend the conference only s after its Kurdish hosts guaranteed there would be no declaration of a provisional government.
However, as of Monday, reports said Chalabi himself was not invited to the Irbil meeting but the gathering is expected include independents like former ministers and diplomats.
Khalilzad and a small group of American officials arrived in Turkey on Sunday to attend the meeting inside northern Iraq.
The Bush administration has given up hope of unifying the bickering Iraqi exiles and hence the significance of the plan for bringing the country under military occupation. The American who heads it will be given the title "military governor" backed by an "advisory council" of independent Iraqis. The day-to-day government would be left in the hands of low-level Ba'ath party members who are now in the bureaucracy under the current regime.
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