PV Vviekanand
The reformists and conservative hard-liners in Iran
are locked in a bitter battle after the powerful
religious establishment arbitrarily used its powers to
disqualify reform-minded candidates from running in
the next parliamentary elections with an obvious view
to pre-empting them continuing to enjoy a majority in
parliament. The dispute might sound like technical ,
but it is not as much as a political crisis as it is
a fight for survival for both sides, for giving in to
the other means the end for either side and easy
solutions would not be easy.
The uproar in Iran following the rejection of more
than 3,500 people as candidates in next month's
parliamentary elections is not a simple political
crisis. It is a crucial tug-of-war between the
hard-line conservative camp represented by the
powerful Guardians Council and liberal reformists who
seek to steer a fresh political and economic course
for the country away from the path dictated by the
theocrats who control the religious establishment.
Ultimately, the ongoing battle will determine whether
the people of Iran would gain the power to rule their
country or the hard-line conservatives — the
religious establishment — would strengthen their upper
hand in determining what is good and bad for their
people.
The omnipresent element in the equation is the steady
pressure the US has been applying on Tehran after the
invasion and occupation of Iraq. And this has made it
a bitter struggle for survival of both conservatives
and liberal reformists.
The conservatives fear is high that at some point the
American pressure would penetrate the ranks of the
liberal camp and that would signal a dramatic change
in the shape and nature of the county -- meaning the
demise of the superiority of the theocratic camp. They
want to pre-empt not only another liberal majority in
parliament – Majlis — but also cut down the strength
of reformists in the legislative body.
For the liberals, accepting the hard-line-imposed
conditions means nothing but saying good-bye to their
political future.
On the external front, their attempts to present a
more moderate face of Iran have been dealt a severe
blow, particularly that Tehran often boasts about its
regular elections and the country's status as an
"Islamic democracy."
The claims are often compared with the reality that an
unelected body has control over elections and only an
unelected official can overrule that body.
The struggle has been simmering for after it burst
forth when moderate Mohammed Khatami was elected
president in 1997 and set out a liberal agenda which,
he hoped, would address some of the basic economic
woes of his people and advance the country towards
returning to the mainstream world politics.
However, Khatami soon found out that the president's
wings were clipped already since the religious
establishment held all the aces and could veto him at
will; the Guardian Council held powers that superseded
those of the presidency.
Beyond that is the absolute authority of the council
to decide who could seek power in the country through
elections, and it exercised that authority this month
by rejecting 3,533 out of 8,144 prospective candidates
for the Feb.20 elections, including some 80 serving
members of the Majlis.
Several ministers and vice presidents in the
government had submitted their resignations in
protest at the mass disqualification of candidates.
However, they were expected to stay on in their jobs
pending appeals lodged with the Guardians Council.
The council has lifted the ban on 200 candidates, but
that seen as cosmetic. Most of the reformists were
expected to remain banned by the time the council
concluded its review.
The Guardians Council argued that the rejections were
made on the basis of "data collected from reliable
sources and the investigations conducted in
[applicants'] neighbourhoods."
Most of the rejected individuals are connected with
the reformist 2nd of Khordad coalition, which is named
after the date of President Khatami's election on May
23, 1997.
However, the stated reason for disqualifying them
include applicants' alleged drug abuse, links with
banned groups, or lack of Iranian nationality.
Throughout his presidency -- and particularly in his
second term — Khatami had to content with opposition
to his liberal approach from the religious
establishment, which also exercised control over the
judiciary as well as the security forces of the
country.
Any sign of political dissent challenging the absolute
authority of the conservatives was immediately put
down; moves adopted by Khatami to address some of the
basic problems were shot down; reformists pro-reform
journalists who spoke out were jailed; and liberal
activists had to content with threats to their life.
In the 1997 and 2001 elections, Iranians voted
overwhelmingly for liberals and reformists but the
elected candidates, despite their commitment,
seriousness and devotion, could achieve little since
they were restrained by the system itself that favours
the entrenched hard-liners, who, by virtue of the
powers given to them, could override them at any
point and at any time.
The actual executive powers of the Khatami government
is severely curtailed and its options are limited in
exercising what should be the legitimate rights of an
executive authority. It is even more ironic that the
government enjoys a majority in the legislative
assembly but the MPs are helpless in view of the
constitutional bindings under which they have to
function.
It is not as if the hard-liners are short-sighted in
strategy. A recent report in the Washington Post
summarised that the relative relaxation of the strict
dress code and a ban on make-up, and the strict
enforcement of laws against watching satellite
channels, men and women holding hands in public and
similar moves are the hard-liners' way of giving the
people "more of what they want and divert attention
from the reformists' demand for a more powerful
democratic say for the people.
The stand-off is indeed a battle of wits and wills as
much as it is a struggle for survival for both sides.
And an easy way does not look any near.