Thursday, July 10, 2003

Iraq resistance is growing

Iraqi resistance is growing

PV Vivekanand

THREE months have passed since Baghdad fell to the American and British military and the Saddam Hussein regime was ousted from power. The coalition forces seem set for a long haul in occupying the country and Iraqi resistance against them seems to be mounting. The success or failure of the occupation will be determined by the pace with which the US-led authority restores normalcy to the cities and towns of the beleaguered country.
IT IS uncertain at this point in time where the US occupation of Iraq would end up and whether it would produce a regime that would be accepted as legitimate by a majority of the people of Iraq and the rest of the Arab World, but one thing is clear: Attacks against the US military are unlikely to pressure Washington into withdrawing its forces from the war-shattered country.
For an overwhelming majority of Iraqis in southern and central Iraq, the immediate priority is restoration of law and order that would afford them the security conducive to making a living, and availability of basic services like water and power. In the north, which had been away from the control of the toppled regime even before the war, things are relatively better, with Kurdish groups maintaining law and order.
The risk that the Americans run elsewhere in Iraq is growing resentment over their failure to provide these basic essentials and the slow pace of reconstruction of the country.
Running contrary to Iraqis' hopes for a speedy return to normalcy is the steady incidents of resistance attacks and American preoccupation with eliminating the sources of resistance.
At least 29 American soldiers have been killed by hostile fire since US President George W. Bush declared an end to major combat in Iraq on May 1. Dozens have been wounded.
Also targeted are Iraqis co-operating with the occupation; seven recruits to an Iraqi police force were killed by a remote controlled bomb in the town of Ramadi, west of Baghdad, last week.
Some experts believe that the US military, equipped with the most advanced surveillance equipment and aggressive weapons, would eventually root out Iraqi resistance through an iron-fist, scorched-earth approach. The US forces would narrow down the sources of resistance and hit them hard, and corner those who are staging almost daily attacks.
The experts also note that the US has announced a reward of $2,500 for information leading to the arrest of assailants who kill a US soldier or Iraqi policeman.
The US has already offered a $25 million reward for information leading to the capture of Saddam or proof that he is dead and a $15 million price for similar information on his sons, Uday and Qusai.
The prediction of these experts that the US would eventually overpower Iraqi challengers is based on the apparent absence of a centralised resistance movement, notwithstanding the audio-tapes containing purported calls by Saddam for stepped-up attacks against the US forces in the country.
Those who forsee in this course of events argue that the 10 or so average daily "encounters" between Iraqi guerrillas and American soldiers do not account for a massive resistance movement and discount the theory that Iraq could prove to be "another Vietnam" for the Americans.
However, others argue that growing signs of organised resistance are emerging and the ranks of the resistance could swell if tens of thousands of desparate soldiers who became unemployed with the disbanding of the army opt to join in.
Plans announced this week call for a 25,000-strong army in about one year. That has little room for the 350,000 to 400,000 former soldiers.
Desparation over the lack of security and stability, basic services and jobs could also prompt others to seek to get rid of the Americans, according to observers who follow this school of thinking.
Iraqis who are prompted by personal, ideological and nationalistic reasons are also seen prone to be waging resistance. However, there is little sign of any co-ordination among the groups and there does not seem to be a central command which organises resistance attacks.
However, over the last two weeks, assailants have been using rocket-propelled grenades and mortars -- and remote controlled bombs as the case was in Ramadai -- in a sign of stepped up resistance.
As such, it remains open to conjecture whether the US would be able to cope with the increasing intensity of resistance while it seems to be continuing to alienate Iraqis by not moving fast enough to restore normal life in the country.

Southerners biding for time

The majority Shiites in the south are refraining themselves from ared resistance. Obviously, their leaders, despite internal differences, are hoping that they would get a larger share of power as and when the US fulfills its promise to rebuild and democratise the country.
The Shiites -- who make up to 60 per cent of the 24-million Iraqi population, would challenge the US in the short term only when their interests are questioned, and American strategists are careful not to antagonise them.
In the meantime, the Shiites are resorting to peaceful protest marches and demonstrations against what they see as decisions that undermine their drive to maintain domination of the area. They have made no secret of their desire to the see the back of the Americans at the earliest.
Americans are mindful that Iraqi Shiites could be used by Iran to counter Washington's moves in southern Iraq and broader political moves involving political power in Iraq. Bush administration officials have accused Tehran of meddling in Iraq's internal affairs through Shiite groups in southern Iraq, a charge Iran has denied.
The US has retained its option of using the Iranian dissident group, Mujahedeen e-Khalq, which has a sizeable presence in Iraq, to destablise Iran through cross-border action and propaganda beamed through radio and television.
It would probably be a re-enactment of the Saddam era scenario where Baghdad backed the Mujahedeen to counter Iran's backing for the Iraqi Shiite opposition group, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Today, the Americans have the Mujahedeen as a card against Iran and Tehran has pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiite groups in southern Iraq that it could use against the US if it suits Iranian interests.
However, it is highly unlikely that Iran would encourage its sympathisers in Iraq to resort to military resistance against the Americans. Washington has already piled pressure on Iran citing Tehran's nuclear programmes, and the theocratic regime there would do without having an open confrontation with the Americans.
The US civil administrator, Paul Bremer, might have sent a wrong signal to the religious leaders of the south when he avoided contact with them during a visit he made to Najaf on Wednesday.
Bremer staying away from tAyatollah Ali Sistani, leader of the Hawza theological institution and one of the most powerful and respected Shiite leaders, would have been seen as an affront to the community.
Sistani has accused the Americans of ignoring the Hawza and issued a religious order that only Iraqis should appoint those who would write a new constitution. That meant a direct challenge to American plans.

The northern equation

The Kurds in the north -- about 18 to 20 per cent of the populaton -- are busy laying the groundwork for the independent state that they dream of.
They are aligned with the US and the alliance is being cemented as an apparent American-Turkish rift is growing over Washington's rejection of Ankara's moves in northern Iraq to counter the emergence of an independent Kurdish state there. That rift was all the more visible last week when US forces detained 11 soldiers from Turkish special forcesin a raid on charges that they were trying to destablise the region by killing the US-installed mayor of Kirkuk. The soldiers were released after three days following top-level Ankara-Washington contacts, but the incident sent messages both ways: Turkey would not be dissuaded from pursuing action to pre-empt the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq and Washington would not allow Turkey to sow instability in the region.
At the same time, the US also reserves the option to back the Kurdish cause and thus keep the Islamist government in Ankara under pressure.
Whatever the course of events in the north, the Kurds would be the last to take up arms against the US military, and that effectively takes them out of the current military equation facing the US forces in the country.
Ankara could encourage the estimated two million Turkomen -- people of Turkish origin who remained in northern Iraq following the collapse of the Ottoman empire in the early 1900s -- to make trouble for the Americans and Kurds.
Reports indicate that Ankara is active among the Turkomen with a drive to resettle them in areas from where they were ousted during the Saddam regime's "ethnic cleansing drive" but is maintaining a low profile.
The US-Turkish proxy tug-of-war would have to emerge into the open since the stakes are too high for all sides involved. But that would not be an immediate factor in US considerations unless Ankara forces the American hand.

The main resistance threatre

Most of the anti-US attacks have occurred in the predominantly Sunni belt in the northeast of Baghdad and this have given rise to the theory that Saddam Hussein, who is allegedly flush with cash of more than $1.2 billion that he took from the central bank in the final days of the war that toppled him from power, is financing resistance and offering bounties to those who succeed in killing American soldiers.
In the hypothesis that this is true, then the question that comes up is: How long could Saddam continue to finance attacks as the US steps up the intensity of its actions against suspected resistance activists?
Indeed, $1.2 billion (provided that the Saddam-central bank story is true) would go a long way but not enough to wear out the Americans.
Cocnerns were raised last week that those who wage armed resistance could expand their effort to include Western civilians when a British television cameraman was shot dead at point-blank range.
Similar attacks have not been repeated, but that has done little to scale down apprehension that Western officials and businessmen visiting Iraq could be targeted.

Bid for legitimacy

Several countries, most of them from Europe and the former Soviet bloc, have joined the American forces in Iraq as peace-keeping troops or have agreed to send tropps there amid arguments in Washington for and against a dramatic increase in the number of American soldiers deployed there.
Some of those countries were seen as friends of Iraq during the Saddam era, but this perception could change if the Iraqis start seeing them as part of the US-led occupation force.
Obviously, the American objective in inviting other countries to join the Iraq operation is double-fold: It could reduce the pressure against American soldiers put up by the resistance and would also add an element of legitimacy to the occupation, given that the United Nations has refused to endorse a force that would serve under American command.
Pakistan's government has said that it might send troops to Iraq but that no decision would be taken without taking parliament into confidence.
The Indianb government, according to informed sources, has taken a decision in principle to accept an American request for troops and has notifed Washington of the decision. But the government faces strong opposition to the move. Observers believe that the government might simply assign a military unit before July 21, before parliament starts a regular session, hoping that it would be able with withstand opposition criticism in the legislature with a fait accompli.
Seven Iraqi exile groups which hope to make up a governing council in co-ordination with the US occupation authority have proposed that an Iraqi security force be deployed in cities to tackle crime.
Deployment of Iraqis familar with the territory and local norms could take care of internal security in the cities and also counter attacks against the foreign forces.
There was no reported American response to the proposal, which was formulated at a meeting this week in northern Iraq of the seven groups.

Political moves

Respected Iraqi politician Adnan Pachachi has said the seven groups would also take part in the governing council but that they would have executive authority and would not serve in an advisory capacity to the US authority in Iraq,
US administrator Paul Bremer has apparently accepted the demand and the council is expected to be announced in the next two weeks.
Shiites would be given more than 50 per cent of the 25 seats in the council and the rest would be divided among Sunnis and Kurds, according to sources quoted by news agencies.
The seven groups include the Iraqi National Congress, headed by Ahmed Chalabi, the Shi'ite Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Al Da'wa Party and two Kurdish political parties.
The council, the first step towards setting up an American-promised Iraqi administration of Iraq, should ideally be in control of most internal affairs, but it is clear that it faces several hurdles:
Iraqis have openly said they resent being ruled by exiles who remained out of the country for decades. However, not many Iraqis could be identified with leadership qualities at this point in time other than those who served under Saddam and they are not acceptable to both the US and most Iraqis.
For the moment, the exile groups are holding together despite their differing ideologies (or the lack of ideology) and agendas in the country.
The best and largest organised group among them is SCIRI, but the US treats the group at arms length in view of its close links with Iran.
The Kurdish groups are more focused in the north, and their priorities are different from those of other Iraqi groups - they want to advance their cause for independence.
Thrown into the equation are efforts to revive the Hashemite monarchy. Sharif Ali Bin Al Hussein, a London-based banker, has returned to Iraq and his supporters are calling for a constitutional monarchy. A rival group supports another Hashemite figure who lives in Jordan - Raad Bin Zeid.
The two groups have not come to grips with each other except through the media.
Do the Iraqis want a revived monarchy?
Some say that a monarchy could serve as a rallying point and unifying factor for the diverse Iraqi communities and tribes. Other say that democracy is the best option.
But the people of the war-shattered country is too far from any serious contemplation of such ideas. They want security, water, food, power and steady employment, and their resistance against anyone seen blocking the way would grow as every day passes without these demands being met -- and their first logical target is the coalition forces.

Friday, July 04, 2003

US going wrong in Iraq

By PV Vivekanand

THE US went wrong from the word go when it gave more weight to its military might than a pacifist approach of political persuasion in post-war Iraq, and it faces a deep quagmire in the country unless it moves fast against lost time to stabilise the Iraqis' most basic needs -- personal safety, electricity, water, health care, job security and regular salaries. This is the finding of international and regional experts who are alarmed over the deteriorating situation in Iraq, where the US military is getting more aggressive every day in the face of mounting resistance attacks.
Had the US tried a different approach, then it would not have been facing the quagmire that it is slowly slipping into in Iraq, say the experts.
The American military action freed the Iraqis from the oppressive rule of Saddam Hussein but pushed them into a much worse situation that the Saddam days in terms of daily life. The US forces gave prime consideration to securing oilfields and installations and ignored - and thereby seen as having encouraged - widespread looting, robberies rape and murder throughout the country. In fact, accusasions that the invading force was more interested Iraq's oil than the welfare of the Iraqis were heard even on April 9, the day Baghdad fell to the US force.
The American actions since then have convinced a majority of Iraqis that the US was not their liberator beyond the point of removing the Saddam regime to serve American interests that have little to do with caring for the people of Iraq or respecting their rights.
In Baghdad and other Iraqi towns male members of families keep watch with guns and take shifts to sleep, fearing armed robbers. Without their guns they feel naked, but the US forces insist that everyone surrender their weapons; not many have met a US-set deadline for giving up their guns.
It is indeed a festering sore. The US forces is not only offering safety and protection to the people of Iraq but is also seeking to deprive Iraqis of the means to protect themselves.
Power and water supplies are erratic; cost of living is shooting up and there is no regular pay, and many families are worse off than the Saddam days when the regime used to supply monthly rations.
Telecommunications are almost non-existent; the sense of normality offered by radio and television is lacking in view of the frequent outages.
If there was any inkling of an American inclination to look at ways to address the situation, that is fast disappearing with the US force's preoccupation dealing with Iraqi resistance; and if the situation continues, the vicious circle would only intensify and the US "administration" of Iraq would prove to be catastrophic for all.
The declared American drive to set up an interim Iraqi committee to help govern the country has been a source of consolation for many Iraqis who welcomed the involvement of their own people in running the country. But, the emerging undercurrents in the intense jockeying for power based on ethnic considerations and diverse ideologies have convinced them that having an effective Iraqi say in Iraqi affairs is not seen anywhere in the near future.
The absence of a central authority to address their problems has fuelled Iraqi anger and despair, say the experts in a report prepared by the International Criis Group.
"Ensconced in one of Saddam Hussein's vast palaces in Baghdad, (US) officials are not allowed to leave the palace grounds without military escort," it says. "They venture out infrequently and know little of Iraq and Iraqis. In turn, Iraqis have no venue, such as walk-in centres, where they can go to air problems, register complaints or hear first-hand from (US) officials," it adds.
The Iraqi frustration is also fuelled by the focus given to American corporates in reconstruction of their country. The Iraqis might not have adequate commercial foundations and equipment to undertake the job, but they are incensed by the feeling that Americans are fleecing their country and their resources and keeping out all others. Even at that, there is little to show on the ground that any reconstruction worth the name is under way.
The ICG underlines what the group sees as the mistakes that the American committed and are continuing to commit in post-war Iraq.
Among the many reasons for the instability in Iraq was the summary disbandment of the Baathist Party overlooking the three distinct kinds of Baathists -- diehard Saddam loyalists, those who joined the party out of expediency, and ideological followers, says the group.
According to the ICG, the vast majority of civil servants, police, judges, engineers and others belong to the second category and have the skills to make the country run again, but they are being sidelines and indeed taken to task for their past affiliation with the party.
"By banning all of them without distinction," the US rulers of Iraq have "ostracised a vital group - and may even end up uniting opposition to the occupation rather than alienating the Saddam loyalists," says the report.
It calls on the US to "seriously reconsider this order and return qualified senior managers to their positions if they do not have a proven record of corruption or abuse."
The ICG report says that there is also growing resentment among Iraqis who aspire to political power. "Even those who came from overseas feel that they are being offered far less than the Iraqi-run interim government that they thought the United States had agreed to before the war," it says. "The closest they are likely to get in the short to medium term is an interim council of 25 to 30 appointed by L. Paul Bremer, the chief US administrator in Iraq, without serious decision-making powers."
Disbanding the Iraqi military without offering its personnel alternative means to make a living was another major mistake of the Americans, according to the ICG. As a result, tens of thousands of young men were turned into the streets without employment, leaving them the option of a life of crime or joining resistance groups which give them something to do rather than wander around in search of non-existent jobs.
The disbandment of the army "has put hundreds of thousands of young men on the streets without serious prospects of work or compensation," says the IGC. "It is feared that many will join the gangs of thieves who roam the streets, or form the core of future armed resistance to the occupation. Some of these men were on the streets last week —  demonstrating against the US and demanding a fairer deal. Shooting at them — as the US forces did - is not the answer to these mens' problems."
"What is puzzling is that so little advance preparation appears to have been made for dealing with the problems that have arisen in Baghdad," says Hilterman. "Many if not most of them should have been anticipated based on years of experience with post-conflict transitions elsewhere.
"The Iraqis' faith in their new rulers is being undermined by ad hoc decision making, lack of cultural sensitivity and apparent neglect of the problems that rile them most. Urgent and focused action is needed if this discontent is not to be transformed into widespread and active opposition in the coming months," warns Hilterman.

Thursday, June 19, 2003

US counts dud cards in Iran

PV Vivekanand


THE failure of the clerical regime in Tehran to
address the bread-and-butter issues of their people
and overzealous imposition of religious restrictions
that stifled personal freedoms are the best bet the US
has in its bid for regime change in the Islamic
republic.
The American charges that Iran is seeking nuclear
weapons and is harbouring Al Qaeda terrorists are
cosmetic as far as the people of Iran are concerned.
They see those charges as simialr to the American
build-up against Iraq, and, if anything, they would
stand behind the regime against external meddling in
their internal affairs.
But the US-inspired slogans against "oppression,
denial of jusitce, disrespect for human rights" might
work to incite Iranians into demonstrating against the
regime since such is the track record of the
theocratic governance of Iran since the ouster of the
shah in 1979.
Contrary to the Iranian people's expectations of a
liberal democracy, public freedoms and economic
opportunities, the post-shah regime headed by the late
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini tightened the norms of
life in the society and focused on fighting a running
conflict with the US.
Indeed, Khomeini, who died in 1989, was successful of
freeing his country from US domination, but he scored
little else to serve his people's needs of better
living standards, employment and political freedoms.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini, did no
better.
Throughout the period since the 1979 upheaval that
saw the ouster of the shah, the theocrats in Iran
dominated governance as well in line with the Shiite
ideology where the religious leadership also maintains
political leadership. Therefore, the president and his
cabiinet were also tied down to the decisions of the
religious establishment under the Vilayet-e-Faqih
system adopted by the Shiites.
On the economic front, the religious esatablishment
created organisations beyond the control of the
government to supervise the elected branches and in
direct control of the armed forces, the judiciary and
the wealthy charitable foundations that account for
nearly half of all economic activities in the country;
hence the tight-fisted rule of the theocrats also
meant that Iranians were never offered the right
economic opportunities that their oil-rich country
should have offered them.
Khamenei exercises absolute power and his hardline
camp dominates the Council of Guardians, which has the
final say in any government move, and the Expediency
Council, headed by former president Ali Akbar
Rafsanjani, a relative moderate but whose voice is
drowned by the hardliners.
Khamenei serves as the ideologue of the conservative
camp and Rafsanjani, as head of the Experiency
Council, acts as the link between the relgiious
establishment and elected bodies.
Any move towards fundamental reforms made by the
current regime of Mohammed Khatami is vetoed by the
hardliners, and the ineffective resistance of the
government against such domination has even alienated
it from the public.
It was with great hope that the Iranians voted in
Khatami as president in 1997, but it soon became
apparent that the religious leaders had no intention
to let him carry out reform. They fought him every
step of the way, with the net result that the people
of Iran gave up any hope for positive change in their
life.
The voters had hoped that Khatami would reinvigorate
the Islamic revolution and prompote freedom of
thought, speech, dress, and social interaction;
education, housing, healthcare and employment. Between
1997 and 2000, the conservatives who had a majority in
parliament kept Khatami's reforms at arms distance. In
2000, the Khatami camp won majority control of the
Majlis, but the conservatives continued to block him
through the Guardians Council. Dozens of eformists
were jailed, nearly 100 reform newspapers were closed
down and popular protests were put down violently by
harcord supporters of the clerical establishment.
What we see today in Iran is a reflection of the
mounting frustrations of the Iranian people. The daily
protests in the last 10 days in Tehran and other
cities of the country are indeed encouraged and even
incited by the US and its Iranian agents, most of whom
are based outside the country but have connections
inside. Supporting the US campaign to stir internal
trouble that Washington hopes would eventually lead to
a movement strong enough to topple the Khamenei regime
are the successors of the shah as well as leaders of
the Iranian Jewish community in the US.
What are Iran's options today to successfully fight
off the American pressure?
There are no overnight solutions that would make the
people of Iran immune to external incitement to rise
up against the regime. Even if there were, the
religious establishment could not be expected to
embrace them since they involve cornerstones of what
the Khamenei camp believes as the foundations of the
Islamic republic.
However, the survival of the regime depends on how it
goes about handling the ongoing protests on the
internal front and warding off American threats citing
the country's alleged nuclear programmes, meddling in
Iraq's internal affairs, aiding "international
terrorism," and supporting "terorrist organisations"
such as the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups
and Lebanon's Hizbollah.
When university students started protests at night
against what was rumoured to be government plans to
privatise universities, a few non-student activists
took to the streets and expressed backing for the
students by honking their vehicle's horns.
Hardline supporters of the clerical establishment hit
back by storming university dorms and assaulting
students. The government intervened and ordered the
arrest of those who attacked students.
Then it was the turn of the religious establishment to
take the next step. It seemed to have realised that
extending a hand of protection to the hardliners might
be counterproductive; therefore it decided not to
muscle the government to release those arrested. That
could indeed be a starting point for the hardline camp
to let loosen their grip on life in Iran and the
faster they do it the better for themselves and their
people.
That is the status quo in Tehran today. But the
protests are far from over, with the US engaged in a
multi-pronged effort to discredit the Khamenei camp
and oust the Khatami regime. It has not reached the
military point yet. The US seems to be marking time to
the point that the internal protests gather enough
moementum and strength before moving in with military
might to back the protesters. The countdown has
started, as far as American strategists are concerned.
But they might be in for a surprise since the Iranians
have an excellent record of uniting against common
threats.... and that might be America's undoing in
Iran.


 

Friday, June 13, 2003

Rantisi killing changes little

PV Vivekanand

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has unleashed a fresh wave of bloodshed by launching an assassination attempt against Hamas leader Abdul Aziz Rantisi, a solid symbol of Palestinian resistance. Seen against the simple logic that Sharon knew well that an attack against Rantisi would spark of massive Hamas retaliation that would wreck the Palestinian leadership's efforts to create an atmosphere conducive to implementing the "roadmap" for peace, all bets are off for the hopes that were stoked by the newfound American interest in Palestine.
HOPES, faint as indeed they were, of a breakthrough for peace in Palestine sparked by the June 4 summit in Aqaba lay shattered in the wreckage of a car that was repeatedly struck by Israeli missiles in the Gaza Strip less than a week later. It was no coincidence that the vehicle was carrying prominent Hamas leader Abdul Aziz Al Rantisi, who miraculously survived the assault. But the momentum for peace that the Aqaba summit offered did not survive the missiles that could not have but been deliberately delivered to quash any moves stemming from the Aqaba promises.
As we saw on Wednesday, Hamas struck back immediately and claimed at least 16 people in a suicide attack in an Israeli bus, and Israel retaliated with more missiles at Gaza and took at least seven more Palestinain lives.
This cycle of attacks and retaliation has become a pattern in Palestine, with no one being able to come up with a solution.
And the latest spurt of bloodshed clearly established that there is little hope of peace as long as Ariel Sharon and like-minded people remain at the helm of power in Israel.
Nothing is enough to convince them that Israel's military might is not the answer to its "security" concerns but acceptance of the inevitability of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people as the basis for a peace agreement.
Sharon's attack on Rantisi exposed his insincerity in living up to the commitments he made at the much-touted Aqaba summit.
With US President George W Bush as witness, Sharon had undertaken to suspend all targeted killings of Palestinian leaders as one of the prime conditions for creating an atmosphere conducive to implementing the "roadmap" for peace.
He violated that pledge with Tuesday's helicopter attack and made things impossible for Bush as well as Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas in creating an atmosphere suitable for a negotiated peace process.
Sharon is not naive to have expected Hamas to let the attack on their leader go by without retaliation; that meant he did not really care about the impact of his order to kill Rantisi on the prospects for negotiations with the Palestinian leadership.
Given that Hamas has rejected the process that was launched at the Aqaba summit and vowed to continue armed struggle for liberation of Palestine, its continued actions of armed resistance fall within the context of the right of the occupied to resist the occupier with whatever means at their disposal.
In a looser framework, the group's stance could be equated with the rejection of the "roadmap" process by armed settlers who reign supreme in the West Bank since armed resistance poses the same problem for the Palestinian leadership as the settlers pose for the Israeli regime.
Sharon refraining from military operations against the Palestinians is a basic prerequisite for Abbas in his efforts to convince groups like Hamas, Islamic Jihad and others to give the "roadmap" a chance, if only perhaps to call Sharon's bluff. Indeed, that bluff has already been called with the attack on Rantisi and it was nothing but a sneaky effort that laid bare the truth that Sharon is following his own agenda in Palestine, notwithstanding the commitments and pledges he made that had even raised doubts in his worst-foes that he might after all be ready to meet the requirements of peace.
A flash of hope has come with Bush's criticism of the assault and his comment that he was "deeply troubled" by it since it undermines Abbas' efforts to contain armed resistance.
Like any US president in the last five decades, Bush should have known that he could not trust Sharon to keep good faith and that loftly declarations th hawkish former general made at Aqaba had more to do with placating the US than sincere commitments or genuine understanding that there could be no real peace in the Middle East without respecting and accepting that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
We can only hope that the American president's pointed reference that actions such as Tuesday's assault do not "contribute to the security of Israel" reflects a mood towards adopting practical action to apply pressure on Sharon when pressure is needed. That is the only means of hope to see the Palestinian problem resolved in a just and fair manner.
That Hamas would strike back with intensity was made clear by the group's founder, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, when he visited Rantisi in hospital.
"Israel said it wanted to send a message to Hamas through this cowardly attempt on the life of my brother Dr Rantisi. I would tell Israel that Hamas has in fact received the message and will send the response soon," he said.
He also declared that Hamas would no longer distinguish between Israeli soldiers and civilians when it stage resistance attacks.
The attack on Rantisiu was seen by many Palestinian officials as a severe blow to the efforts of Abbas to reach a ceasefire and move onward to the implementation of the roadmap.
Ismail Haniyyeh, one of Hamas leaders in Gaza, and other like him are now urging Abbas to cut off all dialogue and talks with Israel. "It is clear that the Israeli commitment to the roadmap is fake," sasid Haniyyey. "We thank God for the failure of the assassination attempt. The Zionist enemy sustained a serious defeat. The resistance, however, won and obtained further support as scores of Palestinians rallied behind Hamas and its leaders," he said.
According to Hanniyeh, the roadmap that Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) said they would implement soon "was obviously based on more assassinations, more house demolitions and more incursions by the Israeli army."
Haniyyeh said that Abu Mazen and his government should abandon talks with Israel and resume resistance to the Israeli occupation. The attempt on Rantisi's life was a clear declaration by Israel that it wanted to liquidate all voices of moderation aired by Abbas in the Aqaba summit, he said.
It is indeed a sentiment shared by a majority of the Palestinains.
Israel maintained that Rantisi was responsible for a series of attacks on Israel. A statement distributed by the Israeli government press office said that Rantisi was "among the most extremist leaders of the criminal Hamas organization in Gaza. He has preached and directed murder, sabotage, terror and incitement for many years."
The statement said that since the Aqaba summit, Rantisi "has stepped up his murderous activities, both openly and covertly and the Israeli government has every reason to assume that Rantisi's criminal activities will increase."
Those explanations would find favour only with those who are anxious to receive such assertions and who want to overlook that it is the right of every Palestinian to use whatever means available to resist the Israeli occupation of Palestiniaan land.
Indeed the Aqaba summit heard Sharon saying he was ready to accept an independent Palestinian entity alongside Israel, but he seemed to have made those pledges and lofty statements a knowing well that he would never be held to account for them.
Sharon's "dismantling" of "illegal" Jewish outposts in the West Bank is nothing but a sham and an insult to international intelligence.
The media are highlighting a dozen or so of "illegal" Israeli outposts in the West Bank. In reality, it costs Sharon nothing to remove them since all these outposts are made up of condemned vehicles and trailers and no one lived them in any case.
Sharon need to remove such outposts because of the "security" problems it poses for him. He has to deploy army soldiers to protect the maverick settlers living in the outposts and requires expensive logistical support.
There are some 102 such outposts accommodating about 1,000 settlers in the West Bank. These are not counted among the 150 settlements that Israel considers as legal and they hold about 220,000 settlers, It is from the 102 that the Israeli army has singled out 14 for removal. That in itself exposes the cosmetic nature of Sharon's moves in this context since the real problem is posed by the proper concrete apartment buildings that are build inside Palestinian towns or in areas adjoining densely populated Palestinian centres.
The "illegal" outposts do not really make any difference to his designs to continue to retain Israel's stranglehold on the Palestinian land through the settlers and settlements. The colonies have "strategic" importance for Sharon in terms of maintaining a Jewish presence in key areas of the West Bank that would deny the territorial "contiguity" that Bush promised the Palestinian entity proposed by the "road map."
The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH) has condemned Israel's assassination attempt against Rantisi and cautioned against Sharon's efforts to sabotage Abbas's efforts for peace. The attack came "at a time when international efforts, particularly those of the US and President George W. Bush personally, are focused on establishing calm in the region and resuming Palestinian-Israeli peace talks," said the centre.
It added that Israel's policy of assassinating Palestinian political leaders "is a grave violation of international law, and a direct blow to any efforts for peace. It constitutes a great danger for the prospects of the roadmap and threatens to provoke more violence and fuel an already volatile situation."
And that is what we saw on Wednesday and would continue to see for some time to come.

Additional reporting by Elias Zananiri from occupied Jerusalem

Thursday, June 12, 2003

Sharon's folly

PV Vivekanand

PEOPLE LIKE Ariel Sharon would never realise that there is a legitimate cause behind the Palestinian struggle and that without addressing this cause no Israeli would ever be able to sleep in peace. They believe that the Palestinians should never demand anything and should accept what Israel says at face value and simply fall in line with whatever the occupiers of their land have in mind for them. There is no other go, and Sharon is determined to force them into that situation by hook or crook.
He would resort to lies and blatant deception if that is what would serve his purpose of subjugating the Palestinians into swallowing whatever conditions Israel attaches to "allowing" them to live in their ancestral land.
That is the picture that emerged this week after Sharon deliberately touched off a fierce wave of Palestinian resistance attacks by ordering an attempt to assassianate a prominent leader of the Hamas movement, Abdul Aziz Al Rantisi.
Sharon, who, only less than a week earlier, had proclaimed that he was ready to do what it takes to make peace and urged his Palestinian counterpart Mahmoud Abbas to do the same, showed that his words were hollow by ordering the attack in violation of the pledge he made not to continue "targeted killings" of Palestinian activists.
Surely, Sharon would have known that the attack on Rantisi would seriously set back Abbas's efforts to arrange a suspension of armed resistance attacks by groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Sharon was actually sending a message to all Palestinians that he had no intention of making peace through dialogue and negotiations and would only want to choke the Palestinians into swallowing his version of Palestinian-Israeli co-existence in the land of Palestine.
Emotions and fury are running high in Palestine, wiping out all hopes for an early advance for a negotiated peace process. But then that is what Sharon wanted, and it is high time the world, particularly the US, realised the truth and behaved forcefully and with determination to ensure that the Palestinians are not denied justice. This would need unprecedented American pressure on Israel, and if Washington is not ready to apply that pressure then it should let the rest of the world do so.

Monday, June 02, 2003

Afront to the world

by pv vivekanand

BRITISH officials are claiming that there is overwhelming evidence that Iraq possessed a large stockpile of weapons of mass destruction although no trace of such armament has been found in post-war Iraq.
It is an affront to the international community to be continued to be fed such contentions without substantiation. Granted that the ouster of Saddam Hussein and American-British occupation of Iraq have become fait accompli and, in real terms, it does not matter whether Saddam had weapons of mass destruction since it would not change the reality on the ground in Iraq today.
But the British claims sound hollow and the mounting world feeling today is that Washington and London knew from day one that Iraq did not have any weapons of mass destruction of any size that would have posed a threat to its neighbours or any other country. Iraq's alleged possesion of such weapons was indeed one of the main reasons cited by the American-British alliance to justify the invasion and occupation that country.
Even if we were to accept the theory that the ouster of Saddam was a blessing to the long-suffering people of Iraq, there is nothing that would prompt us to digest the American and British postures and claims in the name the threat that his alleged weapons posed to world security.
If anything, countering the claims are fresh reports that Washington and London had doctored intelligence findings -- and indeed produced academic studies labelled as information gained through spying -- to convince their public that Saddam's alleged weapons posed the most severe terrorist threat the world ever faced after the Sept.11 attacks in New York and Washington.
Adding more to the growing belief that the US and UK took the world for a ride with their claims about Iraq's weapons are reports that French intelligence had established in early December that the transatlantic alliance had made up its mind to wage against Iraq no matter what.
That French finding, confirmed by the Paris government, was said to have been behind France's firm and persistent stand against the war on Iraq and block American-British moves to have the UN Security Council adopt a new resolution that would have legitmised the war against Iraq and occupation of that country. Obviously, Paris knew that Washington and London were not acting in good faith to secure UN endorsement of the war but were engaged in first-degree deception to legitimise military action against Iraq.
As such, the impression one gets is simple: The war against Iraq was a dead certainty and Washington and London were only interested in producing what they claimed to be evidence that Saddam had stockpiled weapons of mass destruction. That they would have gone to any extent to produce such "evidence" was established when the so-called intelligence findings they cited were proved to be unfounded and fabricated.
The impression one gets from Washington today is that the Bush administration could not care less if it was true that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld suggests that Iraq could have destroyed the alleged weapons before the war started; but the fundamental flaw in that assertion is that Saddam had known without any doubt that his country would be targeted for war and he needed every weapon he could muster to counter the invaders. There was never any realistic question of Saddam being caught alive and put on trial where the purported weapons of mass destruction seized by the invaders and produced in a international court as evidence against him. So why should Saddam destroy any weapon when he needed all the military power he could muster in order to inflict as much damage as possible to the invaders?
That the course of the war went in a surprisingly different direction as a result of American deals with Saddam's military generals who opted to take the easy way is a different story,
In event, the picture emerging from Washington on the issue is one that says that why should the world worry whether Saddam possessed such weapons or otherwise, and, after all, hasn't the war toppled a dictatorial regime and "liberated" the Iraqis? If anything, the US is suggesting, the international community should be glad and thankful to the US for having led the effort to topple Saddam and never mind what weapons he had.
That attitude fits in with the Bush administration's approach that the world should not question its actions anywhere in the world and take if for granted that whatever it does would be aimed at serving mankind. Indeed, there are questions heard here and there in the US Congress that the administration was not exactly very honest when it pumped home into the American heart that Saddam represented the largest single threat to the security of every American. However, those questions are not really bothering the administration since no mainstream American politician would dare raise touch upon an issue that has a highly pronounced Israeli angle.
But the Labour government of Britain led by Tony Blair does not have that leeway in London. The British democracy works differently and British politicians and media would not simply be silenced by whatever is being said in the name of "nationalism" and "security priorities" that are being touted by the Bush administration to ward off criticism from within.
Blair today faces the key question: He had insisted throughout that he had information that proved Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction and that he could not have revealed that information before or during the war since it would have compromised intelligence sources. Now that the war is over, Saddam is gone and Iraq is occupied, what is preventing Blair from revealing the information he had?
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw cut and others justifying the war and Blair's decision to join the American camp cut a sorry figure when they try to borrow a leaf from the American book and argue now that producing physical evidence was not important then the perception that Saddam posed a threat to the world.
"What we did say was, this is a sufficient threat, that if we continue to sit on our hands, the threat will get worse and there'll come a moment where for sure Saddam will use these weapons against his own people and against
his neighbours, and will not only be a threat to international peace and security, but directly and very sinisterly affect international peace and security." said Straw.
What is even more pathetic than such a summary assertion that overlooks logic and even ridicules basic intelligence is that the British officials are citing a UN weapons inspection report of March 7, 2003 which said a dozen empty shells with traces of chemicals were found in Iraq and again a post-war report which said two vehicles could have been mobile laboratories to develop chemical weapons.
Under no circumstances could such claims be deemed as genuine, given that the American-British alliance had said Iraq had tens of thousands of litres of chemical weapons ready for use, and that Saddam had prepared them to be deployed and used at 45 minutes' notice. That assumption has also been dismissed as having come from a doctored document disguised as an intelligence finding, which has been disowned by Britain's prime spying agencies.
The entire episode not only leaves a sour taste but also a humiliating feeling that the world has been conned and that the powers that be are trying to force down their justifications and reasons down the throat of the international community; and, to make it worse, they are smirking to themselves knowing well that their "revelations" make little sense to themselves.

Sunday, June 01, 2003

Preplanned resistance?

THE resistance that the US is facing in post-war Iraq
was planned even before the war and is many folds
stronger than American military strategists and
officials care to admit in public. The mounting
attacks on the American and British occupiers of Iraq
are orchestrated not by a single group but several
factions, the strongest among them being the
intelligence network of the ousted Saddam Hussein
regime. The dreaded intelligence agency, mukabarat,
had drawn up a strategy to make Iraq "as unfriendly as
possible" for the Americans even before the first shot
was fired in the war, according to Arab intelligence
experts.
The experts also say that American and British
journalists are "as good or as bad" as intelligence
agents in post-war Iraq. "Everyone is nosing around,
desperately trying to get information that rival don't
have and they are fertile ground for intelligence
agencies to manipulate through different tactics to
flush out more information," said an expert. "That
accounts for the differing and often startling reports
whose authenticity is often put under question marks."
The experts confirmed the authenticity of an Iraqi
mukabarat document unearthed by the occupying forces
in Iraq. The document, drawn up in January, was based
on a potential fall of the regime leading to American
occupation of the country and detailed a series of
actions against the occupiers.
These included attacks of American military personnel
and installations causing optimum casualties, sabotage
oil and pipelines and infrastructure like power
generators and distribution and incite Iraqis to take
up arms against the occupying forces.
The document was discovered shortly after the US
forces overran Baghdad in early April, but the Arab
sources who spoke to Malayalamanorama affirmed that
they had known about the Iraqi intelligence agency's
plans much earlier through their contacts in Iraq.
While Arab intelligence agencies were wondering how
far the Iraqi Mukabarat would be effective in carrying
out its plans, their American and British counterparts
were sceptical about the authenticity of the document.
"There is no longer any scepticism since what is
happening on the ground is an almost exact match of
what the document called for," said one Arab source.
"It is not a Galloway document," commented a source,
referring to papers that British papers cited as
establishing that MP George Galloway took millions of
dollars from Saddam Hussein. When put to chemical
tests, it was found that these papers, purportedly
dating back to the 90s, were written in the last few
months.
Arab intelligence has found "several concentrations"
of Iraqi groups waging resistance against the
occupiers. "Some of them are well funded, probably
from the coffers of the former regime, while others
have taken up arms because of their nationalist and
patriotic spirits," said the source. "There are also
groups whose leaders believe they would be better off
ensuring the safety and security of their families
without the Americans, who have shown little interest
in even stabilising basic services in the country."
The sources also said US military and intelligence
agencies are following a strategy of maintaining a
tight lid on information provided by members of the
ousted Saddam Hussein regime while planting selected
"leaks" in the media that are often misleading.
The experts say that such "leaks," carried mostly by
American and British media, aim at offering
justifications for failures and shortcomings of the
US-led occupying forces in Iraq and strengthening the
"evil" image of the toppled regime.
The experts do not dispute that the Saddam regime as
one of the worst oppressive in the world. If anything,
they have in their possession evidence that would put
the American intelligence findings to shame in
exposing the excesses of Saddam, his family members
and his regime.
Arab intelligence agencies have moved in with ease
into post-Saddam Iraq to strengthen their presence and
networks in the country. Some of them do share their
findings with American and Western counterparts in a
reciprocal arrangement. But in the case of Iraq, no
such co-operation has been forthcoming from the
Americans, they say.
They are convinced that the US has not gained any clue
to establishing that Saddam had a large cache of
weapons of mass destruction.
The US forces have captured 35 of 55 "most wanted"
figures of the ousted regime, but none of them has
yielded any information that would strengthen the
American and British justification for the war --
Saddam's alleged arsenal of unconventional weapons.

Saturday, May 31, 2003

US seeks India-Israel axis

THE BUSH administration is keen on building a
triangular "strategic" relationship with India and
Israel since Washington has found these two countries
as the most reliable allies in the ongoing war against
terror, diplomatic sources and analysts say.
India joining such a relationship would not be taken
lightly by the Arab and Muslim world, given that the
alliance would be deemed as designed to counter the
resurgence of Islam in the wake of the American
response to the Sept.11 attacks, the US-led invasion
and occupationof Iraq and Washington's support for
Israel and implicit endorsement of its occupation of
Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese territories.
Pakistan will definitely seize upon the "anti-Muslim"
nature of an American-Israeli-Indian alliance to lobby
its Arab and Muslim friends against Indian interests,
but the effect of such a campaign remains to be seen
since most of the Arab and Muslim countries could not
afford to step out of line with the Americans in the
post-Iraq war era.
At the same time, the sting of the Arab and Muslim
reaction to India getting involved in a US-centred
alliance, with Israel playing an equally if not more
important role, could be weakened if Washington is
successful in pushing for an Israeli-Palestinian peace
agreement that would also open the door for peace
between Israel and Syria.
The so-called neoconservatives -- most of them Jews
and known to be heavily pro-Israeli -- who are guiding
American foreign policy are the main force behind
Washington's drive to seal an alliance with Delhi.
Signs of a new warmth in US-Indian relationship have
emerged in recent months. In late May, Indian Prime
MInister AB Vajapyee's National Security Adviser
Brajesh Mishra attended a dinner hosted by the annual
convention of the American Jewish Committee (AJC). He
declared that the United States, India, and Israel
''have to jointly face the same ugly face of
modern-day terrorism."
''Such an alliance," he said, "would have the
political will and moral authority to take bold
decisions in extreme cases of terrorist provocation."
Emphasising the institutionalised democracies in the
US, Israel and India, Mishra said the three countries'
''vision of pluralism, tolerance and equal
opportunity..." would naturally lead to ''stronger
India-US relations and India-Israel relations."
Washington's interest in developing a strategic
alliance grouping India and israel has manifested
itself in several areas:
Washington has approved an Israeli sale of its
advanced Phalcon air-borne reconnaissance system to
India in a deal worth about $1billion and is poised to
approve another deal involving the most expensive sale
of Israel's Arrow anti-missile system developed
jointly with the US.
The Arrow missiles could counter incoming missile and
neutralise nuclear warheads and could be counted as
India's most effective defence against threats posed
by Pakistan's nuclear missiles.
The Phalcon deal was supposed to have been put on hold
until definite signs have emerged of peace between
India and Pakistan and its approval now, even before
India agreed to enter talks with Pakistan, is seen as
the neo-conservatives' desire to take a clear position
on Delhi's side, analysts say.
The newly established US-India Institute for Strategic
Policy will be the focal point in
American-Israeli-Indian military co-ordination.
India counts among one of the largest buyers of
Israeli military equipment. Its arms purchases from
Israel and military service contracts given to Israel
were said to be worth about $1.8 billion in 2002.
Washington has invited India to take part in
"peacekeeping" operations in post-war Iraq. However,
India, obviously mindful of the pitfall that it would
be seen as not only backing the American-British
invasion and occupation of Iraq but also becoming part
of the occupation force, has not committed itself to
the invitation.
Riding on the American invitation is the attraction of
lucrative sub-contracts in reconstruction of Iraq and
a share of trade with that American-controlled
country.
The Israeli angle to the triangular relationship is
expected to be given more shape when Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon visits India this year, by which
time the American Jewish Committee would have opened
an office in Delhi.
The Israeli interest in ties with India revolves
around what Israel sees as the reliability of a
democratic non-Muslim country in the Jewish fight
against Muslim militants. The US approach is based on
Washington's need to develop India as a strong ally in
the sub-continent against China before Delhi is drawn
into the emerging Chinese-Russian axis.
Israelis interests come first for the
neoconvervatives, who are believed to have been the
main force that nudged President George W Bush into
waging war against Iraq, and the most the campaign
focusing on India is orchestrated by hawks like
Undersecretary of Defence for Policy Douglas Feith.
Feith had been instrumental in setting up the
US-India Institute for Strategic Policy, which
includes, among others, the head of the
Washington-based Center for Security Policy, Frank
Gaffney, and a founder of the Jewish Institute for
National Security Affairs, Michael Ledeen. Both of
them are avowed opponents of any American military
relationship with Pakistan outside the immediate
context of Washington's need to have help from
Islambad until the situation in Afghanistan settles
down.

Sunday, May 25, 2003

Where the US went wrong

THE US went wrong from the word go when it gave more
weight to its military might than a pacifist approach
of political persuasion in post-war Iraq. Today, it
faces a deep quagmire unless it moves fast against
lost time to stabilise the Iraqis' most basic needs --
personal safety, electricity, water, health care, job
security and regular salaries.
This is the finding of international and regional
experts who are alarmed over the deteriorating
situation in Iraq, where the US military is getting
more aggressive every day in the face of mounting
resistance attacks.
The American military action freed the Iraqis from the
oppressive rule of Saddam Hussein but pushed them into
a much worse situation that the Saddam days in terms
of daily life. The US forces gave prime consideration
to securing oilfields and installations and ignored -
and thereby seen as having encouraged - widespread
looting, robberies rape and murder throughout the
country. In fact, accusasions that the invading force
was more interested Iraq's oil than the welfare of the
Iraqis were heard even on April 9, the day Baghdad
fell to the US force.
The American actions since then have convinced a
majority of Iraqis that the US was not their liberator
beyond the point of removing the Saddam regime to
serve American interests that have little to do with
caring for the people of Iraq or respecting their
rights.
In Baghdad and other Iraqi towns male members of
families keep watch with guns and take shifts to
sleep, fearing armed robbers. Without their guns they
feel naked, but the US forces insist that everyone
surrender their weapons; not many have met a US-set
deadline for giving up their guns.
It is indeed a festering sore. The US forces is not
only offering safety and protection to the people of
Iraq but is also seeking to deprive Iraqis of the
means to protect themselves.
Power and water supplies are erratic; cost of living
is shooting up and there is no regular pay, and many
families are worse off than the Saddam days when the
regime used to supply monthly rations.
If there was any inkling of an American inclination to
look at ways to address the situation, that is fast
disappearing with the US force's preoccupation dealing
with Iraqi resistance; and if the situation continues,
the vicious circle would only intensify and the US
"administration" of Iraq would prove to be
catastrophic for all.
The declared American drive to set up an interim Iraqi
committee to help govern the country has been a source
of consolation for many Iraqis who welcomed the
involvement of their own people in running the
country. But, the emerging undercurrents in the
intense jockeying for power based on ethnic
considerations and diverse ideologies have convinced
them that having an effective Iraqi say in Iraqi
affairs is not seen anywhere in the near future.
Telecommunications are almost non-existent; the sense
of normality offered by radio and television is
lacking in view of the frequent outages.
The Iraqi frustration is also fuelled by the focus
given to American corporates in reconstruction of
their country. They might not have adequate commercial
foundations and equipment to undertake the job, but
they are incensed by the feeling that Americans are
fleecing their country and their resources and keeping
out all others. Even at that, there is little to show
on the ground that any reconstruction worth the name
is under way.
A recent report prepared by Joost Hiltermann of the
International Crisis Group underlines the mistakes
that the American committed and are continuing to
commit in post-war Iraq.
One of the highlights of the report is the summary
disbandment of the Baathist Party overlooking the
three distinct kinds of Baathists -- diehard Saddam
loyalists, those who joined the party out of
expediency, and ideological followers.
According to the ICG, the vast majority of civil
servants, police, judges, engineers and others belong
to the second category and have the skills to make the
country run again, but they are being sidelines and
indeed taken to task for their past affiliation with
the party.
"By banning all of them without distinction," the US
rulers of Iraq have "ostracised a vital group - and
may even end up uniting opposition to the occupation
rather than alienating the Saddam loyalists," says the
report.
It calls on the US to "seriously reconsider this
order and return qualified senior managers to their
positions if they do not have a proven record of
corruption or abuse."
Disbanding the Iraqi military without offering its
personnel alternative means to make a living was
another major mistake of the Americans, according to
the ICG. As a result, tens of thousands of young men
were turned into the streets without employment,
leaving them the option of a life of crime or joining
resistance groups which give them something to do
rather than wander around in search of non-existent
jobs.
"What is puzzling is that so little advance
preparation appears to have been made for dealing with
the problems that have arisen in Baghdad," says
Hilterman. "Many if not most of them should have been
anticipated based on years of experience with
post-conflict transitions elsewhere.
"The Iraqis' faith in their new rulers is being
undermined by ad hoc decision making, lack of cultural
sensitivity and apparent neglect of the problems that
rile them most. Urgent and focused action is needed if
this discontent is not to be transformed into
widespread and active opposition in the coming
months," warns Hilterman.

Saturday, May 24, 2003

Twist of American justice

IN a strange twist of American justice, a federal
judge in New York has found Iraq partly responsible
for the Sept. 11 attacks and awarded over $100 million
to the families of two people who died in the aerial
assault against the World Trade Center towers.
However, and despite contradictions, the ruling could
be used by successive US administrations to keep Iraq
under indefinite pressure if the current process in
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq leads to a dilution of the
American grip on the country.
The verdict is expected to trigger hundreds of claims
to be filed with US lawcourts claiming compensation
from Iraq for victims of the attacks, and that would
essentially mean that the Bush administration caught
in its own trap of charges it made implicating Iraq
and Saddam Hussein as sources of international
terrorism with little substantiation.
The ruling was strange because the evidence cited by
lawyers for  the families of George Smith andTimothy
Soulas, two of the nearly 3,000 victims of the attacks
in New York and Washington, was based on public
statements made by senior US officials. These
officials included former CIA director James Woolsey
and from author Laurie Mylroie who have claimed that
Iraq "provided material support" to the Al Qaeda
network of Osama Bin Laden. Also cited was a statement
by US Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN where
he asserted that Iraq supported "Islamist
terrorism."
The lawyers conceded that the evidence "barely"
established a link
between Al Qaeda and Iraq was enough for a "reasonable
jury," according to a report in the USA Today
newspaper.
The whole episode has an air of superficiality when
seen against the track record of the American
judiciary.
Despite the public claims made by American officials,
no tangible evidence has been found to establish a
link between Al Qaeda and Iraq except unsubstatiated
reports that a senior Iraqi intelligence official had
met with the purported leader of the Sept.11 assault
team, Mohammed Atta, in Eastern Europe in April 2001,
and a claim that was later found to be hollow by an
Iraqi defector that Osama Bin Laden had visited
Baghdad in 1998.
Documents said to have been found in the office of the
Iraqi intelligence ministry in post-war Baghdad
indicated that an unidentified Al Qaeda operative had
visited the Iraqi capital in early 1998, but that
could be hardly be evidence -- in any sense of the
word in a court of law -- that Saddam Hussein had any
role in the attacks in the US that occurred more than
three years later.
Indeed, intelligence findings deliberately suppressed
by the American and British government say that there
could not have been any link between Saddam and Bin
Laden if only because of their ideological
differences.
Bin Laden, who followed a puritanical form of Islam,
has never concealed his distaste for Saddam, whom he
had accused of using the faith for political purposes
and consolidate his grip on power. Bin Laden also
publicly blamed Saddam for having given the Americans
a pretext to military intervene in the Gulf and stay
on in the region by invading Kuwait in 1991.
And, indeed, if Al Qaedd is behind the post-war
bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, then one could
bet that they were carried out not because of any
sense for revenge for Saddam's ouster but in
retaliation for the overall American approach to the
Middle East and what many perceive as American
hostility towards Islam.
However, that does not change the reality that the
ruling has been made by a US court implicating Iraq in
the attacks and Iraq is hardly in a position to defend
itself.
The ruling also found Afghanistan's ousted Taliban
regime partly responsible for the attacks -- again a
case where no defence could be put up.
The verdict has to be seen against the backdrop of a
heavy dose of what could be nothing but American spin
that has led to more than half of Americans believing
that Saddam was behind the Sept.11 attacks as
indicated in opinion polls prior to the US war that
toppled him in April this year.
While the American judicial system could not accused
of being politically influenced, the court ruling
strengthens the argument that George W Bush is bent
upon somehow proving to American voters ahead of 2004
elections that he was right in invading Iraq and
toppling Saddam. The argument gathers more
credibility, given that the US occupiers of Iraq have
yet to produce any evidence that Saddam possessed
weapons of mass destruction -- the prime reason that
Bush cited for his decision to wage war against Iraq
and oust the Saddam regime from power.
How are the families which have been awarded the claim
going to collect?
That may yet prove to be another landmark turning.
Bush has at his disposal billions of dollars in frozen
Iraqi assets transferred to him, but the funds are
earmarked for Iraq's reconstruction. The US president
could hardly be expected to permit those funds to be
used to settle the claims, particularly that hundreds
of similar lawsuits are being prepared and sent to US
lawcourts.
Ironically, Bush would have gladly used the funds to
settle the claims had the verdict came before he
launched the war and ousted Saddam. Now he and his
people could be expected to fight tooth and nail
against any attempt to touch the booty assigned to
rebuild Iraq as a matter of American priority.
Could the US-endorsed regime that would take power in
Iraq be expected to be held responsible for settling
the claim?
Again the answer could not but be no. Washington has a
vested interest in protecting the regime it would
install in post-war Iraq and it is hardly likely that
Bush would allow it to be exposed to a torrent of
claims that could run into tens of billions of
dollars.
If anything, the US is pressing other countries to
write off even the legitimate debts that Iraq incurred
during the Saddam regime's existence in power. Against
that backdrop, the question could all but be ruled out
whether Washington would care much for Sept.11
compensation since it should know well that Saddam
could not have had any role in the attacks.
Indeed, the Bush administration has left a vulnerable
flank in its haste to implicate Iraq in the attacks
when it set up a separate fund for compensation for
Sept.11 attacks and allowed recipients to file claims
against Al Qaeda as well as Iraq.
One of the obvious explanations of the scenario after
the court verdict is that the US administration could
use the Sept.11-linked claims on Iraq as potential
leverage and pressure on the country for decades,
given that at some point Washington would have to
loosen its military grip on Iraqis.

Wednesday, May 21, 2003

Verdict Iraq and 9/11

PV Vivekanand

IN a strange twist of American justice, a federal judge in New York has found Iraq partly responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks and awarded over $100 million to the families of two people who died in the aerial assault against the World Trade Center towers.
However, and despite contradictions, the ruling could be used by successive US administrations to keep Iraq under indefinite pressure if the current process in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq leads to a dilution of the American grip on the country.
The verdict is expected to trigger hundreds of claims to be filed with US lawcourts claiming compensation from Iraq for victims of the attacks, and that would essentially mean that the Bush administration caught in its own trap of charges it made implicating Iraq and Saddam Hussein as sources of international terrorism with little substantiation.
The ruling was strange because the evidence cited by lawyers for  the families of George Smith andTimothy Soulas, two of the nearly 3,000 victims of the attacks in New York and Washington, was based on public statements made by senior US officials. These officials included former CIA director James Woolsey and from author Laurie Mylroie who have claimed that Iraq "provided material support" to the Al Qaeda network of Osama Bin Laden. Also cited was a statement by US Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN where he asserted that Iraq supported "Islamist terrorism."
The lawyers conceded that the evidence "barely" established a link
between Al Qaeda and Iraq was enough for a "reasonable jury," according to a report in the USA Today newspaper.
The whole episode has an air of superficiality when seen against the track record of the American judiciary.
Despite the public claims made by American officials, no tangible evidence has been found to establish a link between Al Qaeda and Iraq except unsubstatiated reports that a senior Iraqi intelligence official had met with the purported leader of the Sept.11 assault team, Mohammed Atta, in Eastern Europe in April 2001, and a claim that was later found to be hollow by an Iraqi defector that Osama Bin Laden had visited Baghdad in 1998.
Documents said to have been found in the office of the Iraqi intelligence ministry in post-war Baghdad indicated that an unidentified Al Qaeda operative had visited the Iraqi capital in early 1998, but that could be hardly be evidence -- in any sense of the word in a court of law -- that Saddam Hussein had any role in the attacks in the US that occurred more than three years later.
Indeed, intelligence findings deliberately suppressed by the American and British government say that there could not have been any link between Saddam and Bin Laden if only because of their ideological differences.
Bin Laden, who followed a puritanical form of Islam, has never concealed his distaste for Saddam, whom he had accused of using the faith for political purposes and consolidate his grip on power. Bin Laden also publicly blamed Saddam for having given the Americans a pretext to military intervene in the Gulf and stay on in the region by invading Kuwait in 1991.
And, indeed, if Al Qaedd is behind the post-war bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, then one could bet that they were carried out not because of any sense for revenge for Saddam's ouster but in retaliation for the overall American approach to the Middle East and what many perceive as American hostility towards Islam.
However, that does not change the reality that the ruling has been made by a US court implicating Iraq in the attacks and Iraq is hardly in a position to defend itself.
The ruling also found Afghanistan's ousted Taliban regime partly responsible for the attacks -- again a case where no defence could be put up.
The verdict has to be seen against the backdrop of a heavy dose of what could be nothing but American spin that has led to more than half of Americans believing that Saddam was behind the Sept.11 attacks as indicated in opinion polls prior to the US war that toppled him in April this year.
While the American judicial system could not accused of being politically influenced, the court ruling strengthens the argument that George W Bush is bent upon somehow proving to American voters ahead of 2004 elections that he was right in invading Iraq and toppling Saddam. The argument gathers more credibility, given that the US occupiers of Iraq have yet to produce any evidence that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction -- the prime reason that Bush cited for his decision to wage war against Iraq and oust the Saddam regime from power.
How are the families which have been awarded the claim going to collect?
That may yet prove to be another landmark turning.
Bush has at his disposal billions of dollars in frozen Iraqi assets transferred to him, but the funds are earmarked for Iraq's reconstruction. The US president could hardly be expected to permit those funds to be used to settle the claims, particularly that hundreds of similar lawsuits are being prepared and sent to US lawcourts.
Ironically, Bush would have gladly used the funds to settle the claims had the verdict came before he launched the war and ousted Saddam. Now he and his people could be expected to fight tooth and nail against any attempt to touch the booty assigned to rebuild Iraq as a matter of American priority.
Could the US-endorsed regime that would take power in Iraq be expected to be held responsible for settling the claim?
Again the answer could not but be no. Washington has a vested interest in protecting the regime it would install in post-war Iraq and it is hardly likely that Bush would allow it to be exposed to a torrent of claims that could run into tens of billions of dollars.
If anything, the US is pressing other countries to write off even the legitimate debts that Iraq incurred during the Saddam regime's existence in power. Against that backdrop, the question could all but be ruled out whether Washington would care much for Sept.11 compensation since it should know well that Saddam could not have had any role in the attacks.
Indeed, the Bush administration has left a vulnerable flank in its haste to implicate Iraq in the attacks when it set up a separate fund for compensation for Sept.11 attacks and allowed recipients to file claims against Al Qaeda as well as Iraq.
One of the obvious explanations of the scenario after the court verdict is that the US administration could use the Sept.11-linked claims on Iraq as potential leverage and pressure on the country for decades, given that at some point Washington would have to loosen its military grip on Iraqis.

Friday, May 02, 2003

War in making for long

PV Vivekanand

THE BEANS are out now. It has now been made clear that the Bush administration took the decision to invade Iraq on Sept.17, 2001, six days after the aerial assaults in New York and Washington offered the perfect opportunity to wage war against America's enemies and bag the biggest oil price of all - Iraq. The only question that remained was the timing of the war and the build-up to justifying military action.
On Sept.17, 2001, President George Bush signed a top- secret directive to the Pentagon to
begin planning military options for an invasion of Iraq, according to highly reliable sources in Washington.
The directive was signed at a meeting attended by hawks like Defence Secretary Ronald Rumseld and National Security Advisor Condaleeza Rice. Secretary of State Colin Powell had reservations about the move and he was bluntly told that he was free to quit the administration if he did not like the decision, said the sources. Obviously, Powell opted to stay on and became part of the plot as anyone else involved.
Since then, it was a question of justifying the planned invasion and building up the scenario to launch the invasion of Iraq and a group of pro-Israeli hawks were more than glad to oblige by fabricating evidence and drumming up Israeli-inspired political influence in Congress and intellgence services to do the groundwork of the war.
However, Afghanistan figured in between; military experts say that the war that the US waged against Afghanistan beginning in October 2001 was as much as a "dress rehearsal" for the invasion of Iraq as military action aimed at destroying Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda and its Taliban backers. Never mind that not a single hijacker on Sept.11 came from Afghanistan.
Part of that build-up to war against Iraq was establishing reasons. And that entailed dramatic reversals of Washington's firm assertions that Saddam Hussein was a caged lion that could be manipulated at will and was kept "contained" since the 1991 war that ousted Iraq from Kuwait.
Bush administration officials had declared before Sept.11, 2001 that Saddam Hussein was no longer a threat to anyone - the international community, the Middle East and the Gulf states.
After all, it was then an American need to convince the world that Washington's stragey of "containing" both Iraq and Iran were working.
In February 2001, Powell said in Cairo: "He (Saddam Hussein) has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbours."
In May 2001, Powell reiterated that Saddam had not been able to "build his military back up or to develop weapons of mass destruction" for "the last 10 years." Washington's firm policy, he claimed, had been successful in keeping the Iraqi leader "in a box."
In June 2001, Rice said iraq had been rendered weak, divided and militarily defenceless, with Saddam deprived of control the northern part ofthe country.
"We are able to keep his arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt," she said.
How come the situation changed so dramatically in less than a few months, with the same Powell and Rice, as well as Bush himself and others in Washington, declaring that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction and posed a threat not only to his neighbours but also to the region and the international community, including mainland US?
In November 2001, more than a month into the war, the writing was clear on the wall that the US was going to invade Iraq, when Bush included Iraq in his "war against terror" by saying that any country which had weapons of mass destruction to "terrify its neighbours" was a legitimate target.
The broader plot came to the fore a few months later, when Bush described iraq, iran and North Korea as the "axis of evil."
The course of events since a few hours after the Sept.11 attack has been brought out by investigations, interviews and research that went into making a British television documentary -- Breaking the Silence. It makes clear that the Bush administration as well as the British government of Tony Blair collaborated and created falsehoods and reasons justifying the invasion of iraq and hoodwinking the American public and distracting the media from exposing the real reason for the military action.
In secret meetings that were never reported in the mainstream media, US officials had indeed referred to the real reasons, starting with Rumsfeld himself.
According to John Pilger, who made the documentary, the idea that the Sept.11 attacks could be turned into a reason for attacking Iraq came from Rumsfeld.
Pilger writes in London's Mirror newspaper:
"At 2.40pm on September 11, according to confidential notes taken by his aides, Donald Rumsfeld... said he wanted to 'hit' Iraq  — even though not a shred of evidence existed that Saddam Hussein had anything to do with the attacks on New York and Washington. 'Go massive,' the notes quote Rumsfeld as saying. 'Sweep it all up. Things related and not.'
"Iraq was given a brief reprieve when it was decided instead to attack Afghanistan," writes Pilger. "This was the 'softest option' and easiest to explain to the American people - even though not a single September 11 hijacker came from Afghanistan. In the meantime, securing the 'big prize' Iraq, became an obsession in both Washington and London."
Pilger also says that in April last year Condoleezza Rice said in a secret meeting in April last year that the the Sept.11 attacks were an "enormous opportunity" and said America "must move to take advantage of these new opportunities."
Indeed, Iraq, with 11 per cent of the world's oil known oil reserves and with immense potential to challenge Israel - the US' strategic partner in the Middle East -- was on top of all those "new opportunities."
How did Blair enter the picture?
It is almost certain that Blair was told of the American resolve to invade Iraq in a few weeks after the decision was made in Washington, and the British prime minister plunged into campaigning for war immediately there after.
At times Blair appeared to be more determined that Bush himself to invade Iraq and topple Saddam. That should explain the series of British government efforts, including proved falsification of intelligence documents and "sexing up" of a dossier on Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction, that followed.
In September, Blair told his parliament that intelligence documents showed that Iraq's "weapons
of mass destruction programme is active, detailed and growing.
"The policy of containment is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is not shut down. It is up and running now."
It has now been established beyond any reasonable doubt that Saddam did not have any weapons of mass destruction and former chief UN weapon expert Hans Blix has publicly stated that the ousted Iraqi leader could have destroyed whatever he had in 1991 itself.
The Iraq Survey Group, an Anglo-American team of 1,400 scientists, military and intelligence experts, which searched through US-occupied Iraq since June has failed to uncover any evidence of weapons of mass destruction. Subsequently, it was not surprising that the US and UK decided to delay indefinitely the publication of the team's report, which was supposed to have been released in mid-September.
American efforts to link Saddam with Al Qaeda also failed miserably, and it was ironic that Rumsfeld said in September 2003 that he had never said that the Iraqi leader had ties with Osama Bin Laden. In reality, Bush himself and all his aides, including Rumsfeld, had clearly stated or implied that Saddam was in collusion with Bin Laden in the Sept.11 attacks and further plans for similar attacks. It was those assertions and implied affirmations that led more than two-thirds of Americans to believe -- as pre-war opinion polls showed -- that Saddam was the mastermind of the Sept.11 attacks.
In mid-September 2003, Rumsfeld was asked at a press encounter why he thought most Americans still believed Saddam Hussein was behind the attacks of Sept.11, he replied: "I've
not seen any indication that would lead me to believe I could say that."
In the Breaking the Silence documentary, Ray McGovern, a former senior CIA officer and personal friend of George Bush senior, the president's father, says on record that a group of "crazies" were behind the plot to invade Iraq.
"They were referred to in the circles in which I moved when I was briefing at the
top policy levels as 'the crazies'," he says.
"The crazies," says McGovern citing "plenty of documented evidence," were planning the (invasion of iraq) for a long time and that 9/11 accelerated their plan. (The weapons of mass
destruction issue) was all contrived, so was the connection of Iraq with al Qaeda. It was all PR... Josef Goebbels had this dictum: If you say something often enough, the people will believe it."
The "crazies" – or "neoconseratives" —  as it has turned out since theen, could be seen to include Vice-President Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld, John Bolton, under-secretary of state, Douglas Feith, under-secretary of defence, Paul Wolfowitz, a deputy to Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, former chairman and current member of the Defence Advisory Board, and I. Lewis Libby, Cheney's chief of staff, and Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security adviser.
Collaborating with the "neocons" from outside the administration are former CIA chief James Woolsey and Kenneth Adelman, a former official in the Ford and Reagan administrations.
L Paul Bremer, the current head of the US occupation of Iraq, has come from the ranks of the "neocons."
Reports in the American media have said that the "neo-cons" had set up their own intelligence network -- taking in material provided by Israel's Mossad agency -- to build a case for military action against Iraq and often overlooking or ignoring CIA-gathered information that would not have suited their case for US occupation of Iraq.

Lockerbie verdict challenged

PV Vivekanand

THE world is awaiting anxiously to hear the prosecutors present their version of how two Libyans planned and executed a plan that resulted in a mid-air explosion on a Pan Am flight from London to New York 12 years ago at the hearings of the case beginning on May 3 at a former US Air Force base in the Netherlands by Scottish judges under Scottish law.
Equally interesting will be how the defence goes about picking holes in every point made by the prosecution, if pre-hearing reports and results if extensive research conducted by the US television network CBS as well as newpapers.
The crash, which took place over the Scottish town of Lockerbie on the night of Dec.21-22, 1988, killed 270 people - 259 of them aboard the plane and 11 others on the ground when the Boeing crashed down on them.
But by the time the case gets even before the half way mark, more questions are likely to be raised than answered at the trial, where a Pandora's box is expected to be opened once it gets into the core of the affair.
Most important of all, the prosecution case is believed to be weak and its arguments have already been found lacking in substantiating evidence before the case went to court.
Particularly of importance here is that under Scottish law the charge of murder is tough to prove and Scottish judges are known to be proud of their independence.
The charge sheet against the two — Abdelbasset Ali Mohammed Al Megrahi and Al Lameen Khalifa Fhima _ says that Megrahi prepared a suitcase containing a bomb rigged into a Toshiba radio cassette player, and Fhima, who worked for the Libyan Arab Airlines, used planted that suitcase on an Air Malta plane to Frankfurt, Germany.
In Frankfurt the unaccompanied suitcase was loaded on to a Pan Am flight to London. At Heathrow, it was finally transferred to the New York-bound Pan Am 747 which exploded in mid-air half an hour after take-off at a hight of 31,000 feet.
The prosecution is expected to argue that the bombing was in relatiation for a 1985 April US air attack on the Libyan cities of Benghazi and Tripoli, which killed up to five people, including the adopted daughter of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi.
That air raid, which fitted into a pattern of US-Libyan confrontations, was ordered by the then president Ronald Reagan to punish Libya for its alleged role in the bombing of a disco in Berlin frequented by US Marines.
But the alleged Libyan connection to the blast is only one of the many theories that were raised at the very outset of investigations into the crash. These theories varyingly pointed the accusing fingers at Iran, Syria, Libya, the Lebanese drug underworld, and even the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Every theory appeared to be as strong as any, and there is a widely-held argument in the Middle East was Libya is the scapegoat in the case and the notorious Israeli secret service, Mossad, helped fabricate the case against Tripoli.
The burden of proving the case against Libya beyond any reasonable doubt rests solely with the prosecution. By definition, that helps the the defence because all it has to do is to pick convincing holes in the prosecution case. And that should be relatively easy, given the abundance of theories and red herrings in the case.
The defence strategy, as one of the lawyers for the Libyan suspects hinted during a pre-trial hearing in court last week, is expected to be based on laying out a well-built case where the accusing fingers point in several directions. The defence will seek to prove that several other parties had as good motives and opportunity (supported by circumstantial evidence) as Libya to carry out the bombing.
The key piece of evidence expected to be presented in court in the Lockerbie case is a tiny piece of a timer that allegedly helped detonate explosives in the suitcase aboard Pan Am Flight 103. The timer was rigged into a Toshiba cassettee player and the fragement was found in part of the wreckage of the airliner in Lockerbie, the prosecution says.
That timer, according to the prosecutor, was manufactured and supplied to Libya by a small electronics company called MEBO based in Zurich, Switzerland.
That is the main pillar of the prosecution argument, but it could be shaken at it foundations in court because the company argues that similar timers were supplied to several parties, including the Stasi secret service of former East Germany.
If serious doubts are cast on the alleged link between the timer and Libya, then that pulls the rug from under the feet of the prosecution, according to European legal experts.
Major Owen Lewis, a former British army explosive expert and now an independent security consultant, said in an interview with the US television network CBS that he could not fathom how the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reached the conclusion that the fragment came from the MEBO timers supplied to Libya because of some fundamental differences in the construction of the devices bought by LIbya and those sold by MEBO to others.
The prosecution argument is expected to be weakened further by a challenge to the credibility, a record of misguided conclusions and lack of scientific qualifications of an FBI operative who "established" the alleged link between the timer and Libya.
Edwin Bollier, head of MEBO, told the same CBS programe "60 Minutes" that the fragment could have come from one of two timers he had sold to Stasi. He also reported the theft of blueprints for the timer from his office and affirms that whoever had those blueprints could have manufactured a similar timer.
The Stasi connection opens up another avenue. A Syrian-based group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), which was among the first suspects named by US authorities in the case but dropped eventually despite other circumstantial evidence, did have close links with the Stasi and could have obtained the MEBO timer from the East Germans.
Again, that is anticipated as another pillar of the defence argument.
The prosecution is expected to present evidence that clothes found in the wreckage and supposedly came from the suitcase that contained the explosives came from a shop in the Mediterrenean island of Malta and purchased by one of the two Libyan defendants.
Defendant Abdel Basset Al Megrahi, who was the head of security for Libyan Arab
airlines, was known for visiting Malta frequently. The second defendant, Al Lameen
Khalifa Fhima, worked for the Libyan airline at the airport in Malta.
The prosecution contends that the two were Libyan intelligence agents and prepared the bomb that exploded the Pan Am plane, and Megrahi bought the clothes found in the suitcase from Mary's Shop in Malta.
A major hole in that argument is expected to be made with the defence arguing that the shopkeeper could not positively identify the purchaser as Megrahi and the description he provided fitted another man, Mohammed Abu Talb, who was a PFLP-GC member.
A former Libyan intelligence is expected to be produced by the prosecution to testify that he saw al Megrahi and Fhima at the airport on that day of the explosion, and to claim that they put the suitcase containing the bomb aboard an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt. From Frankfurt the suitcase was put aboard the ill-fated airliner.
But the ex-agent's testimony could be challenged on grounds that he has a vested interest in lying because is living under a witness protection programme in the US and stands to be rewarded by upto $4 million from the US government.
In strict legal terms, the ex-agent's testimony needs to be corraborated by another witness and that is believed, at this point, to be missing in the prosecution presentation.
Down the line, the prosecution has to prove that the circumstances were also ideal for the accused to put aboard the Air Malta flight the suitcase containing the explosives as unaccompanied baggage.
Air Malta has categorically rejected the possibility of an unaccompanied baggage being aboard the concerned flight to Frankfurt and affirmed that all procedures were strictly followed and the suitcase was not aboard that flight.
A weekly planner is said to contain a phrase allegedly written by Fhima one week before the crash: "Get the taggs from Air Malta." (This has been explained as related to Fhima's routine work, which included getting Libyan Airlines tags printed in Malta and that the reference to Air Malta tag was linked to competitive pricing. There are also other notations in the same weekly planner which refers to an unidentified printer).
The prosecution argues that Fhima used one of these tags to route the suitcase with the bomb from Malta via Frankfurt and London to New York.
But that argument is countered by Air Malta, which points out that if Fhima, with the help of his Libyan Airline security pass, had substituted the suitcase for one belonging to a passenger on the flight, they would have had a claim for a lost bag when the passengers reached
Frankfurt. But no such claim was made, says the airline, adding that every one of the 39 passengers aboard the flight were individually interviewed and they confirmed that there was nothing amiss.
In essence, it has been generally established that there was an unaccounted piece of baggage at Frankfurt that was could have eventually found its way to the Pan Am flight. But there is no concrete evidence that the baggage came from Air Malta - another major dent in the prosecution case.
"If it cannot be stablished that the bomb that blew up Pan Am 103 started in Malta, then the evidence is worthless," Robert Black, who heads the law department at Edinburgh University and who devised the plan to have the two suspects tried under Scottish law in the Netherlands, told "60 Minutes."
According to Black, the Scottish authorities could have "allowed themselves to be bounced into the charges against the two named Libyans, who may very well have been Libyan Intelligence agents, known to the intelligence services of Britain and the United States. It became tempting to bring closure to the Lockerbie incident by bringing charges against them."
The weakness of the prosecution case was seen as having prompted the prosecutors to demand postponement of the beginning of the hearings. The court allowed two deferments, but turned down a third prosecution request last week.
The defence is expected to zero in on suspicions that the PFLP was behind the bombings. Defece lawyers will cite the repeated instances where the Syrian-based group's name cropped up during the investigations.
Initial reports citing US intelligence sources said the PFLP-GC could have carried out the bombing on behalf of Iran, which seeking revenge for the shooting down of an Iranian plane with 290 passengers aboard by an American warship, USS Vinceness, in the Gulf at the height of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.
PFLP-GC leader Ahmed Jibril, a Syrian colonel, was named as having personally undertaken the alleged "contract" to bomb an American passenger plane in Europe several months before the actual attack. Reports spoke of warnings emanating from Finland and several other European countries, months before the Pan Am explosion, of an impending attack of similar nature.
Figuring high in the reports was a German police raid of a Frankfurt apartment where several men said to have been PFLP-GC members were staying. The raid yielded several weapons, and, most significantly, a Toshiba radio cassette player rigged with a bomb similar to the one that blasted Flight 103 over Lockerbie.
The Palestinians detained during the raid were freed shortly thereafter.
The presence in Malta of the PFLP—GC'S Abu Talb, who is now serving term in Sweden on unrelated charges, at the time of the purchase of the clothes used to wrap the Pan Am bomb and the shopkeeper's description of Abu Talb as the buyer is seen as another strong nail in the prosecution's case.
If there was enough ground to warrant an investigation whether PFLP-GC — and by implication Syria and Iran — were involved in the blast, why did the US move away from that direction?
Explanations provided by Western media include a theory that the US wanted to "neutralise" Iran in the crisis triggered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and "secure Syrian support" for the US-led coalition against Iraq. It meant excluding the two countries from the investigations.
Other theories raised in connection with the bombing involved a covert CIA operation involving druglords in Lebanon whose help the US wanted in order to secure the release of American hostages in Lebanon. This involved allowing drugs to allowed aboard US-bound airplanes without inspection — something the CIA could do with its connections in Europe, says one theory, which is partially supported by the findings of an investigation carried by a private agency hired by Pan Am.
According to the theory, the CIA believed the suspect suitcase contained drugs and allowed its passage through Frankfurt onto the Pan Am flight. Somewhere along the line, somone switched the suitcase with one containing the bomb. It could have been the PFLP-GC or another group with links to the druglords and this group might have been seeking to eliminate the CIA station chief in Beirut, Charles McKee, who was aboard the same flight.
Closely linked to this theory is another which says that CIA agents knew that the suitcase contained explosives and that McKee was the target but they allowed the blast to take place before the CIA station chief was headed for home with a complaint against them that could have led not only to their dismissal from service but prosecution in the US.
"The inference was obvious - Pan Am 103 was sacrificed by the intelligence community to get rid of Major McKee," according to a detailed report carried by the British Guardian newspaper after extensive investigations.
A local farmer from Lockerbie has reported finding a suitcase containing cellophane packets containing white powder among the debris in his fields, but the suitcase was taken away and no explanation was given. It was also discovered that the name the farmer saw on the suitcase did not correspond with any of the names on the passenger list of the crashed plane.