No such thing as Pak bomb

THERE is no such as a Pakistani-made nuclear weapon.
Indeed, Pakistan has atomic weapons, but the only
Pakistani component in them is enriched uranium. The
design for the warhead was supplied by China and the
missile delivery system was provided by North Korea.
The disgraced Abdul Qadeer Khan, often described as
the "father of the Pakistani bomb," is not an expert
in nuclear technology, but a metallurgist turned rogue
nuclear trader who sold Chinese technology dating back
to the 60s and linked equipment designed from stolen
blueprints to Iran and Libya.
Khan, 51, is not a nuclear physicist; nor could he
successfully develop a long-range missile system
without outside help. His contribution was at best his
knowledge of metallurgy.
This is not a new theory. It has been heard for
several years. However, it has proved to be true in
the wake of the crisis triggered by revelations that
Khan clandestinely sold nuclear technology and
equipment to the Libyans and Iranians.
The following facts have been established so far from
various sources, named and unnamed.
— Khan, a metallurgy graduate from Europe, stole
blueprints for gas centrifuges from a Dutch company in
the mid-70s and took them to Pakistan.
— He was put in charge of the country's nuclear
programme by the then prime minister Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto and given a free hand and mandate to develop a
nuclear weapon. Successive government, both military
and civilian, continued to give him absolute authority
and confidentiality to accomplish the goal of
acquiring nuclear weapons.
— Khan, with help from the government and military,
secured a 1962 Chinese design for a nuclear warhead.
He also secured Chinese support for building a nuclear
reactor capable of producing 50 megawatts of power
that went operational in the late 80s.
— Simultaneously, he also secured missile componets
from North Korea and assembled them in Pakistan (the
most noted among the missiles is the one called
Ghauri).
— With help from Pakistani nuclear scientists assigned
to him, Khan built up a reserve of enough enriched
uranium — about 350 kilogrammes — from the
Chinese-built reactor to assemble to 15 to 17 nuclear
weapons by 1998. Some accounts have put the amount of
enriched uranium at 600 kilogrammes, enough to build
30 nuclear weapons.
— In May 1998, he carried out six nuclear tests, and
gave the impression to the outside world that Pakistan
not only has nuclear warheads but also the long-range
system to deliver them. One device is said to be
embedded underground ready for test.
— Since then, Khan regularly hosted seminars and
workshops on "vibrations in rapidly rotating
machinery" — which implied centrifuge technology
essential for producing weapons-gade uranium. Those
forums offered him the chance to draw interest from
Iran and Libya with whom he negotiated deals for
selling them gas centrifuges and other equipment which
he had obtained from China and North Korea.
— Khan was caught last year when the International
Atomic Energy Agency focused on Iran's nuclear
programme and Libya volunteered in secret to give up
its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction.
Centrifuges in Iran's possession were traced to Khan,
and Libya offered information to the US and UK that
its nuclear knowhow and centrifuges came from Khan
through middlemen based in the Gulf and Malaysia.
Since then, Khan has made a public confession that he
had made the deals with Iran and Libya. Conveniently,
the Pakistani government has pardoned but continues to
keep him under detention since he has refused to
surrender "evidence" that the Pakistani government and
military knew about his dubious deals. The evidence is
said to be with his daughter outside Pakistan, and
Khan, fearing for his life after he was caught, is
holding on to the evidence in return for a pledge that
he would not be killed and allowed to leave Pakistan
for a safe haven outside the country.