A war that can't be won

April 8 2004
A war that cannot be won

PV Vivekanand



IT IS a pre-emptive war that the US and its coalition partners are waging on several fronts in Iraq — with the Sunnis to the northwest and northeast of Baghdad and the Shiites in the south. It is amply clear that the US provoked the clashes with the clear objective: Setting the ground for elimination of all groups and individuals of any signifance who could challenge the absolute US dominance of Iraq after the June 30 transition even before the symbolic and namesake transfer of power takes place.
It would be naive to assume that if something goes wrong with the US plans and somehow mounting American and coalition casualties might persuade the US into deciding to call it quits in Iraq. Leaving Iraq is not in the American cards, now or for the next decade or more, nothwithstanding any change of guard at the White House.
Iraq is too central and crucial to American strategic designs in the Middle East. It is unthinkable for Washington to pack up and let go of the strategic prize — direct and indirect but absolute control of Iraq — after having committed itself so deep there with hundreds of billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of soldiers.
As William Cordesman, a widely respected American commentator puts it, defeat in Iraq would be an American disaster far greater than Vietnam.
"Regardless of whether the United States should have invaded Iraq, the fact is that it did," says Cordesman. "Its power and prestige are on the line. It also has stakes in the future of allied leaders in Britain, Australia, Italy, Spain, Poland. ... Its influence in the Gulf — with some 60 percent of the world's proven reserves of crude oil – is at risk, as is its strategic position in the rest of the Middle East."
However, the war is getting highly unpopular among Americans.
The latest Pew Research opinion poll showed that only 32 per cent of Americans believe the White House has a “clear plan” of what to do in Iraq. Only 50 per cent want to keep US troops in the country, down from 63 per cent in January. President George W Bush’s personal approval rating of 43 per cent is the lowest the survey has ever registered.
Against that backdrop, subduing Iraq and showing the American people that the US is continuing to call the shots in the country is equally vital to Bush's prospects for re-election.
That would not be possible if the US let the present situation in Iraq to continue. Washington wants to pre-empt all significant challenge to the post-June 30 situation in Iraq.
Bush himself declared that the US had to “stay the course, and we will stay the course [in Iraq].”
Democrat presidential candidate John Kerry does not think much differently.
While he favours UN involvement in Iraq, Kerry has also pledged his full support for “whatever’s necessary to protect our troops that are there and to provide for stability and success.”
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, a former secretary of state in the first Bush administration, has declared: “We have to start the killing... We have to do whatever it takes to put these people down.” Asked if the US should assassinate Sadr like the Israelis had murdered Sheikh Yassin, Eagleburger responded: “I think so.”

Not simple hostility

It is not simply anti-American sentiments that are driving the Shiites of the south to take up arms against the occupation.
With upto 60 per cent majority in the Iraqi population but under repression by the Saddam Hussein regime, the Shiites had seen Saddam's ouster as opening the door for them to exercise their democratic rights in the country. It presented them with the very opportunity that they had been awaiting for decades.
The Shiites did not engage themselves in armed struggle against the Americans. It could even be said that they gave one year to the Americans to prove themselves, but found that their interests were not being protected. On the contrary, they found that the US-drafted transitional constitution undermined their aspirations to keep Iraq undivided with all its natural and oil resources. The interim constitution gives the northern Kurds a veto of sorts while drawing up the final shape of the country; this could mean the Kurds possibly opting to break away and take with them the rich oilfields of Kirkuk (notwithstanding Turkish objections), according to the Shiite thinking.
Another equally strong reason for Shiite youth to step up their rejection of the American-led occupation and join Sadr was that little was changed on the ground in their daily life in the wake of their "liberation."
The Shiites of southern Iraq had always been denied social justice by the Saddam regime and their hopes of an improvement in the situation were shattered when they found out that the occupation army could not care less about their social conditions. Under Saddam, they were able to make a living, but under the occupation they were even deprived of that opportunity.
They also found that the American-led occupation authority in Baghdad was more interested in installing their hand-picked men in power and was giving priority to Baghdad and its surroundings in reconstruction work while the southern parts remained as neglected as they were under the Saddam regime; even more so, if anything.
Their hopes that they would be able to correct the wrongs of the past and exercise their majority power to improve their lot were dealt a severe blow when it became clear that real power will remain in American hands even after the June 30 transition, which is aimed at creating an impression that Iraqis are ruling Iraq. The new interim government will only be implementing the decisions made in Washington. It will have little credibility among Iraqis. To make things even worse, the senior-most Shiite leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani, and most Sunni leaders have rejected the US plan.
While Sistani has so far not been associated with violent challenges to the US quest for supremacy in Iraq, others have dared to take up arms against the Americans in the country. And that is why the US provoked the ongoing confrontation with the firebrand Shiite leader Mortada Sadr and other Iraqi resistance groups in the so-called "Sunni triangle" outside Baghdad.
However, Sistani has extended implicit support for Sadr. He has issued a statement appealing for calm but condemning the US-led coalition and declaring that the actions of Sadr’s supporters were “legitimate.”
In return, Sadr has promised to deliver a "liberated Najaf in a silver platter" to Sistani, thus establishing that the two have reached an understanding under which Sadr would not challenge Sistani's status as the senior-most Shiite leader in Iraq.

The Iranian angle

It is unclear yet what role Iran is playing in the crisis. Tehran has a vested interest in averting a US-controlled government taking power in Baghdad. Surely Iranian intelligence agents are at work among the Iraqi Shiites, but the extent of Tehran's involvement remains uncertain at this point in time.
At the same time, Iranian traders are said to be active in southern Iraq.
Reports in Iraqi newspapers have complained that Iranian merchants are crossing the Shatt Al Arab waterway and exploiting the situation in Basra and nearby areas by buying en masse whatever is available in the market such as spare parts for automobiles and industrial equipment being brought in as well as scrap material, thus fuelling inflation in real terms and making it very expensive for reconstruction and revival of industries in southern Iraq.
That might indeed an issue of secondary importance, but it does contribute to a growing sense of despair among the Shiites that they are being victimised by all concerned.
To top it all came the Israeli assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in Palestine last month and the US position condoning the killing as demonstrated in White House statements as well as the veto the US used against a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel for the killing.
While the American behaviour was in no way a jolt from the blue — as Washington's track record shows its bias in favour of Israel — it was a reminder to the Shiites, as indeed for most other Iraqis. It highlighted that Washington could not care less about the elimination of Arab and Muslim leaders to serve Israel's interests and added to the growing anti-American sentiments among them.

'Benefit of confrontation'

That the US provoked the confrontation now with ulterior motives was underlined by the Washington Post this week.
The Post wrote: "There may ultimately be a benefit to this confrontation, which began just 88 days before the scheduled transfer of sovereignty from the US-led occupation authority to a new Iraqi government."
The confrontation is “a painful but necessary battle” and “US commanders should not hesitate to act quickly and use overwhelming force” to suppress the Iraqi revolt, said the paper.
The Post acknowledged that fighting had “a cost in Iraqi and American lives,” but it insisted that “the alternative—to step back from confrontation with Iraq’s extremists — would invite even worse trouble.”
Well, the "worse trouble" clearly means a major blow not only to Bush's chances of re-election in November but to America's quest for domination of the Middle East region and, in wider context as international commentators content, the global scene.
The ongoing clashes pitting Sadr forces and coalition soldiers from Spain, Itlay, Poland, Ukraine and Bulgaria in south Iraq and the American miltiary assault on Sadr City in Baghdad is sure to lead to a battle to the finish for both sides.
In practical terms, Sadr and his Mahdi Army on their own could put up stiff resistance and challenge the US military for some time but eventually they would be simply be crushed and eliminated from playing any significant role in the country's future. Surely, in the bargain, the US would have to take heavy casualties, but then Washington is ready to absorb them.
There is no shortage of conventional weapons in Iraq, and no doubt the anti-US forces have access to them, thus making certain that the US military would pay a heavy cost for putting down the rebellion.
There is no doubt that the US would employ whatever force and tactic it would take to wipe out Sadr and his supporters as well as his newfound Sunni allies even it means carpet bombings and raining missles on them wherever they are. It would be a bonus if the US military could catch Sadr alive because they could parade him in captivity for the benefit of American voters.
Indeed, Sadr has vowed fight until death in Najaf, the Shiite holy city in the south. Conventional wisdom says that the Americans might not launch an allout assault against Najaf because of religious sensitivities, but Wednesday's US assault of a mosque in Falloujah showed that those considerations play second fiddle to the goal of wiping out Iraqi resistance.

The American timing

Whether by design or coincidence, the US military strength in Iraq is a post-war peak now.
An overlap in the rotation of troops has increased the number of US soldiers in Iraq from 120,000 to 134,000, and the US has found the situation fit to launch the critical assault now, while retaining the option of sending reinforcements.
The US provocation started with the closure of Sadr's Al Hawza newspaper in late March on charges that it was inciting violence against coalition forces. Then the occupation authorities, working through the namesake Iraqi judiciary, arrested a close Sadr aide, Mustafa Al Yaacubi, and issued a warrant against Sadr himself on charges of being party to the killing of Ayatollah Khoei, a pro-West Shiite cleric who was flown to Najaf along with American forces shortly after the launch of the war in March 2003.
The moves were not scare tactics but were part of a well-scripted scenario.
The US military and the US overseer in Baghdad, Paul Bremer, knew that the moves against Sadr would have led to mass protests in both Najaf and Baghdad and armed clashes, setting the ground for the US push to "take out" Sadr and his top lieutenants.
Sadr has chosen to make his do-or-die stand in Najaf, and he is surrounded by his fighters who might be able to inflict considerable casualties among the Americans, but they are no match to the militarily stronger US forces in an overall context.
The US determination to "get" Sadr was amply demonstrated in the words of US General Mark Kimmitt: “Whether Sadr decides to come peacefully, or whether he decides to come not peacefully — that choice is the choice of Mister Moqtada Sadr.”
“Individuals who create violence, who incite violence... will be hunted down and captured or killed.," said Kimmit. "It’s that simple.”
Equally strong determination has been voiced by Sadr's Mahdi Army: "We are ready to sacrifice our lives for our leader Moqtada if the coalition troops touch a single strand of his hair.”
To make things worse for the US, tribal leaders of Sunni regions and from the largest resistance movement in Iraq have offered their services to Sadr.
Reports from Baghdad said that on Tuesday, three Sunni clerics handed over the message of support to the leaders of the Mahdi Army.
Abari said he represented the tribal sheikh of the Anbar province which contains Fallujah and Ramadi where fierce clashes were raging between US Marines and the Army of Mohammed, an umbrella organisation responsible for most of the anti-coalition violence over the last year.
A letter to Sadr's Mahdi's Army from Sheikh Harrath Salman Al Tey, the leader of the largest Sunni tribe and a man with massive influence Anbar, declared: "We are the Army of Mohammed and all of Ramadi and Fallujah (offer) our army and people and souls and hearts and weapons under your command. There is no more Shiite and Sunni, only Muslims, and now we will fight each other no more and together fight the same enemy."
That should indeed be a nightmare for the US in terms casualties on the ground, but certainly not enough to dissuade the Washington strategists for whom such declarations of open defiance help them identify hostile forces which need to be eliminated.
The intensity of the American military assault on Falloujah was no doubt fuelled by the killing of four Americans who served as gunmen for hire for private contractors. American television showed their bodies being dragged through the street, set afire and hung on a bridge.
Obviously the scenes were too much for Americans to take and that is reflected in the US military's action in Falloujah where they bombed out a mosque, killing at least 40 Iraqis who had taken shelter there.
Some analysts refer to the crisis in Iraq as the beginning of a civil war. That interpretation is countered by an argument that it is not as if two Iraqi groups are fighting each other; it is a war of resistance where the people of Iraq are resisting occupation forces, notwithstanding that the occupiers are backed by a few thousand Iraqi employees.
That might indeed be a tall claim, given that Sadr could not claim to represent even one third of the Shiites in Iraq. But he would pick up support from them in proportion to the use of American military strength to eliminate Sadr and his lieutenants.
US strategists are no doubt aware that they are not exactly enlisting more supporters in Iraq as every day passes by with no solutions to the daily life issues of the people of the beleaguered country. There should be a sense of urgency in Washington and we could expect to see it manifest in the days ahead.